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Backgrounds of Conflict

Ideas and Forms in World Politics

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by Kurt London



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To Reuben H. Markham
great American
indefatigable foe of tyranny

26.00

27.00

Rama Krishna.

Preface

When the idea of writing this book was conceived, the United Nations were still on the defensive. The issues at stake were beclouded and a better understanding of "what we are fighting for" was urgently needed. The revolutionary and ideological character of the Second World War was widely misunderstood and there were many who believed that a compromise could and should be worked out between the aggressors and the democracies.

Since then it has become evident that any compromise with the Axis powers would in reality lead to the defeat and ultimate destruction of democracy. But even after the unconditional surrender of the Axis nations has become a fact, Axis ideologies must be expected to linger among the peoples of these nations. The battle of the isms will not be halted by an armistice. At the same time, the effects of Nazi-Fascist propaganda and indoctrination will be felt in other countries inside and outside of Europe. A durable peace cannot be won until these convictions have been overcome. Walter Lippmann has warned, "Whatever our sympathies and opinions happen to be we must not pull the bedcovers over our heads, hoping that, if we do not hear too much about the ideological conflict, it will somehow subside."¹

Certainly if the philosophies and practices which led to the Second World War are to be successfully contested they must be understood. It is the purpose of this book to present some of the facts concerning the origins and development of these philosophies and practices in order to provide a basis for sound diagnosis and prevention. For, if peace is to be preserved, intellectual preparedness is as important as military preparedness.

It is not sufficient merely to examine the machinery of governments. An understanding of the broad outlines of the political philosophies which inspire their laws and determine their types of administration is essential. The forces which shape the educational and cultural experiences of a people are as important to the world

¹ U. S. War Aims, Little, Brown and Company, Boston, 1944, p. 145.

as is their economic and political organization. Some acquaintance with historical backgrounds will help students to understand how we have come to such concepts as "total" and "global" in the realm of world politics. It is appropriate that such concepts should be made the subject of study in college courses in the fields of political and social sciences, history, and education.

No attempt is made to present novel theories or startling speculations. This book is designed rather to give the reader a grasp of basic ideas dominant in world politics so that he may be able better to judge which convictions should prevail.

At the beginning of the discussion the purpose has been to clarify political terms and concepts. A major portion of the book is devoted to a survey of the anti-democratic systems of government, particularly to Nazi Germany, the most dangerous foe of democracy. Considerable space is also devoted to Soviet Russia, democracy's ally in the struggle against Hitlerism. While the Soviet Union is totalitarian, when considered in terms of objective political analysis, its aspects and goals differ widely from those of Nazi-Fascist totalitarianism. The attention given to Russia is justified by the fact that the peace of the world is likely to depend upon collaboration between the Soviets and the Western democracies. Such collaboration will be rendered less difficult if the peculiarities of Soviet Marxism are made plain. France has been included in the discussion because her tragedy provides an object lesson for citizens of all democracies. Time alone will tell whether France herself has learned this lesson but since she is expected to play an important part in the preservation of Western civilization, an appraisal of Vichy and its antecedents must be realistic rather than romantic.

The parts on Great Britain and America are intentionally brief, designed mainly to illustrate some important aspects of democratic theory and practice in order to contrast them with totalitarian ideologies. It has been the author's purpose to suggest the implications of these systems for those who plan to maintain the peace and to provide the basis for an "intellectual defense" of the principles of democracy.

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K. L.

WASHINGTON, D. C.

June, 1945

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
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Backgrounds of Conflict



Introduction

THE FAILURE OF 1918

Soon after the guns of the First World War were silenced, it appeared that there was no real agreement among people as to what the war had been about, and that there was even less agreement upon solutions to problems presented by the peace. There seemed to be no realization that these problems might be new and that their solution might entail novel measures.

Even now it is not certain what kind of a war that first war was. Doubtless many men had fought for high ideals and had wanted desperately to make the world safe for democracy, to defend the rights of small nations, and to frame a lasting peace. But the statesmen charged with liquidating the struggle at the Paris Peace Conference seemed to reject these ideals in their preoccupation with economic and political advantages or the extension of their countries' spheres of interest.

There was, indeed, a heroic effort to establish a League of Nations to replace the "international anarchy," but this proved to be the work of a visionary few. The "realists" placed no faith in it. And behind its beautiful facade, they rebuilt their world along the only lines they knew and were guided by the principles of selfish individualism and economic nationalism that they had been taught to revere. Even the United States soon washed its hands of the whole affair, discarded President Wilson's beautifully phrased maxims, disowned his vision of a League, and settled down alone in a vain effort to recover economic normalcy and collect the war debts. In retrospect, the conflict began to look more and more like any other test of strength between competing empires.

Viewed in this light the war appeared doubly tragic, for the very advantages which the warring powers had sought to gain had been largely consumed during the four long years of bloodshed and destruction. The legacy of the struggle, even for the victors, was unemployment, inflation, industrial dislocation, contracted markets, depression, and colonial unrest. But no one knew this then. At least

no one anticipated these disasters with any effective remedy. Instead, the nations groped blindly for a return to conditions that were past, and they clung to ideals and usages that were obsolescent.

Herein lay the tragedy of the years of peace. It was assumed that the old order would ultimately return as it had been, that democracy, individualism, capitalism, and peace remained the ideals of respectable men and that most men were respectable. Consequently, social unrest and international aggression here and there were viewed complacently as tempests in isolated teapots. The revolution in Russia, the Fascist march in Italy, and the rise of the Nazis in Germany did not disturb people in the democracies from their lethargy. Japan's aggression in China was protested only weakly. Italy's invasion of Ethiopia was opposed only half-heartedly. The Spanish Civil War was allowed to degenerate into a practice session for Axis armies. Nothing was done to save Austria. And Czechoslovakia was sacrificed.

Until it was too late, most people in western Europe and the United States regarded these events as adjustments within the framework of existing society, regrettably violent, but necessary, and of little concern to the rest of the world. They failed to apprehend the pervasiveness and revolutionary character of the forces responsible. The cause of this unrest and aggression was adjudged to be economic distress, and the palliative was conceived to be stop-gap measures to mitigate the worst suffering until a general prosperity would somehow gradually return. Meanwhile, unfortunately, the wrath of the dispossessed was directed not only at the evils of liberal society—at selfish individualism and political irresponsibility—but at the whole fabric of that society itself—against the very ideas of democracy, liberty, individualism, and capitalism without qualification.

The First World War had loosed strong forces that would surely have transformed this society, but the peace had not directed them into paths that were constructive or socially useful. They became revolutionary and destructive and made a second war inevitable.

IMPERIALIST AND IDEOLOGICAL WARS

Imperialistic wars, like dynastic struggles, are usually limited wars. They are fought for colonies or markets, industrial supremacy or trade monopoly, added territory or prestige. They do not, as a rule, threaten the conquered nation's domestic regime nor destroy its economy. The defeated nation may be temporarily eclipsed, suffering a loss of wealth and prestige, but it need not lose its right to control its own affairs. This kind of war is possible when the combatant powers are in fundamental agreement upon the desirability of maintaining existing institutions. As long as governments are led by men with similar backgrounds and ideas, similar economic interests and political beliefs, wars are seldom pressed to a point where they involve revolutionary changes in society. The colonial and mercantilist wars of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, for instance, left the governments and societies of the combatants almost completely untouched. But this could not be said of the religious wars which preceded them, or of the French revolutionary wars which followed. These wars were fought for more than economic or political advantage. They were fought over ideas, over a complete way of life.

The insertion of this ideological factor into warfare removes the limitations which characterize imperialist wars. Superimposed upon the economic and political aims of the belligerents is the effort to force a series of beliefs upon the enemy and to change fundamentally his way of thinking and living. No mere indemnity, trade monopoly, or cession of territory will satisfy the aggressor. He proceeds with militant missionary zeal to convert his victims by indoctrination or brute force. The consequences are basically revolutionary, for the purpose of the war is not to weaken the enemy but to transform him.

It was indicated above that the conflict of 1914 and the peace which followed were essentially imperialist in nature. They climaxed an era of political and economic imperialism. There were indeed deep-seated ideological differences separating the combatants, but they were ill-defined. The basic disagreements between the Germans and their enemies were neither so large nor so apparent as they appeared in 1939. The aims of the Allies were more

frankly territorial and expansionist then than now. Consequently, the ideals for which many men fought were overshadowed in the end by more sordid economic motives. In the struggle which began in 1939, however, there were fewer basic agreements between the belligerents than before. There were economic aims and ambitions to be sure, but what seemed more important even than these was the fact that victory for one side would result in the overthrow of the social, political, and cultural institutions of the defeated nations, and that the victor's ideology would be imposed upon the vanquished.

Such ideological conflicts are not novel phenomena. The Mohammedan wars of conquest, the Crusades, European religious wars, the French revolutionary wars, and even the American Civil War were all conflicts of this sort. Economic and political motives were present in each case, to be sure, but the addition of an "idea"—whether religious, political, or humanitarian—transformed what might have been limited wars into struggles of exceptional violence and intensity. The resistance of the defenders and the fury of the attackers was fanatical; for the aggressors had a cause to advance, and the implications of defeat for the victims were overwhelming, affecting each individual in his way of life. In this respect an ideological war must be a "total" war.

Not only are such wars unusually violent, but they more readily overstep the bounds of geographical limitation. It is hard to imprison an idea, like a business, within a political boundary. And in this day of rapid and simple communication, when ideas fly along electric wires or through the air like magic and when distance has been shrunk to insignificance, the localization of an idea has become impossible, and the localization of an ideological war very unlikely. Partly for this reason, the present struggle has become global as well as total.

Ideological aggression is based upon the belief that a particular nation or religion or political creed is superior to all others. The adherents of the creed form a movement which, upon reaching power in its own state, readily destroys existing laws and institutions, permitting only those to remain which do not clash with the new ideology. The mass of the people is then indoctrinated with the basic concepts of the movement and enlisted in the cause.

When the ideology is firmly established in the minds of the people and the institutions of a country, the movement is prepared to expand. Missionary or propagandist work abroad commences, to be followed by the sword, and to be concluded with political and cultural "coordination." Once this process of expansion has begun and the forces of opposition have risen against it, it is hard, nay dangerous, for either side to stop short of a conclusion that imposes one ideology or the other upon the conquered. Consequently, an ideological struggle today, when the nations of the world are neighbors, almost inevitably becomes world-wide.

In the twenty years following the First World War, the forces of dissatisfaction crystallized their beliefs into systems that may roughly be labeled "totalitarian." Totalitarianism does not wish to reform democracy but to destroy it, and the world will probably never rest easily until one system or the other has been victorious. The civilized world cannot remain half slave and half free.

Unfortunately too many people in the democracies did not realize this until too late. Through lack of information or understanding, they ignored the terrible appeal of the new ideology and its dynamic force. Very soon they were faced with the alternative of opposing it by arms or of being "coordinated" by it. Ultimately they united against it in war. They stated their principles in such declarations as the Atlantic Charter, and they developed a planned military economy, armies, and navies to defend those principles.

In view of the fact that this titanic struggle should determine whether democracy or totalitarianism is to survive, it is permissible that an attempt be made to clarify the ideological issues involved. These issues have more than a temporary significance, for they are closely involved in any postwar settlement. The military defeat of the Axis powers will not automatically eliminate their ideological convictions. The peace will not be won until these convictions are dealt with. And this can only be done if the origin and nature of the ideologies in conflict are understood and the conquered totalitarian peoples can be convinced of the lasting values in a democratic world order.

POLITICAL IDEOLOGIES

The word "ideology," exactly defined, means the science or study of the evolution of human ideas. But the term is often used today to indicate a sociopolitical philosophy that is based upon a particular set of social and moral theories which imply specific methods of thinking and acting. The fundamental concepts of a democratic ideology, for instance, are belief in the dignity of man and the worth of the individual, belief in free speech, free discussion, free worship, representative government, and belief in compromise and conciliation as rules of social and political conduct. These beliefs are the basis of a democratic society. Members of such a society are expected to respect these ideas and conform. The totalitarian ideologies of which we spoke above are much more absolute and intolerant, and their conception of society is decidedly different.

Italian fascism was based upon the idea of a total state, and it derived its spiritual substance from this purely political concept. The organized state was an object of worship whose grandeur was reflected upon the individuals who lived within its sovereignty and to whom each citizen happily surrendered his individuality—in theory. The state was the personification of society, and in Fascist thought, according to Alfredo Rocco, a philosopher endorsed by Mussolini, "Society is the end, the individuals the means, and its whole life consists in using individuals for its social ends. Individual rights are recognized only in so far as they are implied in the rights of the State." And Mussolini stated without qualification that "the State is the absolute, individuals and groups relative."

Such an ideology was anticipated in a way by Machiavelli, whose advocacy of political ruthlessness and indifference to morality was approved by Fascist thinkers. In 1936, after the formation of the Axis, "cultural agreements" between Germany and Italy imposed upon Fascism some features of Nazism.

Nazi ideology was based upon belief in the superiority of the Nordic race, the mystery of German blood and soil, and the leadership principle. It was practically a religion. Leaders took the place of priests, and the supreme leader became godlike. This ideology seems to be a reversion to primitive tribal concepts, but its presence

may be detected through much of Prussian history. The German spirit and race, according to Nazi philosophers, was the mystical basis for worship, whereas the Christian mystery of salvation and the precepts of meekness and charity were to be despised. Although the Nazis made some effort to establish Christ as a Nordic, they preferred to substitute for the teachings of the Bible a kind of pagan nature religion peopled with ancient Teutonic deities and spiced with romanticized militarism.

This vague and mystical race creed had very real political significance. In its name National Socialists claimed that race and not nationality was the basis of culture, and that Nordic culture is responsible for the growth of Western civilization after the Mycenaean age. Consequently political boundaries were meaningless to the true Nazi, and the German Reich extended wherever descendents of Germans lived or Nordic cultural influence could be traced.

The ideology of Marxism which, in modified form, determines the way of life in the Soviet Union is quite different from these Nazi and Fascist creeds. The Soviet state organism is not an end in itself, nor is it the object of any mystical reverence. On the contrary, Russian communism provides a very realistic approach to human institutions. It is completely economic and social, and it supposes happiness to be the result of material, rather than spiritual blessings. Its aim is, therefore, a prosperous and classless society with the greatest possible production of material, and subsequently cultural, benefits. The individual welfare is the end, and the state is the means to achieve the common goal.

Japanese Shintoism, in contrast to these European ideologies, merges political and religious creeds into one. Japan is a theocratic nation where national pride is equivalent to religious piety. The emperor does not symbolize deity, he is god himself. Shintoism is the product of many centuries, but it is the ideological basis for Japanese expansionist policies in the twentieth century. According to it, Japanese leaders are the executors of a divine will, which is to establish the eternal peace of the Orient (at least) under the emperor's banner. Within Japan itself, the cult of ancestors precludes any great change in the existing social and economic system, since what pleased the ancestral gods when they were alive can hardly

be criticized by their lowly descendents. And since state policies are accepted by the people as an expression of the divine will, they are carried out in a spirit of truly religious devotion.

Modern ideologies have become the sources of much revolutionary impetus. As political religions, they embody all the aggressiveness, fanaticism, and intolerance of rabid sectarianism. They came to power under conditions of social and economic stress, but they have developed a dynamic energy and a character that makes it possible to consider them as cultural phenomena in themselves.

In an age of materialism, there is a tendency to disregard the independent influence of an idea on the actions of individuals or social groups. But no one acquainted with the missionary zeal of early Christian, Mohammedan, or Buddhist proselytists, for example, can honestly deny the magical power of religion to guide men's actions and impel them to deeds of brutality and cruelty as well as heroism and self-sacrifice. Surely the early Crusaders, who mortgaged their worldly goods, left home and family, and faced hardship, privation, and death on foreign soil, were motivated by more than lust for economic gain. They were driven by the power of an idea preached by the church militant.

The devotees of a twentieth-century "New Order," although their motivation is less noble, are similarly influenced by their political faiths. They work and preach and fight to spread their political gospel and to revolutionize the world. They are ruthless and cruel; they have little respect for the lives or property of infidels or heretics. They reject the ideals of social and political democracy and seek to destroy them. They supplant the pseudo science of "race" for the spiritual values of humanitarianism thereby ignoring or revoking centuries of costly and laborious progress.

TOTALITARIANISM

Totalitarianism is a system of government under which every branch of life is organized and integrated with the rest, according to a complete ideological program. It implies the synthesis of all political, economic, social, intellectual, and religious functions of society into a harmonious (or monotonous) whole, in conformity with a specific set of principles. It allows no deviation from this dictated norm. Consequently, it is the antithesis of individualism.

Democracy, on the other hand, is based upon individualism and consists in a reconciliation of the interests of the free individual with those of the state. Moreover, it is based on reason and stems from the rationalist thought of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. But totalitarianism is the negation of rationalism. It is founded on faith in an exclusive ideology and it forbids the use of independent reason if the result is contrary to the "faith." It ignores individual interests unless happily they coincide with those of the state. It restricts the individual's thought and action and is intolerant of nonconformity. The citizen who believes is saved, and the doubter is damned. The executors of the political gospel are the "élite" who are members of the "party" or the ruling class. Since uniformity is required, there is only one party. In a totalitarian government, most officials must be party members, and voters possess the dubious privilege of casting their ballots for the one and only list of candidates.

Similarly, all other human actions and endeavors are simplified, controlled, and coordinated with the prevailing idea of the state. Mussolini expressed the essence of totalitarianism when he wrote: "The Fascist conception of the State is all-embracing; outside of it no human or spiritual values can exist. . . ."

The uniformity which this theory requires is imposed by the party, acting through both official and unofficial channels. The emotional and legal basis for enforcement is supplied by the state's secular religion, or ideology. All organizations, associations, unions, or societies must not only submit to the creed, but they must support it actively. Insofar as the church, be it Jewish or Christian, represents a rival organization or a competing ideology, its existence is intolerable in a completely totalitarian society. If the church teaches equality before God or places humanity before the state, it must be silenced. For humanity, in the totalitarian ideology, is simply a biological term, not a spiritual conception. Actually the churches have not proved difficult to control. Totalitarian practice has wavered between simply excluding them from political and social affairs on the one hand, or outright persecution and suppression on the other. In totalitarian theory, however, true religious belief is supplanted by faith in a secular messiah who is the leader of the state, the political redeemer. So like a religion is the move-

ment that even the language of the totalitarian demigods has the ring of ancient prophecies—full of sound and fury, promises, cajoleries, and threats.

The methods of enforcing belief, or suppressing opposition, and of restricting individual freedom are those of propaganda, organization, and coercion. The totalitarian state insists upon thorough indoctrination and leaves no aspect of cultural, social, or economic life untouched by its agents or uninformed of its ideas. No professional or vocational group, no field of industry or commerce, no branch of the arts, no educational institution, no labor union, no family circle escapes this all-embracing control. Party cells are organized within the smallest units of every group, and the people are expected to cooperate. Dissidence or non-cooperation is treated with large doses of propaganda, or the cruel efficiency of the political police. Pressure is exerted through threats of economic or social penalties, or "training in coordination" in a concentration camp, or, often enough, torture and execution.

The machinery which totalitarianism employs to enforce its rule has similar aspects in the various totalitarian nations but varies in details.

In Italy the authoritarian state existed first, and the party grew up within it. When Mussolini usurped power in 1922, the Fascist party was poorly organized and the Fascist ideology was yet to be formulated. But the Fascist party became the most influential institution in the country. Trades unions were replaced by a system of centralized syndicates and corporations by means of which both labor and management, and the professions too, were incorporated into the machinery of the state.

As party leader, Mussolini dominated the state, sometimes in the name of the government and at others in the name of the party. Although he maintained that the Fascist state summed up "all the manifestations of the moral and intellectual life of man," his regime was characterized by crass opportunism and a Machiavellian disregard of morality. The interests of the state seemed to justify the use of any means.

In Germany the National Socialist party and the government were closely affiliated, but neither completely absorbed the other. The famous, incorruptible Prussian bureaucracy was too strong to

be overcome either by the Weimar Republic or the Nazi party. The party, to be sure, assumed enormous power, but a dual type of administration remained in which all important government offices were duplicated within the party organization. But this did not make the German state the less totalitarian.

Of all totalitarian systems, Germany's was the most efficient and the most comprehensive. The party program, Hitler's *Mein Kampf*, and Rosenberg's *Myth of the Twentieth Century* provided the ideological basis, and an obedient bureaucracy carried out the orders of the party to the state. In practice this proved to be a most effective system for translating an ideology into government policy. Supplemented by an omnipresent and omnipotent secret police, it thoroughly coordinated public life and left the individual no liberty and almost no conscience of his own.

Japanese totalitarianism requires no particular party organization because its national creed, Shintoism, is accepted by all the ruling groups. Japanese politicians do not possess much influence as such. State policies are determined, and the administration is supervised by the military clique, secret societies, and the feudal aristocracy, all of whom embrace Shintoism. In the name of the sacred person of the Emperor, whose will they claim to execute, the authorities carry out those policies dictated by the national ideology. Fulfillment of duties imposed and subordination of individual interests and ideas are assured in most cases by the spirit of Bushido, Japan's militaristic honor code. Any real interference with imperial policies is dealt with by a strong police.

Shintoism and Bushido are integral parts of Japanese culture and explain much of the unity of Japanese thought and action. Moreover, the emperor, in addition to being revered as a god, is also respected as the head of the Japanese family. Herein lies further motivation for subordination of the individual to the imperial will. The result is a most pertinacious brand of totalitarianism that will doubtless withstand all but the most determined assaults of the democracies.

One does not need to be a Fascist to feel that much is not perfect in the world today. There is probably general agreement the world over that some of our problems demand novel solutions. There would also be agreement that the selfish interests of individ-

uals ought not to be allowed to hinder the development of society as a whole. And it is obvious, even in the United States, that the state has become the repository of increasingly larger powers and greater cultural influence.

But totalitarian philosophers drew conclusions from these truths that do not seem justifiable. They rejected all individualism, they refused to look upon a man as a separate ethical unit with worth and dignity in himself. And they magnified the importance and power of the state, both as a practical fact and an idea, to the exclusion of the individual altogether. They practically outlawed all those who could not become part of a vast totalitarian mass mind. Their reasons were that democracy, according to them, was utterly incapable of solving the social and economic problems of the twentieth century without destroying itself.

SOVIET PROLETARIAN DICTATORSHIP

The status of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics requires special definition because it contains elements of both totalitarianism and democracy. Historically, the Soviet Union was the first modern nation to initiate a totalitarian ideology and it was the first to institute totalitarian government. Marxian doctrines demanded the liquidation of the nonproletarian classes under a "dictatorship of the proletariat" in order to achieve a "classless society." Only the proletarian class was deemed capable of leading the U.S.S.R. and the world to this goal. A one-party system was established, based on the principles of the Communist party of the Bolsheviks. The members of this party were selected according to their revolutionary achievements and proletarian backgrounds.

This party dominated the state which it had created. It imposed its ideology upon the nation through the machinery of government, education, and law enforcement. However, the form and methods of this dictatorship changed over the years. Inasmuch as it regarded itself as a temporary means to an end, it adapted itself to changing conditions in political, social, administrative, and even economic fields. Ideologically, its international ambitions were gradually eclipsed by a growing nationalism; politically, isolationism and collaborationism followed each other back and forth; administratively, the original decentralization of government was changed

first into centralization and then back again into decentralization. Only the ideological foundations of Soviet Marxism remained firm, the avowed goal being the improvement of the human lot through the ultimate achievement of a social Utopia rather than the glorification and perpetuation of the state at the cost of the individual's freedom.

Absolute dictatorship of the party, which supposedly represents the interests of the working class, is seen as a stage of transition between a dying capitalism and budding communism. Soviet socialism, therefore, is not rigidly fixed like National Socialism but fluctuating, transmutable, and opportunistic. Strange as it may seem, this flexibility, not to mention its basically humanitarian goal, relates Soviet authoritarianism more to certain democratic features than to Nazi-Fascist despotism, although the political methods of the Bolsheviks have little in common with the democratic conception of individual rights.

DEMOCRACY

Democracy is both a political science and a social philosophy. It is a form of government, and it is also a way of life. Unlike totalitarianism, it does not lend itself readily to definition in terms of rules and regulations that all point to a single and strictly definable goal. Democracy is flexible and elastic, and sometimes it gives the appearance of being quite unstable. It depends, for instance, upon the maintenance of a perpetual balance between such contradictory concepts as minority rights on the one hand and majority rule on the other, spiritual equality on the one hand and physical inequality on the other, individual rights on the one hand, and social duties on the other. Moreover, democracy allows equal validity to traditionally established principles, represented chiefly by the state, and also to new ideas represented by any popular demands for reform. Consequently, individuals and groups within a democracy enjoy a latitude of thought and action that is foreign to totalitarian states where the individual is encouraged, if not required, to identify himself completely with the state and its rigid ideology.

There are, however, certain beliefs that are fundamental to democracy, and any thought or action must remain within the framework of these beliefs in order to remain democratic. Democracy is,

first of all, a recognition of the dignity and worth of the individual. Its other aspects follow from this fundamental concept.

Since the individual is the first consideration, the democratic state is important only as an agency to advance the interests of the citizens. The government is the elected servant of the people, rather than their ruler. And the state is, therefore, no end in itself, no mystery to be worshiped, no master to be served, and no entity apart from the sum total of the individualities that comprise it.

Authority in the democratic state rests in the hands of the people, who are sovereign. Technically, this sovereignty is exercised by means of the suffrage and representation. Delegates of the people are elected by majority vote, and they are supposed to carry out the will of the people. This they also do by majority vote. Such a procedure rests on the assumption that there is such a thing as a will of the people, although the people are individuals and, in reality, they probably have a lot of different wills. Furthermore, democratic practice assumes that, whatever theoretical questions may be raised about the nature of the people's will, it can be discovered by majority vote. But this majority agreement is hardly possible without a deal of argument, adjustment, conciliation, and compromise. This readiness to adjust differences by mutual concession, this respect for the other man's opinion, and the conviction that the resulting agreement represents a close approximation to the will of the people, is fundamental to democracy. It assumes that the people themselves know what they want, and that what the majority want is good for all. It assumes, moreover, that the ordinary man is able and free to exercise intelligent choice. Consequently, democracy rests upon a profound faith in the capacities of human nature. As John Dewey once said, it rests upon "faith in human intelligence and in the power of pooled and cooperative experience."

Even granted that a majority vote will portray the will of the people, the issues which are to be decided by a manifestation of the public will are frequently so complex, and the political unit is so large, that the people's will is very hard to discover. Indeed, the technicalities of the social and economic problems confronting modern governments are so intricate nowadays that the people can prescribe only the broad outlines of the policies they wish to have

adopted. Particular issues require the application of specialists who are not always to be found among the elected delegates of the people. One of the problems of present-day democracy is to make the work of specialists responsive to the will of the people. It may be that, at some future date, parliamentary government, which has been the traditional form of democracy, might have to be altered. But experience up to now seems to indicate that representative legislatures are capable of ensuring that the basic policies of the nation are determined by the people as a whole. Much technical work is done in committees, the members of which acquire by study and experience the status of specialists themselves, and the committees make wide use of the knowledge of experts whom they consult. Much technical administrative work is left in the hands of experts now, and no violence is done to democratic principles as long as such work is always subject to guidance and review by the people or their representatives.

In spite of the strain placed upon governments in recent times, the suspicion that the common people are incapable of self-government has not been confirmed; nor has time justified the belief that government should be left to an oligarchy of birth, money, or brains. The history of the United States, if nothing else, indicates that there can indeed be a government "of the people, by the people, and for the people," even in the complex society of today.

The democratic state must be flexible in order to be responsive to the will of the people, which may change with changing times. The idea that popular sovereignty enabled the people freely to alter their government or their constitution whenever they felt that it no longer served their best interests was part of the liberal thought stemming from English experience in the seventeenth century. Thomas Jefferson even suggested that a democratic constitution ought to be modified every nineteen years when a new electorate had grown up.

"Some men look at constitutions with sanctimonious reverence," he wrote in 1816, "and deem them like the ark of the covenant, too sacred to be touched. . . . But I know also that laws and institutions must go hand in hand with the progress of the human mind."

The experience of democratic countries, however, has been that

radical constitutional revision is not a frequent necessity so long as the elected administration and an intelligent citizenry interpret or amend a constitution according to changing conditions. A constitution is a framework, based upon a philosophy of politics and upon immediate needs. It remains a framework offering the people points of departure and a good deal of discretion as to interpretation.

Actually, the precise form of the government is not important so long as the choice of basic policy is left to the people. Democracy in the past has appeared in a variety of forms. Athenian democracy was aristocratic and exacted high qualifications for participation in politics. Great Britain today is a democracy in which the institution of monarchy and the concepts of class and aristocracy have been retained. On the other hand, the Third French Republic carried the principle of individualism to extreme lengths until it resulted in almost complete disregard of personal obligations to society and the nation.

Moreover, the form of a state is not so important now as it was when monarchy meant tyranny and republic was synonymous with liberty. Monarchies, like the British, can be liberal, and republics, like that established at Weimar, can lead to autocracy. It is not the form, but the spirit, that makes a government democratic.

The spirit of democracy, based on respect for the individual, is contained in two fundamental concepts, liberty and equality. Unfortunately, liberty and equality have meant many things to many men, and it is necessary to define more precisely what kind of liberty and what kind of equality are democratic. Abraham Lincoln once said,

We all declare for liberty; but in using the word we do not all mean the same thing. With some, the word liberty may mean for each man to do as he pleases with himself and the product of his labor; while with others, the same word may mean for some men to do as they please with other men and the product of other men's labor. Here two, not only different, but incompatible things, are called by the same name—liberty. And it follows that each of the things is, by the respective parties, called by two different and incompatible names—liberty and tyranny. . . .

A conventional definition is that liberty comprises the freedom of an individual to do whatever he wishes, without hindrance, as

long as he obeys the law. The question remains where, in a democratic society, the law should end and freedom begin. One answer has been to regard the law as the expression of a social conscience, or a statement of what, at a particular moment, is regarded as injurious to society. In democracy, where the individual is treasured highly, a hindrance to the development of any individual's greatest potentiality might be regarded as injurious to society. But there is a wide divergence of opinion as to how best to provide for the free development of individuals, as to where some should be restrained in order that others might be more free to grow, and think, and act. Opinion differs not only among members of the same democratic society, but it differs within society as a whole from one generation to another. Consequently, the appearance of liberty may change, even though the fundamental concept remains the same, and it is true, as Theodore Roosevelt once said in a message to Congress, that "what would have been an infringement upon liberty half a century ago may be the necessary safeguard of liberty today."

In another sense, it may be that freedom consists in a man's ability to liberate himself from the bondage of selfish desires. A man who could so discipline himself would, of course, be free to do whatever he wished because, by definition, he would not wish to injure society or any individual in it. Since such self-restraint is too much to expect of the ordinary mortal, the law appears as a support for human frailty.

Fundamentally, however, liberty depends in large measure upon an individual's sense of responsibility to his fellow men. This sense is probably not natural or innate; it is more likely to be the consequence of thought, experience, and education. If so, liberty cannot be decreed by law, of course, but liberty itself depends upon the recognition by intelligent citizens of their responsibilities to others, and true freedom is the freedom to live in the consciousness of this responsibility.

The ideal of equality is even more difficult to define. Equality was declared by rationalist philosophers to be a natural law. But there are so many patent inequalities in the human race that the equality of which John Locke and Thomas Jefferson wrote was obviously an equality of a very limited sort.

In the face of eternity all humans are probably equal. And if men

are regarded spiritually as children of God, they are certainly entitled equally to a dignified life and to salvation. But as social or physical beings, citizens of a democracy are certainly not equal. The subtle differentiation between spiritual equality and physical inequality is a unique feature of democratic philosophy. It was unknown to the Athenians, and their democracy remained primarily intellectual and political without becoming social and spiritual. The distinction emanated rather from the teachings of the New Testament, whose Christian ethics constitute a large part of the liberal tradition today.

Translated into social practice this spiritual equality is a very limited concept. Abraham Lincoln, in referring to the Declaration of Independence, once explained its limitations as follows:

I think that the authors of that notable instrument intended to include all men but that they did not intend to declare all men equal in all respects. They did not mean to say that all men were equal in color, size, intellect, moral development, or social capacity. They defined with tolerable distinctness in what respect they did consider all men created equal—equal in certain inalienable rights which are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.

Each of these equal rights is, of course, open to subtle differences in interpretation. The right to life may mean just the right to be protected against murder or mayhem, or it may mean the right to live decently. The right to liberty may mean the equal right to do anything technically within the bounds of a few elementary laws, or it may mean the equal right to live in a society where each member is conscious of an obligation not to harm or exploit his fellow man. It may also include the right to share equally in the political life of the community and to help in defending his own and his neighbor's liberties. And the equal right to pursue happiness may mean just that, or it may mean the right actually to have a little happiness, which is quite a different matter.

Traditionally, however, the right to pursue happiness is regarded as the right to equal economic opportunity—not economic *equality*, but equal economic *opportunity*. The conservative interpretation of this ideal asserts that no arbitrary obstacles such as caste or class distinctions, no privileges of blood or religion, nor legal discriminations should bar any individual from his chosen vocation

or his own particular method of trying to find happiness—as long as it is not definitely antisocial. A more progressive interpretation would assert today that each individual is entitled to more than that, and that he should have the right to work, to have medical care, recreation, and financial security. Again, what one generation regards as an adequate guarantee of the right to pursue happiness might appear quite insufficient a half century later. The fundamental factor is the ideal of individual dignity and happiness and the opportunity for each one to achieve his own happiness in his own unique fashion.

Democracy is indeed a complex and probably very expensive type of social and political organization. It places a great burden on the individual, demanding time, patience, intelligence, a sense of social responsibility, and a spirit of compromise. In return, the individual is rewarded with the broad recognition of his own dignity and worth.

Such a complex and delicately balanced society is the result of the intellectual and social experience of centuries. It is a far cry from the primitive tribalism of ancient man. And it is a far cry too from totalitarianism which is, in many respects, primitive tribalism in technological dress. Moreover, democracy is not static. It is adaptable, evolutionary, and dynamic. To be maintained, it must be studied, cultivated, and fought for.

TOTALITARIAN ECONOMY

Totalitarian states exercise a rigid control over the economy as well as the political and cultural life of the nation. The nature of this control varies, but in each case the state dominates capital and production. Private enterprise, as it exists in capitalist democracies, is eliminated or severely restricted, and the national economy is regulated in accordance with the nation's ideology and political ambition. The Nazi-Fascist states, therefore, are not capitalistic in the traditional sense, although monopolistic capitalism does flourish in Japan where the leaders of industry and the military caste are united by a feudal family organization and are generally agreed upon Japan's national ambitions.

The Nazi-Fascist powers control industry, commerce, and agriculture; but they do not own them and they do not accept such

full responsibility for those employed by supposedly private enterprise. "National Socialism," however, is not an empty phrase, as some of its enemies insidiously assert. The left wing of the Nazi party, weakened in the purge of 1934, remained popular with the majority of Nazi sympathizers, and it was always strongly represented in the government. Hitler himself was never friendly toward capitalism; and the Nazi party program had frankly socialist paragraphs in it. The Nazis enacted no legislation against capitalism as such, but the powers of the government were so sweeping that big industry, the commercial trusts, and the landed estates lost their former independent influence.

It was not so much the social program of the Nazis, however, but the military and geopolitical ambitions of the government which necessitated the regulation and domination of free enterprise by the party and the state. As soon as the National Socialists acquired power in 1933, capital, industry, and commerce were coordinated with the state's military designs, and a regular wartime economy was adopted. Free capital constituted a power that might be a source of disturbance or resistance. Consequently it was encouraged only when it was completely identified with the party. The party, the state, and many individual party members thus became "capitalist." They reaped profits and accumulated wealth. But their wealth and industrial ownership had little value as a political instrument. It was the reward of political reliability rather than any means to acquire influence in the government.

This transformation of private capitalism from free enterprise to dependence upon the party or the state was carried out relentlessly. Private entrepreneurs were restricted in the conduct of their businesses to such a degree that they became little more than agents of the government. Even before the war, they were taxed heavily; they produced only what they were allowed to produce, and they sold when the government wished them to sell; they had no power of their own to engage or to dismiss workers; and they were required to maintain an expensive bookkeeping system for government inspection. These handicaps were increased or diminished by the authorities accordingly as the individual owner conformed to the party dogma and organization.

Under such circumstances, private capital existed in the National Socialist state, but it was entirely controlled by the government, and the rewards for capital investment depended largely upon the political purposes of the state. This situation was the result not only of the party's semisocialist program and the requirements of a military economy, but also of the party's totalitarian philosophy which excluded independent and "uncoordinated" activity on principle. The liberties associated with traditional capitalism—the freedom to accumulate profits, to invest them freely, and to control the investments without undue interference—these are incompatible with totalitarian principles, and they were restricted in Germany on every hand. Profits were indeed accumulated and invested, but only at the suffrance of the party. Many men became wealthy, but the possession of their wealth, or at least the control of their investments, depended upon their command of political influence. In other words, the sources of power in the Nazi state were political, not financial or economic.

Like National Socialism, Italian Fascism was also ideologically opposed to the concept of free enterprise. Moreover, it included some elements of socialism, although it began its active career as the ostensible defender of capitalism. But in Fascist Italy the military and imperialistic activity of the state remained within conventional bounds for several years and did not require the ruthless introduction of a war economy, and the influence of the Roman Catholic Church was large enough to discourage economic radicalism. Consequently, a totalitarian economy developed more gradually until close association with Germany and military sacrifices in Ethiopia precipitated a more thorough control of capital and industry in the mid-1930's. The organization of the corporate state at this time, with the entire population regimented into occupational syndicates, brought with it a corporate economy and signaled the virtual end of free enterprise. Fascist Italy's economic philosophy, however, was never so radical as Germany's, and the Italian people inclined more toward individualism than uniformity, in spite of Mussolini's exhortations. Had Italian Fascism remained in power for several more decades, doubtless the strength of the state would have increased and the influence of the church would have dimin-

ished, the national economy would have lost most of its capitalistic character and been more definitely state controlled.

No such tendency was visible in Japan, however. Japanese industry and commerce were subjected to war conditions for more than a decade, but the essential elements of private capitalism did not change. Although armaments and war industries were indeed under government supervision, enterprise was free and thriving, and Japan's totalitarian imperialism was based on an economy that remained substantially capitalistic. This unique situation was possible because both national imperialism and capitalism in Japan were supported by the same minority at the top of Japan's feudal caste system. This minority controlling the government opposed socialism as faulty materialism and as a completely improper idea, but the masses of the people were largely unaffected by socialist thought anyway. They were disinclined to social change and made only ineffective efforts to better their conditions; they remained economically enslaved, and the feudal lords of industry and agriculture easily maintained the *status quo*. The Japanese leaders combined modern technology with an almost medieval organization of society; they developed the techniques of the industrial revolution without introducing the spirit that brought this technique about. Consequently, the people remained the ready servants of imperialist and capitalist overlords, respectful of the religious tradition on which authority was based and reluctant to change conditions inherited from their ancestors. Under these circumstances, the capitalist system was readily fitted into Japan's totalitarian regime.

Nonetheless, totalitarianism in general remains anticapitalistic because it is anti-individualistic. And the more precise the totalitarian ideology, the stronger is the tendency of the state to dominate capital and production. Moreover, since the power of production and the power of money left to operate freely would constitute a danger to totalitarian rule, totalitarian leaders are compelled to eliminate or at least control these sources of possible opposition.

The attack upon capital carries an immense popular appeal and—except in Japan—has been stressed in propaganda for the masses. But the totalitarian opposition to capitalism is more than a demagogic device to obtain popular support. It is a basic and immutable feature of totalitarian philosophy.

SOVIET-MARXIAN ECONOMY

Soviet Russia's economy is more the author than the product of the Soviet ideology, because economic dogma first brought into being the political organization which now rules the Soviet state. Here for the first time a socialist economy was established on a nation-wide scale. It was not communism, to be sure, but the state expropriated private enterprises, real estate, and farms and became the owner of all the means of production. There was no need to expropriate utilities since, as in most other European countries, they were state or municipal owned before the revolution.

The ultimate aim of Marxism, upon which Soviet ideology is founded, is the establishment of a "classless society" where money would be needed, if at all, only to facilitate the exchange of services for commodities. In the end, everyone would receive satisfaction for all his needs. However, it was recognized that before this end could be reached, there would have to be a transitional period in the development toward the communist society during which everyone would be given equal opportunities and a guaranteed minimum of subsistence for all those who are working. After 1921, the Soviet government, moreover, began to reward its citizens according to their merit rather than according to their needs, with the result that there have appeared vast differences in income.

Nevertheless, the accumulations of money which, in a few cases, were made possible by this system are of no value from the capitalist point of view. Since the state owns all the means of production and distribution, and private profit from any business enterprise is therefore impossible, money in private hands is only a medium of exchange, and its possession carries with it no power as it does in capitalist states. It can be spent, provided there are goods for sale; it can be saved, but not invested. That is, it may not be invested in private enterprise where labor would be exploited, according to Marxist theory. It may be invested in state securities, but a man may not live from the interest on these securities unless he works. For without a job he cannot be a member of an occupational organization; and without membership in such a "trade union" he may not provide himself with the necessities of life. The Soviet Constitution of 1936 says, "He who does not work shall not eat."

Of course, those who produce the most, either in industrial, agricultural, or cultural pursuits, make the most money. But much of the time their aim is more idealistic than materialistic; that is, they are ambitious to produce for the "socialist fatherland," and they are constantly aware that they do not work in the interest of any private person or concern, but for the whole community, or the state. If pressed, they might argue that they are the state, and that in consequence they labor for their own welfare.

Such an economic system requires an enormous bureaucracy to administer the state's enterprises. This is obvious, since everyone is technically a public employee, and the manager of a coal mine, or the chemist in an industrial plant are as much government officials as a third-class postmaster or a clerk in the foreign office. For all these employees—and this means everyone—the state accepts both occupational and social responsibility.

ECONOMY IN DEMOCRACIES

Such tyrannical forms of economy as we have just described are excluded from democracies by the nature of democratic philosophy. Individualism in the economic sphere prescribes the widest possible latitude for the exercise of free enterprise and the development of individual initiative. On the other hand, democratic thought also requires that this individualism be tempered with social responsibility and that the welfare of the people be unimpaired by the actions of the few. At times these requirements appear mutually exclusive, but the contradiction between them is resolved by compromises whose terms vary with time and place. The modest limitations imposed upon free enterprise in the nineteenth century are regarded as inadequate today. In fact, the changes in liberal economic thought during the past hundred years constitute one of the remarkable developments of the democratic ideology.

Before the First World War, capitalist economy was almost universal. Its principles and its characteristics were much the same, whether found in republic or autocratic monarchy. But in the years after 1918, Soviet Russia departed radically from capitalism, and in certain other areas, notably those which later developed authoritarian regimes, movements away from economic individualism became noticeable. Free enterprise was curtailed, and there soon ap-

peared those economies controlled and directed by the state for primarily military purposes which we have labeled "totalitarian."

In the countries which remained democratic, meanwhile, the economic system remained essentially one of capitalism and free enterprise. Much of the effort of statesmen in the postwar years was expended in a vain effort to revive the system of untrammelled capitalism which the war had so altered. These men felt no compulsion to coordinate a vast economy for the production of guns instead of butter. In fact, they pared their military expenditures to a minimum, condemning the investment of capital in armaments as unproductive and sterile.

But the old liberal economy did not return. Monopolistic trusts and cartels continued to grow, thereby undermining the very freedom of enterprise which created them. These were the businessman's remedy for the evils of cut-throat competition. But people became suspicious of the influence of capitalist coadunation; the small entrepreneur resented the shrinkage of his own opportunities; and most governments took steps to regulate or break up large combinations. Antitrust laws had constituted one of the departures from a laissez-faire philosophy in the past. The strengthening of such laws or some more effective legislation for the same ends appeared inevitable.

Another limitation upon the ideal of free enterprise appeared in the spread and intensification of social legislation. Most democracies after 1918 avoided orthodox socialism, but social-insurance programs were expanded, and social services and cooperative organizations grew rapidly, notably in the Scandinavian countries and in Mexico. Totalitarian states developed social services too, but they did so without protecting the independence of the individual, and very frequently it was for purposes of propaganda and indoctrination. They made much, for instance, of their elimination of unemployment; but they did not explain that they had managed to accomplish this result by means of military drafts, labor service, party jobs, war industries, and even slave labor.

Within the democracies the provision of social services and laws to regulate trusts went forward, but neither adequately bridged the widening gap between capital and labor, and the doctrines of socialism attracted a growing proportion of the masses. In the nine-

teenth century Karl Marx had systematized a revolutionary socialist philosophy, and the success of the Russian revolution after 1917 did much to encourage socialists elsewhere. Many did not become socialists, of course, but large sections among the democratic masses, having finally destroyed political privilege and acquired equality in the matter of suffrage, now sought to break down economic privilege and to establish a more democratic economy with more equality of opportunity and more recognition for the services of labor.

Nevertheless, economic individualism prevailed as a policy in the democracies until the Second World War, when military necessity dictated central planning and regulation.

Had the capitalist system been more responsive to social tensions, more aware of the dangers in totalitarianism, and less fearful of reform, adjustments might have been made sooner that would have enabled the democracies to resist the impact of German aggression with more success. The democracies would not, of course, have adopted the kind of military economy that enabled the Nazi state to wage war with such efficiency. But they might have avoided the effects of economic discontent and civil unrest which, for instance, paralyzed France in the 1930's. Many French capitalists, anxious for the protection of their privileges, looked to Fascism or some kind of political reaction for relief. They refused to conciliate French labor, but they cultivated relations with Germany and Italy, and in so doing they doubtless undermined French productive power and national morale. The feud between classes became so bitter that neither was enough concerned with the welfare of the other to be concerned for the nation as a whole. This unhealthy atmosphere was partially responsible for the tragic fortune of France in 1940.

The people of the United States recognized the need for economic reform after the decade of uninhibited prosperity that ended in 1929. The Roosevelt administration, elected in 1932, adopted a series of social and economic measures, some of which were temporary and others intended to be permanent. These were hastily devised, but many of the policies which were branded as revolutionary at the time have been accepted since. Most of the reforms were already commonplace in Europe, but they were a new departure

for the United States. Judged by European standards, they were not radical, but they remedied the worst evils, and they were carried out by thoroughly constitutional means.

The Second World War has brought further changes in our economy. What permanent results the emergency coordination of enterprise by the state will have it is too early now to predict, but there will doubtless be some. Furthermore, the problems of economic rehabilitation loom so large that planning and regulation of a sort will probably be necessary for a long time. The experience of the 'thirties indicates, however, that the necessary changes can be adopted by compromise and through orderly democratic processes, that more social benefits will be guaranteed than now, but that much room for individualism and free enterprise will remain.

Democracy in the past has been the stronghold of individualistic capitalism which developed characteristics at times that were hardly compatible with the principles of democratic philosophy. Ideas about the equalization of economic privilege, however, have spread, and there is a greater readiness now than in the past to recognize the claims of the common man to happiness, and to acknowledge the pertinence of democratic ideas in all fields of life. These tendencies have been crystallized by the Axis attack upon democracy.

CONCLUSION

The great changes in human society within recent times resulted in the formulation of new political ideals and new social concepts. Some of these new viewpoints were irreconcilable, and open conflict between them was almost inevitable. Conflict was made more nearly inescapable by the technological revolution of our age. Improved communications brought into close contact parts of the world which seemed remote to previous generations. The earth used to be divided into definite geographical spheres which were relatively isolated from one another, but this compartmentalization has disappeared.

One consequence of this revolution has been the growing similarity of social and economic problems the world over. Another more important consequence has been the increased concern felt in one country for conditions and reforms in other lands. Contentment over the proper organization of human society has become

world wide. Proponents of national imperialism, communist internationalism, expanding totalitarianism, laissez-faire liberalism, pacifism, militarism, international and supranational organization discussed their ideas for years. When in the end the ever-growing interdependence among the nations made a clash inevitable, two groups of ideologies faced each other, both containing a variety of political trends but each representing and defending a fundamental platform. One group fought for the Nazi-Fascist brand of totalitarianism; the other for the ultimate goal of a social democracy.

To give the reader an idea of the abyss which separates the most representative of the nations within the two hostile groups, American democracy and Nazi totalitarianism, the following chart is presented:

NAZI TOTALITARIANISM

AMERICAN DEMOCRACY

a. The State

The state is supreme, and the individual is a servant of the state.

The one-party system and "plebiscites" instead of elections stifle any expression of the public will.

The constitution is ignored in favor of a party program that is interpreted opportunistically.

A rubber-stamp Reichstag, composed of militarized party members, listens to the Fuehrer and votes unanimously.

Citizenship depends upon race, blood, and political conformity.

The people are sovereign, and the state is the servant of the people.

A plural-party system enables the people to speak through frequent, free, and secret elections.

The constitution guarantees justice based on laws enacted through the democratic process.

A two-chamber Congress debates freely, initiates legislation, and accepts or rejects advice of the administration.

Citizenship is not denied on account of race, religion, or previous condition of servitude.

b. Culture

A secular religion is based on belief in German racial supremacy, unity of German blood and soil, and the leader principle.

The state is antireligious, fostering a kind of national paganism, persecuting the churches and religious leaders.

A Christian culture is the basis for ideals of humanity and the recognition of human dignity everywhere.

The state is separated from the church and guarantees freedom of worship and free activity of all sects as a basic right.

Diversity of thought is encour-

Thought is channelized and individual inquiry discouraged; the aim of culture is uniformity.

Education is a process of developing intellectual sterility and political loyalty.

aged as the basis of intellectual progress.

Education develops individualism and a critical approach to citizenship.

c. Society

Public opinion is regimented by censorship and the standardization of all news.

Appeals to hate and prejudice are normal; foreign cultures are misrepresented and reviled.

Equality of sexes is suspended, and women are relegated to the biological function of procreation.

Public opinion actuates policy; freedom of speech, press, and assembly are guaranteed.

The ideal is a fair, just, and sympathetic approach to the problems of other peoples.

Women have gained full equality, and child-bearing is left to individual choice or fortune.

d. Economy

Business is regimented and controlled according to the political and military purposes of the state; profits exist, but not free enterprise.

Labor is regimented into state-controlled political organizations, occupational groups, or corporations.

Profits and free enterprise are regarded as essential but subjected to some limitation; drastic regulation is a war phenomenon.

Labor's right to organize and bargain collectively is provided to counterbalance the power of capital.

e. Foreign Policy

Political, economic, and ideological domination of the world is a freely expressed ambition.

The "New Order" is a world compelled by fear or force to accept the authority of the German state.

Respect for the rights of other nations, and the ideal of self-government are guiding principles of a "good neighbor policy."

The President and Congress support an international organization based on principles of compromise and cooperation.

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Part 1 The Enemies of Democracy

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SECTION ONE: NAZI GERMANY

German National Socialism was the leading authoritarian system. Of all the forms of totalitarianism, it had the more nearly complete ideology, and it was backed by the greater economic and military power. It carried the greatest influence even among totalitarian nations. Its ideology was the basis of Italian institutional reforms in 1936, and certain aspects of it were adopted in Japan. But it is as a threat to democratic societies that it concerns us.

National Socialism's roots lay in the history, traditions, and experience of the German people. Many of its social conceptions reached far back into the ages of Germanic barbarism and repudiated a thousand years of Christian, or "Western," culture. Other ideas are of more recent origin. But no one could fathom the appeal of this ideology to the German people without knowing something of the German intellectual heritage, nor could one hope to combat or eradicate it without some understanding of its roots in the past.

In the following pages we shall present a brief outline of the origin and development of salient characteristics of the Nazi ideology. The reader should be cautioned against concluding that the threads of German history we shall follow are the only ones. But these are sufficiently prominent to be considered by themselves, and they may even be regarded as the dominant strands in the skein of Germany's cultural evolution.

1 *Historical Background of National Socialism*

LUTHER

Before the Protestant revolts of the sixteenth century, western Europe was a spiritually united Christian community. The pope of the Roman Catholic Church was not only the religious leader of Christendom, but he claimed to be the fount from which flowed the temporal authority of emperors and kings. Neither this claim, nor the temporal ideal of a Holy Roman Empire, was ever realized completely. Rival monarchs successfully challenged the authority of the emperor, and a protracted political struggle between pope and secular princes ended in favor of the latter. One decisive factor in this struggle was the creation of national churches, particularly Protestant churches, which were subject to the temporal power of the princes and quite independent of Rome. The outstanding German leader in this revolt from the church was Martin Luther.

Luther was an Augustinian monk who, having become skeptical of certain church dogmas, disgusted with the venality of the church hierarchy, and alienated by the papal pretensions to authority, openly criticized both the church doctrine and its leadership. Faith, Luther reasoned, was the only means to salvation, and faith was a personal experience which did not require the intercession of an organized church. The church, he concluded, was an invisible organization of all Christians, and each man was his own priest. The claim of the Roman Church that it was the sole dispenser of salvation was, therefore, according to Luther, unfounded.

When the church sought to use the temporal power of the emperor to have Luther silenced and his heresy suppressed, Luther found refuge and support with many minor German princes, and the revolt which he had commenced on grounds of religious dogma and practice rapidly assumed wide political and social implications. Its ultimate success not only divorced northern Germany from the cosmopolitan influence of the Catholic Church, but it contributed in many ways to the establishment of absolutism, and especially

the authority of the German princes. It strengthened them in their rivalry with the German, or Holy Roman, emperor; it gave them the wealth of the church with which to bolster their temporal regimes; and it provided the basis for civil regulation of both religion and education.

Luther's own motives were not altogether spiritual. Like many another non-Italian, he resented the luxury and profligacy of the Papal Curia, the constant demands for money payments to Rome, and the pretensions of the Italian court to temporal power in his homeland. This attitude appealed to the German princes and gave them additional reasons for resisting the emperor, who was acting as the church's defender and police agent in Germany.

Having criticized the Catholic Church for assuming political power, Luther concluded that any church, even his own, should subordinate itself to the temporal authorities. Luther approved not only of the establishment of Protestant churches by the lay heads of the German states, but of the right of each ruler to impose his own religion upon his subjects. Lutheran princes thus obtained control of the church, and the church in turn became a staunch supporter of their autocratic regimes.

Luther was no liberal nor an advocate of toleration. He denounced radical sects like the Anabaptists, and he had no sympathy at all for the peasants who rebelled against feudal restraints in 1525. He urged the princely governments who had sheltered him to stamp out ruthlessly these sources of social disturbance. The princes thus discovered again that Luther and his church were sturdy defenders of their interests.

In another way Luther's religious convictions and political inclinations served to strengthen the authority of secular government. Luther had concluded that the individual was his own priest and entitled to interpret the Bible for himself. But to do this, he must be able to read it intelligently and have it expounded to him by men whose training was not affected by the views of the Roman Church. Luther, therefore, translated the Bible into German, popularized this vernacular version, and recommended school reforms to teach the ordinary man to read and liberate the scholar from Rome. Such reforms had political as well as religious implications. The Catholic Church had done little about providing free educa-

tion of an elementary sort. Now Luther's recommendations were instrumental in the ultimate establishment of free schooling for the children of the masses in northern Germany long before other nations considered such undertakings. The foundation of Luther's ideal curriculum was to be the Christian religion, shorn of Romish trappings, and supplemented by instruction in the virtues of loyalty, efficiency, and patriotism—the whole program to be provided and supervised by the secular state. The consequence in Lutheran areas was an unusual opportunity for the state to control the cultural life of the people.

The spread of Lutheranism over northern and middle Germany laid the basis for a uniquely comprehensive absolutism. The largest and strongest of these north German states by the beginning of the eighteenth century was Prussia.

FREDERICK WILLIAM I

The Hohenzollern electors who ruled in Brandenburg had employed the fortunes of war and marriage to extend their domains until they emerged as kings of Prussia at the beginning of the eighteenth century. Frederick I was the elector who first assumed the title of "king," but it was his son, Frederick William I (1713–1740), who established the military and bureaucratic character of the Prussian state.

Frederick William's love for his army was notorious. In order to create it he dispensed with splendor and luxury in favor of a Spartan regime, and he imposed upon himself and his subjects an extraordinary regimen of sacrifice and discipline. With the help of Leopold of Dessau he reorganized and modernized the army, in the knowledge that Prussia could not play a strong role in Europe without it. Although twelfth in population among European states, Prussia stood fourth in military power when Frederick William died. Only France, Russia and Austria had larger armies.¹ In order

¹ The king had fostered the development of an officers' caste whose professional efficiency became the nightmare of European general staffs centuries thence. On the strength of this tradition, Bismarck's contemporaries Roon and Moltke created the famed General Staff Corps which became the nucleus of modern Prussian militarism and its arrogant defiance of the world. During the Weimar Republic, the Corps went underground but emerged again after Hitler had renounced the Treaty of Versailles. Its few thousand members exercised a formidable influence upon the leadership and administration of the German army.

to build this military machine, the king was accustomed to spend half, sometimes five sevenths, of the public revenue on the army—much to the disgust and apprehension of competing European monarchs. In reality, he instituted a war economy in time of peace. There was no major war during his reign, but he passed on a magnificent military machine to his son.

Another reform of Frederick William's concerned the civil service. Under his personal supervision, he created a highly disciplined and incorruptible bureaucracy. He consolidated the civil administration by subordinating hitherto diverse and independent departments to one supreme board of which he was the active and absolute head. His directions for the members of the board were rigid and more like military regulations than civil service memoranda. Local authorities were subordinated to the central administration which, in turn, depended entirely upon the king's will; and the appointment of every official was subject to the king's approval. Frederick William traveled tirelessly throughout his provinces to supervise and control both the army and the bureaucracy. He encouraged officials to report on each other, and he appointed inspectors to investigate the bureaus and submit highly detailed reports.¹

The regimentation and discipline which Frederick William instilled into the army and the bureaucracy became Prussia's pride and a part of a hallowed Prussian tradition. Compulsory military service was established in principle at least, and the Prussian people learned to revere above all other virtues that of blind obedience—*Kadaver Gehorsam*, the obedience of a corpse.

In such a society there was no flowering of intellectual or artistic achievement. Even the elementary schools which Frederick William strove to establish for the children of the masses reflected the king's penchant for order and obedience. Discipline was taught to children as to soldiers with the rod, and the education they received was as primitive and anti-intellectual as the king himself. The burden of the curriculum was religion and Bible reading, for the king reasoned that if his subjects were God-fearing they would then be obedient and submissive to government "established by God."²

Frederick William was not a cultured man. He was narrow-

¹ See Robert Ergang, *The Potsdam Fuehrer*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1941, Chap. VII.

² Robert Ergang, *op. cit.*, p. 144.

mind and intolerant. He had no taste for art. His language was crude, his temper violent, and his requirements of sacrifice and obedience almost inhuman. If his own sons wished to study literature, they had to do so in concealment. The country's greatest contemporary philosopher, Christian Wolff, was expelled because the king was persuaded his doctrines would undermine military discipline. The Prussian Academy was scoffed at and abused. The Spartan ideals of obedience and service to the state dominated the Prussian scene.

The king was not so narrow-minded as to ignore the economic basis of the state's power. He did much to foster the industrial and commercial growth of his realm. He was aware that human labor, as well as money, was genuine capital; and for this reason, rather than for the satisfaction of any humanitarian impulse or religious conviction, he opened his frontiers to Protestants and Catholics throughout Europe who were expelled from their own countries by religious authorities. The interference of a monarch in the economic activities of his subjects was characteristic of the age, but the thoroughgoing nature of Frederick William's activity has prompted some critics to describe his program as socialist—if it is socialism to require citizens to merge their wills in that of the whole state.¹ Moreover, there are striking similarities between many mercantilist practices of Frederick William's time and some of the principles of the National Socialists today.

FREDERICK THE GREAT

Frederick William expended his efforts in the creation of a strong militaristic state so that Prussia might play a great role in Europe, for he had little faith in diplomacy and much in force. However, he never used his army. It was his son, Frederick the Great, who did that. And he did it with the cynical disregard for the rights of weaker states and with the frank acceptance of the virtues of force that characterize what the Germans call *Realpolitik*. In his youth, Frederick had written an idealistic treatise, *Anti-Machiavelli*, condemning the amoral advice of the Florentine philosopher. But as king he did not hesitate to use force, or to ignore promises and treaties. For the aggrandizement of Prussia he was

¹ See Oswald Spengler, *Preussentum und Sozialismus*, Beck, Munich, 1920.

quite willing to start a war without the slightest moral justification—although his apologists declare that the interest of Prussia constituted the highest possible moral justification. The invasion of Silesia in 1740 and the partition of Poland in 1772 are cases in point. Whatever the ethics were, Frederick's policy resulted in an enlargement of the Prussian state, and it was therefore revered in Prussia as quite proper and laudable.

Frederick the Great was an "enlightened" monarch. He was impressed by the spirit of the French intellectuals, particularly Voltaire. He knew French better than German, which he disliked. He wrote verses in French, and he played the flute. He redeemed the cultural shortcomings of his father, reformed and patronized the Prussian Academy, and sponsored diverse artistic endeavors. But he remained a Prussian in politics. He was as much a martinet as his father, and he used the treasury, the army, and the efficient bureaucracy he had inherited to establish Prussia as one of the most respected kingdoms in Europe. And success made both him and his statecraft the hero and idol of successive generations.

Frederick and his father were the founders of the Prussian tradition, and their thriftiness, their sense of duty, their political ambition, their devotion to the state, their overweening patriotism, their idealization of discipline, obedience, and sacrifice, and their contempt for the comforts and amenities of civilization remain the core of "Prussianism" to this day. It was therefore a significant and symbolic act when Hitler opened his career as chancellor in 1933 by celebrating a service in Frederick's Potsdam Garrisonkirche (Garrison church) and by placing a wreath on Frederick's tomb.

With Frederick's death in 1786 the first great period of Prussia's growth was terminated. The little state had become a European power. Its military and administrative institutions and its diplomatic tradition were fixed. Succeeding kings were neither so strong nor so efficient as Frederick, and the country entered a period of material and political stagnation; but the state proved more resilient than its kings, and the crushing defeat administered by Napoleon in 1806 served only to revive and revitalize the kingdom. With the "war of liberation" against the French, Prussia began a second period of growth which ended with its domination of all Germany in 1871.

During the years of stagnation, however, the unique Prussian tradition and ideology were slowly fashioned and crystallized. Authors, philosophers, historians, musicians, artists, and journalists contributed to the formulation of ideas about the nature of the Prussian state; the relation between it and its individual subjects, and the place of the Prusso-German state in the world. This spiritual defense of Prussianism, this formulation of its political philosophy, and the metaphysical justification of it was the work of a number of gifted thinkers like Fichte, Hegel, or Treitschke whose intellectual achievements surpassed the political accomplishments of contemporary German rulers until the advent of Bismarck.

The philosophies of these men and their disciples grew steadily in popularity, even though opposition to them seemed overwhelming and the application of their principles remained unrealized. A brief review of the most important of their theses will indicate a rather clear line of thought extending from Frederick William's Prussianism down to Hitler's National Socialism.

2 *The Philosophical Justification of Prussianism*

The powers of national monarchs which were enhanced by the Reformation became increasingly absolute during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. No sooner had the various states liberated themselves from Roman influence than their rulers appropriated the powers and prerogatives which had previously belonged to the church. Nevertheless they were happy to endorse the theory that their right to rule was divinely ordained, since the confirmation of God for the exercise of their absolute powers was obviously desirable, and a religious foundation for their thrones would create reverence toward the crown from nobility as well as from the populace. The theory of "divine right" therefore received royal approbation and was defended by some of the best political thinkers of the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries.¹

Such a theory, however, diminished in popularity after the seventeenth century, partly because of the abuse of authoritarian rule, and partly because of the criticism of rational thinkers in England and France. These men based royal authority on natural law and a "social contract." The more liberal of them argued that the contract between ruler and subjects could be annulled by the people. Such a theory not only undermined belief in the "divine right of kings," but it also provided the individual with rights that he had not hitherto possessed. The nature of these rights remained a subject for analysis and dispute for centuries, but liberal thinkers in the age of Enlightenment inclined to follow the argument of John Locke that these rights were natural and inalienable in every human being. The French-Swiss Rousseau employed this concept to exaggerate the dignity of man in a state of nature. Both Locke and

¹ The Reformation brought more power to the state in Roman Catholic countries also. Those monarchs who remained loyal to the church employed their opportunity to take over many of the church's former rights. This was particularly true in France where the theory of divine right was much in vogue.

Rousseau had a profound influence upon the leaders of the American and French revolutions.

Both these revolutions and the liberal thought of the eighteenth century helped to undermine absolutism in Europe, but the idea of the divine right of kings was never really discarded in Prussia. The American Declaration of Independence and the French Declaration of the Rights of Man found some response in Prussia, but the ideas contained in them never took root there, and various interpreters distorted rather than cultivated the liberal principles involved. In Germany the cause of human liberty and individual freedom was gradually discredited by a host of conscious and unconscious critics from Kant to Spengler.

KANT'S CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE

Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) was the founder of what is called the "idealist" school. The provocativeness of his thought and the abstruseness of his expression resulted in his meaning many different things to many different men. He should not properly be brought into this discussion at all were it not for what certain German thinkers did with his philosophy as a starting point.

First of all, Kant made a distinction between two kinds of knowledge, one based on actual experience and sense perception, and another comprising those truths which we cannot know by experience but must assume to exist in order to get along in the world. These were the spiritual and moral truths. With regard to them, Kant said a great deal about freedom, but it was a peculiar metaphysical kind of freedom.

In this moral realm, Kant would assert, a man is indeed subject to law; but it is law which he finds in himself, and obedience to it, therefore, involves no restraint that is incompatible with freedom. This moral law is that which every man, acting as a rational being, regards as properly applicable both to himself and every other person. Once a man has discovered such a universally applicable law, he would be morally obliged to observe it. In fact, he could hardly do otherwise. This is what Kant called "the categorical imperative." Nevertheless, Kant insisted that the man would still be free because he would be obeying only laws of his own choosing.

When Kant applied this line of thought to human relations, he concluded that the aim of mankind was to create a society in which everyone would be a free agent who participated in the constitution and heeded the law only because he had given it to himself. Kant conceived of a society in which every man as a lawgiver was morally bound to make his own rules in such a way that they could have sprung from the united will of the people, and a man would be regarded as a citizen only in so far as he conformed to that united will.

If this appears abstract and theoretical, indeed it is. There are only two observations we wish to make about it. For one thing, Kant appears to have presented only the most lofty and rational argument for voluntary sacrifice and the doing of one's duty; but the emphasis which he placed upon duty and obligation appealed especially to people nurtured in the tradition of Frederick William. For another thing, Kant's assumption of a "united will" that could be arrived at rationally and to which everyone owed a moral obligation contained the germ of thoroughgoing authoritarianism. For it was possible to argue that the leaders of the state, being rationally more adept than the commonality, were better qualified to discover the united will which, when discovered, commanded the obedience of everyone to it.¹

Actually Kant was no authoritarian, because of his insistence upon moral freedom, but he regarded the state as a highly centralizing and unifying power. When it came to the formation of government, Kant regarded the social contract as a principle binding all men together in mutual respect for the law which each one was capable of discovering for himself; and it seemed rational to him that, during the process of coordinating a state, those within its borders should transfer all power to it and accept the obligation to obey it. In his *Philosophy of Law* Kant stated clearly that the state had rights but no duties toward its subjects.

One could not reject this reasoning readily if the state actually represented the moral law which each citizen arrived at, or would have arrived at, through use of his own reason. But in actual prac-

¹ The same criticism may be made of Rousseau's philosophy to which Kant was indebted for inspiration. Some such reasoning was used to justify the Jacobin dictatorship of Robespierre. Our point is that while political development in France and England subsequently followed other ideas, it was these that were followed in Prussia.

tice this would hardly be the case, and the possibilities of abuse in the practical application of such a theory are tremendous.

At any rate, Kant's thoughts fitted in with the Lutheran and Prussian idea of duty, and they formed subsequently the basis of political idealism in Germany. Many philosophers and historians were captivated by Kant's conception of society, and thinkers like T. H. Green and Thomas Carlyle in England employed his ideas to demand more authority for the state. In Prussia, Kant's genuine liberalism was frequently ignored, and the most extreme interpretations of his ideas of duty appeared in the teaching of Fichte and Hegel.

FICHTE'S NATIONALISM

Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762-1814) began his career as a liberal critic of absolutism and ended as a conservative advocate of strict authoritarianism. In metaphysics his contribution was to have removed Kant's distinction between pure and practical reason. Kant had claimed that man's knowledge was limited by the fact that everything had to be interpreted in terms of human experience and that the real "thing-in-itself" was therefore mysterious and unexplainable. Fichte, however, felt justified in assuming that there was really no difference between what actually existed and what man's rational experience led him to believe existed. He believed that the mind, through a process that he called "intellectual intuition," was able to know the fundamental nature of the outside world of sensation.

In moral philosophy Fichte was truly liberal in that, like Kant, he felt that the basis of morality was man's free moral will. Instead of Kant's universal moral order, however, Fichte conceived of a great and universal Will. This Will was a difficult thing to describe, and Fichte never did it adequately. But he felt that the true individual self of each man consisted of a kind of inner urge or will to reach perfection and that each of these individual wills was but a member of a great universal Will, unable to exist apart from it, and existing only to participate in the struggle of this great Will to higher things. But freedom, for Fichte, consisted in the liberation of man from both his base internal instincts and any external fac-

tors that might hinder him in the exercise of his moral free will or his urge to perfection.

This is all very abstract, but it has an important bearing on the philosophy of the state which Fichte subsequently developed and in which we are primarily interested. Fichte's liberal metaphysics were the product of his earlier years. From 1800 until his death in 1814 Fichte lived in Berlin, and for much of that time he was a professor in the university there with the double task of teaching moral philosophy and inspiring patriotism. The nature of his work, plus the authoritarian atmosphere of the Hohenzollern capital, and the advent of conservatism that sometimes accompanies advancing years, led Fichte to say things about the political state which he might not have said before. But what he did say became a part of the German national tradition.

It was possible to conclude from Fichte's idea of freedom that, in political matters, the purpose of government was to remove external hindrances to the exercise of man's moral freedom and the fulfillment of his urge to participate in the universal Will. It was possible to go further and assume that if, in the performance of this function, the government interfered with the actions of the individual and imposed all kinds of restrictions and prohibitions upon him, these would not constitute a restraint upon freedom, but an advancement of it. Fichte, however, never insisted upon these conclusions, and his conception of the state remained a liberal one in which guarantees of individual freedom and liberty of action played a large part. His ideas about political economy and nationalism, however, overshadowed his somewhat inconsistent attitude toward liberalism in government, and his philosophy of history concluded with an idealistic vision of the submergence of the individual in society, an idea that could be misinterpreted as being almost totalitarian.

According to Fichte's philosophy of history the world was to be explained as the result of an evolutionary process in which progress was determined by masterful persons who symbolized or carried out dominant ideas of their times. Fichte imagined five great epochs, the first two comprising the era of instinct and the age of reason which, so long as man remained innocent, was a kind of

paradise on earth where the moral law of the free will ruled supreme. A third period comprised the development of rational society into absolutism, and this was followed by a fourth period (Fichte's own) characterized by revolt against tyranny. In a final stage, absolutism and individualism would be merged into a new order, the complete and voluntary identification of the individual with the state or society.

In the economic sphere, Fichte desired absolute national self-sufficiency, complete government control of business, and extreme economic isolation. Some of the details which he suggested in his book, *The Closed Commercial State*, were that currency that was valid abroad, such as specie, be taken from the hands of the state's subjects and exchanged for money of purely domestic value; that the ordinary citizen be forbidden to leave the country; that the state regulate and control all production, consumption, exports, and imports; and that the state even steal, if possible, foreign patents and copies of foreign machinery. Such demands for state authority were, of course, unpopular with liberals, and, it must be admitted, they were not espoused even by the autocratic administration of Prussia. But they constituted a description of nationalist economics which the Nazis adopted later.

Fichte became a nationalist late in life. At one time, when he was apparently under the influence of Kant's essay on *Perpetual Peace*, he had felt that international cooperation, based upon a strong political and economic organization with world courts and a mixed administration endowed with real power, were necessary for the realization of human progress. But he concluded that only through the nourishment of separate national cultures within national states could humanity eventually profit.

Fichte expounded the idea of national unity and national culture with disunited and defeated Germany especially in mind. He bemoaned the lack of unity and cohesion among the Germans, but he was enough of a romantic to see value in the diversity of society and in the inequalities of men and nations. There were, Fichte said, inferior and superior nations, each with its own destiny and talents; and the benefit of humanity depended upon the cultivation of these separate talents and destinies, rather than upon any attempt to achieve a uniform level of culture in the whole of

Europe. The national differences which Fichte recognized were for him based not upon race, but upon cultural and economic factors, and primarily upon language.

Fichte was not the first to consider nationalism as fundamentally linguistic, but his presentation and use of the theory was able and challenging, and it contributed much to the growth of modern ideas about national patriotism. For Fichte, a nation was more than a group of people or a political state or a geographical area; it was something of intrinsic value, a dynamic and creative community whose people interpreted their culture, their soul, the nation's soul, through their language.

In describing the role which the German nation had played and was to play in the history of mankind, Fichte indulged in all kinds of forgivable and unforgivable exaggerations. It will suffice to remark here that, according to him, the German contribution was the one thing which gave meaning, purpose, and permanence to Western civilization, and that without the Germans the world would have been backward and degenerate. This kind of talk aroused German intellectuals at the time, and it has afflicted many of them ever since.

It may be pertinent to remark that, although Fichte based his definition of the nation upon language, he made one exception. He would not accept Jews as members of a nation even though they spoke its tongue. He was violently anti-Semitic, but not because of any racial doctrines. His wholesale condemnation of Jews appears to have been emotional and completely without tangible motivation.

Fichte's ideal of the voluntary identification of the individual with the state (society?), his advocacy of national autarchy, and his exaggerated ideas about the importance of German culture justify his inclusion in a list of the intellectual forbears of Nazism. In addition, he exerted considerable influence upon Hegel, whose place in such a list is even more unquestionable.

HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY OF ABSOLUTISM

Four years after Fichte died in 1814, his chair at the University of Berlin went to George Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831) whose philosophy of the absolute state was far more radical than Fichte's.

When Hegel's fame reached its zenith he was the uncontested leader of thought in Protestant Germany. His greatest rival was Goethe, the humanitarian, the cosmopolitan, the individualist. Of the two, Hegel's political philosophy triumphed. Although the Nazis rejected many of Hegel's ideas, they owed him much and granted him a place of honor. They disavowed Goethe, however. Goethe was politically a rank conservative indeed, but his broad-minded universalism was incompatible with the Nazi *Weltanschauung*.

Hegel was more dogmatic and absolute than Fichte. In his *Philosophy of Right* he demanded that the state be honored as divine, much as Luther, three centuries before, had proclaimed the divine nature of royal rulers. He sought to prove the reality of God, but his Deity was an impersonal one. His attitude toward religion seemed to be that of a moralist who applied Luther's disciplinary interpretation of Christian principles to the state.

As a matter of fact, the Prussian version of Protestantism had by this time degenerated into what was little more than an impersonal state ceremony required of civil servants and members of the armed forces. The church was dominated by the state, and, in spite of a brief flurry of mysticism in court circles, the official religion had lost its intimate personal appeal. It became a public function, with services conducted by officials who were Prussian subjects first and ministers of the gospel second. Many of the pastors neglected the gospel of love and emphasized the moral law of the state, identifying it with the law of God.

Hegel, like Fichte, sought to replace religious dogma and mysticism with philosophical proofs of God. Fichte had identified God more or less with what he called "the Universal Self"; Hegel identified God with the Absolute. His argument comprises the most complex philosophical speculation in the history of thought.

Reality for Hegel, as for Fichte, existed in an inner self, a mind, or urge, or spirit. The metaphysical problem he faced was to discover and prove somehow the relation between the individual's inner self and an ultimate reality above or beyond the individual which one might term a "moral order," "a universal spirit," or "God," or, as Hegel did, "the Absolute."

Knowledge about any one thing, Hegel averred, was impossible except in terms of its opposite. A man could know himself, for

instance, only in terms of what he once was or in terms of other people and things not himself. Moreover, life, he said, was a process of combining opposites. A man could not be virtuous without actually resisting sin, and his spirit was the force that compelled him to carry on such a struggle. Not only a man's life, but all life, then appeared to Hegel as a struggle between opposites; and the great reality was a universal spirit pervading everything and compelling it to struggle with its opposite. Hegel's unique idea was a conception of life and history as a process by which this spirit gave birth to perpetually recurring struggles between opposites in a kind of historic evolution, the final step of which would be the realization of perfection and the disclosure of the universal mind. His idea was that the result of each struggle, the "synthesis" between each "thesis" and its "antithesis," constituted a nearer approach to the Absolute.

The only reason this abstruse philosophy interests us here is because of its practical application in political philosophy. Each idea or institution, according to Hegel, was to be regarded as the latest "synthesis" at any given moment and therefore the nearest approach to the universal mind. Politically then, the absolute state as it existed in Prussia was the nearest approximation to this divine universal mind and therefore deserving of support, obedience, and even reverence.

The state was very important in Hegel's philosophy for yet another reason. His metaphysics had led him to assert that the individual was nothing considered apart from society and that a man completely detached from others not himself had no value or purpose and really no existence. He therefore concluded that freedom was not lack of contact or conflict with others, but that it consisted in as complete a contact with society as possible. And the freest man was he who most intimately identified himself with society. Freedom then, according to Hegel, could only be achieved by voluntary coordination of an individual with the group. And since the political state was the most complete development of the group, only by living within it and identifying himself with it could the individual know himself or grasp the meaning of life.

It was because of some such reasoning as this that Hegel was able to say, as he did in his *Philosophy of History*, that "the state is the

actually existing, realised moral life" and that "the state is the divine Idea as it exists on earth."¹ Such a conviction led Hegel to dismiss democratic philosophy and representative constitutions as based upon false assumptions and to justify in detail a thoroughly totalitarian state system, to laud as most nearly perfect the authoritarian Prussian state.

Let us pursue Hegel's ideas a bit further. If the state was divine, its morality would be beyond human cavil. Moreover, if one state could be identified with the Absolute, so could another. The two would naturally compete for supremacy, and a new synthesis would arise out of their rivalry. If one state, more powerful than another, conquered its neighbor, this would be a new synthesis almost divinely ordained. War then was not only inevitable, but a part of the divine plan. This conclusion left Hegel unperturbed. War, he observed, was beneficial as well as necessary since in wartime citizens grew more conscious of being a part of the national entity. Long periods of peace, Hegel felt, would result in the deterioration of the state and of life itself, since life was struggle. This is about as far as one could go in justifying the principles of absolutism, national superiority, and conquest that were characteristic of what we call "Prussianism."

Fichte had never gone so far. When he spoke of subservience to the state or identification with the state, he meant an ideal state, not any that actually existed. When he lauded German culture, he recognized the right of other nations to have their own governments and their own cultures. He had wanted a closed commercial state, economically isolated, but he did not think in terms of expansion or conquest. Hegel, however, justified conquest as the fulfillment of the law of life.

A few more remarks will serve to clarify Hegel's idea of the state and indicate its similarity with the Nazi conception. The role of the family in Hegel's society was quite limited. The family was to be regarded simply as a unit to be incorporated within and permeated by the state. Its value was to be measured by its usefulness. The home was to be simply a place of shelter and reproduction. Sentiment and love were to be discouraged and ignored. The social

¹ G. W. F. Hegel, *Philosophy of History*, The Colonial Press, New York, 1899, pp. 37-54.

status of women was to be narrowly restricted to the maintenance of the home and conduct of family affairs.

Economic life, Hegel felt, should be organized on the basis of guilds, and a "corporate" state established wherein the different vocational and professional groups voluntarily submitted to state control. Individual property rights should be exercised only at the sufferance of the state, and in the interest of the state. This would eliminate traditional economic classes in favor of new castes whose economic privileges would be determined by their relative importance to the state. The highest of these new castes, Hegel thought, should be the military, whom he regarded as the first line of national defense. The deified state might also reject ideals of humanity and conventional morality since it was to exist upon a higher level than that of humanity. Hegel also felt that the German nation was best qualified to fulfill his idea of the state and that the German spirit was that which most nearly approached the newly arising universal spirit. Historically, he taught, cultural leadership had passed from the ancient Orientals to the Greeks, thence to the Romans, and finally to the Germans, and that the German idea of the state as developed since the Reformation demonstrated the Absolute's recognition of Germany's right to political supremacy. This is sound Nazi doctrine and altogether Teutonic.¹

ROMANTIC NATIONALISTS AND HISTORIANS

Numerous German men of letters, contemporaries and successors of Fichte and Hegel, further developed a brand of German nationalism best exemplified by the words of Hoffmann von Fallersleben's poem, now Germany's national anthem. The double meaning of "*Deutschland ueber alles*" is quite apparent. It means both Germany *before* everything else, and Germany *over* everything else. There has been some debate about this, but there is enough evidence of German claims to superiority, even during the years when

¹ Paradoxically, Hegel's political philosophy provided inspiration for Karl Marx and scientific socialists as well as for Prussian nationalists. Marx substituted materialism for Hegel's idealism, but employed Hegel's dialectics. He advocated a social state while other disciples of Hegel preached the national or folkish state. The national Hegelians and the Marxian Hegelians disagreed about many characteristics of the state, but they both defended its absolute power. Thus Hegel was an intellectual source of two widely divergent forms of totalitarianism—National Socialism and Soviet Socialism.

the nation did not exist as a political unit, to indicate that the song is a challenge to the rest of the world as well as an expression of deep devotion to the nation.

One of the first exponents of German nationalism was Johann Gottfried Herder (1744-1803) who advocated before most writers the fusion of German lands into a folk state. Although German particularism offended him deeply, he regarded Germany as a cultural unit rather than a legal organization. He was opposed to absolutism, and it was no idea of his that unification should be based on the military and political power of the Prussian state. His patriotism was founded on a belief in the soul of the German people and admiration for the common language and cultural traditions of the folk. He felt that Germany could experience a rebirth if only the spirit of the past were rediscovered and made the basis of social, political, and cultural life. These ideas constituted a revolt against the prevailing rationalism and aroused the opposition even of Kant.

Herder's enthusiasm for the German past led him to believe that Gothic and German were synonymous, an idea enthusiastically adopted by German Romantics. The fact that Gothic was one of the visible symbols of romanticism in all western Europe did not lead them to doubt this thesis. It merely buttressed their belief in the superiority of German culture. Surging Gothic arches represented for them the German striving for the infinite. They were not consciously exclusive nationalists, but there developed with them the idea that *Deutscheit* (Germanity) and *Deutschtum* (German-dom) were the very essence of life. Forests, trees, lakes, and flowers were German; the sky, the clouds, and the stars were German. Nature, life, and art were German. Unwittingly these German romantic poets deprecated things foreign and fostered a belief that the German mind alone had access to the infinite, and that only Germans strove to embrace heaven by building Gothic arches and cathedrals. During the Napoleonic wars, many of the German romantic poets naturally wrote martial verse or went to the wars, thus fusing their art with military and patriotic action.

Another disciple of Herder was Joseph Goerres, a journalist and passionate enemy of France, who agitated ceaselessly for German unity. He proposed a folk state based upon "historical and cultural

rights" and including Alsace, Lorraine, Denmark, Switzerland, and the Netherlands. Goerres and his followers were much impressed by the importance of culture in fashioning the nation, and they were led with the philosopher Schelling¹ to regard the guardianship of religion, the arts, and sciences as a primary function of the state. This emphasis upon the cultural aspects of German Nationalism diverted many Germans from politics, and the German middle class tended to leave state affairs in the hands of their traditional rulers.

The relative refinement of Herder's and Goerres' cultural nationalism was not a quality to be found in the doctrine and practice of Friedrich Ludwig Jahn (1778-1852), the boisterous father of the *Turnvereine*. Jahn was anti-intellectual, in spite of his university education, and he was intentionally rough and ill-mannered, as if it were true that one was looked upon as a liar if he tried to be polite in German. Jahn's book, *German Folkdom*, written in 1810, was a rebellious work influenced by bitterness over Prussia's defeat, and many of his ideas foreshadow Nazi doctrine and practice. He thought in terms of the physical or biological purity, as well as the linguistic and cultural purity, of the German nation. He was originally isolationist, but, after Prussia's military victories in 1814, he was an outspoken expansionist. He disapproved of the Christian church as it existed in Germany and wanted to substitute for it a German church of "Northern Christianity."

Jahn's campaign for the physical regeneration of Prusso-German youth led to the foundation of a political movement of Gymnasts (*Turnvereine*) who were particularly numerous in all the universities and who served as a military free corps during the War of Liberation in 1813-1814 like the Storm Troopers and SS battalions of Hitler's Reich.

Certain German historians of the nineteenth century produced a more practical variety of nationalism than the cultural traditionalism of Herder or the romantic patriotism of Jahn. Among them, Heinrich von Treitschke (1834-1896) was the most influential. His belief in the military virtues, in the state as the embodiment of force, in the state as above private morality, and his prejudice against Jews,

¹ Friedrich Wilhelm J. von Schelling (1775-1854), romantic philosopher and interpreter of Fichte's idealism.

small nations, socialists, materialists, and money-bags mark him as an intellectual standard bearer in the march of Prussianism toward National Socialism.

As a youth, Treitschke had been a liberal, but the failure of the German liberals in 1848 led him to look for Germany's regeneration through a strong state and policies of force, and in his mature years he developed a political philosophy in which the state was the embodiment of power. He advocated opportunism and force, *Macht-politik*, which had been favored by Prussian rulers like Frederick the Great and which found clear expression under Bismarck and Hitler.

With a naivety incomprehensible to an outsider, Treitschke regarded himself as a liberal even to the end of his days. But his readiness to grant all kinds of power and special morality to the state in order to foster and protect the national culture left little room in reality for individual liberties. Treitschke had little sympathy for democratic institutions even though he defended a parliamentary two-chamber system. His ideal was a parliament that accepted rather than determined state policies, and his idea of individual freedom was so hemmed about with acknowledgements of the state's prior claims, that it was practically nonexistent.

In religion and economics as well as politics, Treitschke forsook his early liberal views. He became convinced, for instance, that the state, in order to protect the national culture, ought to dictate the religion of the citizens and provide in its schools compulsory religious education in an officially approved creed regardless of the predilection of individual students. Like the Nazis and Fascists, Treitschke felt that the state could not tolerate any institution whose interests might be alien to those of the nation or whose power was independent of the state. Therefore, a church controlled by the state was tolerable; but a religion whose gospel might be opposed to nationalist ambitions Treitschke regarded as a threat to the national culture and the state.

Treitschke did not believe in equality either of nations or of individuals. Because he made a fetish of force, he asserted that small nations were comical aberrations of civilization condemned by the judgment of history to be subject to superior nations. Even among large nations he assumed the superiority of Germans and their his-

toric mission. He asserted that Germans had a capacity for deeper thinking, a greater sense of loyalty, and more thoroughness than other people, and he made scornful remarks about foreign countries. His contempt for alien cultures scattered among Germans misunderstanding and mistrust of nations beyond their borders. His technique of distorting historical data to substantiate preconceived judgments was readily emulated. As a consequence, German teachers systematically warped the beliefs of students with distortions of historic facts. Dangerous generalizations and wholesale misjudgments became a commonplace of German political thought and helped to develop the pan-German notions popular in the Second Empire and after.

Treitschke's swashbuckling philosophy recognized war not only as an ultimate tribunal in disputes between states, but as a moral good and "the one remedy for an ailing nation." War, Treitschke said, brought forth the heroism, bodily strength, and chivalrous spirit essential to the character of a noble people; it fostered the idealism which materialists rejected; it caused social selfishness and party spirit to be dumb before the call of the state in danger. "The grandeur of war," he wrote, "lies in the utter annihilation of puny man in the great conception of the State, and it brings out the full magnificence of the sacrifice of fellow-countrymen for one another. In war the chaff is winnowed from the wheat."¹

Treitschke was realist enough to know that war was not all glory and garlands. He was even an advocate of what might be called "total" war. It was perfectly equitable, he said, "to wage war in the most effective manner possible, so that the goal of peace may be reached as quickly as possible. For this reason the blow must be aimed at the enemy's heart, and the use of the most formidable weapon is absolutely justifiable."² Psychological warfare and fifth-column activity were foreshadowed by Treitschke's suggestion that a state may "take advantage of all the enemy's weak points, and . . . turn to treason and mutiny within its enemy's borders to serve its own ends."³ The Nazi doctrine of ruthlessness to "inferior" people is anticipated in Treitschke's statement that "A negro tribe

¹ H. v. Treitschke, *Politics*, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1916, Vol. I, pp. 66-67.

² *Ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 609.

³ *Ibid.*

must be punished by the burning of their villages, for it is the only kind of example which will avail. If the German Empire has abandoned this principle today, it has done so out of disgraceful weakness."¹

Treitschke's opinion that there were superior and inferior human beings made him extremely class conscious. He disliked providing equal educational opportunities for all, and he complained at the number of lower middle class youths entering the universities. His attitude toward the lower classes was patronizing, and he approved of organized social-welfare measures because he thought they would not only prevent social strife but compensate laborers for the absence of opportunity and equality.

Treitschke was not a Prussian, but a Saxon by birth. With his views, however, it is not strange that he was welcomed to the University of Berlin where, like Fichte and Hegel before him, he spent his maturer years carrying the torch for Prussian authoritarianism and overweening German nationalism.

RACIALISTS

Thus far we have tried to describe the ideas of several prominent German intellectuals who have stressed with fair consistency the importance of the state at the expense of the individual or who have assumed or asserted the superiority of German culture and the German people. They have done so generally by appealing to metaphysical argument or to history. We now come to a group of men, none of them German by birth, whose pseudo-scientific theories of race established a half mystical, half biological basis for belief in Aryan or Teutonic supremacy.

Racialism is a theory that humanity is divided into biological groups some of which are superior, and some inferior to others by nature, and that the superior groups are entitled to more power and privilege than the others. Such an idea has been prevalent in many eras. Men as great as Plato and Aristotle in ancient Greece distinguished between superior and inferior people, although the more liberal sophists did not. Aristotle believed, in fact, that differences between free men and slaves were ordained by nature, and that racial prejudice was a fundamental human instinct.

¹ *Ibid.* p. 614.

Although the Jews and the Christian church affirmed the equality of all men before God and the Protestant revolt served to reemphasize this ideal, social institutions were long based upon privilege, serfdom, and slavery. By the eighteenth century, the pressure of economic forces and the bold advocacy of natural rights by rationalist and humanitarian thinkers in western Europe and the United States helped to establish new social and political ideals in which the equality of all men, of whatever race or creed, played a large part.

The insistence upon equality was bitterly attacked by advocates of privilege, absolutism, imperialism, and authoritarianism. These men denied human equality both as a fact and as an ideal. After Charles Darwin's biological theories became popular, they frequently applied the idea of survival of the fittest to their argument. German advocates of racial discrimination derived their arguments from two other sources; first, the mystical and romantic nationalism of German writers; second, the teaching of a few Anglo-Saxon eugenists like Francis Galton, Karl Pearson, and Lothrop Stoddard, who adopted Darwin's theories of selection and claimed that "nature knows no equality." These men observed that life produced greater qualitative differences as its organic forms became more highly developed. They concluded that, since man was nature's most complex organism, he was thus the most variable and the least likely to have been created equal.

Most of these eugenists did not give political point to their reasoning except the American, Stoddard, who denounced the idea of natural equality as "one of the most pernicious delusions that has ever afflicted mankind."¹ Stoddard distrusted not only the idea of equality, but the principles of democracy in general. He claimed that eugenic science, by proving equality among human beings nonexistent, had completely undermined the liberal principle of equality in government. Equality, he said, was a creed of "undermen," dangerous malcontents impiously asking to share life with superior beings on an equal basis.

True racialists, however, went much farther than the eugenists in applying their theories to political and cultural life. They had

¹ Lothrop Stoddard, *Revolt Against Civilization*, Charles Scribners' Sons, New York, 1922, pp. 30-31.

two prophets: a Frenchman, Count Arthur de Gobineau (1816-1882), and an Anglo-German, Houston Stewart Chamberlain (1855-1926). Gobineau was the father of the school. His main work, *Essay on the Inequality of Human Races* (1853-1854), was a pseudo-scientific development of the thesis that between races there are pronounced biological differences of a mental as well as physical sort. Superimposed upon Mendelian theories about heredity, it became the nucleus of German racialism under Hitler.

Gobineau divided mankind into three racial units: the white, the yellow, and the black. Ignoring the cultural achievements of the Asiatics, notably the Chinese, he asserted that the white race was superior, the yellow race mediocre, and the black race inferior. He excluded Jews from among the white races and called them "negroid." Latin peoples, being mixed with Mediterranean races like the Jews, he classified as "Semitized." Inter-marriage between races, Gobineau thought, would lead to the decay of national civilization, although he recognized certain remarkable exceptions to this rule. But race mixture, he said, was responsible for such "unaryan" and decadent phenomena as democracy and liberalism.

Among the white races, according to Gobineau, the Aryans¹ were the most advanced, and among them, the Teutons ranked higher than all others. His intention had been apparently to justify in this fashion the overlordship of the French aristocracy as the pure descendents of the ancient Teutons, rather than to credit the modern Germans with sole claim to any racial preeminence. But his ideas aroused more interest in Germany than elsewhere, and the Germans naturally took special satisfaction in them. Richard Wagner, whom Gobineau met in 1876, helped to popularize the idea of German racial supremacy, and he passed it on to his son-in-law, Houston Stewart Chamberlain, who was a British expatriate and an ardent advocate of German imperialism.

Chamberlain, like Gobineau, was more writer than scientist; he

¹ There is no "Aryan" race. The word "aryan" comes from the Sanscrit and was used originally by Sir William Jones (1746-1794) to designate a group of Indian languages. Subsequently, the German scholar Frederick Max Mueller (1823-1900) extended the term to include linguistic groups of Central Asia. Mueller seems first to have used the term "Aryan race" which was readily adopted and widely misused in England and Germany, much to Mueller's discomfiture. There is certainly no Aryan race today nor is there such a thing as a German "race," from an anthropological point of view.

was an amateur in anthropology and a mystic in politics. His stuff appealed to German aristocrats who liked to hear that they were superior because, in spite of their cultural and political achievements, they had never been very sure of themselves. They seemed to suffer from inferiority complexes for which they compensated by boisterous self-assertion which Chamberlain's books appeared to justify. Many of them swallowed the idea of Aryan supremacy eagerly and used it to rationalize a deep-rooted anti-Semitism.

Chamberlain's *Foundations of the Nineteenth Century* was a favorite of Emperor William II. It provided an intellectual basis for Hitler's racial theories and for Alfred Rosenberg's *Myth of the Twentieth Century*. Along with *Mein Kampf* and Rosenberg's book, it headed the Nazis' required reading list.

The basis of Chamberlain's ideas was more fancy than science. Instead of stressing race as a biological phenomena, he emphasized the emotional experience of "race feeling." He was one of the first to ascribe German origin to great men of other lands, such as Dante, Columbus, and Jesus of Nazareth. The Nazis have exploited this idea to the limit, attributing not only the ancestry of Jesus but the greatness of Greece and Rome to Germanic invasions of the Mediterranean world.

Chamberlain characterized nearly everything of value in Western civilization as Germanic and was highly critical of other cultures, both past and present. Rome was great, he said, only because it destroyed Jewish influence and so prevented the semitization of the occident. When Germanic tribes invaded southern Europe, he continued, they carefully retained and Germanized only the best of Roman civilization and rejected all features unsuitable for Nordics. According to Chamberlain, therefore, the Teuton was "the soul of our culture" since all great European culture was basically German, and German Aryans "surpass all other beings; therefore, rightfully they are . . . the overlords of the world."¹

Chamberlain was outspokenly anti-Semitic. He did not accept Christianity as of Jewish origin. He complained that it had been semitized, but he felt that it had regained much strength by being "Aryanized" during the Protestant revolt. He opposed intermarriage with Jews and feared their intellectual influence. He de-

¹ H. S. Chamberlain, *Auswahl aus seinen Werken*, Breslau, 1934, pp. 67-69.

nounced all intercourse with them, the reading of their books, the study of their philosophies, or the enjoyment of their arts. He characterized democracy as an expression of decadence and linked it to Judaism. And he felt that a general decay of civilization could be prevented only by putting an end to the current process of Semitization.

It was a small step from Chamberlain to Alfred Rosenberg, the official philosopher of the Nazi party.¹ But Rosenberg was even less scientific or objective than Chamberlain. He turned racialism into a myth, and from the myth he developed a new creed and a new "German morality." He rejected Christianity as we know it and denounced the ideals of humanity and humility as signs of decay. He attacked the philosophy of love and pity as a distortion of Christ's real teaching. He accepted Christ only as a non-Jew and heaped derision upon his Jewish disciples. In place of Christianity, he recommended worship of the ancient Teutonic nature gods, supplemented by deified personalities from German history. In his Nazi Valhalla, Wotan would stand arm in arm with Bismarck, and Siegfried with Frederick the Great.

The racialism which all these men advocated was more than mere condemnation of "inferior" races. It became a very aggressive national creed with great political significance. As proposed by Gobineau, Chamberlain, and Rosenberg, it was the basis for belief in the supremacy of a racially superior nation which could only be Germany. It was used by the Nazis as a pretext for their ideological expansion and for the claim that a mystical tie existed between the Reich and people of German descent abroad. Its logical consequences would be the doom of the ideal of equality, the subversion of Christian and democratic ethics, permanent antagonism between "master races" and "slave races," and lasting war.

CAESARISM AND CYNICISM

As we have followed it, political thought in Prussia and Germany showed a trend toward state absolutism, racial mysticism, hero wor-

¹ It is curious that the outstanding advocates of German race superiority were "men either of a different race or of a different nationality; Gobineau, a Frenchman; Chamberlain, an Anglo-Scotchman; Hitler, an Austrian; Rosenberg, a Balt, who, until the World War, was a Russian subject."—Melvin Rader, *No Compromise*, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1939, p. 111.

ship, and a tendency to reject traditional morality. Hero worship was extended by nineteenth- and twentieth-century pessimistic philosophers to leader worship, or Caesarism. Nietzsche and Spengler, for instance, repudiated customary ethics and sought to establish a new morality excluding Christian love and pity, and exalting the strength of will embodied in tyrants. But we must introduce our discussion of them by a brief reference to another.

Arthur Schopenhauer (1788-1860) was a pessimistic philosopher who gave a new twist to the fundamental thought of Kant, Fichte, and Hegel concerning the relationship between mind and reality. According to Schopenhauer, beneath the mind, which produces the essence of life, there is a very strong energy, the Will. But, instead of believing this Will to be a constructive force comparable to Fichte's Will or Hegel's inner urge, Schopenhauer conceived it to be a "vicious power" responsible for the permanent struggle of life. Harmony and peace, he concluded pessimistically, were Utopian concepts incapable of realization.

This depressing philosophy was elaborated in 1818 in *The World as Will and Idea*, but it did not become very popular until the latter part of the nineteenth century. At that time it gripped the imagination of Richard Wagner, who composed his *Tristan* under its spell; and it appealed to Nietzsche, who transformed it from a negative into a positive philosophy.

Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche (1844-1900) accepted the idea of Will as the basis of struggle in life, but he interpreted it in terms of the Darwinian theory of the survival of the fittest. He believed the fittest to be the men with the strongest wills, the superior persons, or supermen, whose irresistible "will to power" was "beyond good and evil."

Nietzsche made no practical suggestions for a government of supermen. He was no racialist, although he was frequently misinterpreted as being one, and he thought of leadership in terms of a superior caste rather than any superior nation. It is true that he praised the Aryan race and called the Teutons "magnificent blonde beasts," a description which represented distrust and intellectual condescension as much as admiration, but he was not anti-Semitic. His contempt for the masses, and for Christianity and democracy, however, helped to pave the way toward totalitarian mentality.

Condemning his own century, Nietzsche looked forward to what seemed to him a nobler world:

The aspect of the European today makes me very hopeful. A daring and ruling race is here building itself up upon the foundation of an extremely intelligent gregarious mass. . . .¹

Nietzsche anticipated with satisfaction a "classical era of wars and revolutions in the twentieth century" because he thought it would harden and invigorate the world and produce a more heroic type of man and a new ruler caste. He believed that wars were necessary and sound, and he was not the least disturbed by the moral commandment, "Thou shalt not kill." Moreover, he advocated eugenic breeding to eliminate the unfit, the sick, and the weak although, ironically enough, he himself was physically weak and sick all his life and died after years of insanity in an asylum.

Nietzsche's uncompromising and challenging philosophy was not very popular in his generation. Yet his belligerent pessimism, his philosophy of the superman, and his advocacy of Caesarism found an increasing number of admirers as the years wore on, and many of them became convinced that they were destined to be members of the master race. Among these people, who represent a transition from disintegrating German liberalism to National Socialism, the most influential and universal thinker was Oswald Spengler (1880-1936), author of *The Decline of the West*.

Out of the philosophy of Schopenhauer and Nietzsche and his own vast store of knowledge, Spengler developed a pessimistic and fatalistic philosophy, and his gloomy outlook impressed the worn-out minds and hearts of the German postwar generation. His book, which is a work of enormous erudition, combined historical analysis with forays into the fields of biology, anthropology, metaphysics, mathematics, art, and culture in general. He discarded the traditional partition of history into ancient, medieval, and modern eras and divided history rather into separate cultures which he compared to living organisms with definitely recognizable eras of youth, maturity, and old age. The youthful age was a primitive one, he taught, a formative period characterized by myth, and aspiration,

¹ Fr. Nietzsche, *The Complete Works*, Oscar Levy, ed. Vol. XV, *The Will to Power*, T. N. Foulis, Edinburgh and London, 1910, aphorism 955.

and struggle. Maturity was recognizable in the highest development of all the forms of art, and science, and thought. But a culture's old age was identical with what Spengler called "civilization," by which he meant a society preoccupied with material things and techniques and bodily comforts rather than with the spiritual and intellectual goods such as religion, philosophy, the arts, and pure science. Between civilization and culture so defined, Spengler's preference was obvious, but he believed that Western civilization was now in this final and decadent stage. Gothic youth had been followed by the full flowering of a baroque period which, in turn, was succeeded by the present sterile civilization incapable of producing anything but gadgets and wealth and insipid imitations of the great creative work of a more glorious past. This was the "Decline of the West."

The future, Spengler thought, belonged to an entirely new culture, to be introduced by a youthful age of comparative barbarism and formless primitivism, whose leaders would be a sort of Caesarean supermen, approaching Nietzsche's ideal of a ruler caste. Their methods, their outlook upon life, and their ethics would be quite foreign to "the West" and would constitute a complete reversal of democratic methods and philosophy.

Such a train of thought led Spengler to distrust the social and intellectual standards of contemporary civilization. He rejected conventional morality, and he saw little hope in education, or intellectuality, because he had little respect for the average man's mental stature. Men seemed to him less creatures of intelligence and more like "beasts of prey," less noble than other animals which, at least, could not be accused of hypocrisy. Consequently, he felt that a new "ability to hate" was more important and worth while than a capacity to love.

If the broad outlines of Spengler's thesis found many adherents, even in liberal circles, there was wide disagreement over such detailed conclusions, and especially over the practical solution of the problems facing society. German liberals after 1918 were in the difficult spot of having their plans for a normal, evolutionary recovery of society rendered almost hopeless by the external and internal consequences of the First World War. In this situation many conservatives—we might call them "reactionary revolutionists"—adopted Spengler's program for a new Caesarism based upon a com-

bination of Prussian ideology and state socialism.¹ This program was a prophetic forerunner of National Socialism, but when Spengler was actually confronted with the rise of the Nazi movement and saw its character, he did not fully approve of it, and he never became a member of the party. Nevertheless, the similarity between his philosophy and that of Hitler is striking, if not in practical detail, at least in the ruthlessness and nihilism and contempt for humanity that was common to them both.

Spengler was one of the most scholarly advocates of ruthless absolutism. His erudition may explain why he never quite approved of the Nazis and never took the racial myth seriously. Intellectually he towered head and shoulders above the Nazi pundits to whom he showed the way and whose confused distortions of political and social realities comprised the body of National Socialist philosophy.

¹ See *Preussentum und Sozialismus*, Beck, Munich, 1920.

3 Fundamentals of National Socialism

THE MYTH OF RACE

The Nazi ideology comprised three basic concepts—race mysticism, a belief in the relationship between blood and soil, and the leadership principle. These concepts constituted the basis of the Nazi *Weltanschauung* and were expounded in three principal works: in the official program of the Nazi party, in Hitler's *Mein Kampf*, and in Rosenberg's *Myth of the Twentieth Century*. All of these publications reflected that Prussianism whose development was sketched in the previous chapters. The last of them appeared a few years before the victory of the Nazis in 1933; it was written by the Nazi party philosopher and educational supervisor, and, although it was never translated into English, it ranked next in importance to *Mein Kampf* as a reflection of Nazi doctrine.

Rosenberg's book is divided into three parts. The first commences with a very poetic but unscientific picture of the lost continent of Atlantis as the home of the Aryan race. By using Spengler's technique of culture analysis, Rosenberg tries to prove the myths of race and Nordic superiority.

In the second part of his book, Rosenberg deals with the "Essence of German Art." He measures culture with a racial yardstick and attempts to show the superiority of the Aryans, particularly the Teutons, by citing great works of art. He also elaborates the theme that the arts must be a reflection of the folkish character of the nation.

The third part is a forecast of "The Coming Reich" and a discussion of the main enemies of the racial folk state. These are, according to Rosenberg, the Jews—whom he calls the *Gegenrasse*, or opposing race—and the Roman Catholics. All seven hundred pages of the book are permeated with tiresome and laborious references to race, blood and soil, and the leadership principle.

Let us try to see what Rosenberg meant by race. It may be recalled that Hegel imagined a Universal Spirit, or *Urge*, motivating the world's struggle for perfection, the nearest approach to which

was the absolute state. Rosenberg agreed that the absolute state approached perfection, but he invented the "Soul of Race" as the motivating force in his world. The state itself, Rosenberg felt, was soulless, merely the political expression of the race. But the race had a soul; each race had a different soul, although it was not the sort of thing one could discover or explain by science or reason. About this soul, Rosenberg wrote:

Soul means race seen from within and vice versa; race is the outer form of the soul. To bring to life the soul of race means to recognize its supreme value and under its rule assign to the other values their proper organic place in the state, in art, and in religion. This is the task of our century: to create a new human type out of a new life-myth. . . .

Each race has its soul and each soul belongs to a race. . . . Each race in the long run produces only one supreme ideal. . . . This supreme value demands a definite grouping of the other life values which are conditioned by it. It thus determines the way of life of a race, of a people. . . . The life of a race, or a people, is not understood as a logical, philosophical process, nor does it follow natural laws. Rather it is the unfolding of a mystical synthesis, an activity of the soul which cannot be explained by reason.¹

Rosenberg maintained that race, in his mythical sense, was determined not only by physical and mental attributes, but by enduring spiritual qualities as well. Race characteristics, he said, could not be overcome by the impact of environment upon members of one race in an alien land or clime; and, even if physical adaptation to environment should take place, the mental and spiritual characteristics would remain through all eternity. This was tantamount to saying, of course, that anyone with predominantly German ancestry is still German and feels and thinks like a German—or should.

Moreover, among all the races of the world, Rosenberg claimed superiority for the Aryans, by which he meant Germans. Hitler had written that everything done in the way of culture was the product of Aryans. Aryan man is the "founder of higher humanity, the Prometheus of mankind."² Rosenberg claimed superiority for Germans, but could not quite claim purity for them, since even Nazi specialists admitted that Germans were a mixture of Teutons, Celts,

¹ Rosenberg, *Der Mythos des 20-Jahrhunderts*, Hoheneichen Verlag, Munich, 1933, pp. 2, 116-117.

² Adolf Hitler, *Mein Kampf*, Reynal & Hitchcock, New York, 1941, pp. 397-398.

Slavs, Wends, and Magyars. But in the course of centuries, they said, six basic Aryan types had developed: Nordic, Westic (Mediterranean), Dinaric, Baltic, Falic, and Ostic (Alpine).

Among these racial subtypes, Rosenberg explained, the Nordics are superior, although numerically the smallest group. Nordics are creative and valiant, he said, tall, lean, light-skinned, blond, and blue-eyed. Moreover:

The character of the Nordic race is distinguished by heroism and love of freedom; the Teutons are the ones who have given the world the conception of science and research, not to speak of the fact that the Nordics excel in loyalty and truthfulness. . . . There is no doubt that the Nordics, earlier than all of the other races, have been the bearers of a genuine culture in Europe. The great heroes, the artists, the founders of states are the offspring of the Nordic race. . . .¹

Notice that Rosenberg mentioned love of freedom as a special characteristic of the Nordic race. But this was a unique kind of freedom, as he explained:

Freedom, in the Germanic sense, means independence of mind, free possibilities of inquiry, the creation of a philosophy of the world, a genuine religious feeling. For Asiatic invaders and dark hybrids, on the other hand, freedom means unrestrained destruction of cultural values. . . . To grant outer freedom today to Czechs, Poles, and Levantines means to be delivered over to racial chaos. . . .²

On the basis of such convictions about racial differences, Rosenberg advocated the preservation of racial purity so that the truly superior races would not degenerate through intermarriage with inferior ones. Blood mixture with an inferior race Rosenberg called "incest," and he observed that its result was always "the death of personality, nation, race, and civilization. No one who has defiled the *religion of the blood*," Rosenberg wrote, "has ever escaped this vengeance of the blood, neither Indians nor Persians, neither Greeks nor Romans. Nor will Nordic Europe escape the same vengeance if it does not turn back."³

The decline of Greece, Rosenberg asserted, began when the "Nordic" Greeks intermarried, under their democratic system, with already mixed Mediterranean races; and the downfall of Rome he

¹ Rosenberg, *op. cit.* (first edition of 1930), p. 566.

² *Ibid.*, p. 111.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 22-23, author's italics.

ascribed to intermarriage between the patrician and plebeian classes. Therefore, he said, such intermingling was to be avoided, and even within the Aryan race precaution was to be observed. The Alpine race, for example, he demanded, should not be permitted to dilute Nordic blood too much because its characteristic sympathies for political democracy, pacifism, and lack of spiritual interest were wholly unsuited to the Teutonic character.

His belief in the superiority of the Germans led Rosenberg to claim that their excellence entitled them to unique privileges. There were no absolute values, Rosenberg explained, valid for all races, because each race represented a culture which has its own distinctive kinds of honor, loyalty, freedom, justice, and right. Some races had none of these elements of true culture and others had only some of an inferior sort, according to Rosenberg, but the Nordics possessed virtues of better quality and in greater quantity than any other race whatsoever. This circumstance, he concluded, required that the Nordics, like Nietzsche's supermen, should not be bound nor judged by conventional standards of morality, and that they should enjoy a special standard and a unique kind of right. Right, Rosenberg said, is what serves German honor, but he left it to the individual German to determine what honor required.¹

Obviously Rosenberg's curious theories could not be buttressed by scientific proof. To have any currency at all, they had to be accepted on faith, as a myth or a religious creed. The Weimar Constitution had declared that supreme power emanated from the people. Rosenberg's idea was that in a Nazi state, supreme power, or sovereignty, should come from a belief in the race myth, that the sacrament of "blood and soil," the mystical relationship between race and fatherland, furnished the basis of the state's power, the national existence, and the national entity. Therefore, according to Rosenberg, the foremost aim of National Socialism was to create a new nobility of blood and soil.²

These theories not only involved acceptance of a new and mystical faith, but they demanded a complete break with traditional Christian and democratic ethics. Rosenberg accepted the consequence readily. He had little sympathy for the Bible because, he

¹ *Ibid.* See pp. 563-580.

² *Ibid.*, p. 596. See also Richard Walter Darré, *Neuadel aus Blut und Boden*, I. F. Lehmann, Munich and Berlin, 1939.

said, it was written by Jews (non-Aryans of the most despicable sort), and he had no use for Christian ethics because, he asserted, they were formulated by Jews and Levantines and were alien to the Nordic soul. Consequently, Rosenberg and his followers, with Hitler's tacit approval, rejected Christian values and agitated constantly for the substitution of a new, Nordic morality.

ANTI-CHRIST

The National Socialist program of 1920 promised "liberty for all religious denominations . . . in so far as they do not constitute a danger to the state and do not militate against the morality and moral sense of the German race." The program stated moreover that the party approved of "positive Christianity, but does not bind itself in the matter of creed to any particular confession. It combats Jewish materialist spirit. . . ."

This apparent affirmation of Christianity was quite misleading. Interpreted by Nazis themselves, the party's religious program had an obviously anti-Christian import. For instance, from the Nazi point of view, the Bible contained enough of the "Jewish materialist spirit" to make it dangerous for the Nordic mind. Furthermore, individual religious sects appeared to Nazis as a potential threat to the total authority of the state, and they did not permit these sects to maintain their independent organizations without "coordination" by the Nazi government. Finally, it became clear that the phrase "positive Christianity" actually represented the creed of a new "German church" in opposition to the "negative" religion of traditional Christian sects.

True Nazis were not interested in "coordinating" the Christian churches; they wanted to abolish them. Rosenberg stated quite frankly during the Nueremberg Party Congress of 1938:

It is my firm conviction that the Catholic Church and the confessional churches in their present form must disappear from the life of our people, and I believe I am entitled to say that this is also our Fuehrer's viewpoint.

"The Nordic race-soul," he had written earlier, "strives to establish a German folk church of its own. The creation of this myth is one of the greatest tasks to be carried out in our century."¹ This was

¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 614, 615.

the word of the man entrusted with the supervision of *Kultur* in Germany.

Rosenberg's program for the reform of Christianity would have discarded Christian morality and substituted Nordic sagas and symbols for the Old Testament which, according to Rosenberg, comprised only "stories of cattle drovers and exploiters of prostitutes."¹ The personality of the Christ would have been analysed in a new light because, Rosenberg explained, it had been distorted by "Jewish fanatics like Matthew, or materialistic rabbis like Paul, or African jurists like Tertullian, or spineless mongrels like Augustine."² And the Christian faith as a whole which, according to the new Nazi exegesis, had once been aggressive, vigorous, and revolutionary but had long since become Jewish-Syrian in character, would have to be reinvigorated by the excision of such non-Nordic values as humility, mercy, pity, and charity.

It was these uniquely Christian virtues which aroused the most embittered opposition of the Nazis. Rosenberg explained that they only became part of the Christian tradition because Paul advocated them in the hope of winning support of the masses for a contemplated revolt. They were all right for orientals, Rosenberg admitted, but he felt that the spread of such Levantine values into Europe had wrecked the "religious genius of the Nordic spirit."³ And Reichbishop Mueller, the Nazi head of the German Protestant churches, stated bluntly that "Mercy is an un-German conception. The word 'mercy' is one of the numerous terms of the Bible with which we can have nothing to do."

All told, these Nazi ideas represented a radical perversion of the spiritual traditions of Christian civilization. Fanatical Nazis despised the crucifix as a symbol of death and supplanted it with the "sun-wheel" or swastika; and they replaced the sacraments with a curious "celebration of Nordic blood." Rosenberg even implied that the Fuehrer, Hitler, was the new Messiah of the Nordics.⁴

Among the neo-pagan Nazis who denounced the Holy Scriptures

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 614.

² *Ibid.*, p. 13.

³ See Lewis Spence, "The Neo-Pagan Movement in Germany," in *The Quarterly Review*, New York, July, 1940.

⁴ When he asserted, without mentioning Hitler by name, that the German church was to be "created by one man who longs as deeply for the purification of the New Testament as he has studied it scientifically."

as a Jewish threat to the Germanic spirit, there were three distinct groups. The "German Christians" were most moderate and advocated a purified New Testament, although they would have discarded the old. They admitted that Jesus grew up in an essentially Jewish environment, but they preferred to believe with Rosenberg, and H. S. Chamberlain before him, that Jesus was not necessarily of Jewish blood.

A second group, founded by General Eric Ludendorff and led, after his death, by his wife Mathilde, rejected anything faintly resembling Christianity. Ludendorff favored a return to the worship of Teutonic tribal deities: Odin, the god of virility, and Hertha, goddess of fertility, were his ideals. Professor Ernst Bergmann, who developed Ludendorff's creed in a book called *The Twenty-five Theses of the German Religion*, introduced the legendary Frau Holle, a famous fairy-tale character, as "German Mother-soul." He impiously identified Frau Holle with the Virgin Mary and frankly referred to Hitler as the new "Savior."¹

The Nordic Faith Movement, similarly neo-pagan, was more important than these other radical Nazi sects, however, and was more highly regarded among Nazis because of its stress upon race as an aspect of religion. The movement, founded by Professor Jakob Wilhelm Hauer, accepted neither Christian ethics nor Teutonic deities. It ascribed divinity to energy instead of persons and substituted a concept of Nordic struggle for the ideal of Christian peace. The result was a kind of political pantheism. There were twenty-seven articles in the creed of this new pagan faith as interpreted by Wilhelm Kusserow, and a quotation of the most significant ones seems worth while, since they were based upon the theories of Rosenberg and were evidently approved by him. The first eighteen articles comprised a new confession of faith, and the remaining nine described the ideological basis of a new Nordic state. Here are some of the more important theses:

I. We believe in the eternal struggle between the creative and the destructive powers on earth and the universe.

II. We believe in the eternal revelation in the Divine through the eternal laws of race, blood, and soil.

III. We believe in the unity of blood and soul in all beings.

¹ See below, p. 77.

IV. We believe and acknowledge that the species of man are embodiments of forces which differ in value and duty.

V. We believe and confess that the struggle for the fashioning of this earth is part of our eternal struggle.

VII. We believe and confess that the meaning of our life is the fashioning of the divine powers of the Nordic Race which lie within us.

IX. We believe in the immortality of Nordic Man, in the inheritance of his kind and in the everlasting Nordic Soul as power of the divine on earth and in the universe.

X. The moral law inherent in us demands the struggle for the preservation, growth, and unification of the Nordic races on earth.

XVI. The moral law within us requires us to watch over the honor of our people as our own and to esteem the honor of those of equal birth.

XVII. The moral law within us requires preservation and increase of those of health stock and elimination and destruction of all that is unfit to live.

XIX. The states and peoples of Nordic blood, while fully preserving their historic peculiarities and recognizing the diversity of Germanic languages, must stand by each other's side against all other races for defensive and offensive purposes.

XX. Wars between people of Nordic race are in conflict with the Nordic mission.

XXI. All that is of common importance must be secured as against other races.

XXVII. Economic life in the Nordic state shall serve Man; labor shall serve the folk comrades (*Volksgenossen*). Its fruits are due to them according to the amount and the quality of the results achieved. The accumulation of large fortunes or large landed property is contrary to the rights of freedom of Nordic Man.¹

The Nazis denied officially that they sponsored neo-paganism and pointed to their program of "positive Christianity." But such denials were mainly for foreign consumption. The Nazi ideology, logically developed, led inevitably to the repudiation of churches which did not accept the Nazi gospel, for the totalitarian state could not tolerate any cultural organization even remotely opposed to its principles.

THE LEADERSHIP PRINCIPLE

In Nazi circles, the expression "totalitarian" was seldom used. Instead, Germany was known as a *Fuehrerstaat*, or "leader state." Ra-

¹ The translation used appeared in issue No. 31 of the bulletins of the *Friends of Europe*, London. See also Carl Carmer, ed., *The War Against God*, Henry Holt and Company, Inc., New York, 1943, pp. 6-10.

cialists called it a *Voelkischer Staat*, or "folk state." So perhaps a more accurate expression would be *Voelkischer Fuehrerstaat*, or folkish leader state.¹

The leader of the state was both political head of the government and also the highest officer in the single political party. As a consequence, the party was the true source of authority in the state. But since the party, according to Nazi theory, was the clearest expression of the will of the racial comrades, the people were thus (in theory) represented after all. The German Reich was, accordingly, a tripartite political body, consisting of government, party, and leader. The Nazis called this concentration of power "unitarianism."²

The one-party system eliminated opposition and debate and made possible the absolute power of the leader. Nazi "cells" were distributed throughout the country. They guarded the party's authority jealously and encouraged faith in the metaphysical necessity of obedience. The Nazis, and Hitler himself, did not call this "dictatorship"; they called it "genuine leadership."

The first step toward the legal establishment of a leader state was the Enabling Act of March 24, 1933, passed by an overwhelming majority of the new Reichstag. This enactment was precipitated by the alleged communist arson which destroyed the Reichstag building. That incident and the trial which followed served to alienate many Germans from the liberal and radical cause, although it is now fairly well established that the fire was planned by high Nazi leaders. The Enabling Act, called a "preliminary constitution of the Reich,"³ curtailed the powers of the president of the Reich and gave the Hitler government authority to disregard the Weimar Constitution and rule by decree. Passage of the act, however, was due to terror. Most of the democratic and socialist members of the Reichstag had been arrested; those who remained did not dare to oppose the Hitler cabinet.⁴

¹ F. Morstein-Marx, *Government in the Third Reich*, McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., New York, 1938, p. 64.

² *Ibid.*, p. 67, where the author points out that Carl Schmitt first elaborated this principle in his book *Staat, Bewegung, Volk*, Hamburg, 1933.

³ Wilhelm Frick, Nazi Minister of the Interior, *Der Neubau des Deutschen Reiches*, Berlin, 1934, p. 7. Cited in Franz Neumann, *Behemoth*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1942, p. 51.

⁴ The Enabling Act had a precedent in the Weimar Republic. Under the chancellorship of Dr. Heinrich Bruening, Germany was virtually ruled by decree. Article 48 of the Weimar Constitution expressly provided for such a possibility.

After the Enabling Act had become law, the next step in building the leader state was the passage of the Reconstruction Act in January, 1934. Passed without debate, it granted the government sweeping power to promulgate new legislation. Most subsequent laws were executive decrees issued by authority granted in these two acts which had legalized the concentration of power necessary to the Fuehrerstaat. Henceforth Hitler could proclaim what decrees he wished and delegate his enormous powers to executive branches of the government. Only one check remained—the required approval of the president of the Republic.

The final step in concentrating political power was the fusion of the office of chancellor with that of the president. When Hindenburg died in 1934, Hitler assumed the combined role of president and chancellor. Armed now with the power conferred upon him by the Enabling Act and the Reconstruction Act, and backed by the "unitarian" organization of his party, the Fuehrer was more absolute than the Prussian kings had ever been. Henceforth, the ultimate decisions respecting the fate of the nation were left to one man—the Fuehrer.

After he had liquidated the last vestiges of constitutional democracy, Hitler carried the theories of Hegel, Nietzsche, and Spengler to their logical conclusion. These men had claimed that vital decisions had always been made by great leaders and that this was not only destiny, but the most desirable form of government. The Nazis broadened this idea by regarding Hitler as the expression or embodiment of the genius of the German people and by assuming that a mysterious bond linked the leader and the folk.

Such dogma, whether upheld by historical or metaphysical arguments, could be maintained only upon the assumption of human inequality and the outstanding superiority of the leader, although the precise qualifications of the leader and the nature of his alleged superiority might be subject to debate. Hitler himself implied that leadership demanded will power and energy more than intellectual genius; he regarded a combination of ability, determination, and perseverance as the indispensable requirements.¹ Walter Darré, former Minister of Agriculture, felt that character surpassed education and knowledge in importance. And Robert Ley, vociferous

¹ Adolf Hitler, *Mein Kampf*, Reynal and Hitchcock, Inc., New York, 1941, p. 485.

Minister of Labor, added that a good instinct was one of the most essential qualities of a Fuehrer who, he said, was "born and not made." Some of the leader's more devoted admirers felt that a leader like Hitler must have some special connection with the Almighty. Dr. Ley wrote in one of his National Socialist Training Letters, "We believe in this world in Adolf Hitler alone. . . . We believe that the Lord God has sent us Adolf Hitler that Germany should be established for all eternity." And Hermann Goering claimed a kind of divine infallibility for the leader. "Just as the Roman Catholics consider the Pope infallible in all matters concerning religion and morals," he wrote, "so do we National Socialists believe with the same inner conviction that for us, in all political and other matters concerning the national and social interest of the people, the Leader is infallible."¹

GEOPOLITICS

There remain to be described two other important aspects of National Socialist thought—geopolitics, and National Socialist economics.

Geopolitics is not the "static" science of political geography which defines relations between nations in terms of geography, assumes stable state boundaries, and describes conditions as they are, speculating little about what might be. On the contrary, geopolitics is a "dynamic" exploration of the soil and space as the bases of political power not just in the past, but especially in the future. Whereas political geography is definitely a child of geography, "geopolitics belongs to the realm of political science."² Specifically, German geopolitics examines the problem of *Lebensraum* (living space) and the establishment of German domination over the Euro-Asiatic land masses—to the consequent disadvantage of littoral countries.

In those areas today where geopolitical considerations do not dictate policy, international relations are based upon the fiction that all states are equal to one another and that each possesses sovereign powers. This fiction was first suggested by Hugo Grotius in the seventeenth century as a means of preserving peace. Al-

¹ Robert Ley, *Germany Reborn*, E. Mathews & Marrot, London, 1934, p. 79.

² Hans W. Weigert, *Generals and Geographers*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1942, pp. 12-13.

though anyone could see that vast inequalities in territory, resources, economic development, and cultural achievement did exist and, in reality, destroyed the fiction of sovereign equality, the fiction was adopted as practically useful and desirable. Actually, a compromise between the fiction of equality and the reality of inequality was the best that could be realized. In time of stress, even the compromise broke down, and issues were decided by power.

After the First World War, in an effort to bolster the ideal of sovereign equality, a system based upon "collective security" was proposed. Although intended as a practical program to preserve peace, collective security involved more far-sightedness and higher ethical standards than many states actually possessed. While many peoples clung to this new fiction, revolutionary philosophies developing in Italy, Germany, and Japan undermined it before their very eyes. The Nazis openly discussed the aggressive implications of their geopolitics, but Germany's democratic neighbors minded their own business and did not take the German geopoliticians too seriously.

The "invention" of geopolitics is sometimes attributed to Major General Professor Karl Haushofer of Munich, but this is wrong. Geopolitical thought developed during the nineteenth century in Anglo-Saxon countries as well as in Germany. Haushofer was but an eclectic who neither coined the term "geopolitics" nor created the science it describes. He himself never pretended to be its inventor and acknowledged his indebtedness to others. But he succeeded in making geopolitics a German ideology, and he is said to have inspired Hitler with his ideas to the extent that they became the driving power of the Nazi quest for world domination.

One of the first Germans to conceive of a German-dominated Central Europe was the economist Frederick List (1789-1846). But while he thought in predominantly economic terms, desirous of creating a Germanic customs union, the German geographer Frederick Ratzel (1844-1904) expanded political geography until some of his unusual conclusions took on a definitely geopolitical character.

Ratzel considered a nation as a biological organism whose only alternative to growth and expansion was stagnation and death. Expansion appeared to him, therefore, to be natural for every healthy

nation and even inevitable. It would involve a life and death struggle for survival which, Ratzel observed, would be ruthless and uncompromising without consideration of fairness or honesty. Only the toughest nation would win its "place in the sun."

German imperialists seized upon such a doctrine. Many of them absorbed Ratzel's teachings and began the campaign for *Lebensraum* (later for *Grossraum*, or greater space) which, they thought, could alone save the nation from decline. If space was a vital necessity for the growing German nation, the type and quantity of space to be striven for became the subject matter for geopolitical research. Was there, on this shrinking planet, sufficient space for several great powers? Could any of the smaller powers survive?

A British geographer, Sir Halford Mackinder, presented the world with an analysis of this problem in 1904 when he spoke to the Royal Geographical Society on the "Geographical Pivot of History."¹ He observed that in history, land-locked peoples had repeatedly attacked littoral peoples in Europe and Asia alike, and that Europe and Asia should be looked upon as a single geopolitical unit. The center of this Euro-Asiatic land mass he called the "Heartland." Germany and Russia, he said, were the two great powers competing for the Heartland. The possession of this area was, he felt, crucial for the expansion of power, and the position of littoral powers such as Britain, France, and Italy would be in danger if Germany and Russia were to become allied as the "pivot peoples of the Heartland," or, as we may add, if one of the countries should conquer the other and rule the Heartland alone.

Sir Halford broadened his concept fifteen years later, after the conclusion of the First World War, when he saw how unsatisfactory the peace terms were. He wrote a book which was then only a moderate success in Britain and an unqualified failure in America.² Anticipating a globe shrunk by improvements in communication, he foresaw a struggle for the geographical pivot areas. He enlarged his Euro-Asiatic "world island" by adding Africa to the pivot area. He anticipated the political unification of these enormous land masses and boldly asserted that they would be dominated by those who controlled the Heartland, for, "who rules East

¹ *The Geographic Journal*, London, April, 1904, Vol. XXIII, No. 4.

² Sir Halford Mackinder, *Democratic Ideals and Reality*, Henry Holt and Company, Inc., New York, 1919, reprinted 1942.

Europe commands the Heartland, who rules the Heartland commands the world island, who rules the world island commands the world.”¹

One of those who grasped the full implication of Mackinder's views was Karl Haushofer. He was that rare military man in Germany who was both an army officer and a scholar. He had studied several years in the Far East, and he was thoroughly acquainted with Japan and the Pacific area. He had learned much from the Swedish geographer Rudolf Kjellen (1864-1922) and he had appropriated from him his geopolitical terminology, including the word “geopolitics.” Haushofer had a deep respect for Mackinder and elaborated his ideas in the Institute for Geopolitics at the University of Munich.

Interpreted by Haushofer, Mackinder's pivot theory of the Heartland provided a scientific basis for the old German *Drang nach dem Osten*, the urge toward the East. It corroborated arguments favoring Germany's “natural” right to expand. It supported the Nazis who, in their program of 1920, had demanded “land and territories (colonies) for the nourishment of our people and for settling our surplus population.” Haushofer's geopolitics even pointed out the path for Germany's future policy of alliance. In the mid-nineteen twenties he published a book explaining why Germany should align herself with Japan against Britain, and why the United States would become involved in war with Japan, trying to save the empires of Britain, France, and Holland.² It was the first time that a larger public was confronted with the phenomenon of German geopolitical thought.

Haushofer himself never defined geopolitics precisely. He preferred statements in broad outlines, couched in an involved and flowery style, or he dealt concretely with specific problems illustrating his geopolitical philosophy. From these two sources and a variety of definitions proposed by his disciples,³ the broad outlines of Haushofer's geopolitics may be stated as follows:

Living space is essential for Germany and means the control of

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 150.

² Karl Haushofer, *Geopolitik des Pazifischen Ozeans*, K. Vorwinkel, Heidelberg, 1938.

³ See Derwent Whittlesey, *German Strategy of World Conquest*, Farrar and Rinehart, Inc., New York, 1942, pp. 81-82.

an area large enough to make the Reich self-sufficient and to maintain its large armed forces. This *Grossraum* is divided into "active" and "passive" areas. The "passive" area is the basic homeland, the *Hinterland*, where large reservoirs of manpower and essential raw materials may be stored and where the economy should be relatively independent of imports. The "active" areas are those strategic areas where the Reich's *Lebensraum* would be defended against contestants. Geopolitics is thus intimately related to military strategy, for only armed force can provide and defend living space.

The Germans regarded *Lebensraum* as indispensable to the Reich for two main reasons. One was the actual pressure resulting from a dense population. However, the Nazis did nothing to relieve this pressure either by easing their war economy, reapportioning their land holding, or negotiating with other powers for a settlement of their grievances. On the contrary, they insisted on more children. They required by law that the first-born son of a peasant inherit his father's farm entire and manage it. Younger sons were required to work for the older brother or leave the farm to join the army of dissatisfied seeking new soil. These policies, in addition to an armaments program offering guns instead of butter left no solution to Germany's population problem but expansion.

The other reason for German expansion was ideological. When Hitler came to power, geopolitics was "coordinated" with Nazi racialism and the doctrine of the soil combined with the racial myth. Although Haushofer never touched upon the racial myth, Nazis approached space as a racial as well as a military problem. Smaller states in the way of the "master race's" expansion they deemed unworthy of a national existence, and they boldly imagined the "liberation" and "coordination" of German-influenced culture areas which, they claimed, reached deep into Russia. Geopolitics and the racial myth thus united brought forth the ideology of "blood and soil," and geopolitics became a part of the whole Nazi *Weltanschauung*.

Haushofer and his followers believed that an entente between Germany and Russia was indispensable for the realization of Germany's geopolitical ambitions. The treaty concluded between the two countries in 1939 was a great victory for Haushofer; the inva-

sion of Russia was his worst defeat.¹ However, the jargon of geopolitics was definitely a part of the Nazi language, and Haushofer's ideas became an essential part of the Nazi philosophy. Geopolitical studies furnished information for various ministries, for the guidance of domestic policy and the determination of policies abroad, for purposes of education, and propaganda. Geopolitics produced global thinking in Germany at a time when isolationism flourished throughout the democratic world.²

Geopolitical activity in Germany concerned itself mainly with compiling facts about various regions of the globe. But in order to know how and why to find facts, students attended various institutes of geopolitics, the main one founded by Haushofer being associated with the University of Munich. Other geopolitical training and research centers included the *Arbeitsgemeinschaft fuer Geopolitik* (Work Group for Geopolitics) which was an educational bureau, and the *Reichsstelle fuer Raumordnung* (Reich Bureau for Space Organization) which popularized the concept of *Lebensraum* and may also have been active in redistributing populations.

These and other institutes collected scientific data in the fields of geography, climate, social psychology, politics, economics, and sociology for every area and country on the earth. Material suitable for military intelligence was also collected. A multitude of informants abroad paid by the state, furnished the institutes with the most complete data possible on the nature and potentialities of their areas.

Geopolitical instruction was also introduced into the public schools in many ways, and students were indoctrinated with cultural, racial, military, and economic reasons for Germany's expansion. Germany, the students were taught, was much greater than its actual territory and extended wherever Germans, German descendants, or German cultural influences were found. An example of this geopolitical indoctrination was an official school reader, *Vom*

¹ Weigert, *op. cit.*, pp. 155ff.

² An article on Haushofer's geopolitics, "Hitler's World Revolution," published in the *New Statesman and Nation* in London, August 26, 1939, on the eve of the Second World War aroused a mild sensation because of its novelty. See Robert Strausz-Hupé, *Geopolitics, The Struggle for Space and Power*, G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York, 1942, pp. 77-78.

Deutschen Volk und seinem Lebensraum (The German People and their Living Space).¹ In this book German school children found the following description of their Reich:

By German territory we mean every region of Central Europe which is inhabited by Germans in more or less permanent settlements and which have received its cultural imprint from the German people. This territory includes the heart of Europe.²

This *Nazi Primer*, as the book is known in this country, asserts that the forefathers of the Germans, the Norsemen, expanded in ancient times to find new living space and, mixing with foreign peoples, brought them their own culture. "The culture of Europe and particularly of antiquity, as well as all that is today based thereon, does not come therefore out of the East. Its origin lies in the North, to a considerable extent on German soil."³ After describing further German migrations, the book concludes that "the Germans flooded Europe from the Urals to Gibraltar, from the North Cape to Constantinople," and that "Europe, as a cultural and spiritual unity, is therefore the work of Germans."⁴

The *Primer* then lists in considerable detail the "German culture isles" within foreign territory, in Czechoslovakia, Romania, the Baltic countries, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Poland, and Russia. It admonishes young Germans to regard themselves as descendants of the ancient Teutons who forced their culture upon a degenerate Europe, and it implies that the greater spaces, belonging to the nations listed, are areas of German cultural influence and should, therefore, be eventually incorporated into the Reich.

The German desire for expansion pervaded the ideology of geopolitics and the result was a vicious political *perpetuum mobile*. Because the *Hinterland* could never be quite large enough for a suitable *Lebensraum* nor the "active" areas quite broad enough to defend it, one expansion would necessarily beget another, and the German "race" would invade even those lands which had nothing in common with German culture. The Nazis would have thought this proper too, because, according to them, the superiority of

¹ Translated by Harwood L. Childs and published as *The Nazi Primer*, Harper & Brothers, Inc., New York, 1938.

² *Ibid.*, p. 113.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 116.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 127.

the Nordics justified the subjection of lesser races. And there would be no limit to this expansion because, in Haushofer's own words, "the earth has long since become a single unit of power. No stone falls from the structure of a nation or a state without causing waves and repercussions around the earth. . . ." ¹ Consequently, for the German geopoliticians, "the whole earth is not too big for the expanding of the German 'race'—in short *Blut und Boden*." ²

NAZI ECONOMICS

The principles of Nazi economy are much misunderstood. To many people, Nazism appears to represent capitalism in its most extreme form, and Marxians, including Russian Communists, use the term "Fascist Capitalism" to designate the ultimate development of an economy based on profit. Their conclusions are wrong, but their misunderstanding is easily explained.

During the Weimar Republic, the democratic forces in Germany had been unable to wrest political control from the landed Junkers, industrial barons, and great bankers who had virtually ruled Germany before the November revolution and continued to rule it despite the new constitution. The Nazis came into power with the help of big industry and the banks. Fritz Thyssen, whose frank confession of having helped Hitler did not excuse him, was one among many capitalists who lent their great power and influence to the Nazi cause. ³

Because Hitler attained office with the financial backing of these powerful groups, it was assumed that he was their tool. Italian Fascism, from which the Nazis had borrowed some ideas, had not touched Italy's big capital and large estates, and it was surmised that the German Nazis would exercise equal restraint. For some time after Hitler became chancellor these assumptions appeared to be correct, but they became inadmissible since.

The Nazis outwitted the capitalists who had thought that the socialist ideas of the party's program served only to attract the masses and would not be carried out in practice. In the pursuit of their political aims, the Nazis did not hesitate before the inner

¹ *Weltpolitik von Heute*, Verlag Zeitgeschichte, Berlin, 1934, pp. 151-152.

² Whittlesey, *op. cit.*, p. 101.

³ See Fritz Thyssen, *I Paid Hitler*, Farrar and Rinehart, Inc., New York, 1941.

sanctum of German big capital. They demanded in their 1920 program that common welfare precede individual interests (Art. 10 and 24) and that unearned incomes be abolished (Art. 11). Furthermore, the program called for the nationalization of trusts (Art. 13), the introduction of profit sharing in the large industries (Art. 14), and a land reform to eliminate speculation and interest on mortgages (Art. 17). Hitler himself emphasized that the doctrine of "common interest before self-interest" was the spirit of the program and that the "abolition of the thralldom of interest" was the core of National Socialism.

Gottfried Feder, from whose economic conceptions Hitler derived his knowledge of national economics, stated the economic philosophy of Nazism as follows:¹

The duty of the state is to provide the necessities of life and not to secure the highest possible rate of interest for capital. National Socialism recognizes private property on principle and gives it the protection of the state. The National welfare, however, demands that a limit shall be set to the amassing of wealth in the hands of individuals. . . .

All existing businesses which until now have been in the form of companies shall be nationalized. Usury and profiteering and personal enrichment at the expense of and to the injury of the nation shall be punished with death. . . .

Finance shall exist for the benefit of the state; the financial magnates shall not form a state within a state. Hence our aim is to abolish the thralldom of interest.

When Hitler became chancellor, he could not realize his party's economic program immediately. German capitalism was still too strong, and the German economy too weak to survive a sudden drastic reform. So the Nazis created a new General Economic Council (*Generalrat der Wirtschaft*) in September, 1933, and appointed the most powerful men of big industry and banking to be members of the Council. This seemed a renunciation of their program, but in reality the Nazis did not give up their basic anti-capitalistic philosophy. As the party became stronger and gained more control over Germany's economic and political life, the less Hitler needed the help of the capitalists. Goering's Four Year Plan and the transition to a war economy introduced strict planning of

¹ Gottfried Feder, *Hitler's Official Programme*, George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., London, 1934, 1938, pp. 65-66.

production, and the power inherent in capital gradually shifted from private hands into the control of the Nazi state. Most of the once mighty *condottieres* of industry and commerce were forced to surrender their authority or retire. The outbreak of war in 1939, which most of them opposed, drove the remaining pillars of a once powerful capitalism out of power or even into concentration camps. The few who stayed on submitted to absolute "coordination." Wythe Williams, who perceived the full surrender of the capitalists better than most observers, wrote in 1941:

There is no such thing as straight capitalism in Germany. Bankers, factory owners, and directors of trusts still exist, and their position is high and exalted, but their every step is rigidly supervised and regimented by the State. They draw their dividend and other forms of profits, but in reality these are like salaries from the State more than anything else. . . .

A private right? There is no such thing in the Nazi Reich, even if the biggest banker in the land is involved. A vested interest? It may be an interest but it is no longer vested, for the State can take it away on a moment's notice. . . .

The outward forms of old-fashioned capitalism are preserved. . . . But actually, in all cases, the individual or the firm is told by the government just how much of his capital or earnings he may keep and how much he must transfer to the government. . . .¹

With this forthright analysis of the Germany economy, however, there was not universal agreement, and some writers insisted that, fundamentally, capitalism existed in Germany. Franz L. Neumann believed it had not undergone any substantial change since the time of the Weimar regime and that the Nazis did not have any consistent economic policy but proceeded entirely pragmatically, directed "by the need of the highest possible efficiency and productivity required for the conducting of the war."² E. B. Ashton, on the other hand, pointed out that the "economic structure of the Fascist community is quite as logical as all its other aspects,"³ and he stressed the difficulties of private capitalism under the total

¹ Wythe Williams, *The Riddle of the Reich*, Prentice-Hall, Inc., New York, 1941, pp. 100-101.

² Franz L. Neumann, *Behemoth: The Structure and Practice of National Socialism*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1942, pp. 228ff.

³ E. B. Ashton, *The Fascist: His State and his Mind*, William Morrow and Company, Inc., New York, 1937, p. 91

control of a state which supervised every phase of the economic structure.

As a matter of fact, there is no absolutely noncapitalistic state in the world, even in Russia, and the labels "capitalist" or "non-capitalist" depend upon one's definition. We assume that, in addition to the recognition of private property and the right to profits there are two further conditions essential to capitalism: first, that capital be in the hands of private individuals to invest and control largely as they themselves decide without undue interference from the state; and second, that the free possession of capital carry with it substantial economic power and political influence.

In Nazi Germany, however, political power was denied to the private capitalist. He might have political influence, but it depended upon his party affiliation rather than upon his possession of capital. In Germany also the owner of wealth could not dispose of his capital as he saw fit, but had to comply with orders from the government. In Germany, moreover, the requirements of the total state and not the profit motive determined the nature of the economy. Under these circumstances, it is hard to see how National Socialist Germany could have been called a "capitalist" state.

Douglas Miller revealed how, in Germany, only the war prevented the organization of great government trusts similar to those in Soviet Russia.¹ Three superindustrial groups were to have been set up: automotive, building, and machinery. Standard techniques and administrative uniformity were to have been introduced. The *fuehrers* of the enterprises had already been chosen. This abortive plan indicated how the Nazis intended to nationalize big trusts, and it was probably a development of the policy begun with the Compulsory Cartel Act of July, 1933, which had enabled the Minister of Commerce to "organize" and establish centralized control over the independent entrepreneurs.

For reasons of political expediency the Nazis had to postpone the fulfillment of their complete economic program; chain stores were not liquidated, and interest was not abolished—much to the disappointment of the mass of lower middle-class people who

¹ Douglas Miller, *You Can't Do Business with Hitler*, Little, Brown and Company, Boston, 1941, p. 21.

backed Hitler's election. But the Nazis did not renounce their basic economic principles, and their leaders, including Hitler himself, left no doubt of their opposition to economic individualism and their contempt of traditional capitalism.

The idea prevailed in some circles that the Nazi success in retaining the stability of the mark was nothing short of miraculous. Yet the explanation was simple enough. The first step, taken in the summer of 1933 upon the advice of the former democrat, Dr. Hjalmar Schacht, was to declare a moratorium on interest and amortization payments on all foreign obligations. Under the new ruling, German debtors did not need to buy foreign currency. They paid the Gold Discount Bank in Reichsmarks whose value was artificially inflated within the Reich. The German government got the money, and foreign creditors collected very little. The Germans preferred this partial repudiation to inflation, which would have ended National Socialism quickly enough, and the unilateral action involved was typical of nearly all decisions of the Nazi government concerning international relations.

In addition to defaulting upon foreign obligations, the Nazi government acquired enormous booty from Jews and other minority groups, not excluding Roman Catholics. Moreover, after each bloodless conquest, beginning with the Austrian *Anschluss* in 1938, the store of booty grew. And after the Nazis conquered almost all of Europe, loot from the subjugated nations was systematically absorbed into the German economy.

Although these tremendous spoils swelled the accounts of the German treasury, the Nazi economy remained essentially unproductive, since it concentrated almost entirely upon armament. The greater the armament program became, the more money went into unproductive channels and was, in consequence, lost for productive reinvestment. The Nazi government was thus forced to exploit other countries and to continue to do so.

Shortly after the *Machtübernahme* (seizure of power) in January, 1933, the Nazi government assumed almost total economic control in order to set up their war economy. Imports of nonessentials were virtually halted after 1934; and imports were permitted only for armament purposes after 1935. In spite of foreign boycott movements, German exports fell only slightly because

the Nazi government subsidized them heavily and was not concerned with the effects of reckless dumping practices abroad.

These practices, however, did not increase the value of the mark abroad. The mark became an increasingly disadvantageous medium of exchange, and Germany found it more and more difficult to pay for imports. The Nazis surmounted this obstacle and traded without cash by means of the barter system which Schacht introduced in 1934. Instead of observing the traditional practice in international trade, Schacht concluded individual treaties or contracts with each state. Under the supervision of appropriate national clearing centers, exporters in each country received payment in their own currency while the clearing banks transformed the international payments involved into a mere bookkeeping procedure and carried the balance on their books from one year to the next. Such a procedure, however, was bound to run into difficulties because "the factors which have originally made for an unbalanced trade persist and will lead to greater one-sided balances in subsequent years."¹ In negotiations with Germany, there was always the danger that she would not deliver goods in payment for material received. For instance, South Africa sold Germany the output of three years' wool but received very little of the promised locomotives and machinery in return because their export was banned by military authorities.²

The German economy was not miraculous; it was simply a crisis, or war, economy. It involved continuous economic warfare with other powers and a more or less permanent state of war within the Reich, for the geopolitical aims of the Nazis did not allow for real peace until the ultimate goal—the domination of the world island—was reached. It was an economy of complete and total restriction where government commandeering was a fundamental principle, where taxes were so heavy that even modest earnings were illusory, where prices were dictated and consumers' goods were rationed. The armed forces were given prior claim on almost all articles of modern civilization. Not only exports and imports, but also foreign and domestic investments were strictly controlled.³

¹ Miller, *op. cit.*, p. 74.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 76, 77.

³ See Antonin Basch, *The New Economic Warfare*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1941, Chaps. 2 and 3.

Owners of industrial or commercial enterprises were forced to act as the government's agents, but they had to bear all responsibility and received no extra pay. Private capital existed—on paper; but in practice it was being wiped out or transferred to party representatives in accordance with the Nazi principle that the total state could not tolerate any power which the state could not control.

It is true that some Nazi leaders, notably Goering and Ley, accumulated large fortunes and controlled important enterprises. But they were not capitalists in the traditional sense because their influence upon these industries was a consequence of their political position and not of their ownership. In the National Socialist state economy did not determine policy, but policy determined the economy. The economy was managed to suit the political situation. The possession of capital wealth was not important in itself because the state existed not to protect capital but to exploit it in the interest of the nation. This was Hitler's doctrine.

In order to impose their program upon the once powerful German private industry, the Nazis took over the Association of German Industry, an organization somewhat similar to the National Association of Manufacturers in America. They put it on a war footing long before the actual outbreak of war so as to meet the military needs of Germany's expanding army. Six divisions were set up: industry (subdivided into twenty-nine economic groups), trade, banking, insurance, power, and handicrafts. Moreover, a Reich Chamber of Economy, a sort of holding organization for the Central Association of Chambers of Industry and Economy, was set up parallel to the Association of German Industry, and branches were opened throughout the Reich. All manufacturers and most businessmen were compelled to join, and their political reliability was carefully investigated.

Agriculture was as thoroughly organized as industry and commerce. The Food Minister, who was also the "Reich Peasant Leader," established the *Reichsnaehrstand* (Reich Food Estate) in September, 1933, to control and coordinate farming activity. Membership was compulsory for farmers, and in 1939 the organization was incorporated into the Reich Food Ministry. The regimentation resulting from this organization's activity almost entirely removed individual planning and free enterprise from the field

of agriculture. E. B. Ashton remarks: "Fascism pursued a policy as out of step with capitalist notions as the Russian system of collective farming. What the *Reichsnaehrstand* . . . did to landowners cannot be called capitalism even by the most doctrinaire Communist. Farming was brought under a system of regimentation—or, more precisely, conscription—to a degree known heretofore only in the Soviet Union."¹

In all these organizations to coordinate economy, Nazi party members saw, heard, and directed everything. The Gestapo had at least 120,000 agents, and many of these men were members of all central or branch organizations of industry, commerce, and agriculture. Conduct incompatible with the prescribed laws or ideology of Hitlerism was noted, and the offender who dared to differ with official views suffered bitterly.

- Thus the entire Nazi economic system was compounded of national planning, coordination, regimentation, coercion, outright thievery, and espionage. It was unconventional, to say the least, and cannot be judged in terms of classical economy. It certainly was not capitalistic in the traditional sense, as the former magnates of industry, commerce, and agriculture found to their sorrow.

¹ Ashton, *op. cit.*, p. 104.

4 The Method of Compulsion

THE NAZI PARTY'S TOTAL CONTROL

It has been pointed out before that Germany was subject to both state and party rule. The Nazi party could have absorbed the state if it had wanted to, but it never attempted total amalgamation, partly because it had too much respect for the old Prussian civil service, and partly because there were advantages in a double-faced administration. Like the military leaders of Japan, who tolerate a civilian government only to brush aside its decisions if these are not convenient, the Nazi party used government agencies to devise policies which could be disavowed at any time by the party.

The party's big responsibility was the organization of the Nazi way of life. Its own organization was efficient and highly bureaucratized. The Fuehrer of the Reich was also the supreme leader of the party. He had a party chancellery separate from the Reich Chancellery. Second in party rank was the deputy leader who had a chancellery of his own. Immediately beneath these men in the party hierarchy were the twenty-one party cabinet members, each heading a special party ministry. A party minister did not need to be a state minister. For example, the party's head of foreign affairs, Alfred Rosenberg, was never Minister for Foreign Affairs.

The departments in the party cabinet were:

National organization	Foreign office
Propaganda	National youth leader (Hitler Youth)
Press chief	Agricultural office
National leader of the press	Chief of staff of the Storm Troops
Chief party judge	Leader of the Elite Guards
President of the second chamber of the party supreme court	National legal office
Colonial policy office	Leader of the Reichstag
Treasurer	National labor leader
	Municipal affairs office

Subordinate to these main departments were the leaders of districts, counties, local groups, cells, and blocks,¹ and the mass of the

¹ District leader, *Gauleiter*; county leader, *Kreisleiter*; local group leader, *Ortsgruppenfuehrer*; cell leader, *Zellenfuehrer*; block warden, *Blockwart*.

party members, each responsible to his immediate superior. A number of "affiliated groups" with special status were controlled directly from the top because their leaders were in the party cabinet. Such groups were the SA (*Sturm Abteilung*, or Storm Troops), the SS (*Schutz Staffel*, or Elite Guards), and the Hitler Youth. The most comprehensive affiliated group was the Labor Front whose powerful leader, Dr. Robert Ley, was at the same time the national organizer of the party and the Minister of Labor. The national organizer, moreover, and the party treasurer supervised countless additional organizations such as the Industrial Cell Organization, Women's League, Students' League, offices for war victims and public health, associations of teachers, physicians, technicians, and public welfare.

The party, organized in this complex fashion, decided how German subjects should live and interfered with the lives of individuals in a way that defied the imagination of freedom-loving citizens of a democracy. The party's national organizer was like a great octopus "whose tentacles reach into every city and town, into every shore and village in Germany."¹ There was no private life in the totalitarian state; the individual was under the constant observation of the state's secret police and the party's supervisors. The Germans had lost their privacy, and Dr. Ley was delighted with the situation.

Ley, like Hitler, believed that "the peoples and the individual human beings are like children and must be treated as such," and he was proud that the Nazis "have developed a leadership of the people which makes it possible to investigate and examine every last citizen and tell him how . . . he must act . . . in every phase of life. . . . There is no such thing as a private individual in Germany." And if any complained that they wished to be left in peace, Ley would respond, "No, my friend, I shan't leave you in peace. I wouldn't think of doing such a thing."²

The party decided how children should be brought up and what names they should be given, what the position of women should be, how to look, how to dress, what to eat, what to read, what kind of entertainment to enjoy, with whom to be friendly, whom to marry, and what to talk about. The members of a family were encouraged

¹ Wallace R. Deuel, *People Under Hitler*, Harcourt Brace and Company, New York, 1942, p. 138.

² Quoted by Deuel, *op. cit.*, pp. 138-139.

to spy upon one another and report politically or socially dangerous remarks. Husbands, wives, and children denounced one another. The Reich Supreme Court declared that only two kinds of remarks were really "private": soliloquy, and entries in a diary.¹

The terrible agent in all this supervision of domestic life was the Gestapo (*Geheime Staats Polizei*, or Secret State Police) who were all-powerful. The decision of a German court was not binding upon the Gestapo; people who were acquitted in court might be taken into "protective custody" and held at a Gestapo prison or sent to a concentration camp. Before 1936 the regular police did not generally interfere in political matters, and victims of Nazi persecution vastly preferred detention by the police to a Gestapo prison. But a decree of February 10, 1936, greatly enlarged the Gestapo's power, and the regular police really became the executive organ of the Gestapo throughout Germany, dealing with political "crimes" and matters related to the possession of arms and ammunition. The concentration camps were, however, administered by party police (SS and SA detachments) under the control of the Gestapo, and the regular police had nothing to do with them.

The Gestapo, led by Heinrich Himmler, nominally subject to the authority of the President of Ministers of Prussia (Goering), was actually independent of restriction. It controlled everything imaginable and had extraordinary power. It could hold a person without warrant as long as it wished. Its methods of "disciplining" were subject to no restraint, and its tortures made the American "third degree" a child's game. It spied upon everyone, even the police and its own members, and operated according to the old Prussian belief that fear begets loyalty and faith. To implement its policy and carry out internal purges, the *Untersuchungs und Schlichtungsausschuss*² was formed. Officially, this body's task was to prevent discord within the party; in reality it "purged" failing party members. The entire system of espionage and counterespionage kept the party, and through it the people, in a mental goose step.

The Gestapo also spied on Germans and refugees abroad. Gestapo agents, thoroughly trained in Jewish religious customs, "fled"

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 148.

² *Utschla*, or Committee on Investigation and Conciliation.

Germany as Jewish refugees. By threatening violence upon relatives of real refugees still in Germany, they tried to blackmail their victims. In some cases they murdered prominent refugees and kidnapped others, returning them to German concentration camps, to make their threats more real.

Within Germany the party organization, especially the cell leaders and block wardens, supplemented the work of the Gestapo and assured strict adherence to Nazi laws and ideology on the part of every family and every individual. Although every member of the party was a potential agent for the party and the Gestapo, block wardens were particularly enjoined to be acquainted with the lives and thoughts and habits of people within their block. Cell leaders were active in organizations like the NSBO (*Nationalsozialistische Betriebszellen Organisation*, or National Socialist Business Cell Organization), the Nazi substitute for trades unions which were destroyed when Hitler came into power. The cells of this organization, thoroughly nazified, watched over every business enterprise, and the members played the role of political commissars. Both employers and employees, who had to be members of their respective organizations, were thus subject to the constant scrutiny of the cell leaders.

Required membership in the business cell involved even more than this intimate scrutiny. First one had to qualify as a member, be an "Aryan," and have a clear record of obedience and proper attitudes. Nonmembers could not find regular employment and might be drafted by the government for forced labor. This was the fate of most Jews under sixty-five, unless they happened to be conscripted by the armed forces. Moreover, membership involved the performance of certain extracurricular functions, such as participation in demonstrations whether the individual liked to march or not, attending indoctrination lectures, or working overtime if the government so commanded. Members had to attend regular "home" evenings in the local party organization, and they had to accept what was offered them as amusement or recreation.

Under Nazi rule, the citizen was a "social animal" in the worst sense of the phrase. He could never retire into the privacy of his home. And according to Dr. Robert Ley, he might not have the right of privacy even when he was asleep.

SOCIAL WELFARE

The paternalistic state which regards its citizens as "children" does provide some social benefits in return for the surrender of individuality and privacy. The Nazi state furnished social security and regulated relations between management and labor.

The Nazis denied that there existed a natural conflict between employers and employees. A business enterprise is not a private affair, they claimed, but a public trust, and its owner might not do what he wanted with it because the power and leadership which accompany ownership were delegated to him by the state. He was therefore responsible to the state, and the employees shared his responsibility. Both were supposed to work for the same end—the welfare of the community. Article I of the National Labor Law of January, 1934, stated: "In a business undertaking, the employer, as leader, and the employees, as followers, shall work together to further the purposes of the undertaking, and for the common good of the people and of the State."

The leadership principle was thus applied to business as well as to party and government. The National Labor Law required that the leader make all the decisions, and that the followers keep faith with him. He, in turn, was to care for the welfare of his employees. The fact that the owner was a leader automatically changed the relationship between him and his employees. His new status obviated the negotiations which used to characterize relations between workers and owners, both of whom assumed that a basic contradiction of interests had to be overcome. Supplanting the Workers' Councils established in 1920 in the interest of the employees, a *Vertrauensrat*, or Confidence Council, was created for the purpose of "deepening the mutual confidence that must exist within the work-community."¹ The Confidence Council actually represented a check on the business leader's authority.

Another institution which curbed the freedom of the employer was the *Treuhaender der Arbeit*, or Trustees of Labor. These trustees, appointed by the government, could override the will of an employer in case the body of his workers or the majority of the

¹C. W. Guillebaud, *The Social Policy of Nazi Germany*, Cambridge University Press, London, 1941, p. 23.

Confidence Council were against him. They were mediators responsible for industrial peace, and they handled questions involving wages, hours, and working conditions. While there were some negotiated wage contracts up to 1934, changes were made rarely after that year, and then only by order of the Trustees of Labor who knew that they had to keep wages and prices stable.

Strict wage control was begun in 1938. By this time, friendly relations with the great European powers had ceased, and Germany's extended arms program, the expansion of her military highways, and the construction of the Siegfried Line were taxing the labor resources of the Reich to the limit. Wages had to be kept down, but as in Russia, increased pay was provided for better work.

Two newly created courts defend the workers' rights. The "Court of Social Honor" dealt with matters of prestige and "honor." A regular Labor Court prevented unjustified dismissals, and no worker could be dismissed without good cause.

Perhaps the most popular social-welfare institution was *Kraft durch Freude* (KDF), or Strength Through Joy. Participation in the benefits of this organization was limited to members of the Labor Front. There was no compulsion to join KDF, but the membership of twenty-five million attested to the advantages of doing so. Strength Through Joy was much like the Fascist *Dopolavoro* organization.¹ Its best known peacetime undertakings were the holiday cruises in specially built or chartered luxury liners on which thousands of workers traveled to Scandinavia or the Mediterranean at amazingly low rates. This imposing organization provided a modern version of the old Roman bread and circuses for the masses. It also required its members to attend theater performances, concerts, moving pictures, and sports. It took care of the individual's natural urge for relaxation and enjoyment, but it also fostered loyalty to Nazism and served as an instrument of ideological indoctrination. A movement to beautify factories and workshops was also part of the KDF plan to keep the workers contented.

In addition to the operations of the KDF, welfare agencies administered the exemplary health and old-age insurance program begun by Bismarck in the 1880's. Furthermore, the *Nationalsozialistische Volkswohlfahrt* (NSV, or National Socialist Peoples Wel-

¹ See below, pp. 168-169.

fare) provided the *Winterhilfe*, or Winter Help for the needy. During the last campaign before the war, over 400,000,000 marks was contributed more or less voluntarily for this fund, but the distribution of the money could not easily be checked. Nazi statements were unreliable because they served propaganda purposes. However, since the number of unemployed diminished, due to slave labor, emergency work, war industry, and military conscription, it was not unlikely that the Nazis used the money to bolster their health insurance program and to help where, from a political standpoint, such aid would bring the best results.

The advantages of Nazi social institutions were, of course, limited to *Volksgenossen*, or racial comrades. Non-Aryans, Poles, Czechs, and other "inferior" minorities were excluded. Labor laws were also inapplicable to Jewish workers, many of whom were drafted for slave work in industry and who, like other minority workers, had to work in segregated units, with little pay, no rights, and no contact with Aryan workers. Nor did Jews receive any Winter Help assistance, although their ration cards allowed them less food, no clothing, and no delicacies (fruit or candy). Furthermore, minorities were restricted to certain shopping hours, and they could buy only what the Aryans left.

BREEDING SOLDIERS AND THE SUPER RACE

The birth rate declined in Germany during the years of the Weimar republic mainly because many parents were unwilling to risk raising children during the prevailing economic and political uncertainties, and also because birth control had become successful and abortions, while officially penalized, had become common. Democratic individualism fostered independent decisions in family matters.

The Nazis took a different view. They began an intensive campaign for more children and outlawed abortion as a crime against the state. They offered substantial loans to penniless young people who wanted to get married. These loans were cancelled and became outright gifts after the birth of the fourth child. In addition, *Kinderbeihilfen*, premiums for families with many children, were provided. These loans and premiums were paid out of a fund raised by bachelors' taxes.

The success of the Nazi population policy was enhanced by denunciation of women without children, the abandonment of traditional morals, and the open recommendation that girls bear children out of wedlock. The Nazis proclaimed that an unmarried mother deserved higher esteem than a married woman without children. Heinrich Himmler declared in 1939, in a message to German women: "A young girl who shirks her highest duty is a traitoress and like a soldier who abandons his flag. For pure-blooded German girls there is a war duty beyond marriage—to become mothers by soldiers going to the front."¹ The German Army promised special advantages to illegitimate children of members of the *Wehrmacht* by Dutch or Norwegian mothers. If such a child were acknowledged by the *Wehrmacht*, that is, if the father were proved to be a German soldier, the German state would pay for the child's maintenance. This provision may also have been extended to other occupied countries.² In the Polish town of Hellenowa, German boys and selected Polish girls were forced to serve for breeding purposes in a "camp for racial improvement." Children born to the girls were taken away from them to receive a state education in Germany. The couples were not permitted to remain together after their purpose had been fulfilled.³

Unmarried German girls who expected children were called "Hitler brides" and were very proud of their status. They were received in beautifully situated rest homes where they spent peaceful weeks before and after the birth. These institutions were under the supervision of the "Mother and Child Movement" (*Hilfswerk Mutter und Kind*). There were more than sixty such homes in which Hitler brides received free board and medical care. These girls were fanatically devoted to Hitler. Gregor Ziemer reports how food was blessed in one of these homes which he visited:

After the white-clad nurses had arranged the food, everybody turned towards the wall where hung an imposing picture of Hitler above a huge swastika. The women raised their right hands and spoke in chorus: "Our Fuehrer, we thank thee for thy munificence; we thank thee for this

¹ *Magazine Digest*, November, 1942, quoted from *Das Schwarze Corps*, official organ of the SS.

² *Svenska Dagbladet*, Stockholm, August 12, 1942.

³ Dorothy Thompson, *Listen Hans*, Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, 1942, pp. 261-265.

home; we thank thee for this food. To thee we dedicate our lives and those of our children."¹

The Nazi ideology, which rejected traditional ethics and morality, revolutionized the concept of sex. Mating came to be regarded in true Nazi circles as a mere "biological problem."² Accordingly, the Hitler brides were not only indoctrinated with Hitler's ideology but also were told that frequent intimacies with men were necessary to their well-being. "We know from statistics that most of the women who leave here conceive again within a short time," said the matron of one of these homes. "The separation from their men for several weeks, the daily talks about sex, the stimulating literature we give them when they leave—it all helps to raise the birth rate. And that is our ambition. . . ."³

From time to time the authorities investigated the progress of the children borne by Hitler brides. They expected these "state children" to be reared as staunch Nazis and fearless soldiers. They ran no risk that any mother might "demilitarize" her children, should she, by any chance influence or instinct, change her mind about the cannon fodder she had borne.⁴

In addition to this unorthodox promotion of extramarital procreation, the government encouraged marriage in its traditional form. However, before a marriage might take place, exacting examinations determined whether the candidates were fit to produce children desired by the Third Reich. A Marriage Health Law forbade the marriage of persons under guardianship or those with contagious diseases, hereditary diseases, and mental disorders. Among mental disorders, the Nazis listed criminal attitudes, homosexuality, and a state of mind dangerous for the community. Obviously, this last alleged disorder was subject to broad interpretation by the local authorities and was therefore used as a means of arbitrary restriction in special cases. But marriage was encouraged and the marriage loans, which became gifts if the offspring was numerous, and the premiums for additional children, created a situation in which "it pays to be prolific."⁵ Mothers with large families were deco-

¹ Gregor Ziemer, *Education for Death*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1941, p. 34.

² *Ibid.*, p. 35.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 35.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 42-46.

⁵ Deuel, *op. cit.*, p. 245.

rated with special medals in iron, silver, or gold, according to the number of children they had borne.

The party issued *Ten Commandments for the Choice of a Mate* which embraced its ideals and illustrated the objectives of Nazi eugenics. The first sentences of each commandment follow:¹

1. Remember that you are a German.
2. You shall maintain purity of mind and spirit.
3. Keep your body clean.
4. Being of sound stock, you shall not remain single.
5. Marry for love.
6. As a German, choose a mate only of your own kindred blood.
7. In choosing a mate, consider the ancestry.
8. Health is the prerequisite for even outward beauty.
9. In marriage seek not a plaything but a helpmate.
10. You shall desire many children.

The Nazis carried their eugenic principles to the extreme by introducing a notorious sterilization law for the "prevention of hereditarily diseased offspring."² They listed a number of illnesses which, they claimed, were recognized as hereditary by medical authorities throughout the world. Such illnesses were schizophrenia, congenital mental deficiency, manic-depressive insanity, inherited St. Vitus dance, inherited deafness, physical deformity, blindness, and (a controversial point) chronic alcoholism and addiction to drugs.

The law forbade the sterilization of men and women who could prove that their illness was not hereditary, but the number of people who were sterilized after the law came into effect was estimated to have been half a million by 1938, "while about three million more are said to be ear-marked for treatment."³ These figures are probably conservative. Moreover, sterilization is a "privilege" when compared with the inhuman procedure of castration introduced in 1935. By 1939 the Office of Race Policy admitted that about two thousand persons had been castrated. In all probability, the correct figure is much higher.

The practice of euthanasia or "mercy killing" by the Gestapo

¹ They are quoted in full in Lothrop Stoddard, *Into the Darkness*, Duell, Sloan and Pearce, Inc., New York, 1940, pp. 197-200.

² Law of July 14, 1933. *Reichsgesetzblatt*, I, p. 529.

³ James T. Shotwell, ed., *Governments of Continental Europe*, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1940, pp. 498-499.

has been reported. There has been no confirmation by the government, and the evidence available is slight. However, American reporters like William L. Shirer, Joseph C. Harsch, and Wallace R. Deuel heard that up to one hundred thousand unfit patients were killed, before the outbreak of the war, in various parts of Germany. These writers also reported that the Gestapo often used their victims to experiment with new poison gases.¹

This practice seems fantastic, but the Nazi policy of eliminating unfit people rather than caring for them was confirmed during the war by intercepted army orders according to which gravely wounded or maimed soldiers were to be given the *coup de grâce* on the field of battle. Furthermore, the practice of using human beings for deathly experiments and their bodies for chemical purposes was reported in Poland where mass executions of Poles and Jews aroused the horror of the civilized world.²

¹ Joseph C. Harsch, *Pattern of Conquest*, William Heinemann Ltd., London, 1942, pp. 227-228; William L. Shirer, *Berlin Diary*, Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1941, pp. 569-575; Deuel, *op. cit.*, p. 220. Cf. Stoddard, *op. cit.*, pp. 192-197; Stoddard is sympathetic toward racial breeding.

² The Nazis built so-called "extermination camps," death factories in the literal sense of the word. Such establishments were discovered by rapidly advancing Allied armies before the evidence could be destroyed. Most notorious were the camps at Maidanek and Oswiecim, Poland.

5 The Method of Indoctrination

THE PROPAGANDA MINISTRY

Hitler dedicated large sections of *Mein Kampf* to the necessity and technique of propaganda. He explained that a movement must distinguish between two groups of people—adherents, who agree passively with the movement's aims, and members, who work actively for the attainment of the movement's goal. The task of propaganda, he said, was to spread the new ideas, create sympathy for the movement, and attract adherents. The task of members, who in Hitler's case comprised the Nazi party organization, was to develop, select, and train new members from the vast body of adherents.

The first task of Nazi propaganda then was to collect a reservoir of adherents for later organization; it was also to hasten the decay of existing ideas and institutions by undermining them with the new ideology.

Good propaganda, according to Hitler, would impose a single ideology upon the whole people, "soften them up," make adherents of many, and prepare the rest to accept the victory of the movement. The more people this propaganda reached, the better it would be, Hitler observed, and the propagandist need not concern himself with the importance, knowledge, capability, or character of the people he reached so long as he reached a great number. For if the whole nation were mentally united by propaganda, he pointed out, a few men could handle the organization; and the more effective the propaganda, the fewer the men in the organization need be.

Furthermore, Hitler pointed out that the masses were "feminine" and reacted emotionally rather than rationally. Therefore, he said, propaganda should appeal to the emotions, especially to hate; and in order to arouse hatred, invective must be used, people must be defamed, and facts must be distorted. Propaganda has no relation to truth, Hitler declared, and the propagandist is free to lie

in order to reach his objective. Propaganda must be simple and correspond to the lowest intellectual level of the masses. Propaganda must also strive for virtual monopoly, and the Nazis, unlike the democracies which allow propaganda for all points of view, permitted only one—that for the Nazi ideology.¹

Shortly after Hitler came into power, a propaganda center was established to put Hitler's theories into practice and to persuade the people to welcome the "national revolution." The Ministry for Popular Enlightenment and Propaganda was created and entrusted to Joseph Goebbels, an utter cynic full of contempt for the masses who proceeded without conscience to cram the Nazi ideology down the throats of a gullible German public. His new ministry's mission was defined in a decree of June 30, 1933:

The Reich Ministry for Popular Enlightenment and Propaganda is competent to exercise spiritual influence (*geistige Einwirkung*) upon the nation; it will have to propagandize the state, culture, and economic life, instructing the people of Germany and of foreign countries about them; it will have to administer all institutions which serve these purposes.

According to Nazis, the aim of the ministry was to create a "unified will of the nation in the spirit of Adolf Hitler," and, in Goebbels' own words, to develop a "link between government and people." What Goebbels meant was that the people were to be persuaded to follow the Nazi leaders, since the people in Nazi Germany were never partners but only subjects of the government. The Ministry's task was not too difficult, because the German people seem always to have been susceptible to high-sounding phraseology and ready to adopt the current trends of thought, particularly in the field of politics where they lacked training and experience. The kaleidoscopic nature of these trends in pre-Hitler years accounts for the political confusion which characterized Republican Germany.

When the Nazis won unlimited power, they expanded their propaganda activities in a great effort to free the people from the necessity of thinking for themselves. Their attack was simple and direct. They avoided the professional jargon which characterized

¹ See *Mein Kampf*, Reynal & Hitchcock, New York, 1941, pp. 846-850.

previous government literature but which held little attraction for the average citizen. Their principles were simplicity and aggressive repetition. "It is the secret of effective propaganda," said Goebbels, "not to make statements about a thousand things but to concentrate upon a few facts only and to direct the people's eyes and ears again and again to these few points."¹

It was a fundamental belief of the Nazis that cultural life as an expression of the people was vitally important to the state, especially so since the Nazi aim was to create a new *Kultur*. Consequently, the Ministry of Propaganda took over supervision of all cultural activity, and to facilitate this aspect of its work, organized the Reich Chamber of Culture.²

The Ministry of Propaganda was divided into seven divisions. The first dealt with the administration of the Ministry itself, its legal and financial problems, accounting and personnel, its library, the Council on Commercial Advertising (a center for expositions and commercial fairs), and the Reich Chamber of Culture.

The second division managed the actual propaganda, manipulating and coordinating it according to the Minister's directives. It supervised the district and local agencies of the Ministry, dealt with the organization of celebrations and demonstrations, propagated racial myths, created national emblems and songs, supervised literature and publishing, maintained contact with youth organizations and sports, controlled the German Academy of Politics, and organized travel for propaganda purposes.

Division III supervised radio broadcasting and controlled the Reich Radio Corporation. Division IV dealt with the press and supervised domestic and foreign journalists. Division V was the motion-picture division which sought to use the cinema for propaganda purposes and to develop a new Nazi film art. Division VI dealt with the theater and fine arts, the management and direction of stage presentations. It was also interested in folklore and design. Division VII organized counterpropaganda against "atrocities" and other critical attacks upon Nazism both at home and abroad.

¹ Speech of March 5, 1933.

² See below, pp. 106 ff.

THE REICH CHAMBER OF CULTURE

Of the many devices which the Nazis used to imbue the German mind with the Nazi ideology, the Reich Chamber of Culture (*Reichskulturkammer*) revealed perhaps most clearly the thoroughness with which the National Socialists tried to conquer the people's thoughts and revolutionize their cultural concepts.

The idea that culture had nothing to do with politics was not in harmony with the Nazi concept of a total state. Cultural activity, the Nazis said, had to be mobilized to help implant the new ideology. So the Hitler government sought to control the personnel of Germany's cultural leaders and to select them on the basis of race and political loyalty. They set up the Reich Chamber of Culture, under the auspices of the Ministry of Propaganda, with the task of helping to "express and direct the national will and to keep it perpetually coordinated with the guiding maxims of the new State."¹

Culture, specifically the arts, grows out of the folk, the Nazis reasoned. As such it could not be artificially regulated. Nevertheless the Nazis believed that cultural creation was of public concern, and subject to guidance. Consequently, the Chamber of Culture was to exclude all "unreliable and unsuitable elements." It became the specific task of the chamber, according to a decree of November 1, 1933, to foster German culture first by "coordinating all the members of the different divisions, by regulating economic and social matters of the cultural professions, and finally by concentrating upon the cultural responsibilities towards the people and the Reich." The decree implied that not only creators but also distributors of a *Kulturgut* (cultural value) must be members of the proper branches of the organization. For example, not only writers but also publishers had to join the Literary Chamber.

The Nazi definition of a *Kulturgut* was first, any creation of the traditional arts shown or performed in public and, second, any other intellectual creation transmitted to the public by means of print, film, or radio. This comprehensive definition embraced all cultural activity, whether it were carried out for the common good or for commercial purposes, whether it were the work of individuals

¹ Law of September 22, 1933.

or of groups, of German citizens or foreign nationals, employers or employees.¹

The Chamber of Culture was efficiently organized. Its president was the Propaganda Minister himself; its vice-president was the state secretary of the Propaganda Ministry. Three directors acted as business executives, and a *Landeskulturwalter* (district culture warden) represented the Chamber in each of the thirty-one German Gaue, or districts.

This Reich Chamber was a kind of holding company for seven specialized bureaus, each of which was subdivided into a chamber proper and the association of cultural workers who were its members. The seven departments were those dealing with the fine arts, music, literature, press, theater, radio, and cinema. The individual departments of the Reich Chamber were each intricately organized so as to reach literally every person and group connected with their activities.

The Chamber of Fine Arts, for example, had departments dealing with painting, graphic arts, and sculpture; commercial art and design; associations of artists and artisans; art publishing and art dealing; household arts, interior decorating, and gardening. Membership in the Fine Arts Chamber was required of all sculptors, painters, designers, architects, interior decorators, art publishers, art dealers, and antique dealers who wished to practice their profession or carry on their business. All organizations connected with the fine or applied arts had to be members too, including art schools, artists' associations, art leagues, and other institutions for fine arts.

Specially drawn up official codes for each profession or group attempted to guarantee an art in keeping with the spirit of National Socialism. Fees and prices were regulated by statute, and the quality of work had to meet officially determined professional and commercial standards. Not a single type of art activity was ignored, but all was rigidly organized. Specific provisions even applied to cemetery stone masons and stone cutters. All art schools of any sort were supervised by the chamber. Art teachers were licensed only after they had met the required professional standards and satisfied the authorities as to their ancestry, political reliability, and personal

¹ Hans Hinkel, *Das Handbuch der Reichskulturkammer*, Deutscher Verlag für Politik und Wirtschaft, Berlin, 1937.

character. New schools might not be opened unless the chamber were convinced of the need for them.


The *Reich Chamber of Music* had six divisions which dealt with questions of general musical culture, music education, choirs and folk music, concert organization, musical instruments and printed music, and even the economic problems of the German music world.

Writing was officially recognized as a profession in Nazi Germany, as in Soviet Russia. But a distinction between journalism and true literary effort existed; the *Reich Chamber of Literature* dealt only with books. In addition to administration, its divisions supervised writers (grouped together as librettists, playwrights, copyright administrators), the book trade, book propaganda, libraries, address books and advertisements, and the economic problems of the German book trade.

The *Reich Press Chamber*, which was supposed to provide for the "self-education and recreation" of the people, had no less than fourteen divisions: the Association of German Newspaper Publishers; the Association of German Periodical Publishers; the Association of News Agencies; the Association of Religious Papers (separate Protestant and Catholic sections); the Association of the Radio Press; the Association of the German Press; the Association of Publishers' Employees; the Association of Press stenographers; the Association for Advertising Newspaper Trade; the Association of Readers' Circles; the Association of Wholesale Distributors; the Association of Newspaper and Periodical Retail Trade; the Association of Station News Stands. There was certainly no press activity omitted here.

The *Reich Theater Chamber* was a professional organization for all branches of the theater, vaudeville, and dance. Its eight divisions dealt with administration, legal affairs, opera, professional associations (state), variety (vaudeville), dance, public exhibitions, and the Association of State Publishers. The *Reichsdramaturg* (Reich Chief Dramaturge) was not actually a censor, but was responsible for the reliability of the authors, and for the supervision and promotion of stage productions.

A *Reich Radio Chamber* was included as a separate unit in the Chamber for Culture because the Nazis felt that radio, apart from



A DIAGRAM OF THE REICH CULTURE CHAMBER

its use as a news agency, was a new form of artistic expression. Its various departments dealt with propaganda (exhibitions and radio soliciting); economy and technique (industrial); radio law; culture (programs, microphone control, and professional radio associations). The chamber supervised the twelve main Reich stations and sixteen branch stations, as well as the amateur establishments.

The *Reich Film Chamber* was treated with special care and interest by the government because the Nazis regarded the cinema as one of the most important agencies for the propagation of the Nazi ideology. The Film Chamber's control extended over foreign and domestic news reels; casting, directing, and producing; film economics; professional associations of industrial, artistic, and technical film workers; and the associations of producers, distributors, motion-picture theater operators, film technicians, and documentary film producers.

Although policy was determined and supervision was exercised by the central organization, the activities of the individual chambers were promoted and subsidized by communal or municipal bodies. The private benefactor of the arts in Germany became a relic of the past. He would not have had enough money to subsidize the arts, and even if he had, the government would not have allowed him any influence in a domain which the Nazis claimed belonged to the state.

The state has had a distinguished record as a benefactor of the arts in Europe. German art institutions especially have long been largely subsidized by the state; therefore removing private influence from cultural affairs was not difficult for the Nazis, since most of the important cultural institutions were already under partial or total state supervision or control.

The Nazi organization of culture was stronger and more centralized, however, and its supervision was more strict, since the party intended to make art serve as political propaganda, and the leaders were determined to coordinate culture with their political ideology. As a result, the spiritual and intellectual value of German culture deteriorated, although the political value of what was now called "Kultur" increased.

The idea of a German *Kulturstaat*, or cultural state, has long been the dream of German idealists. But the Nazi version of the

cultural state was entirely political and designed to serve the total state by representing the Nazi ideology in all the forms of art and culture. The Reich government issued directives, and the local agencies saw that the individual artists, actors, and writers carried them out. Culture was thus made an instrument of political indoctrination within the Reich and of ideological propaganda abroad.

NAZI EDUCATION AND EDUCATIONAL PHILOSOPHY

The Propaganda Ministry, the Reich Chamber of Culture, and many party organizations including the Gestapo were the informal agencies of adult education. They made one gigantic school out of Germany. Yet the Nazi government gave even more attention to the training of children in order to safeguard the future of National Socialism. From its inception, the Nazi movement directed its greatest bid for sympathy to German youth. Nazi leaders considered the molding of young minds of decisive importance and took great care to organize education so as to provide concentrated training in Nazi ideology.

The Nazis inherited a well-organized system of schools. But they eliminated several types of secondary schools and completely revolutionized traditional German educational philosophy. They rejected the old German educational idealism, the *Bildungsoptimismus*, or belief in the value of liberal education in the humanities. Ever since the Reformation, when great humanists established classical education to train mind and character, German schoolmen have believed in the value of a nonutilitarian, cultural training for the élite. Methodological reforms in the nineteenth century did not change this point of view. The Nazis did change it, and, moreover, they adopted a new basis of selecting students for higher education.

German education before the First World War did not accord equal opportunities to the poorer classes. The Prussian *Dreiklassen-Wahlrecht* (three-class suffrage, based on wealth) was reflected in an educational system throughout Germany based upon economic and social distinction. Children of the poor were rarely able to obtain a secondary education and therewith access to positions of leadership. The Weimar Republic's educational reform, imperfect as it was, tended to eliminate such discrimination and emphasized

the principle of selection on the basis of intellectual ability. But the Third Reich introduced selection according to racial, physical, and political standards. It also revised methods and curricula, bringing them into line with Nazi ideology.

"The whole function of all education is to create a Nazi," declared Bernhard Rust, Reich Minister for Science, Education, and Culture.¹ So Nazi educators dismissed German *Bildungsoptimismus*. They did not want knowledge for knowledge's sake. They objected to the importance attached to the individual in pre-Hitler schools and, instead, demanded that the individual be looked upon as part of the "racial community" and not as a separate unit. They also wanted more physical training.

Hitler himself declared that the task of education was to develop healthy bodies rather than to burden the mind with too much knowledge. He demanded that physical training be the first duty of the school and the development of character the second. He wanted young people to be trained in will power and vigor of decision and made aware of their responsibilities. Only when these aims had been accomplished might the Nazi school be concerned with learning as it is commonly understood.²

In an address to the graduating class of the Adolf Hitler school in Croessinsee, Robert Ley stated bluntly, "You boys who have come through the strictest selection are perhaps not always the best scholars but undoubtedly the toughest."³

Germany's leaders also expected the schools to produce good Nazis, loyal supporters of the Nazi political regime. Dr. Frick stated on May 9, 1933, "The German school must form the political man who has his roots in his people whom he serves in both thought and action."⁴ And Education Minister Rust wrote, almost five years later, that the "National Socialist system of education is not the outcome of pedagogical planning but of political struggle and of the laws which govern such a struggle."⁵

All these statements revealed an anti-intellectualism which was typical of National Socialism. It resulted in lowered standards in

¹ *Voelkischer Beobachter* (Nazi party organ), February 13, 1938.

² *Mein Kampf*, pp. 613ff.

³ April 19, 1939.

⁴ May 9, 1933.

⁵ Decree of January 29, 1939, translated in *Educational Yearbook*, 1939, p. 185.

both secondary schools and institutions of higher learning. Pupils who formerly would have proceeded to secondary schools after the compulsory four years in the *Grundschule* were encouraged or obliged to complete their formal education in the higher elementary schools. Such elementary training used to be reserved for "intellectually slow pupils or children of paupers," but the Nazis made it the basis of German community life.

To make these views effective and also in order to check the increase of an "educated proletariat," access to the secondary schools and universities was severely curbed. A law against "the overcrowding of schools and universities" of April 25, 1933, cut the number of students to be admitted to higher studies in 1934 to 15,000 as compared with approximately 30,000 students entering the universities every year previous to the arrival of the Nazi regime. As a result of this law, total enrolments in German institutions of higher learning dropped from more than 130,000 in 1933 to less than 75,000 in 1936. These restrictions had to be relaxed later on, as it was found that the German universities and technical colleges were not producing a sufficient number of highly trained individuals to meet the requirements of the period of war preparation and of war itself. For some time, Nazi Germany suffered from a shortage of physicians and well-trained engineers.

Even more revealing of Nazi anti-intellectualism were the new criteria of selection applied to all those who wanted to proceed to higher studies. As laid down in the Selection Decree (*Auslese-Erlass*) issued by the Reich Ministry of Education in conjunction with the Racial Policy Board (*Rassenpolitisches Amt*), the decisive factors in the selection of students for advanced studies were to be racial purity and political reliability, not academic achievement.¹ Moreover, six months of service in a labor camp were a prerequisite for admission to the universities. Brawn became more important than brain.

Women were discouraged from attending higher schools. The education of girls, for the Nazis, was not the same as for boys. Hitler's own statement left no doubt as to his intentions in this respect: "The goal of female education has invariably to be the future mother."² Girls, in consequence, were only in rare cases per-

¹ Decree of January 29, 1939.

² *Mein Kampf*, p. 621.

mitted to proceed toward a university degree. At no time might they constitute more than 10 per cent of the total student enrolment. Coeducation, never popular in Germany, was outlawed. The secondary-school curriculum for girls differed from that for boys by stressing home economics rather than sciences.

The course of study in German secondary schools was reduced from nine to eight years for both sexes. So far as the young men were concerned, the reasons for this reduction may easily be traced to military and industrial requirements.

Bernhard Rust, in the Selection Decree mentioned earlier, proclaimed that National Socialism "has replaced the artificial conception of what an educated person is with the true conception of real man, that is, a personality shaped by blood and historical fatality." Only a closer analysis of the German educational program under the Nazis can show how this "real man" was nurtured.

THE SCHOOLS AND THEIR CURRICULA

Preschool education, or the Kindergarten, was developed by Swiss and German educators during the nineteenth century, but German authorities were not enthusiastic, and kindergartens never became state-subsidized institutions. They remained more or less municipal or private shelters for children of poor parents or playgrounds for children of the well-to-do. During the last years before the Second World War, only about 10 to 15 per cent of all children between the ages of three and six attended preschool institutions.

The Nazis controlled children in these early years only indirectly through the parents. Direct supervision began in the *Grundschule*, the common elementary school for all children between the ages of six and ten. Beyond the *Grundschule* was the *Volksschule* which offered an additional four years of free elementary education for all children who did not attend more advanced schools. The curriculum of these schools was changed not so much in form as in content. It included training in Nazi ideology, the racial myth, blood and soil, worship of heroes in general and the Fuehrer in particular. Subjects like biology, history, geography, and the German language were all used for purposes of indoctrination. Many famous works of

German literature were discarded and replaced with the propagandistic party literature of Nazi writers. The Nazi geopolitical philosophy pervaded all instruction, and health education was practically premilitary training.

Although school attendance was compulsory for all children aged six to fourteen, "non-Aryan" children were excluded from all public schools. For a time, the Jewish community was able to maintain a few schools for its own children.

Special *Hilfsschulen*, auxiliary schools for retarded pupils, existed for the purpose of segregating the mentally subnormal from the normal. Every community in which twenty-five children of low mental rating were born within five years had to organize such a school. The Nazis hoped that these schools would not be necessary after their eugenic measures had eliminated the mentally subnormal parents.

Vocational education, continued two to three years beyond the elementary schools, was required of all boys fourteen or over who did not attend any other institution. The vocational schools were called *Berufsschule*. Attendance was on a part-time basis, and no tuition was required. Fees were charged, however, at the *Fachschule*, a voluntary trade school with a full-time schedule.

The *Mittel- or Hauptschule*, middle or central school, was a compromise between the *Volksschule* and secondary schools. It had an enlarged curriculum with two more years of study than the *Volksschule* and was designed to train boys for minor industrial and commercial positions, but graduates were not prepared to enter a university. Middle schools usually operated in smaller towns only. Their organization was hardly touched by the Nazis, although their curriculum was nazified. Their existence, however, was hardly justified according to the Nazi educational philosophy, for they were not suited to leader education, and the Nazis regarded the enriched curriculum as an unnecessary luxury for those whose education was supposed to remain confined to the elementary level.

In the secondary schools, the Nazis discriminated against the humanistic curriculum of the gymnasiums which for centuries provided the main form of secondary education. By eliminating several varieties of these famous schools, the Nazis made the Ober-

schule, or upper school, which neglected the classics, the pillar of secondary education. The eight-year course after the completion of four compulsory years at the *Grundschule* afforded the students an opportunity to specialize in language or science only during the last three years. The classical curriculum was limited to a special form of the *Oberschule*, the formerly all-important *Gymnasium*. It was almost exclusively reserved for boys and accessible only after special examinations.

Another secondary-school type, created by the Weimar Republic, the *Aufbauschule*, or "building-up" school (that is, building up on preliminary training in the *Mittel- or Hauptschule*), was taken over by the Nazis. It was a simplified secondary school with a six-year course for youths between the ages of twelve and eighteen who had attended the *Grundschule* and completed at least two years in a *Mittelschule*. The schools were maintained for children in rural districts or small towns where *Oberschulen* did not exist.

The purged curriculum of the secondary schools was taught by means of rigid drill and strict discipline; corporal punishment was reintroduced. The character of the new curriculum was the outcome of the Nazi belief that political considerations are more important than scholarship. The individual fields of study were thoroughly nazified, and nearly every course was calculated to promote the Nazi ideology. This fact can be made most clear by a selective summary of Education Minister Rust's directives for secondary schools in effect January, 1938.

German: Apart from recitations in speech and writing, four special topics were to be stressed: *The people as a blood community* (race and inheritance, family tree and ancestry, folklore); *The people as a community of fate and struggle* (soldieri, heroism, war poetry, warriors of the First World War, women in wartime, the German struggle in border districts and abroad, colonies); *The people as a working community* (lives of workers, peasants, researchers, artists, housewives); *The people as a community of thinking and feeling* (Germanic *Weltanschauung* and feeling of life, state and folk in poetry, political thinkers in the spiritual struggle, nature and god).

History was to be taught as a series of periods, not necessarily related by any continuity of events, but certainly colored by the

character and deeds of great personalities, the "heroes" of their time. Factual accounts and unbiased judgments were not recommended if they resulted in an "irresponsible attitude of pretending to complete understanding falsely described as objectivity." The focal point of history was to be the fatherland and its racial philosophy. All historical material was to be interpreted with this fact in mind, and teachers were to relate it to contemporary events in the Reich. Hero worship was to be stressed; some of the heroes recommended were Bismarck, Queen Louise of Prussia, Marshal Bluecher, Frederick the Great, the Great Elector, the Knights of the Teutonic Order, some of the great Holy Roman Emperors, and Arminius, who destroyed the Roman legions in the Teutoburg forest. Dates to be remembered were to be those which portrayed German history as a development toward Hitler as the climax.

Subjects singled out for emphasis in German history from Bismarck's time to the present were: political Catholicism in attack against the German state; the schism of the German people into castes and classes; the emancipation of women as a sign of democratic degeneration; the growth of the folkish, anti-Semitic movement; the nature of English, Russian, French, American, and Japanese imperialism; the Dictate of Versailles; the Weimar Republic as a futile attempt to realize the west European ideals of 1789 in Germany; political Catholicism as an ally of the Marxist and capitalist Internationale; the Jewish world rule in Germany and Bolshevik Russia; the decay of parliamentarianism; salvation through Hitler.

Geography (still according to Rust's decrees) was to be taught as a political subject, making clear the "great tasks of German foreign policy." Germany and the areas which Germans inhabit were to be treated with special "love," and the rest of the world was to be studied particularly as throwing light on Nazi doctrines. America was to be treated as an example of the changes in civilization brought about by European migration and as proof of how great spaces could be conquered. The geopolitical concepts presented in *The Nazi Primer*, described above,¹ formed the core of Rust's suggestions for geography teaching in all the schools.

The aim of biology instruction (according to Rust) was not to

¹ See above, p. 83.

be the acquisition of detailed knowledge, but the understanding of the laws of life, the respect for the "incomprehensibility of organic unity," and the relationship of man with nature.¹ "All educational work of the folkish state must climax by burning into the hearts and the brains of youth the sense and feeling of race. There should be no boy or girl leaving school without having been led to the definite recognition that purity of blood is essential."² Instruction concerning plant and animal life was to be different for boys and girls because "the female sex, when compared with the male sex, comprehends the system of nature more by way of feeling and imagination than by intellectual analysis."³

Physics too was to be taught so as to inculcate respect for the incomprehensibility of nature. Too much speculation was to be avoided, and the teacher was to stress everything that might relate to defense and military matters, such as aviation, ballistics, sound measurement, and optics. Chemistry was also to be related to defense. Since the ultimate secrets of chemistry were presumed to be beyond the reach of human minds, Rust recommended that the "science of matter should get away from materialism." The researches and discoveries of chemists of Nordic-German origin were to be given special attention, the science of substitutes encouraged, and young chemists so trained that, in case of war, essential industries should not suffer for lack of competent laboratory workers. And finally, chemistry instruction was to provide knowledge "indispensable for the understanding of contemporary problems."

In spite of all these efforts to ensure "proper" political attitudes on the part of students, the Nazis continued to regard any formal academic training with suspicion. Obsessed with their fear of intellectual training, they preferred such educational ventures as the Labor Service as more in keeping with their idea of training for leadership. As stated before, the German youth had first to pass through a labor camp before entering the university. In June, 1933, Education Minister Rust had said: "I must state that the truly practical and great school cannot be found in the universities or the gymnasiums. It is in the Labor Service camps, for there is where teaching and words cease and the deed begins. Whoever is a failure

¹ *Erziehung und Unterricht in der Hoheren Schule*, Weidmannsche Verlagsbuchhandlung, Berlin, 1938, p. 141.

² *Ibid.*, p. 142.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 152.

in the Labor Service has no right to lead Germany as an academician."

THE LABOR SERVICE

The Labor Service was actually begun on a voluntary basis under the Weimar Republic for the purpose of taking unemployed young people from the city streets and affording them a healthful period of activity in the country. The Nazis made labor service compulsory (for men in 1933, for women in 1939) to facilitate a more intensive indoctrination of youth in the Nazi way of life as much as to decrease unemployment and build healthy bodies.

Each of the thirty-one Gaue in Germany was organized into eight Labor Service groups which were in turn divided into sections, the whole supervised by the Minister of the Interior. Six to twelve months attendance at one of the more than twelve hundred labor camps was made compulsory for young people aged eighteen or more, and before the Second World War, enrollment in the camps totaled about two hundred thousand.

The camps were organized in military fashion, with planned and organized activity during sixteen hours of the day. This activity usually included about six hours of manual labor and three to four hours of semimilitary training and political indoctrination. The actual labor was expended on drainage projects, farm work, road building, reforestation, and settlement work.

In addition to providing labor experience and vocational training, the Labor Service was intended to break down class feeling and promote the idea of national solidarity by mixing youth of all social and economic classes on an equalitarian basis. It was intended moreover, to instill in every young German respect for his duty toward the German community. The regimented, semimilitary life accustomed youth to discipline and respect for authority. And the political instruction carried further that indoctrination already begun in the public schools.

Each camp housed 152 men, including 17 administrative officials graded in a military hierarchy of 17 ranks. The "privates" received pocket money of 25 pfennigs a day. Their maintenance cost the state about 1 Reichsmark a day, but the state was amply compensated by the work accomplished.

Camp leaders were chosen from among deserving SA or party members. They were given training in special labor camps and were then appointed as camp leaders for ten-year periods. The fact that about twenty-five thousand future leaders were in constant attendance at these training camps indicates the importance which Nazi leaders attached to the Labor Service program.

THE UNIVERSITIES

After meeting the necessary requirements of secondary schooling and the labor service, young men were required to serve two years in the army. Only then were they permitted to proceed to the university. Here again, racial and political requirements for admission were as strict as the academic requirements. But what is more significant is that the Nazis completely destroyed the spirit of free, objective inquiry that was the glory of German universities in the past, and they substituted for it the biased approach of the anti-intellectual Nazi. There is no such thing as objective knowledge, the Nazis claimed; so all studies, even the physical sciences, were "subjectivized." Education Minister Rust explained the Nazi point of view in a speech at the five hundred and fiftieth anniversary of the University of Heidelberg in 1936.

"National Socialism," Rust said, "is justly described as unfriendly to science if its appraiser assumes that independence of presuppositions and freedom from bias are the essential characteristics of scientific inquiry. . . . National Socialism has recognized the fact that to construct a system of knowledge without presuppositions and without certain value judgments as its foundation is totally impossible." Objectivity, he continued, is a "pretentious assumption of absolute knowledge which paralyzes the powers of decision to such a degree that it may be used to justify the most deplorable conditions imaginable."

Professor Ernst Krieck, one of the outstanding educational theorists of Nazi Germany, explained the positive aspects of this new theory of knowledge:

Today we are striving toward a science which studies the whole man in the light of the great task of racial and political reconstruction which has become ours. In so doing we overcome the ancient antithesis between nature and spirit, individual and society, by stressing the unity

and totality of the great social structure of which we are a subordinate part, with particular emphasis upon its racial foundations.¹

Hitler himself put it more bluntly when he remarked that the slogan "objective science" had been "coined by the professorate simply in order to escape from the very necessary supervision by the power of the state." Hitler believed that "the idea of a free and unfettered science, unfettered by hypothesis, could only occur in the age of liberalism. It is absurd."²

Since science was forced to be subjective and was subordinated to the ruling ideology, the nature of the university studies and of student life changed correspondingly. The German universities, once noted for their spirit of objective inquiry, became regimented National Socialist drilling institutions. They stressed pseudo-scientific subjects like racialism, and they reduced the hours devoted to study, even in essential subjects like medicine. They were entirely dominated by the Nazi party and the National Socialist Student League which sponsored the shortening of study time against the will of most professors in order to obtain more time for party activities.

The Nazi university student was no mere seeker after truth or knowledge or professional skill. He was a self-conscious, self-appointed missionary of the Nazi gospel. In the words of Reich Student Leader Scheel, "a German student must be Hitler's political soldier and an exemplary National Socialist. His duty is not only to study, but also to participate actively in the nation's political life, which can only mean that students will be employed as propagandists, both in speechmaking and writing."³

This deterioration of academic life was bound to have serious repercussions in years to come when war and faulty education depleted the ranks of German scientists.

PARTY TRAINING SCHOOLS

The education of party leaders was intensified by institutions which specialized in ideological indoctrination. *Nationalpolitische*

¹ In a speech at the 550th anniversary of the University of Heidelberg, 1936.

² Hermann Rauschning, *The Voice of Destruction*, G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York, 1940, p. 213.

³ See regulations for registration in German universities, January, 1943.

Erziehungsanstalten (national political training institutes) were created in 1933 with a curriculum corresponding broadly to that of the *Oberschule*, but with a completely Nazi character and atmosphere. They were boarding schools which collaborated with the Hitler Youth Movement, though supervised by the Education Ministry. Students were under constant Nazi surveillance and discipline, and admission was more strictly controlled by the party than in the case of other advanced schools. Before the outbreak of the Second World War, about fifteen of these schools operated in Prussia, and there were a few more in other parts of Germany.

Another step toward the education of party leaders was taken by the Reich Youth Leader in 1937 when he established *Adolf Hitler Schools* in each Gau or district. These were also boarding schools on the secondary level, for boys twelve to eighteen, but admission was granted only to those specially selected by the local Hitler Youth leaders. The schools were state supported and tuition is free. About four thousand students attended them.

The graduate of an *Adolf Hitler School* became a natural candidate for the *Ordensburgen* (Castles of the Order) where the party's élite received the best leadership training available, according to Nazi standards. Immediately after secondary school, a candidate for the *Ordensburgen* had to finish two years of military service and, in addition, several years of practical experience in any sphere of life. If by that time his record were still clean, he might qualify to enter the *Ordensburgen* for a four-year course which cost the state about 50,000 marks per student. Four *Ordensburgen* were contemplated originally, one in the south, one in the west, one in the east, and one in the north of Germany. At least three of these were actually established. Candidates studied for one year in each place. The *Ordensburgen* were a strange cross between monasteries, country clubs, and military academies. Students between the ages of about twenty-three to thirty were accepted only after the Labor Front Leader himself was satisfied concerning their "aryan origin, their physical fitness, their loyalty to the Nazi state, courage and capacity to lead, familiarity with the Nazi ideology, good academic training, and excellent behavior."

The staff of each of the castles included a commanding officer and his adjutant, one master of education, one administrative

executive, and a staff of instructors. The student body was divided and subdivided into units of five men each. Physical exercise and competitive athletics comprised about two-thirds of the curriculum. The rest was ideological training.

There remains to be mentioned an institution set up in 1934 combining political training and social welfare. For boys, this program was called *Landjahr* (country-year), and for girls *Landheimjahr* (country-home-year). The idea was to give needy city children, on their leaving elementary school, some opportunity for physical improvement, some training in Nazi character formation, and some instruction in social and political living. Children from industrial areas whose parents might not be entirely reliable were chosen to receive the benefits of this program. Farmhouses and youth hostels were used by groups of boys or girls who, during the eight months of their *Landjahr*, divided their time between farm work and political study. While highly advertised at home and abroad as one of the great social achievements of the Nazi regime, the number of children taken to rural districts at any one time never exceeded thirty thousand.

For somewhat similar reasons, *Nationalpolitische Lehrgaenge* (national political courses of study) were established for secondary-school pupils. These provided intensified ideological training in healthy surroundings during about three weeks in the summer. Although the course was compulsory as a part of school work, parents were required to pay the costs of transportation and board.

Hitler is said to have remarked once that "there must be only one possible education for each class and for each subdivision of a class. Complete freedom of choice in education is the privilege of the élite and of those whom they have specially admitted."¹ Nazi schools were organized accordingly, and the varied schooling formerly offered to different social and economic classes was adjusted to serve different political classes. Elementary schools served the masses. Secondary schools enabled the party to select future leaders. Party boarding schools were for those whose background and personalities gave promise of especially reliable Nazis. And the Castles of the Order were for the "future members of a Herrenklasse (ruling, or master class) . . . who are masters of life and death,

¹ Rauschning, *op. cit.*, p. 42.

of human fear and superstition, who have learned to control their bodies, muscles and nerves and remain at the same time impervious to the temptations of the mind and sciences, presumably free."¹

In addition to these institutions of formal indoctrination, the Hitler Youth movement played an important role in German education. It removed children from the home and other influences potentially hostile to Nazism, and it converted them into fanatical followers of the Führer.

THE HITLER YOUTH

The German Nazi youth movement represented the compulsory consolidation of the Nazi party's youth organization with all former youth associations of every kind and of all political, social, and confessional groups. It was designed to win young people to the Nazi faith, to keep them from every source of doubt or independent thought, to alienate them from their families, and to possess their souls as well as their bodies. The Nazi leaders felt that the future of their ideology would be assured only if the youth could be won over. They realized that the adult German population would never be wholly "dependable" because they had reached maturity when different conceptions of life prevailed. But the Nazis knew that young people ignorant of everything except the Nazi ideology, unable to make comparisons, and untutored in the principles of Christian ethics—such young people might readily be persuaded to follow their Nazi leaders unto death.

The Hitler Youth Movement dated from the early history of the Nazi party. In 1926, Kurt Gruber, a postgraduate law student, organized the first units of Nazi Youth and was their first Reich Führer. In 1931 Baldur von Schirach took over the leadership, and in 1933 he was given the title of "Youth Leader of the German Reich."² He immediately set about incorporating non-Nazi youth associations into the Hitler Youth and dissolving the remainder. Stress was laid upon the abolition of the confessional (especially the Roman Catholic) youth leagues.


¹ *Ibid.*, p. 42.

² During the war, Schirach became Gauleiter of Vienna and a certain Artur Axmann succeeded Schirach as Reich Youth Leader. Schirach remained, however, the HJ's guiding spirit.

The Hitler Youth was organized to include the *Jungfolk* (young folk), the *Hitler Jugend* (Hitler youth) proper, and the *Bund Deutscher Maedel* (League of German Girls) or BDM. The *Jungvolk* were boys between ten and fourteen years of age, and the *Hitler*

REICHS JUGENDFUEHRUNG

(Reich Youth Leadership)



Jugend, or HJ, were boys from fourteen to eighteen. The BDM was subdivided into the *Jungmaedel* (young girls) between ten and fourteen, and the *Maedel* (girls) between fourteen and twenty-one.

In 1936 the movement was expanded by the enrollment of boys six to ten in an organization called the *Pimpfe* (an idiomatic nickname). Perhaps the Nazis borrowed the idea for including youngsters of this age in the Hitler Youth movement from the Italian Fascists who had drafted children from six to eight into their youth

organization.¹ The *Pimpfe* were to accustom themselves to Nazi discipline and prepare for the tougher tasks ahead in the HJ. Before being admitted into the HJ at the age of ten, however, boys had to undergo a rigid examination in Nazi ideology, the art of propaganda, practical military achievement, athletic prowess, marksmanship, knowledge about Hitler, the Nazi party, and "foreign affairs." The textbook for these youngsters was like a military manual.²

The Reich Youth Leader had an adjutant and a chief of staff. Under his direct supervision were the office of his chief of staff, the office of the Reich Councillor of the BDM,³ and the chancellery of the youth movement.

The youth movement had three important Nazi functions; to indoctrinate boys with the Nazi ideology, to train them for military life, and to educate the girls for motherhood. Of all these, indoctrination was the most important and the key to the rest. For youths up to the age of fourteen, the process was based upon appeals to the emotion rather than reason. Doubts and misgivings were quashed by severe punishment, and, since the boys had already grown up in Nazi surroundings, the movement's aim was readily achieved. After the youths had reached their fourteenth year, the party needed only to strengthen their beliefs and sift the leaders from the followers.

The movement's program involved what one might call "serious play." The young folk, Schirach once wrote, declare war on the spoiled child and seek to develop self-reliance. In order to promote "masculinity" boys were kept occupied away from home and under the supervision of youth leaders as much as possible. Frivolity was frowned upon and supplanted by earnest games and exercises and instruction, all intended to illustrate the virtues of social service and cooperative effort. As a result, the young people of the HJ and BDM became terribly serious about their mission as the political soldiers of National Socialism and the carriers of the Nazi *Weltanschauung*.

In general, school training and the youth movement supplemented one another. Conflict between them was avoided by a

¹ See below, pp. 175 ff.

² See Ziemer, *op. cit.*, Chap. 3.

³ The Nazis did not grant this woman the title of *Fuehrerin*, a rank of honor bestowed only upon Frau Gertrud Scholtz-Klink, the *Fuehrerin* of German women.

separation of functions and personnel of the leaders. "School is education from above," Schirach explained, "the HJ education from below." The implication of this statement was that the Hitler Youth organization was really more important than the school. This was borne out by the fact that teachers were not welcome as leaders in the HJ. According to Schirach, schoolteachers were not properly trained to be youth leaders, and they might have misinterpreted the spirit of the movement.¹

Much of the activity of the older members of the Hitler Youth was premilitary training. In 1934, Schirach claimed in his book, *Die Hitler Jugend*, that this was not so, but it soon became obvious that the HJ was organized along strictly military lines, with such branches as the HJ flyers, the HJ marines, and the HJ motor corps. Army weapons, vehicles, airplanes, and gliders were readily available for their use, and hand-grenade throwing became a main event in HJ athletic meets. At the same time, instruction in the Nazi ideology was continued, and HJ members studied Germanic culture, history, Nazi music, biology, chemistry, mathematics, and English.

Girls of the BDM were urged to achieve a maximum of physical fitness and physical beauty (as measured by Nazi standards which, fortunately, were not universal). Their training pointed toward motherhood and the rearing of large and healthy families, and toward the development of a fanatical loyalty to the party to be passed on to their children. Calisthenics and physical exercise comprised about two thirds of their program. The rest of their energy was devoted to schooling in the Nazi *Weltanschauung* which, for girls, involved learning handiwork, domestic science, eugenics, and hygiene, since the Nazis regarded intellectual training as even less important for women than for men.

Youth leaders were given special and careful training. Preparations for *Fuehrerschulen* had been made long before Hitler became chancellor, and by the end of 1933 every district in Germany had its own youth-leader school. The regular course of study in these schools was intensive, but took only a few weeks. Athletic and military activity filled about half the time. Additional subjects for study

¹ See Baldur von Schirach, *Die Hitler Jugend*, Verlag Zeitgeschichte, Berlin, 1934, Part III.

were race, history, "socialism," the geopolitics of Germandom, the singing of Nazi songs, and the organization of celebrations, vacations, song fests, and the like. A three-weeks' course of study of a hundred seventy hours at one of the district youth-leader schools included forty-nine hours of *Gelaendesport* (field exercises like marching, group exercise, and military formations), forty hours of physical exercise, thirty-seven hours of political training, sixteen hours of rifle practice, seven and a half hours of conference, seven and a half hours of *Heimabende* (home evenings), five hours of training in organizing *Heimabende*, five hours of singing lessons, and three hours of daily political reports.

At one time, the Hitler Youth movement tried to cooperate with foreign youth movements "in the interests of peace." But indoctrination in German geopolitics, and in the myth of German racial superiority had so warped the minds of these German youths that they could not help but feel antagonism toward a world which, according to the Nazi formula, denied to Germany that which was rightfully hers. The idea of expansion in the east, the clamor for colonies, the propaganda against Russia as the Judeo-Marxist monster, and against Britain and the United States as decadent plutocratic democracies—all this had excited the imagination of German youth. They would not see another point of view; they could not talk peace. Instead, in their blindness, they were prepared to fight and to walk nonchalantly into enemy fire and to die for their Fuehrer.

Nazi education was indeed an "education for death."¹

CONCLUSIONS

Nazi Germany was a very dangerous, determined, and thoroughly organized enemy of democracy. Its ideology implied the domination of the world by a superior German race, the establishment of a new German morality, and the expansion of a new German *Kultur* by force or by guile. This program was no mere dream of some irresponsible hack but the formally professed goal of the responsible leaders of the German people. It was drilled into the German people by a fantastically thorough system of education and indoctrination. It was backed up both at home and abroad.

¹ The title of Gregor Ziemer's excellent book, cited above.

The lack of freedom, the restraints upon the individual, and the suppression of the spirit inherent in the Nazi system are hard for the citizen of a democracy to understand, and an American can scarcely realize how much oppression the average individual endured under Nazi rule. The fact that the Nazis found so much constraint to be necessary may appear to be a basis of hope for the postwar world, but the permanence and the viciousness of the Nazi ideology may not be ignored. It is deeply rooted in German tradition. It has permeated every corner of the German world and every layer of German society, and it will not easily be eradicated.

For ten years the Germans sang "Today we own Germany, tomorrow the whole world." No mere military defeat will make them forget that boast. The task which confronts the democracies, however, is to persuade them to do so.

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SECTION TWO: FASCIST ITALY

6 *Fundamentals of Italian Fascism*

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

1. *General Aspects.* An earlier section traced the roots of National Socialism in the evolution of ideas that took place in Germany during the last four centuries. When Benito Mussolini founded the Fascist party in 1919, the same year in which the National Socialist party was organized, he was, ideologically, in a much less fortunate position than Hitler. He was a political parvenu who had to create his own ideological pedigree.

The contrast between the histories and intellectual climates of Italy and Germany—clearly illustrated by the distinct forms which the Reformation and the unification took in the two countries—produced different bases for their enmity toward democratic procedures. Latins may conquer their natural individualism to a certain degree—under duress—but will never be able to extinguish it as the Germans do. German sympathy for metaphysical concepts and ideological myths finds less response where political ideas have not the globe-encircling tendency of Teutonic geopolitics. To a considerable degree, the Italians have remained the habitual regionalists that they have always been.

The historical sources of Italian Fascism are limited. Where they appear to be vast, they are an operatic invention. Mussolini's dream of recreating the old Roman Empire in the twentieth century was as picturesque as it was Utopian. It fired temporarily the imagination of some sections of the Italian people and aroused a belligerent spirit among youths who were too immature to recognize that the struggle for control of the Mediterranean Sea was one between Germany and Britain with Italy confined to the role of a fellow traveler of Germany. The vision of a Fascist Roman Empire with Italian hegemony over *Mare Nostrum* was hardly ever more than mere imperialistic propaganda.

The Renaissance is another important period in Italian history from whose greatness the Fascists tried to borrow. They pointed to the revolutionary character of the Renaissance which struggled to free the mind from the shackles of a rigid scholasticism. Its youthful vigor and rebellious impetus seemed seductive. Even more useful was the lack of political morality during this period, offering "inspiration" for opportunism and intrigue.

However, it was the *Risorgimento*¹ which appealed to the Fascists more than any other epoch in the history of their country. This movement toward unity and liberation from the Habsburg servitude, dating from the 1820's, achieved its aim with the unification of Italy under Victor Emmanuel I in 1870. The leaders of the *Risorgimento*, men like Mazzini, Cavour, and Garibaldi, were all liberals of various shades. The elements which effected the unification of Italy were incomparably more progressive than those which brought about a similar result in Germany a few months later.

The Fascists did their utmost to popularize the heroes of the *Risorgimento* as their patron saints. Any demand for political discipline on the part of one of the liberal thinkers was interpreted by them as a quest for authoritarianism. They turned Giuseppe Mazzini, one of the most admirable representatives of liberalism in Italy, into an advocate of their theories. But, in fact, the strongest influence of authoritarian trends came to Italy from foreign thinkers. The Germans Hegel and Nietzsche, and the Frenchmen Bergson and Sorel, furnished the intellectual bases for modern Italian absolutists.

Since Fascists have called their movement a "historical process" and have sought to find a background for it among some of Italy's foremost thinkers, we may examine both this claim and the more important contribution coming from foreign sources.

2. *From Dante to d'Annunzio.* Dante Alighieri (1265-1321), the great poet and thinker of Italy, was one of the first to be named as an "apostle of those ideas which have become articles of faith of the Fascist creed and, in particular, of the concept of Empire which plays one of the leading roles in the Fascist philosophy of life."²

¹ Literally: "rising again," implying the rise from oppression to liberty.

² Mario Palmieri, *The Philosophy of Fascism*, The Dante Alighieri Society, Chicago, 1936, p. 220.

Dante's *De Monarchia*, his treatise on government, was written in response to the political troubles of his time: the age-old and unproductive struggle between church and empire, the abuses and corruption which temporal interests had brought into the church, and the strife within his own Italy. Dante accepted the medieval concept of unity within the church and within the state, but favored a clear separation of the two powers. A strong empire was to him a means of achieving universal peace.

Fascist interpreters have distorted Dante's ideas by claiming that he had in mind the concentration of power in the hands of an absolute monarch with the seat of government in Rome. They have contended that his advocacy of separation between church and state pointed to a belief in the establishment of an authoritarian state which alone would be able to create the world empire. Where Dante wanted peace, the Fascists declared that war is not only necessary but also "beautiful" and "artistic."

Niccolò Machiavelli (1469-1527) deserves a high rank among the intellectual ancestors of Fascism. To be sure, Machiavelli was a patriotic Italian who was distressed by the petty squabbling among the city-states of the Peninsula. His observations and his activity in the civil and diplomatic service of his native Florence led him to take a "realistic" view of power politics. He came to the conclusion that the only way of achieving unity and order was through power, divorced from moral considerations, as he saw it practiced around him. His hopes centered for a time on the brilliant and unscrupulous figure of Caesar Borgia. Machiavelli has often been misinterpreted and misunderstood; the liberal Cavour was an apt pupil of his.

In his famous book, *The Prince*, Machiavelli identifies the state with society; in fact the state is society. The result of his "realism" was to accept the premise that the chief motivation of man is selfishness. The Prince, embodying the state, will therefore be guided by that opportunism which has been so characteristic of Mussolini's career and politics. The end of the state is power, unrelated to morals; the state operates above, or rather outside, the ordinary standards of morality; hypocrisy, deceit, the weakness of men will all be used as tools in furthering the power of the state whose end is the purely material one of industrial and commercial prosperity;

religion, too, is but another tool in the hands of the Prince.

All the methods suggested by Machiavelli for the expansion of the power of the state have been followed by Mussolini: increase of population; formation of "fortunate" alliances; maintenance of a large standing army; and a regulation of economic activity for the purpose of creating an empire. In 1924, the Duce wrote an unfinished thesis on *The Prince* in which he affirmed his belief in the absolute state and in the discretion of the state in creating its own morality.¹

The Neapolitan philosopher Giambattista Vico (1668-1744) has been presented as another precursor of Fascism, and his book, *The New Science*, first published in 1725, as another milestone in the formation of Fascist doctrine. Vico conceived of history as a series of cycles, *corsi* and *ricorsi*, not as a continuous development. Each civilization had its own spiritual cycles emanating from a "divine ideal." He rejected materialistic and empirical approaches to truth finding and replaced them with spiritual idealism. Opposing Descartes' philosophy, which dominated the thinking of his time, he looked upon mathematical science as arbitrary, and stressed, quite against the convention, the reality of historical knowledge which, for him, was the basis of the "new science." The obtuseness of his writing and the fact that his ideas did not fit into the mold of his time are responsible for his not having been "discovered" until the nineteenth century.

In Fascist interpretation, Vico demanded that life be brought back to the vision inherent in the divine ideal, that is, the "ideal of today" rather than a hypothetical (scientific) conception of the future. The "ideal of today" is the ideal of the world of man. The true facts of this world cannot be shown or suggested by science. Authority should ordain the "ultimate criterion of the conduct of social life"² because those who rule have a closer relationship with the "divine." There is no social contract between the ruler and the ruled. "With Vico," concludes Palmieri, "Fascism is born and individualism begins to die."³

The most quoted Italian of the *Risorgimento* is Giuseppe Maz-

¹ Mussolini, *Preludio al "Principe," Gerarchia*, Vol. 3, 1924.

² Palmieri, *op. cit.*, p. 199.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 201.

zini (1805-1872). Despite the fact that he has been claimed by absolutists as well as liberals, Mazzini certainly was no totalitarian. All his life he strove for the development of the individual, although he did not share the belief in inherent natural rights of the liberalist school of Locke, Paine, and Jefferson. Instead, he related the concept of right to the idea of duty. He did not mean that there should be no liberty, but he felt that men should become conscious of their responsibility to the group.

Unlike the Fascists, Mazzini did not believe that the state owes nothing to its citizens while they owe everything to the state. His was a reciprocal system of well-balanced rights and duties between state and society. "We part forever from the exclusively individualist Age. . . . We believe in association . . . as the only means possessed by us to realize truth as the method of progress. . . ." ¹ Unlike most modern historians, he did not believe that the French Revolution initiated a new age; he taught that it concluded a period of developing individualism and that the era of "association," or, as we would say, cooperation, had arrived. ² "The watchword of the future is association," he said, ³ but he added that "without liberty no true society exists, because between free men and slaves there can be no association but only dominion over some of the other." ⁴ The Fascists forgot this interpretation conveniently.

Mazzini was neither a Fascist nor a collectivist. The fact that he advocated a strong centralized government does not mean that he wanted total government. Man's duties toward humanity took precedence for him over man's duty toward the state. It appears, moreover, that he tried to reconcile individualism and cooperative society with the aim of creating a working relationship between state and citizens for the mutual benefit of both. Likewise, the fact that Mazzini did not approve of the principle of *laissez faire* does not indicate sympathies for despotism on his part, and the efforts of the Fascists to claim him as their own can hardly be regarded as warranted. In fact, Mazzini's modern type of liberalism is evident in the economic sphere, for he wanted to retain the system of private

¹ Mazzini, *The Duties of Man and Other Essays*, Everyman's Library, E. P. Dutton & Co., New York, 1910, pp. 173, 176.

² *Ibid.*, p. 257.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 51.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 77.

enterprise but insisted that the state or the community somehow control and supervise the conduct of business.

Mazzini was one of the few important nineteenth-century liberals who clearly foresaw the weakness of unrestricted individualism. In its place, he advocated group action as a safeguard for every member of the group. He was in this far ahead of his time. The only resemblance to Fascist ideological thinking appears in that part of Mazzini's philosophy which recalls Hegel's historical idealism. Mazzini saw history as a continuous process guided by a divine providence. In most respects he deviates considerably from Hegel, who was revered by those early Fascist philosophers who called themselves "Neo-Hegelians."

In Vilfredo Pareto (1848-1923) we come to an authentic source of Fascist ideology. Pareto was first a mathematician, who became an economist trying to apply mathematical processes to economic planning, and finally developed into a famous sociologist. During an early period of exile, Mussolini came under the influence of Pareto's lectures in Lausanne and remained thereafter his faithful admirer, although Pareto's influence on Mussolini has often been exaggerated.

Pareto advocated a society in which a ruling minority, the élite, should "convince" the people of the validity of its ideals not only by force but also by indoctrination. "One may say," he taught, "... that the governing class has a clearer view of its own interests because its vision is less obscured by sentiments; and that, as a result, the governing class is in a position to mislead the subject class into serving the interests of the governing class; but that those interests are not necessarily opposite to the interests of the subject class, often in fact coincide with them, so that in the end the deception may prove beneficial to the subject class."¹

All those who do not rule should, without contradiction, observe and revere the instructions and prescriptions of their governing leaders. Pareto believed that the concepts of religion and morality could be particularly useful in inducing the governed to accept this view. The government should be alert to "take advantage of sentiments," for the "statesman of the greatest service to himself and his party is

¹ Vilfredo Pareto, *The Mind and Society (Trattato di sociologia generale)*, ed. by Arthur Livingston, Harcourt, Brace and Company, New York, 1935, p. 1592, § 2250.

the man who himself has no prejudices but who knows how to profit by the prejudices of others."¹

According to Pareto, scientific approaches to life are acceptable only for the purpose of knowing, not of doing. Doing means acting spontaneously, that is, according to the dictates of sentiment. It is a matter of certain driving forces which may be called "ethical." Ethics is a nonscientific subject, as is religion. It is thus exempt from scientific criticism and analysis. In other words, the élite should use all available devices, from force to persuasion, to make it clear that ideas are not made to be analyzed critically but should be absorbed illogically, unscientifically, sentimentally. Since the mass of individuals cannot be expected to comply at all times with such a policy, their selfish interests have to be suppressed and future generations educated to nonanalytical obedience. The use of these concepts by Fascism is obvious.

The romantic roots of Fascism are perhaps best represented by Gabriele d'Annunzio (1863-1938). Poet and novelist of deservedly high repute, d'Annunzio was not a thinker, or perhaps it would be more accurate to say that he thought with his heart rather than with his head. The result was expressed in a desire for action and an exaltation of the value of action for its own sake. A violent interventionist at the beginning of the First World War, he played in that war, despite his age, a creditable, if somewhat theatrical, part in the Air Force.

A rabid nationalist, he achieved a brief moment of national and even international fame on the political stage through his seizure of Fiume in the autumn of 1919. In itself a minor episode, the circumstances and the atmosphere which surrounded the adventure gave it significance beyond its local aspects. What is more, during his brief "reign" of one year in Fiume, d'Annunzio organized there a virtual dictatorship, and bestowed upon the *Reggenza italiana del Carnaro* a constitution of his own design. This interesting document, issued in August, 1920, contains in embryonic form many of the features characteristic of Mussolini's Fascist Italy.²

The importance of this incident or of d'Annunzio's influence

¹ Melvin Rader, *No Compromise*, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1939, p. 49. See also Pareto, *op. cit.*, p. 1570, § 2249.

² See R. Albrecht-Carrié, "Fiume: Nationalism versus Economics," *Journal of Central European Affairs*, April, 1942, pp. 49-63.

should not be exaggerated, but it served as a rallying focus for the forces and ideas which went into the making of Fascist ideology. D'Annunzio was at first highly honored in Fascist Italy, until it became apparent that the country was too small a stage for two such strong individualists as himself and Mussolini, and he was induced to accept innocuous retirement on the shores of Lake Garda. D'Annunzio is the best single illustration of the type of mentality which rallied to Fascism the Italian Nationalists and such people as Marinetti, the Futurist.

3. *Foreign Influences.* If there is any deeper meaning in Fascism, it comes from other influences than those which have so far been mentioned, influences whose teachings the Fascists borrowed and elaborated upon. Thus the philosophical basis of the Fascist doctrine is derived in great part from such sources as Kant's categorical imperative and his belief that freedom can be achieved only by self-conquest, from Fichte's moralism and statism and from Hegel's idealism and spiritual totalitarianism. All these sources are part of the mosaic which forms the Fascist pattern of thinking. The philosophy of Hegel, in particular, was transformed and despiritualized by the Neo-Hegelians whose leaders were Alfredo Rocco and Giovanni Gentile. The metaphysical aspects of the Hegelian "absolute" lost in depth what the worship of the "divine" state gained in emphasis.¹

On the whole, however, the Fascist doctrine is much more flexible than the Nazi ideology. The Fascists never scrupled to adapt the writings or statements of great intellects to suit their book. The use of Nietzsche's concept of the "superman" may be cited as an illustration.

Closer in time than the German philosophers, the Frenchman Henri Bergson (1859-1943) was also found useful by the Fascists. Bergson claimed that human thought can only progress by disregarding previously conceived and accepted theories and systems. He developed the concept of the *élan vital*, or, as we may also call it, creative evolution, a process of adaptation to reality, which is thus apprehended in its truest form.

Bergson's stress on intuition, misinterpreted into a depreciation of intelligence, was seized upon by Fascist thinkers and applied to

¹ See above, pp. 50-53.

the Fascist idea of state and society according to which the members of a society can find liberty and fulfillment only as parts of a state which has absorbed and completely determined the character of this society.

The pragmatic philosophy of the American psychologist William James (1842-1910) appeared to Fascist opportunism as another convenient peg on which to hang its ideology. The Fascists overlooked conveniently James's postulate that beliefs and opinions should be given the right to test themselves and to succeed if they can. In Fascist interpretation, this meant the superiority of Fascism to democracy and the right to use every means to achieve a Fascist victory. James did not claim that there could be only one successful belief; obviously, an individualistic democracy has room for many trends and opinions.

James also contended that the character of societies and institutions is basically changeable as they merely reflect acquired habits. History is the sum total of changes to which these habits are subjected, and it is the individuals who bring about the changes. The Fascists, of course, did not conceive of a multitude of individuals who all together make history. For them, the only individuals who make history are infallible leaders who make it to suit their purpose and will.

The teachings of Georges Sorel (1847-1922), another Frenchman, are said to have had considerable influence on Mussolini. Sorel called himself a "socialist," but he hated parliamentary socialism just as much as he despised the bourgeoisie. He had once been the friend of the French Socialist leader Jean Jaurès whom he had assisted in the trial of Captain Dreyfus, but he was unable to remain in the same camp with any man who followed a systematic political doctrine. Sorel's interest was centered on the irrational human aspects of socialism rather than on economic systems. Being deeply pessimistic, he opposed intellectualism and fought against what he called the "cultural humanism" of the bourgeoisie. He ridiculed the faith in peaceful democratic progress. Although he respected the theories of Karl Marx, he did not subscribe to Marx's foremost doctrines, for example, the theory of surplus value. He claimed that what socialism needed was not so much an economic system as an organization of the masses on an ideological basis.

In his famous book, *Reflections on Violence*, he declared against "mechanistic" socialism, that is, a socialism systematized and functioning according to rigid dogmas. Instead, he invented the "myth of the general strike" as an instrument to unite labor and to frighten the bourgeoisie into compliance with the demands of labor. What race is for Hitler, the general strike is for Sorel; it is the core of his ideology. He wrote:

The general strike is indeed what I have said: the *myth* in which socialism is wholly comprised. . . . Strikes have engendered in the proletariat the noblest, deepest and most moving sentiments that they possess; the general strike groups them all in a coordinated picture, and, by bringing them together, gives to each one of them its maximum of intensity. . . . We thus obtain that intuition of socialism which language cannot give us with perfect clearness . . .¹

For Sorel, as for the Fascists, scruples about the use of violence are signs of the weakness of a decaying society. Marx's words that "force is the midwife of society" were praised by Sorel and applied in his reasoning. He watched the success of the Russian Revolution with extreme interest and, though appalled by the consequences of violence during the Civil War, he admired Lenin's realism and economic planning.²

The Fascists accepted Sorel in some respects and rejected him in others. They disregarded his sympathies for Marx and his interest in the working class. They borrowed his theory of the "myth of the general strike," changing it into the myth of the total state as an irrational driving force. They also adopted Sorel's doctrine of violence, which offered, in their version, a suitable excuse for the inhuman treatment of their political opponents.

But the real "philosophers of Fascism" did not arise until years after the "march on Rome." Led by Mussolini, they formulated some of the basic concepts of the doctrine. Without going into a detailed treatment of its history, it will be necessary to sketch its development in order to understand its nature.

¹ Georges Sorel, *Reflections on Violence*, authorized translation by T. E. Hulme, Peter Smith, New York, 1941, p. 137.

² He added an appendix on Lenin to the last edition of *Reflections on Violence* which appeared during his lifetime.

7 Formation of the Fascist Doctrine

MUSSOLINI'S EVOLUTION TO 1925

Mussolini and his Fascist followers have been accused of inconsistency. The charge is warranted. Yet, in a sense, Mussolini's evolution was quite consistent, but only from the standpoint of his having remained true to the demands of a strong personality with an over-developed ego. These demands might require the taking at various times of positions which, by any other standards, would involve blatant contradictions. Since the Fascist movement has been so closely identified with its founder and leader, it will be useful to mention briefly the high points of Mussolini's career.

Mussolini was born in 1883. Like Hitler, he came from the lower middle class and he suffered hardships in his youth. But, unlike Hitler, he was enough of a rationalist to look to economics for an explanation of his own difficulties and those of his generation. He became a socialist and rose to a position of leadership in the Italian Socialist Party. In 1912, he became a member of the executive committee of the party and editor of the party organ, *Avanti*. In 1915, however, when the socialists refused to support the war, he severed connections with them. With money—given him, according to one version, by Frenchmen desirous of bringing Italy into the war—he founded the newspaper *Popolo d'Italia*, which remained his mouth-piece to the end.

Mussolini participated in the war until he was discharged from the army in 1917, when he returned to his newspaper work. He did not develop a definite political platform until 1919, when he evolved a not too precise blend of his earlier socialism with his more recently acquired nationalism. He still lacked a suitable policy toward the Catholic Church. In keeping with his fusion of traditionally antagonistic elements, his approach to established differences of outlook was iconoclastic. As Nietzsche and Sorel had justified violence, he eulogized war and brutality and scoffed at cultural traditions. Before the Fascist Party was founded on March 23, 1919, and for years thereafter, Mussolini was close to the Futurists who, under the

leadership of Marinetti, assailed every value that was even slightly rooted in tradition.¹ During this period Mussolini still opposed the monarchy and spoke in favor of a republican form of government devoid of church influence.

Typical of the flexibility of the Fascist mind was Mussolini's statement of his opportunism which he has always defended as a basic Fascist principle:

Fascism was not the nursing of a doctrine worked out beforehand with detailed elaboration; it was born of the need for action and it was itself from the beginning practical rather than theoretical.²

Mussolini's break with his fellow socialists in 1915 is an illustration of this opportunism. While still claiming he was a socialist, he began to seek the support of the middle and upper classes. Fascist rowdies, organized as "squads," began to break up socialist meetings.³ The propertied classes, frightened by such episodes as the occupation of the factories in 1920, approved of these tactics, and the wealthy began to subsidize the Fascist movement. For the first time, the Fascists gained thirty-five seats in parliament at the elections of 1921.

The inability of parties to organize stability, reflected in a succession of increasingly weak governments and in a general loss of faith in the value of parliamentary institutions, was responsible for Mussolini being called upon to form a government on the occasion of the relatively innocuous episode of the "march on Rome" in October, 1922. With this event began the second period of Fascism, which lasted until 1925.

This period was characterized by opportunistic maneuvering. At first, many concessions had to be made; a number of cabinet posts were held by non-Fascists and the Fascists themselves constituted but a small minority in the Chamber of Deputies. Furthermore, the good will of the capitalists was needed for the financial support of the party and they could not yet be safely antagonized.

¹ Futurism is a revolutionary movement in art. It repudiates tradition and extols the "esthetic" qualities of the machine. It developed in Italy about 1910 and was led by F. T. Marinetti.

² Benito Mussolini, *The Political and Social Doctrine of Fascism*, authorized translation by Jane Soames, The Hogarth Press, London, 1933, p. 8.

³ See below, p. 161.

Mussolini meanwhile recognized the desirability of producing a philosophic doctrine for Fascism. In 1921 he had written to a friend: "If Fascism does not want to die, or, worse still, to commit suicide, it must now supply itself with a doctrine."¹ But so anxious was he not to be tied down too rigidly by such a doctrine that he added: "Yet this shall not, and must not, be a robe of Nessus, clinging to us for all eternity, for tomorrow is something mysterious and unforeseen. . . ."²

The philosophical construction of such a theory took place during the first years of the third period of Fascism which lasted from 1925 until 1936. During these years, Fascism gave up its last few compromising features and its caution. It became politically stabilized and its totalitarian tendency began to emerge. Significant of the change, the relations between Mussolini and Marinetti were severed; the Charter of Labor³ was proclaimed in 1927; a thorough internal reform purged the government and all stages of local administration of nonconformists. The corporations came into existence in 1934, following the creation of a Ministry of Corporations as early as 1926.⁴

When Mussolini decided upon the creation of a Fascist doctrine, his choice for the work fell upon his friend, Giovanni Gentile. Gentile was Italy's foremost philosopher of idealism who, as minister of education from 1922 to 1924, gave Italy its first Fascist school system. Alfredo Rocco, minister of justice, was another whose writings helped to clarify the spirit of Fascism. In addition, Mussolini himself did some teaching on the subject.

GENTILE AND ROCCO: 1925-1935

Gentile and Rocco represent respectively the more moderate and more radical types of Fascist intelligentsia. Gentile was too scholarly to be able to maintain his influence for long. Rocco, a rabid and cynical nationalist, distrusted human beings even more than did Gentile. Between them, they provided Mussolini with the

¹ Quoted by H. Arthur Steiner, *Government in Fascist Italy*, McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., New York, 1938, p. 25.

² *Loc. cit.*

³ See below, pp. 156-157.

⁴ See below, pp. 158 ff.

spiritual and intellectual bases for his later writings and statements.¹

Gentile began to link the Fascist movement to the idealism of the Risorgimento. Condemning the scientific and economic materialism into which, he claimed, the Italian state had fallen after its unification, he contended that the action of the Fascist squads had initiated a new period that would restore Italy. For him, the nature of Fascism was threefold. First, the conception that totalitarianism was not a political device but symbolized "the whole will and feeling of the nation."² Second, "Fascism is not a philosophy. Much less is it a religion. It is not even a political theory which may be stated in a series of formulae."³ Fascism, according to Gentile, was a rigorous application of Mazzini's "Thought and Action." The Duce formulated his views and executed them at the same time. This meant that Fascism was anti-intellectual, and Gentile did not hesitate to emphasize the fact. He believed that intellectualism is the "divorce of thought from action." Third, according to Gentile's interpretation, Fascism was not merely a political system. It was more, for it was "politics" in the all-embracing Aristotelian sense. Its focal point is the national state. "Both Fascism and nationalism regard the state as the foundation of all rights and the source of all values in the individuals composing it."⁴ But Fascism transcended by far the conception of nationalism since it regarded "the state (as) a wholly spiritual creation."⁵ Instead of class rule found in a non-Fascist national state, the Fascist state was a "people's state and, as such, the democratic state *par excellence*. The relationship between state and citizen . . . is accordingly so intimate that the state exists only as, and in so far as, the citizen causes it to exist. . . . Hence the enormous task which Fascism sets itself in trying to bring the whole mass of the people, beginning with the little children, inside the fold of the Party."⁶ Gentile accepted Hegel's meta-

¹ Their writings appear, in condensed form, in the *Enciclopedia Italiana*.

² Giovanni Gentile, "The Philosophic Basis of Fascism," *Foreign Affairs*, January, 1928.

³ *Loc. cit.*

⁴ Gentile, *loc. cit.* For Aristotle, "politics" meant the sum total of social and political life.

⁵ *Loc. cit.*

⁶ *Loc. cit.*

physical definition of the state and its spirit. Just as men are part of the *Weltgeist* or *Volksgeist*, so citizens are part of the state. Mussolini himself expressed this required surrender of the individual when he wrote: "All in the state and for the state; nothing outside the state and nothing against the state."

The peculiar use of the words "freedom" and "democracy" by the Fascist philosophers merits special attention. Gentile stated that Fascism was democracy *par excellence* because "freedom can only exist in the state, and the state means authority," while freedom, in liberal countries, meant "action against the state." So, to reach this goal of a population unified in the ideals of the state and no longer interested in the problems of their own existence, a new mentality must be produced. Instead of scientific materialism, spiritual idealism must be planted in the hearts of men, women, and children.

Alfredo Rocco was less spiritual and more sociological in his definition of Fascism. Being a political animal, man, he said, could not help living in social groups which were all part of the human species. If the human species wanted to survive and develop toward progress, it must consider successive generations and not just any contemporary "collection of individuals." To think in terms of individuals was atomistic and mechanistic. Against such a conception of a "society for the individual," Fascism wanted the individual to think in terms of society. "For liberalism, the individual is the end and society the means; . . . for Fascism, society is the end, individuals the means, and its [Fascism's] whole life consists in using individuals as instruments for its social ends."¹

Freedom was permissible so long as the citizen used it in the interest of the state. The state was absolute and groups of individuals existed only in relation to the state. Having a will and personality, the Fascist state was a *Stato Etico* (ethical state). Citizens acting in the interest of the state could not help acting ethically right. What were the peculiar ethics of the Fascist state? Mussolini answered the question by saying that "Fascism rejects the doctrine of materialism and any doctrine which attempts to explain the intricate history of

¹ Alfredo Rocco, "The Political Doctrine of Fascism," International Conciliation Pamphlet 223, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, New York, 1926.

human societies from the narrow and exclusive standpoint of material interests."¹ In contrast, "Fascism, now and always, believes in holiness and heroism"² and not in actions influenced by economic motives.

Under such conditions, the Darwinist theory of permanent strife was reinterpreted and stressed. Fascism "believes neither in the possibility nor the utility of perpetual peace."³ This, then, was the ethics of the Fascist state: War is neither good nor evil but an experience of the race; it stimulates heroism and courage; without wars there would be no competition, only retrogression and decay. "To die or to suffer for such a triumph is not to die or to suffer at all, it is to live forever."⁴ The life of the individual had little value under the circumstances; only the life of the state was valuable. Life consisted of a series of sacrifices for the state. One might compare the enduring of privations for the state with the punishments which medieval saints inflicted upon themselves for the sake of their devotion to God. The doctrine became a religion even though Mussolini and his followers denied it.

FASCISM FROM 1936 TO 1940

The last period of the development of Fascism started in 1936, after the conclusion of a political, economic, and cultural treaty with National Socialism. The formation of the Axis required the introduction of some new features into Fascism in order to permit the coordination of all political and spiritual forces between the new allies. During this period, the Chamber of Deputies voted itself out of existence, in 1938. Parliamentary government as such had ceased to function as early as December, 1925, when the chamber had to give up its legislative responsibilities to the cabinet which shared them with the Fascist Grand Council. Furthermore, as a necessary concession to Germany, in 1938 Italy adopted the racial policy of the National Socialists, thereby completely reversing the Duce's earlier position in regard to the racial myth. Mussolini had emphasized that there were no pure races left, that cross-

¹ Palmieri, *op. cit.*, p. 77.

² Mussolini, *The Political and Social Doctrine of Fascism*, p. 13.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 11.

⁴ Palmieri, *op. cit.*, p. 83.

ing of races had often produced excellent results, and that race is not a reality but a "feeling." "National pride has no need of the delirium of race."¹

Anti-Semitism was introduced as a matter of political expediency. A country collaborating with Germany had to ostracize and persecute Jews and "non-Aryans" for the sake of totalitarian alignment. No one could say that the Italians are a pure race. They are, on the contrary, a good example of an intermingling of many races from many lands, including non-European strains bordering the Mediterranean Sea. In the course of history, northern and southern European, Jewish, and Near-Eastern elements produced what today is the Italian people. However, anti-Semitism having become the official policy of the Fascist government, publicized in the press, there began to appear in Italy some of the same vagaries that have characterized the racial policy of the Nazis. The Italian people as a whole did not take with enthusiasm to Mussolini's reversal of his race policy, which may explain why its carrying out was relatively milder than in Germany.

In addition, during this last period of Fascism, the idea of a great rejuvenated Roman empire was taken up in earnest. The idea was not an invention of Fascism; the memory of Rome had never died in Italy. But the pre-Fascist governments of Italy had pursued for the most part a policy which, devoted to the national interest as it was, and playing with fair skill and success the game of power politics, had nevertheless been a policy of limited aims, rooted in a sound estimate of the balance between ends and means, that is, in a correct appraisal of the real power and resources of Italy.

Playing on the chord of national pride, anxious to produce some spectacular achievement, and taking advantage of the confused international situation which followed the resurgence of Germany, Mussolini finally embarked upon the Ethiopian adventure. The ease of his conquest and the successful defiance of the half-hearted sanctions imposed by the League, gave the regime a considerable, if temporary, measure of popularity at home. As might be expected, Italian Fascism, inextricably tied to the Nazi chariot, reached the

¹ Emil Ludwig, *Conversations with Mussolini*, Little, Brown and Company, Boston, 1933, pp. 69-70.

height of its totalitarian character when it entered the Second World War on Germany's side. Easy victory seemed within reach. But the initial success was destined to be short-lived. Fascist opportunism had driven Italy into the war; it now lost Ethiopia and Lybia; in fact, the whole Italian colonial empire was soon at the mercy of the Allies.

Soon after the Allied forces had begun to invade and occupy Sicily and a part of southern Italy, Benito Mussolini, creator of Fascism and dictator of Italy, "resigned" on July 25, 1943. Three days later the Fascist party, for twenty years all-powerful in Italy, was dissolved by a new Italian government headed by Marshal Badoglio. Fascist rule in Italy had collapsed under the impact of the Anglo-American offensive.

Fascism, created by the sword, perished by the sword. But the ideas it proclaimed are far from dead. They live on in various forms and disguises. Fascist-inspired governmental organization, economy, and outlook have not been eliminated through Fascist collapse in Italy. Their potential danger to society remains. For this reason, the study of Fascism must by no means cease. On the contrary, it must be continued and intensified wherever democracy is regarded as the only tolerable way of life and the only desirable approach to a better future.

THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE FASCIST DOCTRINE

At the end of twenty years of evolution, the Fascist doctrine could have been formulated broadly in the following terms: "The State, as conceived and realized by Fascism, is a spiritual and ethical entity for securing the political, juridical, and economic organization of the nation, an organization which, in its origins and growth, is a manifestation of the spirit."¹ The state is all-important. It alone can be free. Man, being a social animal, can live only in groups. Together these groups form society. Without authority society cannot develop and be led toward progress and prosperity. Consequently, the principle of authority is a divine principle. If the state tolerated any higher authority, it would be God. However, God is not permitted to interfere in the business of the totalitarian state; he becomes a mere figurehead. The highest form of

¹ Mussolini, speech of March 10, 1929, quoted by Steiner, *op. cit.*, p. 27.

the state is the national state. It is "not only the present, it is also the past, and above all, the future."¹ This means that the national state is a historical concept and that its progress from the past to the future and not the well-being of one particular generation must be considered when policies are devised. Adhering to this belief, the leaders of the national state endeavor further to strengthen national unity and consciousness with spiritual forces.

The state, according to Fascism, creates its own morality and is not bound by any conventional ethics. The introduction of racialism was one aspect of its basic opportunism; the attacks against Ethiopia, Greece, and France, another. "Fascism is above all action and sentiment," said Rocco. The state will adapt itself to circumstances. Outer events and not inner aims are the forces that drive the Fascist state to its destiny. Its historic mission is to end the era which was initiated by the French Revolution and to replace it with the new "Roman Era"—even though this contradict Mussolini's earlier declaration that Fascism was no export article.

The individual citizen has a reason for existence only if he is consciously and subconsciously a part of the state. Actions of individuals must be subordinated to the general good. It is the leaders of the state who determine what is good or not. The individual must not even try to find a place for himself in society; it is the business of the state to put him where the leaders decide. Since a parliamentary state cannot take care of him, the solution lies in the corporate state which is part of the Fascist ideology. The Fascist individual should find his happiness in the "happiness" of the state. Such happiness is not of a hedonistic nature. The Fascist, like the ancient Roman, is not interested in leading an easy and pleasurable life. He must be "austere, serious, and religious," ever aware of his moral responsibilities and spiritual tasks. Liberty, as understood in democratic countries, Fascists reject as dangerous for the state. No individual, they say, should be "superior to the state." The Kantian interpretation of freedom² is taken over and sharpened by Palmieri who states poetically that "in the Fascist conception, to be free means to be no more a slave of one's own passions, ambitions, and desires . . . to will what is true and good and just . . . in

¹ Loc. cit.

² See above, pp. 44-45.

other words, to realize here in this world the true mission of man.”¹

Who, then, was called upon to rule a people so “austere” and war-minded as Fascist Italians? The leader and his party. As in other totalitarian countries, there was only one party in Italy which was completely identified with the state. The position of the party was officially recognized when the Fascist Grand Council was elevated in 1929 to the rank of a state institution, and when the secretary of the party was made an *ex officio* member of the Council of Ministers in 1937. The civil service became coordinated in the years after 1925.

The Duce’s rule was absolute. While formally his position might appear less powerful than Hitler’s, since the crown was retained, his capacity of president of the Grand Council and Head of the Government, responsible to the king alone, made him in law as well as in fact the uncontested ruler of Italy.

Similarly, the Fascist party, as has often been pointed out by Italians, was not a party in the traditional sense but a legalized organ of the state. Thus it may be said that the members of the party hierarchy were at the same time state officials.

At the very center of the Fascist state the system of corporations² played a capital role. But before this most important socioeconomic aspect of Fascism is discussed, the relationship between Fascism and the Catholic Church should be surveyed briefly.

THE FASCIST STATE AND THE CHURCH

Mussolini at one time was an avowed atheist. In 1904, during his sojourn in Lausanne, he made a speech entitled “Man and Divinity.” He formulated his thesis in the following words: “God does not exist. Religion is absurd in science, immoral in practice, and a malady in man.”³ However, when he thought that the time had come to break with his earlier type of radicalism he tried to come to terms with the church. While he himself did not become a good Catholic, he made peace with the church by concluding the Lateran Treaty in 1929. By this agreement, the Church of Rome and the Fascist state recognized each other, thus ending the dispute

¹ Palmieri, *op. cit.* p. 90.

² See below, pp. 158 ff.

³ Speech of March 26, 1904, first published by the International Library of Rationalist Propaganda in the same year; reprinted by *L’Idée Libre*, February, 1929.

between the Kingdom of Italy and the Holy See that had lasted since 1871. The Fascists acknowledged the sovereignty of the Papal State, Vatican City, and its right to maintain diplomatic representatives. A concordat made the Catholic religion the state religion to be taught in all schools. The Fascist government agreed to pay to the Vatican 750,000,000 lire in cash and 1,000,000,000 lire in government bonds in final settlement of all outstanding obligations. The Fascist state was apparently to be a Catholic state.

But this was neither a retreat of Fascism nor a restoration of the ancien-regime type of "law and order." Certainly Mussolini was anxious to secure at home and before the outside world the sanction of respectability. The maneuver was very successful since there developed a widespread tendency abroad to look upon "Catholic Fascism" as a desirable state of conservatism.

Yet the Lateran Treaty had two aspects overlooked by those who believed that it guaranteed a moderate development of Fascism which would serve as a splendid bulwark against the tide of Bolshevism. The first was the fact that the Catholic Church, under Pope Pius XI, officially recognized the Fascist regime. Pope Pius XI had not only stated that Mussolini was "a man sent by Providence" but also that Mussolini was a man who, like himself, did not believe, as the pope expressed it, in the "ugly fetishes of liberalism." Pius XI had much occasion, in subsequent years, to regret his readiness to deal with the Fascists. He loathed the introduction of racial policy so contrary to the very spirit of the Catholic Church. In September, 1938, he remarked to a group of Belgian pilgrims:

Sacrificium Patriarchae Abrahamae. Mark well that Abraham is called our Patriarch, our ancestor. Anti-Semitism is incompatible with the thought and sublime reality expressed in his text. It is an antipathetic movement. We Christians have nothing to do with it. Through Christ and in Christ we are of Abraham's spiritual descent. No! It is impossible for Christians to take part in anti-Semitism. . . . Anti-Semitism is intolerable. Spiritually, we are Semites.¹

Nevertheless the church had recognized and approved the existence of the ultranational Fascist state and thereby put itself, by

¹ Quoted by *News from Belgium*, Vol. II, No. 31, August 1, 1942, edited by the Belgian Information Center, New York.

implication, in the position of having given its moral sanction to Fascism.

The second aspect, also detrimental to the church, was the fact that Mussolini's interpretation of the treaty did not quite correspond to the Vatican's view. For Mussolini soon proceeded to state that "the Catholic religion has a pre-eminent position in Italy, but other religions must neither be persecuted nor otherwise interfered with."¹

The Fascist claim that the state is infallible and the contention of the church that it is the sole possessor of truth and guide to its interpretation made a conflict between the two almost inevitable. Very soon after its conclusion, in February, 1929, it appeared that the treaty in itself was not enough to dispose of the antagonism between the church and a state which sought to exercise its control over all aspects of the citizen's activity. The conflict broke out over the alleged activity of the Catholic Action.² The Fascists resorted for a time to the familiar tactics of the squads and, in May, 1930, on the plea of political activity in violation of the concordat, Mussolini ordered the dissolution of Catholic Action societies.

This was only the beginning. The church had many reasons to be dissatisfied with the Fascist interpretation of the concordat. In this particular case, the pope countered by issuing an encyclical about Catholic education, inevitably one of the sharpest points of difference. The reply came from the secretary general of the party, Augusto Turati, who stated that the totalitarian character of Italian education should be stressed even more.

Again a compromise was reached when Turati visited the pope. In a "second concordat" with the church, the Fascist government apparently yielded by granting the Catholic Action organizations the right to spread religious and moral propaganda which in no way opposed the Fascist regime. When the Catholic organizations used the new breathing spell to rally and to divide their members into "professional groups" for the discussion of various vocational problems, the Fascists denounced this action as hostile to the basic laws of the state. This time the church was unable to avoid the

¹ Quoted by Carlo Sforza, *Neither Liberty nor Bread*, edited by Frances Keene, Harper & Brothers, New York, 1940, p. 166.

² An organization founded in 1922 by Pius XI to coordinate the activity of Catholic societies.

suppression of Catholic youth associations in May, 1931. To no avail did the Holy See protest against this measure which it regarded as illegal.

The formation of the Axis in 1936 weakened further the significance of the concordat. The church realized that the degree of reverence of the Fascist state for the authority of the Holy See depended wholly on the political "necessities" of the moment. This state of affairs was quite to be expected for the total state cannot, by its very nature, tolerate any organization whose political and spiritual power may interfere with its own. The severance of the church from the state was easier in Germany where Catholicism has regional influence only and Protestant Prussia carries great weight in the formation of policy; the Protestant Church is part of the state and without political influence unless supported by it.

The Catholic Church and the Italian state, as the result of the formal agreements between them, could not help but become closely associated with each other in the public mind. To that extent the Lateran Treaty and the Concordat do not represent a fair *quid pro quo*. The Fascist state was able to present itself as enjoying the sanction of the church, both toward the outside world and before its own people, while in exchange it yielded nothing of its own principles and characteristics, fundamentally inimical to the Christian outlook. While the church chose not to use the opportunity of making a clean break with Fascism, there is little reason to believe that the more rabid pagan tendencies of Fascism, represented by such exponents as Roberto Farinacci, made a deep impression in Italy.

8 The Economy of the Corporate State

THE CHARTER OF LABOR

The Charter of Labor, proclaimed on April 21, 1927, provides a clue to the ultimate aims of Fascism in creating the Corporate State. This charter was not a well-defined law but an enumeration of principles which formed the basis of Italian economic legislation. It is worth quoting a few of the more significant articles of the charter.

Article I. The Italian Nation is an organism endowed with a purpose, a life and means of action transcending those of the individuals, or groups of individuals, composing it. It is a moral, political, and economic unit which finds its integral realization in the Fascist State.

Article VI. The legally recognized occupational associations ensure legal equality between employers and workers, maintain discipline in production and labor and promote the betterment of both.

The Corporations constitute the unitary organization of the forces of production and represent all their interests. . . .

Article VII. The Corporate State considers that, in the sphere of production, private initiative is the most effective and valuable instrument in the interest of the Nation.

In view of the fact that the private organization of production is a function of national concern, the organizer of the enterprise is responsible to the State for the management of its production. Collaboration between the forces of production gives rise to reciprocal rights and duties. The worker, whether technician, employee or laborer, is an active collaborator in the economic enterprise, responsibility for the direction of which rests with the employer.

Article IX. State intervention in economic production arises only when private initiative is lacking or is inadequate, or when State political interests are involved. The intervention may take the form of control, of assistance, and of direct management.¹

Further articles included the regulation of the so-called collective labor contracts, worked out by the corporations; certain "labor

¹ Quoted in F. Pittigliani, *The Italian Corporate State*, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1934, Appendix A, pp. 245-250.

guarantees," such as the right to paid vacations for every employee who had worked for one full year; prescriptions for discipline; insurance, and social welfare. Even though this charter was issued at a time when Fascism was emerging from its obligations to capitalism, the possibilities of state control through the corporations is apparent. Like the Nazis, the Fascists tried to compensate the workers with various social welfare measures for the loss of their freedom of action. Like the Nazis, the Fascists maintained—on paper—the principle of individual enterprise while they curtailed it with supervisory measures and threats of control if management and labor did not comply with the policies emanating from the government.

This double-aimed policy toward capital and labor, which has become so typical of totalitarian government, was well brought out in Article III of the Charter of Labor where the declaration that "syndical and occupational organization is free," was followed by the statement that "syndicates legally recognized and subject to State control alone have the right to represent the whole category for which they are constituted." Furthermore, while it was stressed that elections of the representatives in the syndicates were free, the fact persisted that Fascist leaders did not permit any candidate to be elected who was not part of the Fascist hierarchical system. Thus they retained the hold of the party on the corporations. Voting was not secret. In an election by acclamation no one would have dared reject a candidate acceptable to the Fascist party or to its local representative.

It remains to be mentioned that individual disputes between labor and management were not to be settled within the corporations. For local arbitration, there existed labor courts somewhat similar to the German labor courts. Individual and collective cases could be negotiated, but the individual need not necessarily be represented by his respective association. As a matter of fact, many a plaintiff forewent the possible aid of his organization, fearing that the procedure would be too cumbersome. Thus by far the greater number of court cases were settled without the assistance of the associations. The dominant influence in the decision of the labor courts was that of the local Fascist representative, that of the employer being next in order of importance.

THE SYNDICATES AND CORPORATIONS

Mussolini repeatedly stressed the identity, in the economic sphere, of Fascism with the corporate state which rested upon the principles of *syndicalism* and *corporativism*. The attempt to explain these terms is hazardous because, in economics as in other fields, Fascist policy was based on expediency and opportunism rather than on preformulated doctrine. The corporate state was a process of growth, still incomplete when Fascism collapsed.

Fascist workers' syndicates gradually superseded the former labor unions which were dissolved. These unions were denounced by the Fascists as working against the state for their own selfish purposes and fostering the class struggle. Therefore, the Fascist syndicates were organized and came to be the sole legal representatives of the workers. They were incorporated into the Fascist state. The industrialists were forced by the government to recognize the syndicates as the sole representatives of the workers. On the other side, the Confederation of Industrialists, also legally sanctioned by the government, was to be recognized by the syndicates as the only rightful representative of industrial management.

The Fascists claimed that membership in the syndicates was not compulsory. Yet it became evident that not to be a member would be tantamount to ostracism—social, political, and economic. Only members of the Fascist party could become officers of the syndicates and they were subject to strictly defined qualifications. This policy was formalized by the Palazzo Vidoni Decree of October 2, 1925. Following this first step, the Fascist state went on to overcome the remnants of liberalism in the social and economic spheres. True to its totalitarian doctrine, Fascism could not tolerate any socioeconomic organization outside its reach.

Whenever questions of importance for the respective syndicates or employers' federations arose, their representatives met and negotiated under the supervision of government agents. In the beginning, the workers lost many points; however, the more Fascism threw overboard its dependence on the propertied groups, the more its decisions were determined by the policies of the Fascist state rather than by any of the factions.

The organization was still a loose one; the establishment of cor-

porations between 1930 and 1934 was a further step toward the total control of economic life. The word "corporation" has different meanings in Italian and in English. In America, a corporation is a legally constituted enterprise, usually private in character, which has a charter of its own and conducts its business accordingly. It is not controlled by the government, save in times of emergency like war and to the extent that national planning may be imperative. It remains subject to common law and does not imply the organization of either employers or workers.

In Fascist Italy, a corporation was a public body representing one of the twenty-two branches of industry and agriculture on the basis of a compulsory organization. Each corporation consisted of three groups: (1) the employers' federation; (2) the syndicate of employees; (3) the government appointees safeguarding the "interests of the state." In this tripartite setup of the corporations, employers and employees had to listen to and comply with the orders of the government. Although the Chamber of Corporations may impress unwary observers as a gigantic arbitration board, in reality it served a number of purposes outlined by Fascist legislation.

Italy, with inadequate supplies of natural wealth, vital foodstuffs, and raw materials cannot hope ever to become self-sufficient. Consequently, long-range planning assumes for her particular importance. A planned economy became even more necessary with the belief of Fascism in war as the ultimate solution of the ideological and economic crisis throughout the world. To avoid any flaw in the Fascist production schedule, work conditions had to be regulated through the corporations; wage scales for every job specialty had to be determined as well as the number of hours, working conditions, increments, wage cuts, overtime, and recreation.

The corporations played a vital role in the rigid price-control policy of the Fascist government. The liberty of ordering an increase or decrease in wages or an increase in working hours naturally had a great influence upon the prices of manufactured products in industry and agriculture. Fascism, it should be emphasized, restricted free private capitalism and drifted more and more toward state capitalism, especially after 1930.

There existed corporations for the following economic groups:

cereals; fruits, vegetables, and flowers; wines and edible oils; husbandry and fisheries; lumber and forestry; textiles; clothing trades; metals; machinery; liquid fuels; chemical trades; paper, printing, and publishing; building; water, gas, and electricity; mining and quarrying; glass and pottery; banking and insurance; internal communications; sea and air transport; public entertainment; hotel industry; professions and arts.

There was a numerical equality of the representatives of the employers' federation and of the syndicates. But it is doubtful to what extent workers were really represented by the syndicates' officers since the latter were not necessarily workers themselves. The interests of the public, the "consumer," were taken care of by three moderators who were members of the Fascist party. Although the corporations were part of the Fascist state, their relationship to the state was never fully clarified. Would they arbitrate only, or would they also become instrumental in introducing new social legislation? Would they be nothing but the tool of the Fascist party or would they be permitted to coordinate their creative ideas? Would the state dominate the corporations or ultimately the corporations the state? Could not the corporations become so large and powerful that they might finally overrule the state?

The demise of Fascism has left these vital questions unanswered. The power of the corporations was growing rapidly and their officially regulated economic collaboration with each other was likely to strengthen their influence even more. This strength might eventually have proved to be a boomerang for the Fascist government because, if the corporations had any reason for existence, they had to be given great power; if these powers were not made available, corporativism would have lost its dynamics and soon become obsolete.

For the Fascist state, the corporative idea was a subsidiary means subjugated to an essentially political purpose. Yet, it may be pointed out that, if the economic complexity of contemporary society is to lead to some compromise between the antagonistic forces of individualism and collectivism in the form of voluntarily accepted cooperation, the study of the technical aspects at least of corporativism may well afford useful and important suggestions for the organization of the future world.

9 Organization of Fascism

THE METHOD OF COMPULSION

The Fascist party defined itself as a "civil militia under the orders of the Duce in the service of the State." It should not be forgotten that Fascism, like National Socialism, began as a fighting organization; the mainstays of the movement were the *Fasci di combattimento*, approximately meaning "battle units," (*fascio* is bundle; the ancient Roman lictors carried *fascces*, a bundle of rods around an axe, as a sign of their power of life and death). In 1921, these *Fasci* were changed into the Fascist party. In other words, the "movement" transformed itself into the "party."

Before Mussolini came to power, he organized Fascist "squads" for the purpose of clubbing down political opposition. (This system was imitated by Hitler's Storm Troopers, the S.A.) After the victory of Fascism, these squads were increased and organized into a Fascist Militia which was used to gain control of the whole country. Young men in the uniform of the Militia, all wearing black shirts, patrolled the stations, streets, and public buildings, and became conspicuous throughout the land.

Mussolini saw himself compelled to create this private army in 1923 because the opposition to Fascism was growing rapidly after the victory of 1922. Liberals and Socialists tried their best to make the young Fascist regime collapse. The bitterness of the struggle reached a climax with the murder of the Socialist deputy Matteotti in 1924. But, after a brief interval of hesitation, Mussolini succeeded in turning the episode to his own advantage and strengthened his personal hold on the Fascist movement by assuming responsibility for its deeds on the one hand, and, on the other, emphasizing the necessity of strict discipline. In 1925, Alfredo Rocco began the reform of the penal code to bring it into conformity with Fascist ideas, a task successfully completed by 1930.

The Fascist party was strictly hierarchical in organization. It was not a mere political party in the ordinary sense, but, as pointed

out before, a legally recognized organ of the state. In January, 1937, the party's Grand Council was likewise given formal recognition. It became the real governing body; there were no limits to the range of its activity. It was broader in scope than the Nazi Party Cabinet which was not a legal organ of the state.

The Duce dominated the party but his position was so exalted that his name was not even on the list of "hierarchs." Next to him, the high party officials exercised their influence; the mass of the party rank and file followed and obeyed. The hierarchy distinguished between five different levels. At the top was the secretary of the party, appointed by royal decree, but subject to dismissal by the Duce. There were no secure appointments: every hierarch might find himself suddenly dismissed if he showed lack of efficiency, lack of obedience, or too little adaptability to the policy of opportunism.

The second level belonged to the National Directorate consisting of eleven members revocably appointed by the Duce at the suggestion of the party secretary. This body included secretaries from the most important centers of Italy. The third rank was made up of a group of men whose work was of particularly great importance, namely, the federal secretaries (liaison officers delegated by the central party to supervise the local Fasci) and the federal leaders of the Fascist youth organizations. The fourth grade in the hierarchy was filled by lesser officials, the leaders of provincial student groups, and lesser officers of the youth organizations. Finally, at the lowest level, were the commanders of the local Fascist groups and the local political secretaries.

Strict control of the subordinates by the superior party officials was characteristic of the relationship between the various levels of the hierarchy. Appointments and suggestions for appointments to the lower grades were in the hands of the higher ranking hierarchs. The appointments were all personal and no elections took place.

The administration of the party with its 7300 local fasci was very elaborate, no less imposing than the Nazi party organization. The secretary had his own chancellory. Furthermore there were six divisions of administration: the political secretariat, the administrative secretariat, the permanent price-control office, the office of

press and propaganda, the historical office, and the office of archives.

Another department of the party's administration was engaged exclusively in work for the youth organizations, namely, the Young Fascists, the Young Fascist Women, the Fascist University groups, and groups of rural Fascist girls. Separate and not quite so important were the offices of various compulsory professional groups; for example, the Fascist teachers' associations, or the associations of different types of public employees like railway workers, postal employees, and workers of other state enterprises. The last department controlled the *Dopolavoro* organization, the National Union of Retired Naval Officers, the National Olympic Committee, and the Italian Naval League.

This elaborate organization was the guardian of political orthodoxy and obedience in social and economic matters. As in Germany, large demands were made upon the time of the individual. For those who did not comply or were courageous enough to oppose the Fascist decrees, means of repression were not lacking. The Fascists elevated brutality to a method of government. Concentration camps for political "criminals" were established on the islands of Lampedusa, Pantelleria, Ustica, Lipari, and Ponza. The little advertised but omnipresent OVRA (*Opera Volontaria Repressione Antifascista*) was the Italian version of the inevitable secret police organization that is one of the foundation stones of any totalitarian regime. A Special Tribunal for the Defense of the State, the counterpart of the dreaded People's Court in Germany, dealt with opposition to the state, the Duce, and the king.

Fear was the supreme ruler of Fascist Italy. The policy of intimidation through fear, developed to a high art by the Nazis who surpassed their Fascist teachers, permeated the whole life of the nation. The danger of arrest by the police or the Fascist militia was an ever-present threat. The Fascists called this state of mind "iron discipline, leading on the road to glory."

The Fascist Militia (Voluntary Militia for the National Security), like the Storm Troopers of Hitler, was the guardian of the ideology of the state. Almost all the militia members did their work on a voluntary basis; they even bought their own uniforms and donated all their free time to the service of Fascism. They

proved invaluable and very inexpensive to the government. The militia men were trained by former army officers. They were used in Spain, in Ethiopia, against Greece, and against Russia. They did not command high respect among their fellow citizens.

These were the most important instruments through which the system of compulsion was enforced on the nation. But no government can expect to keep on suppressing people for an indefinite period. Therefore, the young generation of Fascist Italy were to be subjected to an appropriate indoctrination for life under a totalitarian regime. The adult population, too, was subjected to a never-ceasing "informal" education. The Germans learned much from the way the Fascists carried out their principles in practice, and the Fascists, in turn, doubtless learned from the Soviets. In Italy, as in Germany, the whole nation had to go to school again; in Italy, as in Germany, the state treated its adult population like adolescents, not excluding those who had declared themselves 100 per cent Fascists and had become members of the party.

THE METHOD OF INDOCTRINATION

The Fascists began rather late to exploit culture for purposes of indoctrination. Artistically, the Italians always were individualists, and Mussolini himself understood this national characteristic. His early association with Futurism is a case in point. The standardization of the arts under Nazism provoked his sarcasm—so long as political conditions permitted. Unless they interfered in politics, artists and scientists were incomparably freer in Italy than in Germany, at least until 1936 when a cultural agreement with Germany was concluded. As late as 1938, German refugees from Nazi oppression were permitted to work without interference so long as they showed no hostility toward Fascism.

Up to 1936, only certain fields of intellectual activity were controlled by the respective divisions of the party; for example, the newspapers, radio, and all propaganda. The creation in 1934 of the position of Under Secretary of State for Press and Propaganda was a step in the direction of stricter control. Propaganda was thus elevated from the rank of a party activity to that of a semi-independent institution. This development culminated in the foundation of the Ministry of Popular Culture in 1936.

The ministry had seven departments: one each for the Italian press, foreign press, propaganda proper, motion pictures, travel, theater, and radio. The department of the Italian press had four divisions: (1) personnel and general affairs; (2) dailies and periodicals in the Italian language (also those appearing abroad and in the colonies); (3) books and libraries; (4) internal propaganda (comprising literary, artistic, and sport publications, children's papers, and trade papers for radio and cinema). It will be noted that more or less all literary activities were unified, while the German Propaganda Ministry set up two separate chambers to deal with books and periodicals respectively.

The department of the foreign press had three divisions. The first dealt with personnel, general affairs, and news service to foreign countries; the second supervised foreign newspapers and foreign journalists according to language groups (one group consisting of French, Spanish-Portuguese, and English; another comprising Germanic, Slavic, Oriental, and other languages). The third division studied translations and criticism; it also administered an archive for foreign publications and regulated the circulation of foreign papers in Italy.

The department of propaganda had two divisions only. The first dealt with personnel and general administrative problems and worked on various aspects of propaganda in foreign countries. It distributed all sorts of publications and translations and was well-informed about the book market and libraries. Important, too, was a section on economic and corporative propaganda. The second division specialized in motion pictures, radio, and the fine arts. This was the only reference to the fine arts within the organization of the ministry. As will be remembered, the German Propaganda Ministry had a large section designed to use the fine arts for propaganda material. The Italians used them for simple cultural propaganda only. The whole propaganda division was subdivided into sections for internal and external propaganda.

The motion-picture department had four sections. The first was of a general and legal nature. It dealt with personnel questions, credits, and the supervision of the great national production center, *LUCE*. The second controlled the artistic and technical aspects of the production of films. The third was interested in film trade

papers and all sorts of "cultural" activities related to motion pictures. The last section tried to reorganize the Italian motion-picture industry, the distribution abroad of Italian movies, and the international exchange of pictures. It may be said that this reorganization never succeeded and that the Fascists were not able to produce good pictures. For this reason, the Italian public continued to show its preference for foreign, particularly, American, motion pictures, which the government forbade when Italo-American relations began to be strained.

The department of travel had five divisions administering all the details of one of Italy's foremost peacetime industries. The theater department, or, as it was also called, the "department of stage inspection," covered more than its name suggests and operated under four divisions. The first division dealt with administrative matters; the second was concerned with music, especially opera, concert, dance, operetta, mechanically transcribed music, and subsidies for the arrangement of Italian musical productions abroad. The Nazis, it will be remembered, organized a Chamber of Music for their *Reichskulturkammer*; the Fascists inserted music as a mere section into their Ministry of Popular Culture. Division three controlled the legitimate stage and was responsible for the permission of new performances; it also superintended radio dramatics and sponsored competitions. The fourth division supervised the more technical aspects of all these arts and maintained the theatrical censorship bureau.

The last department was the "inspectorate for radio and television." It had a Bureau of Coordination where the interests of all the ministries were taken care of and where correspondence, copywriting, and filing were handled. One division was devoted exclusively to domestic service, catering to the various strata of the people in town and country in accordance with the dictates of the Fascist government. The other division dealt with foreign countries only and set up special programs for the Mediterranean countries, the Far East, East Africa, Arabic countries, Greece, Latin America, and North America.

When the new ministry was created, its first incumbent was Galeazzo Ciano, who subsequently became minister of foreign affairs. In his budget speech before the senate on May 22, 1936, he

made some revealing remarks concerning the individual departments.

The control of the domestic press, Ciano said, should not be solely negative. The department would see to it that the new philosophy and the Fascist way of thinking would improve both journalism and journalists. There should be a complete elimination of the "black column" which was merely "an apology of crime catering to the ill-placed interests of the publisher. Such news items are now confined to the briefest possible space."¹ Signor Ciano was referring, of course, to crime and scandal news. The regulations concerning the profession of journalism were subsequently taken in hand by the respective syndicates.

Books were also put under stricter censorship than before. The "freedom of the artist" was not to be confined by censorship to shortsighted and narrow limits, and "every wholesome expression of the mind is welcomed, respected, and circulated. But if unqualified contraband is being smuggled under cover of art, or if ideas which prove offensive to the national, religious, and social ethics of Fascism are disseminated under cover of science, the Ministry will become intransigent and publications of the foregoing nature will be suppressed without mercy."²

At the same time, the minister demanded an improvement in the standard of literary production for the sake of Italy's national prestige. The Nazis found themselves compelled to issue the same "order." They did not succeed, and neither did the Fascists. Creative activity cannot be coerced into a political mold.

Concerning the motion-picture industry, Ciano admitted its failure to produce tangible results. Since "the cinema, today, is perhaps the most powerful means for the esthetic, moral, and political education of the people," the state should take a special interest in it and, in some cases, itself be the producer. The cinema would never kill the legitimate stage, he added when talking about the theater department, and the state would see to it that the living theater and the opera were further assisted and encouraged.³

As for the radio, Ciano tried to justify the expansion of the

¹ "The Ministry of Press and Propaganda," speech by Galeazzo Ciano, *Società Editrice di Novissima*, Rome, 1936, p. 7.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 9-10.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 20.

language divisions. This time (1936) saw an increased foreign propaganda on the part of Fascism. Ciano stated that it had been his aim "to cast a true light on the activity of Fascism, and to provide the world with a daily documentation on the trend of thought and the creative work of the regime. This is becoming more and more necessary as the ranks of foreigners who are drawing nearer to Fascism begin to swell, while barriers, consequently raised by opponents to hinder the trend of new and highly successful ideas require to be smashed."¹ Note that the minister stated in the same paragraph that propaganda was "not to interfere with the internal affairs of other countries."²

Two more institutions for the spread of Fascist culture should be mentioned. First, there were the Institutes of Fascist Culture founded in Bologna in 1925. They consisted of a decentralized organization with the purpose of spreading Fascist morale and of creating a uniformity of spirit throughout the country. These institutes became the purveyors of local Fascist "culture" in the same way that the *Deutsche Kulturbund*, German Cultural Bund, spread "culture" in the totalitarian spirit.

The other institution was the famous *Opera Nazionale Dopolavoro*, a leisure-time organization, which combined the purposes of social welfare and political indoctrination.³ The *Dopolavoro* was founded in 1925 on a "voluntary" basis. By the time Italy entered the war, millions of Italians had joined it. The services extended to the members were manifold: (1) physical education, sports, excursions; (2) artistic education and visits to theaters, operas, concerts, cinemas, and special radio programs; (3) folk and popular arts; (4) vocational education; (5) assistance in case of need.

There is no denying that this organization did excellent work and, as a result, won new recruits for Fascism. The Germans knew why they imitated *Dopolavoro*. Under democratic auspices, such an organization could be made to serve useful ends; but it would have to be divorced from ulterior motives of indoctrination. In Germany and in Italy, humanitarian purposes have been secondary

¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 16-17. Italics mine.

² *Ibid.*, p. 16.

³ *Dopolavoro*, "after work."

in the creation of welfare organizations, however excellent these may have been in practice. Their primary aim has been to collect members; to control those members individually by controlling their groups; to supplement their education to the advantage of the state; and, finally, to use their leisure time as well as the organization for additional indoctrination.

Dopolavoro gave much to those who became its members, but it asked even more in return. Other organizations of a social welfare character were also willing to help, but they, too, were very demanding. Membership was voluntary in theory, but compulsory in practice. There was perhaps only one organization which could not gain more members: the Maternity and Child Welfare Institute, whose replica was the German Mother and Child movement. The Fascist "battle for the increase of Italian population" was a losing battle. Bachelors were heavily taxed; government officials were practically compelled to marry under penalty of losing their jobs—but the Italians refused to obey. The fact that Italians did not receive as much money for a marriage allowance as the Germans can hardly account for a substantial decrease in the birth rate.

THE FASCIST SYSTEM OF EDUCATION

Italy had its first important educational reform in 1859. It was in that year that Gabriele Casati created a new educational system for the provinces of Piedmont and Lombardy, based on the French idea of centralization. This system was gradually adopted by other parts of the Peninsula and remained fundamentally intact until Gentile introduced his new Fascist schools and curricula.

The Casati reform was not uniformly successful because the responsibility for establishing and maintaining schools remained in the hands of the local communities which, in most cases, hesitated to spend money for education. Consequently, the percentage of illiteracy in Italy at the time of the First World War was amazingly high. In the south, only 30 per cent of the people could read and write; in the central provinces, about 41 per cent; in the northern districts, where the situation was better, about 89 per cent. Frequent attempts at reform did not produce tangible improvements.

In October, 1922, the newly installed Fascist government empowered Giovanni Gentile to revise the Italian school system thor-

oughly and to imbue it with the new spirit. A reform plan, presented and accepted in December, was carried out by Gentile. After his resignation in July, 1924, his basic plan remained in force but the details were repeatedly modified. This period of changes continued until 1939 when Giuseppe Bottai, then minister of education, ended what the Fascists called the "tragedy of retouchings." He introduced another reform whose character took into consideration the changes Fascism had undergone since 1922 in political, social, and economic respects.

1. *Fascist Educational Philosophy.* Education was naturally regarded as one of the most important instruments of Fascist indoctrination. Yet it is interesting to find that even the Fascist Charter of Education, issued in 1939 and designed to "fascistize" education to the extreme, did not abandon cultural education quite so completely as Germany. Italy is, after all, with Greece, the cradle of Western civilization. It is only natural that so venerable a tradition should have deeper roots than in Germany. Besides, a knowledge of the classics was obviously important in the eyes of a regime which cherished the dream of creating a modernized version of the old Roman Empire.

The fundamentals of Fascist philosophy were strongly reflected in Fascist education. The unitarian and centralized aspect of the new Italy was stressed, and the need of a common culture emphasized as a basis for the new nationalism. At the same time, education was not to be the same for all individuals. On the contrary, there was to be a sharp differentiation between the various types of schools, between elementary and higher education. Only those likely to be of particular service to the Fascist state were to be admitted to the higher schools. The selection of a political élite became one of the central problems of Fascist educational practice. Consequently, there was no equality of educational opportunities such as exists in America.

A careful distinction was made between elementary and secondary education because different results were expected from the two levels of training. Like the German, the Italian elementary school was designed to be the school of the masses. In its early stages, it remained purposely nonvocational and it was to foster the spiritual and cultural growth of the child through the teaching of religious

and artistic subjects. This reflected the "idealism" of early Fascism and its philosopher Gentile, who was vigorously opposed to rationalistic and scientific education. By contrast, the advanced elementary schools, which were meant for the children of the lower middle classes and petty officials, were highly differentiated along strictly vocational lines. Significantly enough, they were described as "informative" by contrast with the "formative" schools, the secondary schools preparing the élite.

Classicism ruled the curriculum of secondary schools; Latin, for example, was a compulsory subject in all of them. Like the seventeenth-century humanists, Gentile wanted the entire higher educational plan to be based upon a knowledge of the classics; while not eliminating religious teaching, he strove to direct former "sectarianism" into worship of the divine state and its high priest, the Duce. Religious teaching thus became the handmaiden of Fascist indoctrination. The Concordat under which religious training was made compulsory both in elementary and secondary schools turned out to be a Pyrrhic victory from the point of view of the church.

Italy still permitted private schools to exist, but these schools were under state supervision; they might use no textbooks other than those approved by the Ministry of Education. Their students were required to pass examinations before a state board just like students of public schools. While public schools, which were free, accepted students with high qualifications only, private schools accepted any students whose parents were in a position to pay. This situation within the Fascist setup may seem paradoxical. While many Fascists did not like private schools, they did not succeed in eliminating them. Even the Bottai reform of 1939 did not attempt to abolish them. Of course, no amount of money could help any student pass the very rigid graduation test, the prerequisite for entrance into the universities. Selection on the basis of Fascist orthodoxy remained a cardinal principle of the educational philosophy of Fascism.

Gentile's reforms reflected the trends of Fascism in its early stages. The Fascist doctrine had not even been definitely developed then. The situation was very different in the thirties when Fascism had achieved maturity. In consequence, the Gentile reform should be regarded as a partially successful attempt to reduce illiteracy,

to establish "idealism" in education, and thus to prepare for the introduction of some basic Fascist ideas in the schools of the new Italy. As time went on and political changes took place, many features of this earlier scheme proved no longer adequate and modifications were introduced. Finally, the Duce ordered Education Minister Bottai to reconstruct the entire educational organization and, this time, to make it "genuinely" Fascist. The new system was approved by the Fascist Grand Council on February 16, 1939, as the "birth certificate of the Fascist school." The outbreak of war prevented the scheme from being put fully into operation.

2. *The School System.* The Duce asked for an ambitious program. Gentile's reform had been philosophical and doctrinal; now Mussolini wanted a new school system, not merely a reformed one. After the new school charter had been accepted by the Fascist government, Bottai circularized his report, explaining that the application "of the principle contained in the school charter will result in a radical renovation of the school, Fascist in its system, method, structure and style."¹

The most important aspects of the new school charter may be summarized as follows:

Since the Fascist doctrine was now definitely established and had put the whole nation under a total and unitarian rule, cognizance of this totality should be taken by the school in its form, methods, and curriculum content, and it should be related to the organs of Fascism for its sociopolitical training. (The relationship between the school and the youth movement was a closer one than in Germany.)

For vocational training, suitable types of schools would have to be found in accordance with the capacities of the pupil rather than with the desires of his family. This meant that "parents or guardians will no longer be able, for family or economic reasons, to exert undue influence on the selection of the professions of their children."² Talented students without means would be given the opportunity of studying at the expense of the state.

Cultural and social snobbery was countered with the introduction of manual training during the regular school periods and by

¹ Giuseppe Bottai, "Circular on Education," February 16, 1939, quoted by Howard R. Marraro, "Italy's New School Charter," *School and Society*, May 20, 1939.

² Marraro, *loc. cit.*

the requirement of "vacations" spent in (compulsory) camps. The camp work idea was apparently borrowed from the German Labor Service but largely modified.

Education began at the age of four when the child received some preliminary training in the *scuola materna* (kindergarten). Upon reaching six years of age, his three years of elementary schooling began. The child would then spend the fourth and fifth years of the elementary level in the work school (*scuola del lavoro*). After these two years of manual training, the ten-year-old child would face the question of what school to choose. Basically, he had three possibilities: he might take a three-year course to prepare himself for a trade; he might start a three-year vocational course in preparation for one of the technical schools that would lead to a job in a commercial or industrial enterprise; or he might decide to attend a three-year course in a junior high school (*scuola media inferiore*) with a view to entering the senior type of high school.

After finishing one of the three-year courses, the student had either to be recommended by the teachers or to pass an examination in order to be permitted to go ahead. Corresponding to the type of school, a choice of commercial, technical, agricultural, surveying, or nautical institute would be available. The top-ranking secondary schools remained the classical and scientific lyceums. They offered a five-year course which opened the way to the universities.

There was very little flexibility in this system. A pupil having elected at the age of ten to attend a junior high school might, at the age of thirteen or fourteen, decide to attend a technical or vocational school rather than the senior high school (*ginnasio* or *liceo*). After that no changing over from one type of school to the other was possible.

The end of the high-school period was marked by a very rigid state examination. The Board of Examiners considered not only the academic merits and the political reliability of the candidates but also the quota of university students. Their number was determined by the government and, as in Germany, restricted. Each type of senior high school prepared the students for particular university departments. No change was allowed.

The school system was primarily designed for boys. Girls, as a

rule, were not expected to go into higher studies. There were special high schools of commercial and technical character and teachers' preparatories for girls. Very few girls studied at classical lycées and went to universities. The position of women in Italy has always been socially restricted. Church and tradition made the home the center of female activities. The Fascists had no difficulty in continuing and strengthening this tradition.

When Gentile was directing Fascist education, he wanted the universities to be and to remain scholarly institutions of free learning and free teaching. This worthy purpose could not stand up under the pressure of Fascist regimentation. The universities deteriorated in spite of the fact that legally they were regarded as autonomous and were entrusted with their own jurisdiction in the traditional way. The professors, being state employees, had to become members of the Fascist party and no new instructor was considered unless he had Fascist affiliations. In 1932, a professional oath was introduced pledging the professors to follow Fascist doctrine as their basic guide in teaching. Some famous educators refused to take the oath and resigned.

Fascism also captured the student body. The Fascist student associations were the most ardent supporters of Mussolini. Their relationship with the "Young Fascists," the oldest and most belligerent of the youth movement groups, was very close. Their activity was political rather than academic.

A law of December 31, 1934, ordered all education to be coordinated with later military training. "Military education is an integral part of national education," the law proclaimed, "it begins as soon as the child is capable of learning, and continues until the citizen is in a condition to take up arms for the defense of the country."¹

The decree was one of the most significant expressions of the spirit of Fascist education. The emphasis on premilitary instruction was aimed at molding the mind of the children and adolescents, preparing the ground for political indoctrination. The close cooperation between the semimilitary youth movement and the schools was in keeping with the martial aspects of an education for death. It should be added that all these efforts of Fascism at capturing the

¹ Quoted by Herman Finer, *Mussolini's Italy*, Henry Holt and Company, New York, 1935, p. 485.

allegiance of youth were successful up to a point only. A degree of passive resistance was met at the lower levels while in the higher strata, in the universities, the attempts at Fascist indoctrination often produced cynicism and scepticism rather than faith.

3. *Youth Movements.* The effort to capture the loyalty of youth was not confined to formal education. The *Balilla* organization was created as a semiprivate movement, subsidized by "voluntary" contributions. In 1926, the National Balilla Institute (*Opera Nazionale Balilla*) was founded. It became part of the Italian national system for the control of youth and was organized for the "assistance and physical and moral education of youth" under the sponsorship of the Ministry of the Interior. "Fascism considers the problem of the education of the young as one of the fundamental tasks of the Revolution . . ." stated the charter establishing the Balilla Institute.¹

The Balilla Institute remained semiautonomous until 1929 when it was put under the control of the Ministry of Education. Youths between the ages of eight and eighteen were "invited" to serve in their respective groups; in 1934, six-to-eight-year-olds were added, and some time later, young people from eighteen to twenty-one were also included. The fundamental aim of training was to instill in the young the sense of military discipline, to instruct them in gymnastics and all kinds of sports, to educate them culturally, and to do some "religious" teaching as well. By 1938, the Fascist government had succeeded in enrolling about 65 per cent of all Italian youths, both boys and girls, in its movement. It may be assumed that the remaining 35 per cent were either physically unfit or regarded as coming from politically unreliable families.

The following table shows the organization of the various groups:

BOYS		GIRLS	
<i>Figli della lupa</i> (wolf cubs)	6-8	<i>Figlie della lupa</i>	6-8
<i>Balilla</i>	8-14	<i>Piccole italiane</i> (little Italian girls)	8-14
<i>Avanguardisti</i>	14-18	<i>Giovani italiane</i> (young Italian girls)	14-18
<i>Giovani Fascisti</i> (young Fascists)	18-21	<i>Giovani Fasciste</i> (young Fascist girls)	18-21

¹ Law of April 3, 1926, quoted by Finer, *op. cit.*, p. 427.

The entire organization was called *Gioventù Italiana del Littorio* (GIL).¹ Its motto was: *Believe—Obey—Fight*, which may be translated as faith, discipline, and action. The organization was a replica of the hierarchical organization of the Fascist party. It put "character" and "moral" training in the first rank, followed by a physical training which amounted to premilitary instruction. Various activities of a boy-scout nature supplemented the training. Military instruction began at the earliest age levels when wooden rifles were given to the Wolf Cubs; the *Balilla* used small army rifle models. Upon being transferred to the *Avanguardisti*, the boys learned to shoot with regular army rifles. Special groups were even instructed in the use of machine guns. The Young Fascists had already begun their army training; they were by now completely familiar with military conceptions, regulations, and technique.

During all these years of training, the boys were indoctrinated with Fascist ideals and Fascist conceptions about the position of Italy in the world. Their absolute loyalty to the regime was symbolized by the oath they had to swear upon entering the various stages of the GIL. The manuals for *Balilla* and *Avanguardisti* reminded the youngsters that they belonged throughout their lives to the Duce and the Fascist cause and not by any means to themselves. The oath was stressed repeatedly and was even printed on their membership cards.

The Young Fascists were the party members of the future. When they became twenty-one years of age, they would be admitted into the ranks of the party or, perhaps, into the militia, which was a special honor. Their importance to the party was indicated by the fact that the secretary of the party himself was their commander. (School teachers, who had to be members of the party, led the younger formations; militia men commanded the *Avanguardia*.) Their training was planned for war and violence; the emphasis was on shooting practice rather than on the harmless pleasures of youth.

The training of girls was not quite so military. The influence of the Catholic Church, the deeply rooted Italian ideas about the family and the position of women, and Fascism's own views, served to mitigate the belligerency of the girl corps. Augusto Turati, for-

¹ Italian Youth of the Lictor.

mer secretary of the Fascist party, set forth as follows the purposes of the girl's training:

1. To fulfill her duties as daughter, sister, student, and friend, with cheerfulness and joy even though they be fatiguing.
2. To serve the Nation as her other and greater mother, the mother of all good Italians.
3. To love the Duce who has made the Nation stronger and greater.
4. To obey her superiors with joy.
5. To have the courage to repulse those who give evil council and deride honesty.
6. To educate the body to withstand physical fatigue and the spirit not to show pain.
7. To abhor stupid vanity but to love beautiful things.
8. To love work which is life.¹

Practically speaking, the girls in the youth organization received training in civics, physical education, Fascist ideology, and domestic sciences. Their goal was to be perfect wives and mothers, beautiful and healthy, and good Fascists.

Those who were to lead youth on the basis of GIL principles, received a special training course in a Fascist Academy of Physical and Youth Education. There was one for young men in Rome and a smaller one for girls in Orvieto. Male candidates had to pass a competitive examination after having been graduated from a secondary school; they had to be over twenty-four years of age, physically well developed, and not married; they also had to have a politically satisfactory record, and be members either of the party or of the Balilla Institute. Their final acceptance was based not only upon the examination and the physical test, but also upon the candidates' moral references and background. The course lasted three years.

The course for girls who wanted to study at the Orvieto Academy took only two years; high-school graduates between the ages of seventeen and twenty-one, unmarried, and members of one of the Fascist organizations were admissible. They would be active as leaders in the *Piccole* and *Giovani Italiane* sections.

A number of smaller organizations like the *Doposcuola* (after school) Institute for children whose homes could not provide suffi-

¹ Quoted by H. W. Schneider and S. B. Clough, *Making Fascists*, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1929, pp. 181-82.

cient care for them, or the Junior Red Cross Society for hygiene training, useful as they appear, all served the same ultimate purpose—to make good Fascists out of the children.

Nothing can better show the character of Fascist indoctrination than ten commandments which were hammered into the minds of both young and old:

1. Know that the Fascist and in particular the soldier, must not believe in perpetual peace.
2. Days of imprisonment are always deserved.
3. The nation is also served even as sentinel over a can of petrol.
4. A companion must be a brother, first, because he lives with you, and secondly because he thinks like you.
5. The rifle and cartridge belt, and the rest, are confided to you not to be ruined in leisure, but to be preserved for war.
6. Do not ever say "The Government will pay" . . . because it is you who pay; and the Government is that which you willed to have, and for which you put on a uniform.
7. Discipline is the soul of armies: without it, there are no soldiers, but only confusion and defeat.
8. *Mussolini is always right!*
9. For a volunteer there are no extenuating circumstances when he is disobedient.
10. One thing must be dear to you above all: the life of the Duce.¹

CONCLUSION

The comparison between Nazism and Fascism makes the latter appear as a milder form of totalitarianism. To a certain extent that is so. The greater mellowness and deeper roots of Italian culture, reflected in the traditions and character of the Italian people, account in part for the difference. It is true that, in actual effect, Fascism was not able to secure as firm a hold on the Italian people as Nazism on the German. But when it comes to the fundamental issue of an outlook upon life, the difference between the two is small. In a way, the seeming greater mildness of Fascism made it the more dangerous, for it gave it a greater "export value" than Nazism. Thus it is that many people in the democratic countries, blind to the fundamental vices of Fascist ideology, have allowed themselves to be impressed by a superficial—though much advertised—efficiency. This apparent efficiency, especially in the eco-

¹Quoted in Finer, *op. cit.*, p. 443.

conomic domain, has often been contrasted with the "impotence of democratic muddling." In addition, the Lateran Treaty did much to give Fascism the stamp of respectability. It has not been one of the lesser successes of Fascist propaganda to succeed in building up an association, in the minds of many, between Fascism and a presumed "law and order," especially in contrast with the fear for the safety of established institutions engendered by the discontent of the masses.

Of the two ideologies, Fascism is the older. In many ways it served to prepare the way for Nazism, which learned much from its teacher whom it was soon to excel. In addition, Fascism set in motion a wave of nationalism such as the world had never before experienced. A capital difference between Fascism and Nazism lay in the fact that the latter disposed of the much greater resources, and therefore power, of the German nation. This is what made it a far more dangerous and immediate threat to the outside world. By herself, Italy alone could never have been such a threat. But, to the historian of the future, the real significance of Fascism is likely to appear in the universal appeal of the new ideology, which cut across national boundaries; an appeal coming from the fact that it was a response to problems which are typical of our time. That is why, despite its demise in Italy, the danger represented by the Fascist ideology is anything but dead.

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SECTION THREE: JAPAN; FEUDALISM AND IMPERIALISM

10 *Fundamentals of Japan's Religious Ideology*

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

In the Age of Gods (*Kami-Yo*), that is, during the prehistoric era of Japan lasting until approximately 660 B.C., the divine forebearers of the emperors fulfilled their mission by giving birth to Izanagi and Izanami, the parents of the sun-goddess Amaterasu-Omikami. Five generations after the sun-goddess appeared in the world of man, one of the offsprings of this family of gods became the first Emperor of Japan, Jimmu. He is a legendary figure but not entirely fictitious. His existence is supposedly documented; however, taking the year 660 B.C. as the beginning of his reign is an assumption which cannot be proved definitely. The Chinese calendar was introduced into Japan almost one hundred years after Jimmu ascended the throne.

The history of early Japan is clouded in mystery. Not even the origin of the Japanese race can be determined with precision, although it is assumed that Malays must have entered the islands from the south. Chinese and Korean elements played a considerable part in the racial composition; they brought culture and script characters to Japan. The earliest Japanese chronicles, the *Kojiki* and the *Nihongi*, date from 720 A.D. They are not reliable and must be checked with Chinese chronicles and archaeological discoveries.

All we know of the centuries between the ascension of the Emperor Jimmu and the reign of the regent, Prince Shokotu, c. 600 A.D., is that the frontiers of Japan were defined and that the introduction of Chinese and Korean culture elevated the country from barbaric primitivism to a higher type of civilization. In 552 A.D. Buddhism was introduced. Prince Shokotu, who assumed the regency almost half a century later, became an ardent Buddhist. He was the first great ruler of Japan and he did more for his country's

culture than any other sovereign had done previously. To him, Japan owes much and the imperial house even more. Already in his time, the feudal lords had become strong; he curbed their power, at least for the time being, and issued his famous "Seventeen Article Constitution." This document not only shows a decided Buddhist influence but also makes it clear that his Korean teachers instructed him in Confucianism. Confucius' teachings are not alien to some of the basic Shinto ideals, particularly to the way of family life which is so vitally important in Japan. It is worth quoting a few of Shokoku's principles:

In everything let there be good faith, for without it everything ends in failure;

Let the court officials attend early and retire late for the whole day is hardly enough for accomplishing the business of the state;

Let no official sacrifice the public interest to his private feelings;

Flatterers and deceivers lead to the overthrow of the state and the destruction of the people;

When you receive imperial commands, fail not to obey them carefully;

Let all important matters be discussed by many persons.¹

During the following centuries, Japan remained completely under the cultural influence of China and of China's glorious T'ang dynasty which made that country the greatest and most powerful of the Eastern world. As in China, the power and the glory of the court rose in Japan. Eventually, the growing influence of the court led to the creation of the ancient city of Nara whose splendor must have been unique in the history of austere Japan. In the eleventh century, the power of the imperial court diminished rapidly because the provincial *daimyo* (feudal lords) had strengthened their position and independence. They controlled the country's wealth and commanded armies of considerable size and military prowess. Not unlike the medieval barons in their relation to their king, the knights who served their *daimyo* received positions and livelihood from him and, in return, watched over his life, his honor, and his riches. These knights were the *samurai* (literally, attendants) who developed into a warrior caste with a strict moral code. They

¹Quoted by M. M. Dilts, *The Pageant of Japanese History*, Longmans, Green and Company, New York, 1938, pp. 23-24.

were also called *bushi* (fighting gentlemen) whence the expression *Bushido* which is both a state of mind and a code of behavior fitting for noble warriors. The importance of this spirit of *Bushido* upon the formation of Japanese mentality cannot be overestimated.¹

Until some time after the eleventh century, the growing strength of the landholding class could have been checked by the court. The court, however, was too deeply preoccupied with esthetics, Chinese art and philosophy, and all the elaborate ceremonials which came with the introduction of Chinese culture into Japan. It did not care to play one lord against the other in order to weaken their individual positions. Furthermore, the court faced the danger of a rising priestly caste. Alone, it was not strong enough to subdue this menace; it had to call for the help of the *daimyo* and their *samurai*. These very soon crushed the imminent revolt but they did not return to their estates after victory was achieved. Once in the capital, they wanted to exercise power themselves. They did not intend to destroy the court as an institution because, after all, the existence of the emperor was part of the national religion. However, they began to crowd the court out of active political life and eventually succeeded in reducing it to a shadow government without actual importance.

The real governing power was taken over by the *Shogun* (*genralissimo*). The first *Shogunate* originated as the result of the struggle between the two mightiest clans, the Minamoto and the Taira. The Taira lost, were annihilated to the last family member, and thus left the Minamoto clan the uncontested rulers of the country. Being ruled by both emperor and *Shogun*, Japan had thus become a "duarchy" which was to last for seven centuries, until 1867. The first of the *Shoguns* was *Yorimoto* who established himself in 1186 at *Kamakura*. The place of residence of the *Shogun* changed according to the location of his home estate; only the emperors steadily lived their shadow existence at *Kyoto*. They were revered by everyone but had no political influence whatsoever. At the beginning of the seventeenth century, the *Shogun* moved to *Yedo*, which is the ancient name for *Tokyo*.

During the last period of the *Shogunate*, from 1600 to 1867, the

¹ See Inazo Nitobe, *Bushido, The Soul of Japan*, G. Putnam & Sons, London and New York, 1905.

amazing Tokugawa family ruled the country while keeping it in complete isolation. It was Iyeyasu, the first Shogun of the Tokugawa clan to assume the reins of government, who ordered, on penalty of death, that Japan should not permit any foreigner to land on the island empire and that every spiritual and cultural influence which might have reached Japan from the outside should be eradicated with fire and sword.

Japan had not lived in such isolation before 1600. Her relations with China and Korea had flourished, at their beginning, through peaceful commercial and cultural ties. Later they were, every now and then, disturbed by Japanese attacks. Korea particularly has always been a goal of Japanese aggression; Japan's greatest warrior, Hideyoshi, undertook two expeditions in grandiose style (1552-54 and 1597-98) to subjugate Korea. He began as successfully as Napoleon in Russia and envisaged an attack upon China after the consolidation of his gains. But the campaign ended in disaster, like Napoleon's Russian campaign, and for similar reasons, namely, the interruption of communications with the homeland. However, since that time, Japan has never renounced her "rights" on Korea. When Hideyoshi died in Japan in 1598, the rest of his expeditionary force left Korea and sailed home.

Europe did not learn anything about Japan until Marco Polo described it in his *Travels*. Almost two and a half centuries later, the Portuguese Mendez Pinto rediscovered Japan in 1542 and taught the Japanese the use of firearms. Also, Christian missionaries came to Japan (Francis Xavier was the first) and had a limited amount of success. Unfortunately, this development was interrupted by the extremely bad behavior of subsequent European seamen who compromised Western Christianity by their unrestrained greed for wealth. The medieval Japanese could not understand the contradiction between the Christian principles preached by the missionaries and the conduct of the men who pretended to be Christians. This was one of the reasons which had determined the Shogun Iyeyasu to close Japan against foreign intrusion and to establish domestic peace after almost two centuries of strife among the feudal lords. It was the wish of the great Hideyoshi that Iyeyasu should continue the social system, economically based upon agriculture with rice as currency, which Hideyoshi had begun to estab-

lish. Iyeyasu obeyed his master faithfully. For the first time, a "new order" based on extreme isolationism and the return to ancient tradition and its conservation was introduced in Japan. "A new order is instituted in which the elements from the past are rearranged. The regime of the Tokugawa established a new order of this kind, destroying nothing, but reweighing and redividing and thus creating the new."¹

Desirous of perpetuating their power on the basis of the *status quo*, the Tokugawa made sure that no political power should remain in the hands of the emperors, whose role was to be confined to the spiritual domain. Emperors being divine, worldly affairs could not touch them. In order to be quite secure, the Shogun kept close supervision of the court's expenditures and restricted the imperial families to the essential means of subsistence only.

The way in which the Tokugawa handled the great *daimyo* shows the high degree of their political craftsmanship. They defeated the attempts of the *daimyo* to unite and, during holiday seasons, forbade them to come to town together. Having organized an efficient spy system, the Shogunate was informed of every move of the *daimyo* and their servants. The geographical nature of Japan made such supervision easier than it would have been in China where the feudal system was equally entrenched, but where the degree of centralization achieved by the Shoguns was impossible to accomplish. In order to maintain such a rigid system, force and even violence had to be used. The Tokugawa did not hesitate to resort to them. The principles of government outlined by Iyeyasu were simple: the court had to be supervised; the *daimyo* had to be made economically dependent upon the Shogun and to be set one against the other; the social groups had to be strictly separated through ritual regulations with no possibility of ever intermingling; the political energies of the higher classes had to be directed into harmless channels, preferably of a cultural and artistic nature.

The Tokugawa family held at least one third of the land of central Japan. The three hundred larger fiefs of influential *daimyo* were so organized that every one of their estates was surrounded by estates of the Shogun's spies. In other words, the *daimyo* rarely had common frontiers with each other and thus were unable to

¹ E. Lederer, *Japan in Transition*, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1938, p. 48.

organize seditious movements. Furthermore, the *daimyo* were required to live a part of the year in Yedo (Tokyo) where Iyeyasu had established his residence. If they could not come, their wives had to represent them. These journeys were extremely expensive; the *daimyo* came with a following befitting their social rank, which meant that they had to pay for hundreds or even thousands of friends and followers. Thus the Shoguns ruined the economic resources of the *daimyo* and always had them or their families as convenient hostages should a rebellion occur.

The Tokugawa controlled all commerce and, most important, the agricultural production. Rice remained the official currency until the nineteenth century. The rate of exchange for rice to be accepted as land rent depended entirely upon the Shoguns' will. The *daimyo* were not permitted to determine the value of their rice production themselves or even to make their rice function as a means of exchange unless they had received the Shoguns' permission.

The complete isolation of the country and the peculiar type of the absolutism of its government during more than two and a half centuries under the Tokugawa dynasty, had a powerful influence on the formation of the Japanese character. This period constitutes the immediate background of modern Japan; an understanding of it is a prerequisite to an understanding of the Japan of today. During this period, the "duarchy" instilled its double-faced political ideology into the people; stifled liberal thinking by strengthening the power of the ruling class and by keeping all classes strictly within their own limits; did not permit any but one single interpretation of Confucian ethics as the approved system of learning. "Any doctrine other than this was tabooed as heretical. . . . Innovation in any respect, but most of all ideas, was strictly forbidden."¹

The American Commodore Perry, by putting an end to Japan's isolation in 1853, also ended the Tokugawa era. The Shogunate had developed weaknesses which now became apparent. Only sixteen more years passed before the last Shogun opened the doors of Tokyo to the army of the emperor. Under Emperor Meiji, the court of Japan again became the center of the nation's power. After his death in 1912, imperial influence began to wane once more

¹ Inazo Nitobe, *Japan*, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1931, p. 94.

although not nearly to the same extent as in the Tokugawa period. Instead of the Shogun, the generals and admirals tried to seize political power. The introduction of Western ideas hampered them but they quietly prepared for their opportunity. The successes of Japanese expansionist policies and the military and diplomatic victories from 1894 to 1932 strengthened the position of the military and their allies, the few big capitalists who, between them, controlled the bulk of Japanese economy. A new "duarchy" was about to be created, this time with the military leaders as rivals of the civil government. Since the generals claimed to represent the will of the "divine" sovereign, the civilian representatives of the government were not able to maintain their position.

It was the influence of Shinto which brought about this peculiar situation. Shinto is the national religion of Japan, which not only provides for spiritual needs but also regulates social relations and, in addition, rationalizes Japan's aspirations in the world and the peculiarities of her administration. It is therefore necessary to analyze Shinto as a historical phenomenon which has shaped the Japanese mind for fifteen hundred years and is responsible for the religious and political aspects of Japanese ideology.

SHINTO, ITS HISTORY AND MEANING

Shinto is not a religion in the ordinary sense. It does not offer doctrines or dogmas developed on the basis of a definite philosophy. Shinto is a cult which originally had no defined ethics. Only in the course of the centuries, with the help of Confucianism, did ceremonial laws evolve into strict moral precepts. These precepts were at first limited to ethical matters and laws of physical purity. Even today, cleanliness of the body and utter abhorrence of all pollution play a major role in the regulation of Japanese social behavior.

The interpretation of Shinto has varied through the ages. But these variations, affecting ceremonial, were of a superficial nature. Scholars who have attempted to analyze Shinto in its purest form, have come to fundamentally similar conclusions. They have stated that Shinto is the way to worship the gods and goddesses of heaven and earth; but it may also be the way of government or the rule of right and justice, in fact, the way in which the emperor governs the country. Or, as other scholars have claimed, Shinto is the way

which was indicated by the divine ancestress Amaterasu-Omikami, the sun-goddess; but it may also be the everyday way or the right path of duty that should be followed by man. It is the way existing between lord and subject, man and wife, parents and children, brothers and sisters, and among friends. Shinto is the national religion which has been transmitted from the "Age of Gods." It maintains the national constitution and is the moral essence of the nation.¹

These interpretations, taken together, make Shinto a religion stressing four basic worships: nature worship, hero worship, ancestor worship, and emperor worship. Nature worship was originally the most important part of the ritual. The early Japanese distinguished between innumerable gods, "800 myriad" of them, reminding one of the animism of primitive tribes.² In recent times, this part of Shinto, while still existing, has lost much of its importance to the worship of heroes, ancestors, and the imperial family. Ancestor worship, in fact, has become the greatest force of Shinto and is today, in conjunction with emperor worship, the basic element of the Japanese national religion.

The belief in the divine character of the family and the divinity of ancestral spirits plays in Japan a role comparable to that of the *lares* and *penates* (home deities) in the ancient Roman family. The Japanese family is just as patriarchally organized as the Roman; profound respect is paid to the family's own ancestors and to the ancestors of other families as well. The higher the standing of the families, the higher the respect paid to their ancestors. The greatest respect is paid to the ancestors and members of the imperial family. As family units have their *pater familias* (head of the family), so the population of Japan is considered to be one big family with the emperor as its head. This not only gives the mikado a loftier stature but also brings him emotionally close to the hearts of his loyal subjects who feel that they are to be envied in having a family head who is a direct descendant of the sun-goddess.

Shinto has two aspects: one ideological and one religious. The

¹ For further details, see A. Akiyama, *Shinto and Its Architecture*, Japan Welcome Society, Kyoto, 1936, pp. 3-8.

² Animism is the belief of primitive tribes that every natural object possesses an inherent spirit.

National Faith Shinto is a very broad ideological conception, also known as *Jinsha Shinto*, which is mainly concerned with ancestor and emperor worship. It may well be called a "nonsectarian movement." In a much narrower sense, Shinto is a religious ritual, *Shukyo Shinto*, which embraces thirteen different sects. While the National Faith Shinto is supervised by the Ministry of the Interior, the sectarian Shinto is controlled by the Department of Education.

Shinto derives its origin from the ancient imperial courts. At the beginning, Shinto and the court were one and the same, the emperor being the high priest. The very word "government" meant literally the "administration of affairs pertaining to religion" (*matsuri-goto*). The word "shrine" (*miya*) was also used for the location of the imperial palace. Not until the reign of the tenth emperor, Sujin (564-631), did a separation between religious and worldly rule—or as we might say, between church and state—take place.

Of extreme importance were the influences of Confucianism and Buddhism upon Shinto and Japanese mentality. The moral philosophy of Confucius was imported from China about 286 A.D. when a member of the Chinese Han dynasty visited the Japanese court and brought with him the great classical books of Confucius and Mencius. From the beginning, there was no friction between Shinto and Confucian thought. Both revered the family as the divine basis of social life, thus blending their moral precepts into one ethical system which has been recognized ever since.

Buddhism was introduced later, in 552 A.D., when the court of Korea sent the image of the founder of Buddhism as a gift to the court of Japan. However, a reconciliation between Shinto and Buddhism was not easy. It took a long time and much struggling between Buddhists and non-Buddhists before a common ground was found upon which an intellectual agreement could be based. Japanese priests traveled to China and Korea to study Buddhism there; Chinese and Korean Buddhists came to Japan to teach the saintly way of Amida Buddha. The greatest difficulty was not so much spiritual as political. Buddhism preached equality; Shinto was inseparable from the feudalistic organization of a stratified Japanese society. At this time, the *uji*, the family patriarchs, began to become dangerous for the court whose power they contested.

But the court was satisfied when the Buddhists rationalized a combination of Shinto and Buddhism by dividing the competence of the gods. The two faiths established the doctrine of duality (*Ryobu*) which states that the gods in heaven have earthly manifestations, and that the earthly spirits are Shinto deities while the original deities in heaven are Buddhist in nature. So far did the Buddhist theologians go that they claimed the eight hundred myriad Shinto spirits were the exact replicas of Buddhist deities. On the other hand, the Shinto priests pronounced the Buddhist deities replicas of Shinto spirits.

The great Shokotu, himself a devout Buddhist, did his utmost to indoctrinate the Japanese people with Buddhism. But the very fact that Shinto in the broader sense had always remained identical with the nation and its ruler made a complete conquest of Japan by Buddhism impossible.

EMPEROR WORSHIP, NOW AND THEN

The genealogy of the Japanese emperors begins in the Japanese Olympus where, during the "Age of Gods," many generations of gods and goddesses ruled in heaven, preparing for the day on which Izanagi and Izanami would beget Amaterasu-Omikami, the sun-goddess, the divine ancestress of the mikados. Generations later, the first Emperor of Japan, Jimmu, began a hard and protracted family struggle against his divine relatives who apparently did not approve of his coming down to earth and ascending the throne of the Yamato race. According to the myth, Jimmu Tenno—Tenno meaning "son of heaven"—needed not less than 1,792,476 years before he won the contest with his family and proceeded to formulate Japan's basic policies. Jimmu is a legendary figure, but his life and deeds are said to be provable. He is quite seriously referred to as an authoritative source by modern Japanese statesmen. The year of his accession to the Japanese throne is supposedly 660 B.C. However, as has been stated, before the introduction of the Chinese calendar centuries later, the chronology of Japanese historiography is unreliable.

Jimmu, so the chronicles state, proclaimed the principle of *Hakko Ichiu*, a mystical conception meaning that the peoples of the world should be brought under one "roof." The roof was a

symbol of the imperial rule. Jimmu's world was certainly far from any "new world order" or even a "new order in Asia"; all this emperor tried to do was to pacify and make homogenous the different tribes living on the Japanese islands so that they could be molded into one nation.

Under Jimmu's successors the principle was temporarily forgotten. Even the great Hideyoshi did not justify his expedition to Korea and China with the ideal of *Hakko Ichiu*. It was only in modern times, after the Meiji restoration and the end of Japan's isolation, that *Hakko Ichiu* was revived and appropriately reinterpreted. Emperor Hirohito, the one hundred and twenty-fourth ruler of his line, stated in an imperial rescript of 1940:

It has been the great instruction bequeathed by our imperial foundress and other imperial ancestors that our grand moral obligation should be extended to all directions and the world be unified under one roof. This is the point of view we are trying to obey day in and day out.¹

Some Japanese under Christian influence have interpreted *Hakko Ichiu* as "world brotherhood"; but the most far-reaching interpretation of *Hakko Ichiu* is in terms of world-wide expansion and conquest of the globe so that all men may live under the "roof" of the Japanese emperors. Former Foreign Minister Yosuke Matsuoka made the following elucidating statement which should be kept in mind for its implications:

I firmly believe that the great mission which Heaven has imposed on Japan is to save humanity. In conformity with the great spirit in which Emperor Jimmu founded the empire, Japan should take over management of the continent on a large scale, propagate *Hakko Ichiu* (meaning that all the world is one household) and the way of the Emperor and then extend it all over the world.²

The frankness of this statement makes clear how inseparable emperor worship is from Japan's national faith and policies. In fact, her national aspirations are identical with her religious ideology. Emperor worship has remained an essential part of the National Faith Shinto since the distant days of Emperor Jimmu; it is still the creed of every loyal patriot. It is highly emotional in nature and,

¹Quoted by Otto Tolischus, "God, Emperor, High Priest," *New York Times Magazine*, November 23, 1941.

²Quoted by H. J. Timperley, *Japan: A World Problem*, The John Day Company, New York, 1942, pp. 101-102.

significantly, derives its appeal more from the national than from the spiritual aspect of Shinto. It is, indeed, a manifestation of the soul of Japan, pervading Japanese life in its totality.

As a Japanese scholar writes: "The National Shinto Faith culminates in the form of emperor worship and patriotic loyalty to the Emperor—a sense of utmost devotion to the *Jinno* or Divine Ruler, which is suffused with religious zeal and enthusiasm. Just herein lies the life and kernel of Shinto. . . . It is, in fact, a Japanese patriotism, suffused with religious emotion; or, in other words, a peculiar enthusiastic patriotic sentiment, often soaring into the plane of adoration or religious worship toward the Emperor or Mikado, a manifest deity in the sense of the anthropic religion. I should, indeed, call it . . . a manifestation, coupled with religious zeal, of *Yamato-damashii*, or, the "Soul of Japan." ¹

Emperor worship did not deteriorate in the least during the time when the court had no political power, particularly after the twelfth century when the Shogunate deprived the emperors of any practical influence. Even then the emperors remained the spiritual symbols of the Japanese nation. Nor was it abandoned when Emperor Meiji restored political power to the court in 1868, breaking down some of the worst features of feudalism and attempting to modernize Japan's political and economic structure. On the contrary, a further strengthening of the National Faith Shinto served to keep emperor worship firmly entrenched.

The Department of Divine Rites received a place above all administrative and legislative offices, and Shinto was separated again from Buddhism. Fundamental Shinto with its thousands of shrines, some 114,000 throughout the country, was reinstated and their maintenance assisted by the government.² The court did everything to foster this movement, but there was no religious persecution of other sects. Buddhism, Confucianism, and related sects (but not the Christian) are free to worship as they see fit. However, Shinto is a *conditio sine qua non*. Its importance to the throne caused Emperor Meiji to appoint more than seven thousand government preachers who in the years from 1875 to 1877

¹ Genchi Kato, *What Is Shintoism?* Tokyo, 1935, pp. 14, 29, 59, 63-65, quoted by James A. B. Scherer, *Japan Defies the World*, The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Indianapolis, 1938, p. 87.

² Nitobe, *op. cit.*, pp. 314-315.

traveled all over the country and taught their flocks "to practice the principle of love of country and reverence for the gods; to make clear the reason of heaven and the way of man; to accept gratefully the rule of His Majesty and to obey his will."¹ This propaganda campaign was unsuccessful but is certainly among the world's most peculiar undertakings. Emperor Meiji's fears that the restoration might revolutionize the Japanese mind proved unfounded; he underestimated the tenacity with which the Japanese cling to their tradition.

Viewed in the light of its historical background, the Mikado's position is infinitely higher and loftier than the position of any Western monarch has ever been. It is also different in that the Tenno may have little political power and yet remain the exalted leader of a "chosen people." Even at the height of the medieval papacy, there was always in the West a separation and a struggle between the political and the religious power. For a comparison, one must turn to the Arab, and later the Turkish, caliphate, where the ruler of the state was at the same time head of the religious organization. But, unlike the Japanese, the Moslem State—a state of Asiatic origin for that matter—was not rooted in nationality.

The Japanese emperor symbolizes the entirety of the nation's worldly and spiritual aspirations. Thus religion amounts to patriotism, and patriotism is the exercise of the national religion. More than seventy million Japanese bow at least once every day in the direction of the imperial palace, and this bow is both a prayer and an expression of patriotic devotion. And as ancient Christian martyrs died willingly for the greater glory of God, so the Japanese die readily for their emperor who represents their gods and their country.

Alien as such a mental attitude is to Western thinking, its practical results are not very different from those of European totalitarianism. Emperor Meiji voluntarily gave his people a "constitution" and instituted a parliamentary machinery of government. But the limitations of the powers of the throne, an essential feature of constitutional government, were not in fact applied to curb imperial absolutism. It was expressly stated that the parliamentary bodies did not possess ultimate power and should merely assist the

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 316.

emperor in matters of government. As a result, more than half a century after Emperor Meiji proclaimed his constitution, the Japanese Diet was nothing but a ceremonial sounding board which the real leaders used to state their policies. A shortlived democratic trend previous to the Manchurian campaign was quickly forgotten, and the Diet became an assembly not unlike Hitler's Reichstag in Germany.

The introduction of Western technique and civilization makes it difficult for the rest of the world to understand how a nation can adopt the forms of modern life and yet cling to an ideology fundamentally alien to the West. Some observers have thought that too much was made of emperor worship, and that the emperors, after having been shadow figures for many centuries, could not possibly command so much respect and reverence from the people. But this view is incorrect, for the homage everybody pays to the Tenno is basically reverence toward the country. In this sense, Japan is very definitely a totalitarian country, and the emperor is the personification of a thoroughly authoritarian state.

It may be that Japanese leaders used emperor worship for demagogic and chauvinistic purposes; it may be that some of the more highly educated persons had their doubts about the divine origin of the emperor. But for the Japanese nation, the emperor remained the living symbol of the divine destiny of the Japanese Empire. For the millions, he remained the *pater familias* of the national family and the overlord of a society which had lost its feudalistic form but not the content of class distinction and ancestor veneration. Obedience to the emperor was obedience to the nation. Obedience to the nation was obedience to the eight hundred myriad gods in the Shinto heaven. Only a revolution of unimaginable extent, brought about through a complete collapse of Japan's military, political, and economic organization, may induce a change of mind. Even then, the Japanese being Asiatics, one may doubt that they would turn to occidental schools of thought.

THE SPIRIT OF BUSHIDO

There is yet another ideological phenomenon to be discussed which is closely related to the development of the Japanese mind through the millennium and a half of its historic existence: the spirit

of *Bushido*, or the "way of knights." (The *bushi* or *samurai*, as will be remembered, were the fighting gentlemen of the feudal lords; they became a national institution when the rule of the court was usurped by the Shoguns.)

The *samurai*, living symbols of this "way of the warriors," became a class pledged to unfailing loyalty to their lords, to an ascetic and frugal life, to filial piety, and to worship of their elders and ancestors. Their exalted ideal of an austere life was an Asiatic version of the ancient Spartan discipline. In fact, *Bushido*, Spartan character and, perhaps, Prussian militarism at its purest, are spiritually related.

The *samurai*, however, were in addition fanatical Shintoists, which fact intensified their asceticism even above that of the Spartans whose religion was rather perfunctory and, of course, beyond that of many Prussian officers for whom king and country were the main objects of loyalty, religious service being regarded as part of their professional duties. Japanese writers quote Iyeyasu, the first Shogun of the Tokugawa family, as a shining example of the spirit of *Bushido*. This Shogun's prescription for the way of life of a *samurai* sounds as pessimistic as the teachings of the early Christian Church and is virtually identical with the *via regia crucis*, the royal way of the cross. Life is a heavy burden, Iyeyasu said, so proceed carefully and be ever aware of your own imperfections. This is your lot, but do not be dissatisfied or desperate about it. If you feel desires overwhelming you, think of the days of extreme danger through which you have passed. Control yourself and find fault with yourself rather than with others. Temper is your greatest enemy.

Iyeyasu did not enumerate all the virtues of the *samurai*; he must have taken for granted that they were known. But he stressed the sense of shame as one of the most important character traits of a *samurai*. "This feeling of a breach of decorum or decency is shame, and we become conscious of it when we have a standard by which to judge our thoughts or actions—a law existing either within us or without, and binding us to obedience."¹ Shame, in this particu-

¹ Nitobe, *op. cit.*, p. 354. See also this author's *Bushido: Soul of Japan*. Nitobe was one of Japan's finest propagandists. He idealized Japanese life and thought and had the gift of presenting his ideas in English with a good understanding of Anglo-Saxon psychology. Valuable as his books are as sources of material, his statements on Japan should be read with caution.

lar interpretation, becomes thus an instrument for testing one's attitudes and deeds with respect to the prevailing social standards. It regulates, in a way, the two other important characteristics of the *samurai*, loyalty and filial piety.

So strong was the impression which the spirit of *Bushido* made upon the people as a whole that it became a national ideal partaking of a religious character. In the spiritual history of the world, men have always deeply impressed their fellow men by foregoing the pleasures of life for the attainment of nonmaterial goals. The *samurai* were regarded as saints and their words were revered as true because they had not been touched by the petty diversions of everyday life. They were expected to live up to their exalted spiritual position morally and physically. They were expected to abandon the pleasures of an epicurean life; they were not permitted to dance or to participate in large-scale feasts. If a *samurai* were married, the life of his family had to correspond to his high ideals; his wife, like himself, would have to throw her life away without hesitation if circumstances should demand such a sacrifice.

Hara-kiri, or *seppuku*, the particular type of *samurai* suicide, is part of the honor code of the *samurai*. If the sense of shame compels him to admit failure, *Bushido* demands the supreme consequence. He will open his abdomen with his sword, the symbol of his knighthood. This act is no escape as suicides generally are. It is a protest, a token of grief, or a way of executing himself when an average citizen would have been executed. Capture by an enemy always was regarded as dishonorable. Thus a *samurai*, if captured, would be expected to commit *hara-kiri*.

Such violent self-justice must entail a violent attitude toward others. And so, in the name of honor, Japanese history shows a long record of assassinations. In olden times, the assassins gave themselves up, handed to the authorities a written explanation of their act, and then committed suicide. Nowadays, the modern descendants of the ancient *samurai* do not bother to explain their motives for assassination. They also do not bother to apply the principles of *Bushido* to their foreign enemies. It is true that *Bushido* has no written code of honor, and its concept has always remained a loose assemblage of moral precepts and customs for the warrior. Many *samurai* lived up to these ideals in previous centuries, and there

may still be soldiers in modern Japan who do not agree with the methods applied by their superiors toward foreign armies against whom they struggle for the empire's expansion. But *Bushido*, in its finest sense, died when Japan opened her ports to the world because, apparently, the Japanese thought that it was not necessary to keep their code of honor toward foreign "barbarians" and so they limited *Bushido* to domestic use.

Bushido has become an abstract ideal for the people of Japan who like to call themselves a "nation of samurai." In fact, as some modern Western scholars claim, the concept of *Bushido* had almost been forgotten for a long time; it became popular again after the close of the nineteenth century when the Japanese militarists foresaw a century of crucial struggles and were vitally interested in militarizing the population both physically and ideologically. Consequently, *Bushido* has degenerated into death-defying ruthlessness, motivated by religious and nationalistic fanaticism. *Bushido* has become for Japan what Prussian militarism was for Germany. It proved very useful for educational purposes: to harden the physique and morale of children and to teach them self-control is of capital importance for a generation of future soldiers.

To reach an objective, *Bushido* allows any trickery. The ancient samurai had this privilege just as the ancient Spartans sanctioned any crime to achieve a goal which was in the interest of the state. Realization of the goal was always considered more important than the technique used toward its attainment. Japan has followed these precepts faithfully. The most recent examples are the unexpected attack upon the Russian fleet in Port Arthur in 1904, and the treacherous raid on Pearl Harbor in 1941. Despicable from the Western point of view, this system of sudden unexpected warfare still remains within the spirit of *Bushido*.

One can, then, speak of a Japanese ideology based upon the National Shinto Faith and the spirit of *Bushido*. It is an age-old ideology which was successfully used for many centuries and which is being used now. The Japanese did not have to develop or invent a new ideology as a spiritual basis for their political aspirations as did the Germans and the Italians. Their tradition, religion, social organization, and state of mind had remained ever adaptable to any purpose desired by their government. Shinto and *Bushido* are

rooted even more deeply in the national character of the Japanese people than National Socialism in Germany, let alone Fascism in Italy. They are so much a part of the thought of every individual that even the most skeptical intellectuals are afraid to violate the Shinto taboos, and even the most humble workman may feel the responsibility of *Bushido* when he is called to the colors.

11 State and Society in Modern Japan

THE STATE

Immediately after Emperor Meiji had ended the Shogunate, he ordered the drafting of a Japanese constitution. After many deliberations, the work was finally approved and promulgated in 1889. Politically minded observers from the West wondered how the absolutist religious ideology of Shinto could be reconciled with a parliamentary constitution. Any constitutional government, if it is to have meaning, must recognize certain rights of the people and thus, to a degree, be democratic. The Japanese state, however, never gave up its adherence to the principles inherent in Shinto and nipped in the bud, through its police, the shy beginnings of democratic trends.

Is the Japanese constitution compatible with Shinto? Baron Hozumi, late president of the all-important Privy Council and one of Japan's leading jurists, succeeded best in answering this delicate question:

The Emperor holds the sovereign power, not as his own inherent right, but as inheritance from his Divine Ancestor. The government is, therefore, *theocratical*.

The Emperor rules over the country as the supreme head of the vast family of the Japanese nation. The government is, therefore, *patriarchal*. The Emperor exercises the sovereign power according to the Constitution, which is based on the most advanced principles of modern constitutionalism. The government is, therefore, *constitutional*.

In other words, the fundamental principle of the Japanese government is *theocratico-patriarchal constitutionalism*.¹

This is a fair enough statement. The Japanese Constitution may well be called "autocratic" and thus said not to change the old order fundamentally. The restoration was hardly more than a revolution of forms. The etiquette of the deteriorated Shogunate was abolished; in its place a modernized court made its appearance.

¹ Baron Hozumi, *Ancestor-Worship and Japanese Law*, Tokyo, 1901, pp. 87-88. Quoted by Tatsuji Takeuchi, *War and Diplomacy in the Japanese Empire*, Doubleday, Doran & Company, Inc., New York, 1935, p. 9.

To be sure, officially, the Meiji regime broke with the ancient feudal tradition, but an objective appraisal of contemporary Japanese society leads to the inevitable conclusion that the social structure has changed little as compared with previous periods. Just as the constitution did not devalue the divinity of the emperors, so the elimination of the outer structure of feudalism did not uproot the spirit of Japanese society. The powerful impact of Western ideas remained limited to techniques and formalities. The average Japanese businessman may spend his working day dressed in Western clothes but he will change immediately into a Japanese kimono upon returning home; this act is symbolic of his attachment to the traditional ways of Japan. In the same way, the Japanese constitution is but a hollow and formalistic imitation of Western constitutionalism in all those parts which make Japan appear a modern nation. She has indeed progressed technologically, but her spirit has never changed.

The first article of the opening chapter of the Japanese constitution says:

The Empire of Japan shall be reigned over and governed by a line of emperors unbroken for ages eternal.

The fourth article of the same chapter supplements:

The Emperor is the head of the Empire, combining in Himself the rights of sovereignty, and exercises them, according to the provisions of the present Constitution.

What are these provisions? The emperor exercises legislative power with the consent of the Imperial Diet. The laws to be accepted by the Diet are the work of the cabinet of ministers. The ministers are the advisors and immediate servants of the crown, and would never suggest a law which is not acceptable to the emperor. The Diet, knowing this, cannot refuse its consent without appearing unpatriotic and blasphemous.

When the Diet is not sitting, the emperor can promulgate ordinances instead of laws, which have to be subsequently approved by the Diet as soon as it is in session again. If the Diet does not approve them, they must be revoked. But this would be an effrontery toward the emperor and, consequently, all the Diet may do is to suggest certain modifications—which seldom happens.

The emperor sees to it that the laws are promulgated through the proper organs; he determines the organization of the different branches of his government and the salaries of the civil servants; he is the supreme commander of the armed forces; he declares war, makes peace, signs treaties; he can declare a state of siege, order amnesties, and issue titles and ranks.

The second chapter of the constitution deals with the rights and duties of subjects. The rights are few, and most of them, as experience has shown, are ignored by local authorities. The right of property is the only privilege granted to every Japanese subject without reservation. But the right of secrecy of letters, of the inviolability of the home, of impartial trial, of presenting petitions, or of changing one's domicile are all subject to "exceptions provided by law." In other words, any emergency decree issued by the government automatically curtails these rights. Since there exists an emergency from the time Japan started her campaign for a "new order" in Asia, present-day Japanese subjects are mainly acquainted with their duties and hardly with their rights under the constitution.

In view of this, Article XXIX strikes the Western observer as not devoid of irony:

Japanese subjects shall, within the limits of the law, enjoy the liberty of speech, writing, publication, public meetings and associations.

There must always have been severe "limits of the law" for the Japanese people because they hardly ever had the opportunity to enjoy the blessings of these basic freedoms. Since the short period during the twenties when liberalism seemed to become more successful than ever before, not one of the promised freedoms has really been granted. The fear of the authorities that the Japanese may develop what the police call "dangerous thoughts," has led to a system of control which sometimes puts to shame the secret police organization of Nazi Germany.

The granting of religious freedom is perhaps one of the very few concessions really made to the subjects. But this promise, as laid down in Article XXVIII, involves no risk for the government. It is regarded as self-evident that every patriotic Japanese is an ad-

herent of the National Faith Shinto. Whether he belongs, in addition, to another religious sect, remains his personal affair inasmuch as it does not change his attitude toward the nation and the government.

The remaining chapters of the Japanese constitution deal with organizational matters. Chapter III prescribes the organization of the Imperial Diet; Chap. IV establishes the responsibility of the ministers and the Privy Councillors; Chap. V sets up the Judiciary; Chap. VI determines the fiscal organization; Chap. VII gives some additional rules, among them a law according to which the provisions of the constitution may not be changed by the Imperial House Law (the constitution of the court) and, conversely, the Diet may not enact any changes in the Imperial House Law.

Under such circumstances, a free political life in the Western sense could not develop. During the two and one-half centuries of the Tokugawa Shogunate, the organization of parties for any purposes whatsoever was ruthlessly suppressed. Immediately after the Meiji restoration, political leaders tried to direct provincial uprisings into the formation of political parties but were completely defeated by the authorities. Count Itagaki tried to bring together many of the dissatisfied men into a Liberal Party during the latter half of the nineteenth century; the Marquis Okuma and the educator Fukusawa founded a Progressive Party representing the moderately well-off middle classes; the editor Fukuchi tried to found a Conservative Party which, however, never gained much support in conservative circles.

The parties were never able to do efficient political work. Their merit lay only in the political education which they attempted to give the uneducated masses of Japanese subjects. Moreover, since the cabinet ministers are not responsible to the Diet (which is allegedly a representation of the people)¹ but to the emperor and,

¹ There has been, since 1925, an electoral law, giving all males over twenty-six who were neither criminals nor paupers (financially dependent) the right to vote. Elections were secret, using the Australian ballot. However, campaigning for candidates who did not belong to the government parties was hardly possible. The government would apply all sorts of laws against opponents and accuse them of abusing the electoral law. Consequently, it happened only twice that the government party lost an election—and these cases did not affect the government's strength at all. In 1942, of course, the Imperial Rule Assistance Association took over after the former Premier, Tojo, had put an end to parties and free elections.

therefore, cannot be dismissed by the Diet but only by the emperor, the influence of political parties remained largely fictitious. The emperor, on his part, if in need of advice, would not seek it either from the people or from his ministers. He would bring the matter to the Elder Statesmen, the so-called *genro*, a group of elderly gentlemen of conservative opinions whose activity is not constitutionally legalized but who exist as a quasi-public body on the strength of extraconstitutional tradition. There is a tendency to constitute a *genro* from ex-premiers, possibly in collaboration with the Lord Privy Council and the Ministers of the Imperial Household. The Privy Councillors, a constitutional body, are the legalized replica of the Elder Statesmen. They, too, have wielded tremendous power through their influence on the emperor, but this power has been waning for a number of years and the competition of the *genro* has been heavy.

Party lines and party programs shifted repeatedly since the first attempts were made to influence the Japanese government through party politics. The two biggest political parties, *Seiyukai* and *Minseito*, were about equal in numbers and influence before the Manchurian war began in 1931. In a very rough way, they corresponded to the major parties in the United States. There were, in addition, smaller groups representing the interests of farmers, tenants, and labor. But the more progressive a party program became, the less it subscribed to the national religion and the more suspicious it was to the authorities. For example, socialist groups were quickly dissolved. So, in effect, the parties were politically powerless. And since the Manchurian war initiated a period of permanent emergency, with the government ruling by decree-laws and purposely ignoring even those few concessions brought about by the Meiji restoration, political parties have become superfluous or outlawed.

The Japanese press may appear to be comparatively free, but the editors receive negative orders instead of positive ones like their Nazi or Fascist colleagues.¹ Knowing what they may not do, they attain a sometimes amazing extent of liberty for a dictatorially ruled country. Perhaps the government tolerates this state of affairs because the real rulers are never directly attacked. Criticism is only

¹ W. H. Chamberlin, *Japan Over Asia*, Blue Ribbon Books, Inc., New York, 1942, p. 272.

directed against the "constitutional" government and some of its powerless representatives.¹

In consequence, it has never been necessary for the Japanese rulers to set up a one-party system. They maintain order and obedience through the age-old ideology of Shinto and *Bushido*; they command a ruthless police, expert in suppressing "dangerous thoughts"; and they have on their side the armed forces as the basis of their unlimited power. Moreover, there exist a number of secret societies such as the notorious "Black Dragon" with ultra-nationalistic programs; these are the prime movers of an aggressive imperialism striving for world conquest.² They are the symbols of the new nationalistic imperialism and are being treated with circumspection if not with respect by the government because they have the backing of the army and navy.

The tendency to revive, in a modernized form, a regime similar in character to that of the Tokugawa period can be observed in many ways. The power of the military leaders has negated all the major policies of civilian governments which tried to keep peace between Japan and the Western world. These military leaders reduced, once more, the actual power of the emperor while giving lip service to his religious and political significance. It seems to be the tragic destiny of Japan to have her national policies inextricably tied to her imperial symbols. The continued dominance of the National Faith Shinto over the Japanese spirit is hard to reconcile with the establishment of peaceful relations between Japan and the outside world. The struggle for the recognition of the fact that only the breaking away from the Shinto ideology can bring peace and prosperity to the Japanese people has made very little headway. Even in the hearts and minds of "progressive" Japanese intellectuals, the balance still leans in favor of Shinto. Inazo Nitobe, who knew the West as he knew Japan and who admired the United States without loving his native country any less, stated the problem in this dramatic form:

This Empire of ours will be wiped off the political map of the world should violent hands touch our ruling House. The history of this nation will lose all significance for mankind should its sons fail to continue in

¹ Loc. cit.

² Cf. Chamberlin, op. cit., pp. 330ff.

the march of democracy. We should sink into nonentity, should we, through self-complacency, cease to "polish our native gems with stones quarried in other lands." Japan is started on a fair way to prove to the world that Royalism is not inconsistent with Democracy, that it is not incompetent to deal with proletarian problems, and that a king can be an instrument of Heaven for the achievement of social justice.¹

Nitobe's death spared him the disillusion of seeing the utter defeat of his ideals. The third and fourth decades of this century are witnessing the evolution of the Japanese paradox toward a climax which, like that of an ancient Greek tragedy, seems equally tragic and inevitable.

SOCIETY AND ECONOMY

The beginnings of Japanese society present an organization of life centered around the clan. Every clan had its own house gods, ancestors, and type of cult. The clan was ruled by the patriarch, not necessarily the oldest but the most influential man. He and his wife and children stood at the top of the family hierarchy. One rung down the ladder were found the dependents of the family, relatives, who were subservient to the Uji, the rulers of the clan. Farther down the social scale lived those people who were permitted to remain in the "lap of the family" although not related to it. They were free in so far as they could not be sold like slaves, but their freedom of movement was definitely restricted. At the bottom of the social organization came the slaves.

The clan life was strictly regulated in terms of duties, rights, and social behavior. As the clan grew, it developed into large communities. The patriarch, in such cases, was the all-mighty ruler and, in later times, became a *daimyo*. He was given the right to inherit his aristocratic title and his estate like a monarch. The many internal struggles which mark Japanese history originated in the antagonism of rival clans.

The more the country grew into a unified nation with a definite national religious ideal, the more the ideals of the clan became the ideals of Japan in the form of ancestor and emperor worship. The Tokugawa period brought this system to its climax and carried it to the extreme by classifying people according to their status in the

¹ Nitobe, *op. cit.*, p. 230.

family of the nation. There were certain cult plays which were reserved for the higher ranking "family" members only; there were shrines for high- and lowborn.

It has already been pointed out that the Meiji restoration broke only superficially with feudalism, leaving Japan's social structure as paternalistic as it had been for many hundreds of years. This paternalism was introduced into modern factories which, in Western eyes, look rather like progressively directed reformatories. On the other hand, entrepreneurs preferred home workers, possibly laboring in the isolation of their villages. Wages could thus be kept low and people held under control more easily. Furthermore, the family patriarch, very eager to become an entrepreneur himself, would defend the interest of the employer and exploit his family to the utmost in order to be able to buy some vital machinery and then become an "independent" agent of the manufacturer for whom he was working. Every home worker would try to keep his land and himself free from the menace of creditors.

One of the cruelest reminders that the restoration did not bring about social changes is the surviving custom that fathers may sell or rent their daughters to factories where the girls have to live as inmates for five years, or to tea houses where they may be trained to be Geishas, or even to ordinary brothels. This usage is still practiced by indebted farmers, by money-hungry small traders, by brothers who have promised to pay a debt of honor; it is used for the education of a male family member whose career, according to the decision of the family head, may elevate him above the standard of his present social position.

A great many farmers or small artisans must either mortgage their property or sell their daughters to a factory, pocketing the daughters' salary for years ahead and using this money as their working capital. This custom, so abhorrent to Western ideas, is regarded as quite normal and honorable in Japan. It is an outstanding proof that Japan's modernization has remained external and that her developing technology has not kept pace with modern ideas of life which have accompanied technical progress in the West. A girl can rarely work off her father's debts. Bills for her daily expenses and for her clothes run high; she is given ample credit because the more money she uses, the fewer opportunities she will have to become

free again. Whether she works in a factory or in a brothel, the principle is the same. Very few girls have the necessary strength of character to avoid an accumulation of debts and then become free again after the expiration of the contract. If, by any chance, the male members of her family should require more money, she can be sold once more—provided she still adheres to the traditional attitudes of the family and believes in the inferiority of the female.

Selling girls, even loved ones, into servitude for the sake of the family's social, economic, or honorable standing has always been regarded as such a "beautiful custom,"—the very expression used in Japanese literature—that a score of dramas and legends, old and new, are woven around this topic. Freda Uteley has tabulated the reasons for the sale of daughters in four northern districts. She found that of a total of 50,340 girls sold, as many as 41,422 or 82 per cent were sacrificed for economic reasons; 4116 for traditional reasons; 2020 because they themselves or their families lacked moral sense; 1918 through unscrupulous brokers; and 864 for miscellaneous reasons. By economic reasons, Miss Uteley meant "extreme poverty or actual famine."¹ It is abject poverty which causes parents to victimize their daughters most of the time.

Male and female factory workers are almost equal in numbers with a slight preponderance of males. In 1933 there were only 2,050,501 factory workers of the two sexes working in Japanese industries; the remainder worked in their homes. While the authorities have done everything in their power to keep the number of factory workers down and that of home workers up, Japan's growing industrialization and her increasing armament program have tended to defeat this policy. The number of workers in the factories is increasing and the economic importance of home industries will decrease. This, in turn, makes the suppression of "dangerous thoughts" increasingly difficult.²

"Dangerous thoughts" are liable to occur and to grow under an economic system which not only vigorously perpetuates feudal class distinctions and denies equal opportunities to new generations, but also insists on maintaining a capital centralization which

¹ Freda Uteley, *Japan's Feet of Clay*, W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., New York, 1937, pp. 169-170.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 172-173.

may be called "the greatest on earth." By far the greatest part of invested capital is controlled by giant concerns such as those of the Mitsui and the Mitsubishi families. The accumulation of money and power in the hands of these trusts in Japan is far greater than has ever been the case in the heyday of American capital concentration. Through their absolute control of raw materials, the big concerns dictate their economic will to the banks as well as to the producers' associations. The State forces all the small producers and traders to unite in guilds and associations under government supervision. Out of 212 guilds of small manufacturers 114 are thus connected with Mitsui and 68 with Mitsubishi. These guilds and associations force their members to have their goods inspected, to buy raw material jointly, and to adopt the same specifications, thus facilitating marketing, especially export, for the big merchant firms, in particular Mitsui.¹

Since the early thirties, the four largest trusts have been Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, and Yasuda. These few concerns, with the help of a small number of minor ones more or less dependent on the leading trusts, hold in their hands the economic life of Japan and control the Yen as absolutely as the Shoguns fixed the value of rice during the Tokugawa era. The feudal family system and the home work organization connected with it are the foundations of this type of supercapitalism; the lack of civil liberties and popular rights maintained on religious and national grounds is another reason for its development.

The reason why civil rights in the Western sense do not exist in Japan has been explained before. Under these circumstances, it is interesting to examine labor movements as they have developed since the First World War. A Federation of Labor (*Rodo Domei*) was founded in 1918; a short while thereafter, employers established an Association for Conciliation of Labor and Capital which, according to Nitobe, has been engaged in statistical work and in analyzing labor-capital relations, the distrust of labor having made its active functioning impossible.² The strikes staged by the unions made the employers particularly uncomfortable because most of the strikers did not leave the shops but remained in occupation on

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 240.

² Nitobe, *op. cit.*, pp. 289-290.

the roof. In order to save his face, the employer would in most cases accede to the demands of the strikers but would use the first opportunity to revoke his decision.

With some limited success in the big cities, the unions—there were then several of them—tried to become political factors and associated themselves with the rising political parties. There appeared the Social Democrats, who opposed the existing social and economic order but desired to reach their goal by peaceful evolution; there was the National People's Party which went a few steps further in its demands but still expected to achieve them legally; there was the Japanese Masses Party which, also legally, strove to carry out a reversal of the social, economic, and political organization of the nation. The Party of Laborers and Peasants appears to have been the most aggressive and may have been in contact with the Third International.

The membership and influence of these parties were rather limited. So the results of the struggle for reform by the labor unions were meager and remained as theoretical as the international labor "suggestions," issued by the League of Nations, which were sometimes adopted but more often ignored. However, employers were compelled to improve working conditions and to "restrict" child labor, that is, to limit working hours for youths under sixteen to a mere eleven. An act to protect women and minors was also passed but did not really achieve more than superficial improvement.

Considering all these facts one sees that the masses in Japan are under the rigid control of the state. Not less than 92.5 per cent of the Japanese population are *Heimin*, common people. The gentry who have all the power and all the money constitute about 5 per cent, and the *Eta*,¹ outcasts, number about 2.5 per cent. Although there are some differences in social standing among the *heimin*, they live on the same principles and in similar circumstances. They are all brought up in similar educational institutions and trained in similar moral conceptions. Bound by the National Faith Shinto,

¹ The *Eta* are outcasts mainly for religious reasons. Most of them are butchers and leather workers, a despicable (though necessary) occupation from the Buddhist point of view. According to the Meiji constitution, all Japanese citizens were to be regarded as equal, and the government tried to carry out this imperial prescription. However, as individuals, Japanese citizens still draw the line of discrimination between themselves and the *Eta* some of whom are wealthy and most of whom live in segregated communities.

obliged to revere the emperor as a divine ruler and supreme family father, deprived of the opportunity to improve their economic status and to alleviate their inherited social burdens, the Japanese people are utterly enslaved by the ruling classes whose members reign absolute in the name of the emperor. For the people, there is hardly any difference between the rule of the financial magnates and that of the military clique. Both have the same results: political, social, and economic suppression.

When Japan chose to embark on a policy of aggression on a grand scale, there was no need of a political "movement" or of a strong political party like the National Socialist. No Fuehrer was required to keep the people believing and obedient, for the Japanese tradition provided all the necessary means to insure their docility. It was only years later, almost a decade after the Manchurian aggression, that some military leaders thought of tightening Japan's ideological totalitarianism with a more thorough political organization. Close cooperation with the Nazi-Fascist leaders since the outbreak of the Second World War has no doubt influenced General Tojo to reorganize the Imperial Rule Assistance Association, since 1941, along Westernized totalitarian lines.¹ It was a time of totalitarian successes, and the Japanese leaders apparently believed in the emulation of methods which had given Germany a tremendous headstart in the years 1940 and 1941.

However, it is doubtful whether the introduction of Westernized methods of political control was warranted. Unable to mature politically, owing to the weight of Shinto tradition, the Japanese people have shown no inclination to overthrow the oppression of their rulers despite the steady worsening of their lot since the days when Manchuria was conquered and the doctrine of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere was proclaimed.

Japan has become a police state where every attempt to think in terms other than the traditional is regarded as dangerous. There is no freedom of the spoken or written word; there are daily arrests of liberals, even of the most harmless and moderate ones; there are tortures and mistreatments of the people by a police no less vicious in its methods than the Gestapo of Heinrich Himmler. So brutally and inconsiderately do the police behave that even con-

¹ See also pp. 223-224 ff.

servative elements half-heartedly admit that sometimes "the police are going too far. . . . The police have power not only to carry out the laws but to disregard them and police ordinances have the force of law like other Imperial ordinances."¹

JAPANESE GEOPOLITICS: THE CO-PROSPERITY SPHERE

Japan, too, has had her Haushofer. In fact, she has had several of them. The peculiar institutions which have been analyzed, the combination of emperor worship, Shinto, and the spirit of *Bushido* made fertile ground in which to plant the seeds of an ideology of expansion, such as modern Japan has witnessed.

There are three phases of Japanese expansion which have all been carefully planned and whose ultimate aims have been "documented" by Japanese geopoliticians. The first phase covers the conquest of China, following the acquisition of Korea and Manchuria. The second phase is the creation of a Pan-Asiatic movement under the aegis of Japan, a device for expansion which would comprise, in addition to eastern Asia, all the possessions of the Western powers in the Pacific area, including the Dutch East Indies, Malaya, Indo-China, Thailand, Tibet, Burma, and India. The third phase means nothing less than the final step toward world domination by crushing the power of America, Russia, and the great European nations, whether they belong to the Axis or not.

The First Phase. The growth of Japan since the Meiji restoration has been impressive. According to a census taken in 1872, there were roughly 33 million people in Japan; in 1935 there were almost 70 million. The Meiji budget of 1868, the year in which the emperor assumed the power, was not higher than 33,000,000 yen; in 1935 it was seventy times as large, about 2,300,000,000 yen.² Increases in economic power and political influence have been proportionally large.

As a result, the Island Empire clamored for more space and sought expansion in "self-defense." After Japan had launched her drive against Manchuria in September, 1931, the Lytton Commission of the League of Nations investigated her violation of the pact with China and of the Pact of Paris in which it had been agreed

¹ Utley, *op. cit.*, pp. 267-268.

² Tatsuo Kawai, *The Goal of Japanese Expansion*, The Hokuseido Press, Tokyo, 1938, pp. 17-22.

that the "contracting parties should seek settlement of disputes or conflicts by pacific means only."

The report of the Lytton Commission denied Japan's claim that she had acted in self-defense. Yet from the Japanese point of view, expansion could no longer be avoided. Furthermore, the Japanese government claimed that its military position against the Soviet Union had to be strengthened. The Lytton Commission recognized the importance of this Japanese point of view. As it stated in its report:

Manchuria has been frequently referred to as the "life line" of Japan. Manchuria adjoins Korea, now Japanese territory. The vision of a China, strong and hostile, a nation of four hundred millions, dominant in Manchuria and Eastern Asia, is disturbing to many Japanese. But to the greater number, when they speak of menace to their national existence, and of the necessity for self-defense, they have in mind Russia rather than China. . . .¹

This fear of Russian aggression was increased by the extension of Russian influence in China during the twenties. Japan even sought to pose as the defender of China: "In the twentieth century," a Japanese spokesman writes, "the Japanese nation, as a bulwark against Communism, constitutes a real Great Wall for China. . . ." ²

Japanese writers have made great efforts to conceal the imperialistic nature of the aggression against China. They stated that Japan wanted to unite the Japanese and Chinese races in the "spirit of Musubi" which is a philosophy of harmony and good will. The attempt has not succeeded mainly because the invading Japanese armies behaved like barbarian hordes and because the expansionist aims of Japan were too frankly expounded by many nationalist leaders.

But the "China incident" ³ cannot be regarded as an isolated phenomenon. The conquest of China is but the second step in

¹ Quoted by W. W. Willoughby, *Japan's Case Examined*, The Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1940, p. 30.

² Kawai, *op. cit.*, p. 63.

³ Officially, Japan does not regard herself at war with China. The Japanese government is "at peace" with the puppet government of Nanking but has declared its intention to destroy the Chungking government of Chiang Kai-shek which it regards as "bandits" who do not represent China. While the Japanese propaganda has called the war, during its first years, an "incident," it later spoke of it as a "punitive expedition."

the plan of Japanese^e expansion, the first having been the domination of Manchuria. However, Japan's ambitions would not stop even if her armies should control the whole of China, for the "vital interests" would demand that Japan proceed to the next step: the domination of Greater Asia.

On November 18, 1938, the Japanese government sent a note to the American ambassador in Japan, declaring its intention of creating a "New Order" in East Asia. The note stated that

Japan at present is devoting her energy to the establishment of a new order based on genuine international justice throughout East Asia, the attainment of which end is not only an indispensable condition of the very existence of Japan, but also constitutes the very foundation of the enduring peace and stability of East Asia. It is the firm conviction of the Japanese Government that in the face of the new situation, fast developing in East Asia, any attempt to apply to the conditions of today and tomorrow inapplicable ideas and principles of the past neither would contribute toward the establishment of a real peace in East Asia nor solve the immediate issues.

In order to establish a "New Order" or, as the Japanese like to call it, a "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere," their foothold in China must be secured not only militarily but also politically by the proclamation of an Asiatic "Monroe Doctrine." According to repeated Japanese statements, Japan's interests are just as closely bound with China's as the interests of the United States are bound with those of the rest of the Western Hemisphere. But what is perhaps more fundamental, the Japanese government was troubled by the open-door policy of the Western powers as a possible check to Japanese plans for total domination in Eastern Asia.

The attempt to assimilate the Japanese designs of domination in East Asia with America's domination of the Western Hemisphere, just like the comparison between the Monroe Doctrine and Germany's designs for a European "new order," is fundamentally a misrepresentation. The Monroe Doctrine was primarily intended to prevent the extension or the restoration of European controls in the Americas, and while it is true that the doctrine was at times perverted to justify American interference south of the Rio Grande and in the Caribbean, the changed temper of American opinion found expression in the "good neighbor policy" which

may be described broadly as a sound reinterpretation of the Monroe Doctrine under the altered circumstances of the present time. It should be noted, also, that the initial phases of Japanese aggression were almost coincident with the inauguration of the "good neighbor policy."

As a matter of fact, Japan's interest in China has been recognized by American statesmen. Theodore Roosevelt (in 1905) and Secretary of State Lansing (in 1917) admitted a limited Japanese "Monroe Doctrine," and Ambassador Castle, as late as 1930, stated that "Japan must and will be the guardian of peace in the Pacific."¹

The Second Phase. The path of Japanese expansion is clear. Formosa was a convenient jumping off place toward South China, and eventually toward the Philippines, though this last step had to wait until Japan was prepared to face a clash with the United States. Likewise, the occupation of Hainan (an island off the extreme south of China) and of the Spratly Islands (midway between North Borneo and South Indo-China) was a prelude to the invasion of this last possession. The final step came with the attack against the Philippines, Malaya, Burma, the Dutch East Indies, and the South Pacific area. Further conquest was scheduled to bring British India and Eastern Siberia under Japanese domination. Officially this superimperialism is sailing under the flag of *Pan-Asiatic* policies. "Asia for the Asiatics," proclaim the Japanese. They want the whole of Eastern Asia to be purified of Western influence and made a "heartland" of Japanese power. General Sadao Araki, one of the Japanese leaders who has never been afraid of frank statements, declared in 1933:

The various countries now in East Asia are objects of the white race's oppression. The already awakened Japanese Empire can no longer allow them to tyrannize any more. . . . The Japanese people must have the spirit and power to convince the entire world of Europe and America of the true spirit of Asia . . . and, going a step further, make manifest to them the mission of Japan. Let the people of Europe and America recognize, let the whole world recognize, that Japan is here and now shouldering the whole responsibility of Asia.²

According to W. H. Chamberlin, Pan-Asianism "has become in-

¹ Willoughby, *op. cit.*, quoted on p. 135.

² *Documents Illustrative of Japan's National Policy*, published by the Council of International Affairs, Nanking; quoted by Willoughby, *op. cit.*, pp. 142-143.

creasingly popular, especially among high military officers," being "one of the potentially explosive ideas that have contributed to Japan's drive for expansion."¹ He quotes the Japanese publicist, Rin Kaito, who repudiated the Occidental belief in Western superiority of culture and concludes:

For over a century and a half the Asiatics have been pressed down by the whites and subjected to Western tyranny. But Japan, after defeating Russia, has aroused the sleeping Asiatics to shake off the Western tyranny and torture.²

Professor Takeyo Nakatani, secretary of the Asiatic League of Nations, in a pamphlet entitled *Asiatic Asia: What Does It Mean?*, frankly claims that there is a necessity for Japan's hegemony:

To bring order and reconstruction to the present chaotic conditions of Asia is a duty that rests mostly on the shoulders of Japan. . . . She has been asked to put to work all her forces, cultural, political, economic, and, if need be, military, in order to bring about unity and wholesale reconstruction in Asia.³

The so-called Pan movements have rarely had much success outside of the countries of their origin. Pan-Germanism remained an essentially German domestic product. Pan-Slavism, while it found much sympathy throughout the Slavic world, served primarily the political purposes of the Czarist government, as it may one day serve the Soviets. Pan-Asianism, too, is unimportant outside of Japan, as most experts on Asia agree, but it is very useful to the Japanese government in fostering national pride, aggressiveness, preparedness for war, and imperialist expansion.

One of the most striking documents dealing with Japan's far-reaching imperialistic aims is the so-called Tanaka Memorial. Baron Tanaka, then Premier of Japan, is said to have sent this memorandum to the emperor on July 25, 1927. Allegedly, it was prepared during a conference in Mukden, Manchuria, with the collaboration of high military and civil administration officers who discussed the problem of the conquest of Mongolia and Manchuria for almost two weeks in continuous session. The resulting memorandum is reported to have come into the hands of Chinese editors who published it a few months later.

¹ Chamberlin, *op. cit.*, p. 21.

² *Ibid.*, p. 21.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 23.

The Japanese have maintained ever since that the Memorial was a forgery designed to discredit Japan in the eyes of the world. However, it does not contain much that was not known before to Japanese nationalists and well-informed outsiders. Moreover, even if the Memorial were a forgery, it was a rather exact preview of things to come. Many of the steps indicated in it have since been taken:

For the sake of self-protection [Baron Tanaka allegedly wrote], as well as the protection of others, Japan cannot remove the difficulties in Eastern Asia unless she adopts a policy of "Blood and Iron." But in carrying out this policy we have to face the United States which has been turned against us by China's policy of fighting poison with poison. If in the future we want to control China, we must first crush the United States just as in the past we had to fight the Russo-Japanese War. But in order to conquer the world, we must first conquer Manchuria and Mongolia. In order to conquer the world, we must first conquer China. If we succeed in conquering China, the rest of the Asiatic countries and the South Sea countries will fear us and surrender to us. Then the world will realize that Eastern Asia is ours and will not dare to violate our rights. This is the plan left to us by Emperor Meiji, the success of which is essential to our national existence.¹

The importance which the Japanese military government attributed to Pan-Asianism can be measured by an appraisal of the "Greater East Asia Ministry" which was created in 1942 and has replaced the Overseas Ministry, thus reducing the influence of the Foreign Office considerably. Since the summer of 1942, the Foreign Office has consisted of four departments only: treaties, research, trade, and general affairs. The department of general affairs has taken over the work of the former divisions for Europe, America, Eastern Asia, and the South Seas on a greatly diminished scale.

The Greater East Asia Ministry has four departments: general affairs, Manchukuo, China, and southern territories. Japan's colonies in Formosa, Korea, and Sakhalin are also under its care. The armed forces have a great influence on the ministry and thus dominate, through it, the Foreign Office as well. Diplomats, too, are to be supervised by this new ministry which symbolizes Japan's quest for Asiatic expansion.

¹ *Japan's Dream of World Empire, The Tanaka Memorial*, ed. by Carl Crow, Harper & Brothers, New York, 1942, pp. 28-29.

The Third Phase. Whether Baron Tanaka wrote his Memorial or not, leading Japanese imperialists have supported for many years the designs expressed in it. The Meiji restoration revived ancient imperialist trends as they were visualized by Hideyoshi almost three centuries before Meiji. It is amazing and significant that the many years of self-imposed isolation under the Tokugawa did not change the imperialistic disposition of Japan's ruling class. "Having China's entire resources at our disposal," says the Memorial, "we shall proceed to conquer India, the Archipelago, Asia Minor, Central Asia, and even Europe."¹

Of equal frankness was Baron Hotta who was Premier at the time when the emperor had to accede to Commodore Perry's treaty between America and Japan. In an accompanying note to the emperor, Baron Hotta pointed out that "among the rulers of the world at present, there is none so noble and illustrious as to command universal vassalage, or who can make his virtuous influence felt throughout the length and breadth of the whole world . . ." and that, consequently, "in establishing relations with foreign countries, the object should always be kept in view of *laying a foundation for securing the hegemony over all nations.*"² Speaking of suitable alliances for the protection of "harmless but powerless nations," he claimed that Japanese "national prestige and position thus insured, the nations of the world will come to look up to our Emperor as the Great Ruler of all nations, and they will come to follow our policy and submit themselves to our judgment."³

Just as revealing of the ultimate aims of Japan is a letter written by General Shigeru Honjo to the Japanese War Minister, and first published by the *China Critic*, Shanghai, on December 3, 1931. The writer pointed to the dangers of a national renaissance in China, of the existence of a strong Red Russia, and of the strongholds of the United States in the Pacific, all obstacles to the national policy of Japan. "Before declaring war on America," stated the General, "we must strive to gain a superior position for our military strength both in China and Russia. We must aim to cripple China and Russia once and for all. . . ." If the resources of these countries could be made available to Japan, the general

¹ Crow, *op. cit.*, p. 33.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 13-14. Italics mine.

³ *Loc. cit.*

continued, American influence East of Hawaii would easily be driven out. After vanquishing American influence in the East, British interests in Hongkong and Singapore would not be strong enough to resist. After the first step, the occupation of Manchuria, Mongolia, and the rest of China, Siberia would be penetrated "until we occupied Upper Udinsk and forced Russia to cede to us the great plains east of the Lena River and up to the Behring Strait. . . ." ¹

After describing at length the enormous wealth of these regions, the general continues:

With such wealth and resources at our disposal, we would encounter not the slightest difficulty even should we elect to train an army twice the size of the armies of China and Russia and to maintain a navy equal in strength to the navies of Great Britain and the United States. We would then be in a position to drive away the United States to the east of Hawaii and Great Britain to the west of Singapore and to hold supreme power in the Pacific without any difficulty, while all the islands constituting the South Sea Archipelago now under Dutch rule as well as the British colonies of Australia, New Zealand, etc., would be within easy grasp at our Imperial will. Once we have attained such an influential position, we could proceed to conquer the whole country of China and the whole continent of Asia, and further to subjugate the whole continent of Europe as well as that of Africa by force . . . ²

These superimperialistic visions of a people who long before Hitler believed that their Taiwa Race (also called "Yamato Race" from the original Japanese tribes) was superior to all other peoples, were largely disregarded by the outside world before the entry of Japan into the Second World War, just as German geopolitical designs were brushed aside as Utopian schemes. However, it is now clear that the political and military strategy of Japan followed exactly the pattern and formulas developed since Emperor Meiji and became firmly anchored in the religious ideas of the country. Japan's world imperialism, based as it is not only on economic foundations but on the conception of Japan's divine mission to lead and save the world, may impress Western observers as an improbable fancy. Yet, fantastic as it may seem, its inherent force must be recog-

¹ Quoted in Appendix A by H. J. Timperley, *Japan, A World Problem*, The John Day Company, New York, 1942, pp. 123-124.

² *Ibid.*, p. 126. Italics mine.

nized. Japan's ideological myth compares favorably with or even surpasses corresponding Nazi dreams of world domination. In a pamphlet on the "Mission of Japan under the Reign of Showa,"¹ General Sadao Araki, former Minister of War, wrote:

To fulfill the vision "to conquer the world and embrace the universe as our state" so as to pacify Emperor Jimmu's desire "greatly to nourish and increase" our ambition has been our traditional policy. If the actions of any of the powers are not conducive to our imperialism, our blows shall descend on that power. . . . Our imperial morality, which is the embodiment of the combination of the true spirit of the Japanese state with the great ideals of the Japanese people, must be preached and spread over the whole world. . . .²

Even more fanaticized by Shinto mysticism are the ultranationalistic organizations led by Toyoma Nakano. Otto Tolischus has very clearly explained the stand taken by Nakano:

To them (the Nakano organizations) the Japanese Emperor, as a direct descendant of the Sun Goddess, is by divine appointment both Emperor and god of the mundane world, and therefore entitled to rule the earth as the Sun Goddess rules the heavens. . . . Their doctrine is that Japan can never rest, till that rule becomes an actuality, till every nation receives its "proper place" according to the principle of Hakkō Ichiu. . . .³

Perhaps the most significant document on the character of Japanese nationalist ideology is Professor Chikao Fujisawa's book *Japanese and Oriental Political Philosophy*, written in 1935. This book is said to be almost as important in Japan as *Mein Kampf* in Germany. Formerly Japanese representative on the secretariat of the League of Nations and professor of political science at the Kyushu Imperial University, Fujisawa became one of the leading men of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association, a body created to disseminate war propaganda among the Japanese people. While

¹ Showa is the official designation of the reign of Emperor Hirohito. Ironically, it means "reign of peace."

² Quoted by Timperley, *op. cit.*, pp. 100 and 128-140, translated from the Chinese version in the *Ta Kung Pao*, May-July, 1933, and included in *Documents Illustrative of Japan's National Policy*, Nanking, October 27, 1937, Vol. V, Nos. 1 and 2.

³ Otto Tolischus, "Japanese Seek World Rule by Divine Appointment," *New York Times*, August 11, 1942. Two of the Nakano organizations are the Black Dragon and the Black Current societies. Membership of these organizations is secret; however, their hold on the Japanese people is said to be extremely strong.

paying homage to Hitler's brand of absolutism, he asserts that the Japanese philosophy of state will soon decisively influence European political trends. For him, the emperor is the "absolute cosmic life center" and the only source of all-embracing moral power capable of reforming the world and of establishing eternal "peace and harmony" under the leadership of the Tenno. The "Way of the Gods" will in the end induce the nations outside of Japan's present sphere of influence to give up their individualism—which Fujisawa defines in social as well as in economic terms—and entrust themselves to Japan's paternal leadership.

Fujisawa goes on to claim in all seriousness that the earnest prayers of the Tenno to his divine ancestress, the sun-goddess, will cause heavy blows to fall upon the nations of the "old order" and curb their "inordinate desire" to dominate the Far East. He predicted in 1935 that a "holy war" would be launched sooner or later which would awaken most nations to the "cosmic truth"; these nations would realize that they cannot find their ultimate destiny and harmony with the world unless they put themselves under the integral guidance of the *Mikoto* (mikado). Professor Fujisawa "piously" insists that one should not consider this noble idea in any sense "in the light of imperialism, under which weak nations are merely subjugated."¹

Distorting and deliberately falsifying history after the manner of the German Nazis, Fujisawa uses what he calls "history" to prove that Japan is the land which has given birth to all human life and civilization. Instead of placing the cradle of the human race on the banks of the Euphrates and the Tigris, or on the Pamir Plateau, Fujisawa seeks to prove that the mountainous middle region of Honshu, the biggest of the Japanese islands, saw the birth of life on earth. Just as the Germans claim that all culture came from the "Aryans," so Fujisawa states that world civilization emanated from the Yamato race. The extent of arbitrary handling of history can be judged by Fujisawa's allegation that Japan civilized China. Yet it is well known that it was China and Korea who brought the written language, moral concepts, and higher civilization to crude and primitive Japan as late as the fifth century A.D.

¹ Otto Tolischus, "Japan's 'Holy' War Has Mystic Excuse," *New York Times*, August 14, 1942.

These fanciful interpretations can hardly surprise us when we consider that the Japanese people believe that their emperor is divine, that their country is divine, and that they themselves are a divine people chosen to liberate the world from unrest and, by bringing "the light which comes from the East," to return peace and harmony to the world under the guidance of Japan. The intensity of such belief is so strong that even some of the few Japanese Christians accept it. Had Christ known Japan, they say, He would have gone there and made Japan, instead of Palestine, the center of Christianity in the world.¹

The forces driving toward the ultimate realization of a universal *Hakko Ichiu* are, consequently, very strong in Japan. When Yosuke Matsuoka was still president of the South Manchurian Railway, he stated, in 1931: "It is my conviction that the mission of the Yamato Race is to prevent the human race from becoming devilish, to rescue it from destruction and lead it to the world of light."² This conviction has penetrated the Japanese mind. It will be a gigantic task for the United Nations to convince the Japanese people of the futility and nonsense of such beliefs.

The task is rendered especially difficult by the close identification between political and religious ideology peculiar to Japan. Political ideas may change, sometimes from outside pressure, but religious beliefs are more deep-rooted than political ones. The record of the success of force in imposing religious convictions has been a poor one; religion has in fact been the source of the most bitter conflicts. Only time, not mere defeat in war or even military occupation of the Japanese islands, can bring about a real change in the Japanese view of their nation's place among nations. From the point of view of the outside world, the redeeming feature lies in the meagerness of Japanese resources. Stripped of her possessions, Japan may well sink to the position of a power of the third order.

WAR AND POLITICS

In order to carry out its far-reaching geopolitical aims, the Japanese government has always regarded war as inevitable since it did

¹ Cf. *Christianity in Japan* by Clara Eastlake in Carl Carmer, ed., *The War Against Religion*, Henry Holt and Company, Inc., New York, 1943.

² Quoted by Syngman Rhee, *Japan Inside Out*, Fleming H. Revell Company, New York, 1941, p. 17.

not really expect other nations to yield to its persuasion. Through the centuries, the spirit of *Bushido* has served to imbue the descendants of the Yamato race with military ideals. The modern governments of post-Meiji Japan, just like those of the Nazis and Fascists, have taken advantage of this philosophy to glorify war as the "father of creation" and the "mother of culture." For the Japanese, war is not "simply an inevitable outcome of the application of the idea that 'might makes right'"; on the contrary, such principles should be curbed in the "pursuit of righteousness and creative activities." On the other hand, war is a means of "taming, correcting, and directing all evil forces that tend, with baneful will toward the grasping of power for power's sake." This must be done by the Japanese "in such a manner as to cause our endeavors to be transformed into, or to be assimilated with, the benign and magnanimous soul of Japan and to flow into that majestic and all-embracing course of universal justice, or the Imperial Way."¹

If war is the means of leading the world to a condition agreeable to the emperor, then those must rule the country who are, at the same time, leaders of the armed forces and protagonists of Japan's quest for world domination. Any civil government desirous of maintaining friendly relations with other governments is to be rendered powerless by the military and nationalist leaders who pool their influence in certain secret societies. The best known of these societies are the Black Dragon Society, the Black Current Society, and the Black Ocean Society. There are also some semi-Fascist leagues like the Society of the White Wolf, the Federation of Samurai, and the Society of Starbeams. The imperialistic associations have wielded great power for many years and have used the tactics of striking terror into the hearts of liberals or conservatives who favored the maintenance of a reasonably decent status in international relations. Assassinations have been frequent and uprisings of fanaticized junior officers have happened time and again.²

The Imperial Rule Assistance Association is the only official institution of this type. It was originally set up by Prince Konoye to rally the people around a patriotic organization after the political

¹ K. W. Colegrove, *Militarism in Japan*, World Peace Foundation, Boston, 1936, pp. 52-53.

² See Hugh Byas, *Government by Assassination*, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1942, Part III.

parties began to deteriorate or were dissolved by the police. It started as a "nonpolitical" league but was soon taken over by the military. Very similar to the Nazi and Fascist parties, the IRAA was regarded by the Japanese nationalists as a nucleus for a one-party system in Japan. After 1941, General Tojo became its leader and did not permit any other party or group to exist. So strong grew the power of the IRAA that practically no candidate for the Imperial Diet was elected unless he had been approved or nominated by the association.

A reorganization of the IRAA along totalitarian lines was effected in June, 1942.¹ Since then, there have been five bureaus functioning: general, practice, training, Asia development, and investigation. In addition there exists a control commission, probably for the purpose of investigating the investigators.

It is difficult for outsiders to ascertain what the individual bureaus conceal under their departmental names, but it seems possible that the IRAA is the first attempt in Japanese history to lay the groundwork for a Westernized brand of Japanese totalitarianism. Some minor Fascist groups have been developed, the best known of which was led by a Buddhist scholar, Ikki Kita, leader of the Society of the White Wolf, who wrote *A Bill for the Reconstruction of Japan*. This book attacked existing economic conditions and was based on anticapitalistic premises which brought about its prohibition. However, it had become rather well known before being taken off the market; it suggests a mixture of national socialism with Shinto principles and Buddhist philosophy.²

However, it seems doubtful whether Japanese totalitarianism can ever become an Asiatic Nazism so long as the emperor remains the highest source of power. His very existence would prevent the rise of a Japanese Fuehrer. There may be men whose dictatorial powers equal those of the Shoguns, and it is not improbable that the reactionary nationalists work for the reestablishment of a modern Shogunate. However, Japanese leaders, with all their worldly power, cannot assume spiritual leadership so long as Shinto retains its hold. These leaders themselves depend on the belief of the

¹ Otto Tolischus, "Japan's Military Has Supreme Rule," *New York Times*, August 27, 1942.

² Cf. Chamberlin, *op. cit.*, pp. 286-287.

Japanese people in Shinto as a national religion whose mystical ideology prepares the people mentally for the acceptance of their government's imperialism. Consequently, they must retain the emperor's supreme position. They know that once the magic spell of Shinto is broken, Japanese imperialism will have lost its religious basis and appear as old-fashioned greed before its own people.

With the growing influence of Nazi-Fascist totalitarianism which made itself felt particularly after the conclusion of the Three Power Pact, Japan found herself caught in a perplexing dilemma. On the one hand, her collaboration with the Axis powers and her tendency to develop a new type of Shogunate military dictatorship in Western style may lead to the decay of her ancient ideology. On the other hand, National Faith Shinto, when interpreted as an ultra-nationalist quest for world rule under the divine emperor of divine Japan, must lead to eventual disaster for Japan cannot win a war against the United Nations nor bear the strain of a "holy hundred-years war." She will rather become the victim of her religious-nationalistic idealism or, as one may say, of her rulers' megalomania.

That Japan had prepared for years her participation in the Second World War is not open to doubt. An account like Kinoaki Matsuo's *How Japan Plans to Win*¹ gives evidence of this, if more were needed, and also shows the extent to which opinion outside of the Axis countries—aided in this by Japan's own picture of her "weakness"—allowed itself to fall victim to its own wishful thinking.²

The following survey of the Japanese system of education and indoctrination will help to understand how Japan succeeded in keeping alive her ancient traditions and maintaining, despite increasing and unending sacrifices, the devotion of her people to her imperial aims.

¹ Kinoaki Matsuo, *How Japan Plans to Win*, translated by Kilsoo K. Haan, Little, Brown & Company, Boston, 1942.

² The United States Foreign Service was well informed about Japan's preparations for war but the Department of State faced Congressional disbelief and a strong disinclination of public opinion to accept the warnings of the government. United States relations with Japan are well documented in *Peace and War, United States Foreign Policy 1931-1941*; Department of State Publication No. 1853, Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C., Parts I, VII, XIV.

See also Joseph C. Grew, *Ten Years in Japan*, Simon and Schuster, Inc., New York, 1944.

12 *Education and Indoctrination*

CHILD PSYCHOLOGY

Educational psychology in Japan—if such a term is permissible at all—serves to cast the youthful mind in the mold of social tradition and subservience to the state. Restriction of movement begins in earliest infancy when the baby, for about two years, is almost continually carried on its mother's back during its waking hours. The infant quickly learns to restrain itself and to accept the discomforts arising from its mother's movements. If there are older children in the family, they help their mother carry the older babies and are entirely responsible for them. Infants are overprotected from cold but never overfed.

Life in a Japanese house of old-fashioned design also serves to hamper the child's movements severely and to train him for communal responsibility. The flimsiness of these houses, many of which consist of wooden framing and paper, makes it dangerous to play. Young children who dare to crack paper walls or, worse still, to disarrange the lintel may be punished severely. (One of the more brutal punishments is the *moxa*: fragments of wax are rolled, applied to the body, and then set on fire.) Learning to sit "correctly" in Japanese fashion is another way of acquiring physical discipline, since it is very painful at the beginning. Bowing, too, is taught to the children as a means of body control.

The foremost law of education is cleanliness. The Japanese conception of physical cleanliness far surpasses Western ideas. Any excretion of the body is regarded as pollution; consequently, eating, which causes some of the excretions, is not considered a particularly pleasurable function. Also, any kind of sickness is unclean and must be "washed away."

When the children become older, about five years of age, they have to adjust themselves to the social system into which they are born. The importance of the boys grows and far surpasses that of the girls. Both boys and girls are taught early in life to keep think-

ing of their respective status and task in society. A boy, for example, has to obey his father and elder brothers blindly, but he does not have to listen to his mother because she is a woman. This attitude makes the boys' life one of activity while it represses the energies of the girls. Being passive by compulsion and habit, they are rarely the source of friction. There can be nothing worse than a girl behaving in a boyish manner. The family watches closely to see to it that their girls are not called *otokorashii*, "like a boy."

Boyish aggression is checked only by the father or older brothers. All female members of the family are exposed to the terrorizing tactics of the "young master." It has been pointed out that the separation of the male from the female world is typical of Japanese psychology. Male is light and active; female dark and passive. Even foreign nations are classified as virile or effeminate ones.

Virility also means success. Consequently, a boy's failure in school is a disgraceful thing. The schools respond to this with severe discipline and rigid examinations. Like the Spartans, the Japanese boys are taught to hide their emotions and to ignore pain. There is nothing more contemptible than a "sissy" in Japan; the result of hundreds of years of training in the spirit of *Bushido* has left its mark. Japanese education is as basically formal and ceremonial as Japanese life. Progressiveness in the Western sense is no part of Japanese educational psychology; the idea of using manual work alone furnishes the pretext for some activity teaching. The Japanese have been interested in American methods of progressive education from this point of view only; they did not understand—or perhaps deliberately overlooked—the fact that modern American education is the result of political democracy.

PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION

For more than two thousand years education was the privilege of the ruling classes. The common people had no part in it so far as literacy and formal learning were concerned. Informal education, outside of school, was always used to indoctrinate the people in the ideals which emanated from religious sources, and were consequently part of the prevailing social and national morality. There was only one Buddhist priest, Kukai, who in 828 made an attempt to introduce schools for the common people. He failed quickly;

however, his name has lived on as that of one of the greatest educators of old Japan.

For the high-born, there were court schools, somewhat similar to the court or palace school founded by Charlemagne in Europe. It was Prince Shokotu who introduced these schools for formal learning. Otherwise, the nobility had its sons trained mainly in the virtues of *Bushido*; institutions for the education of future higher officials offered training in literacy according to the Chinese model schools. The Chinese example was followed throughout the time of the Tokugawa Shogunate.

The Tokugawa, conservative as they were, introduced the custom of teaching common people in the *Tera-Koya*, a school attached to a temple. As in the Chinese schools, established by the feudal lords for the children of their vassals, which remained strictly Confucian and thus an acceptable model for the Japanese rulers, so the ideals of Confucianism were also taught, in a condensed and simplified form, in the *Tera-Koyas*. Throughout the period of the Tokugawa the main tenets of pedagogy were: formation of the individual's character; adjustment of the individual to the family and the state; education for good government; striving toward "universal peace"—under Japanese hegemony. For similar purposes, schools for adults (*Shingaku* and *Hotokuyo*) were established in order to introduce to the people in popular form important aspects of the Japanese world conception. Educational facilities were organized for the needs of boys only. Female education remained strictly limited because the social position of women was so inferior to that of men. The Confucian texts expressly dwell upon the "seven reasons for the repudiation of wives," the "five faults of women," or the "three steps of subordination of women."

At the time of the Meiji restoration there were about 16,000 *Tera-Koya* schools in Japan. Most of them were very primitive with only one teacher in charge of instructing pupils in the rudiments of the three R's and the inevitable subject of "morality." It was not until 1890 that education became compulsory for all children from six to twelve years of age regardless of their social status.

The educational reforms introduced by Emperor Meiji were the result of two divergent tendencies. The necessity for an adaptation to the Western world in certain aspects of Japan's national

life was recognized as urgent but, on the other hand, a complete adaptation to the West had to be avoided in order to maintain the fundamental Japanese ideals. The *Kokutai*, a word that expresses integrally all the ideals of the Japanese realm in political, religious, and social aspects, was to be preserved through appropriate instruction; yet cognizance was taken of Western ideas in so far as they could strengthen the *Kokutai* in its competition with the West.

Thus the educational philosophy of Japan is quite different from that of any Western nation. The imperial "rescript on education," issued by Emperor Meiji on October 30, 1890, may be regarded as the foundation of Japan's educational philosophy. Its implications are so important and far-reaching that a full quotation seems appropriate:

The Imperial Rescript on Education

Know ye, Our subjects:

Our Imperial Ancestors have founded Our Empire on a basis broad and everlasting and have deeply and firmly implanted virtue; Our subjects ever united in loyalty and filial piety have from generation to generation illustrated the beauty thereof. This is the glory of the fundamental character of Our Empire, and herein also lies the source of Our education. Ye, Our subjects, be filial to your parents, affectionate to your brothers and sisters; as husbands and wives be harmonious, as friends true; bear yourselves in modesty and moderation; extend your benevolence to all; pursue learning and cultivate arts, and thereby develop intellectual faculties and perfect moral powers; furthermore advance public good and promote common interests; always respect the Constitution and observe the laws; should emergency arise, offer yourselves courageously to the State; and thus guard and maintain the prosperity of Our Imperial Throne coeval with heaven and earth. So shall ye not only be Our good and faithful subjects, but render illustrious the best traditions of your forefathers.

The Way here set forth is indeed the teaching bequeathed by Our Imperial Ancestors, to be observed alike by Their Descendants and the subjects, infallible for all ages and true in all places. It is Our wish to lay it to heart in all reverence, in common with you, Our subjects, that we may all thus attain to the same virtue.

The 30th day of the 10th month of the 23rd year of Meiji.
(Imperial Sign Manual. Imperial Seal.)¹

¹ English translation used from *Japanese Education*, a pamphlet by professors K. Yoshida and T. Kaigo, Japanese Board of Tourist Industry, Tokyo, 1937.

Clearly, this reform was not based upon the introduction of liberal or progressive aspects of universal education but upon new administrative and organizational methods only. The educational philosophy remains in the tradition of Japanese historical conceptions, namely, based upon the ancient morality code as it developed through a synthesis of Shinto, Confucianism, and Buddhism. The unchangeableness of ancient traditions prevails against modern principles of curriculum building, teaching methods, and educational opportunities. As long as family code, ancestor idolatry, and emperor worship form the very core of religious nationalism, not even the official abolition of feudalism can end the division into castes and classes whose educational standards differ widely. To be sure, the free common elementary school is now the uniting element for the majority of children of all classes, but most of the groups who attend are *heimin* or ordinary citizens. The children of wealthy or aristocratic families are usually sent to a peers' school so as to preserve the distance between them and the masses of the people. The more well-to-do *heimin* send their boys to secondary schools and colleges. Most families of the lower income groups will try everything, even selling their daughters, to secure as good an education as possible for their sons in order to open better vocational prospects for them for the greater glory of the family.

Japan's industrialization did not upset her educational philosophy. Western influences have remained limited to formal or technical matters. The aim of Japanese schools is today, as it has always been, the formation of "moral" personality. Only a few vocational institutions stress utilitarianism. Herein lies one of the most fundamental differences with Western education which, particularly in America, is predominantly utilitarian.

One more detail of interest should be mentioned. The schools in Japan are all free of denominational ties. Belief in National Faith Shinto remains a prerequisite because it incorporates belief in the "soul of Japan." But there is no religious instruction in any of the sects to which the children may belong. Instead of such instruction, moral training is offered as one of the main subjects to be taught from the first year in school. By indoctrinating the pupils in the most essential points of morality, patriotism is made a subject of religious content. In fact, moral training is the cornerstone of

the Japanese curriculum throughout the years of education of youth, no matter in what type of school the student may be.

Summarizing, one could say that the Japanese school is not a school in which talents are furthered or careers prepared. Education, in the Japanese interpretation, is moral instruction, and every subject taught remains but a subdivision of the general moral sciences. Consequently, educational administration is totally centralized and uniformly organized throughout the mother country and the colonies. This is the reason why the French school system was used as the Western model when Emperor Meiji introduced his educational reform. Even later, when Prussian methods were adopted, the system of administration remained as centralized as it has always been in France.

THE SCHOOLS

The kindergarten, *Yochien*, for children between three and six years of age is well known in Japan but is not compulsory. It is used more frequently as a preparatory school in cities than in rural regions. The basic form of education is the lower elementary school, *Jinjo Shogakko* (lower little school), offering a free compulsory six-year course for boys and girls between the ages of six and twelve. It is a type of unified school which did not exist in some European countries whose system was much more democratic than Japan's. There is coeducation during the six years of elementary schooling only.

Like the French, the Japanese have established a higher elementary school offering supplementary courses of two to three years. These institutions are called *Koto Shogakko* (higher little school) and are not compulsory. However, about 60 per cent of lower elementary-school pupils usually follow their studies up to the higher elementary school. For boys whose parents are in a position to afford further studies, a five-year course at the *Chugakko*, Middle School, follows. It aims to perfect and round out the general course of the elementary school. The middle-school graduate may then enter a three-year secondary training at the *Kotogakko* (higher school), which prepares for the university.¹ There exists a type of

¹ Exceptionally bright boys may be permitted to skip higher primary school and complete the middle-school course in four instead of five years.

higher school for girls, *Kotojogakko*, which, however, does not offer more than a five-year course beyond the primary school and sometimes even less.¹ It should be stressed that participation of women in university studies has not as yet been officially regulated. Rarely are women granted admittance to the state institutions of higher learning except two: the Nippon College for Women and the Imperial Academy of Music in Tokyo, the latter being the only coeducational institution of higher learning in the Japanese Empire.

There are a number of vocational and professional schools: some of them require graduation from the Middle School or a corresponding period of study at the *Kotogakko*. They are a kind of technical college. The university, of course, takes the highest rank in the school hierarchy. There are imperial, state, public, and private universities which generally embrace the departments of law, medicine, literature and philosophy, science, economy, commerce, and agriculture. Institutions which possess only one of these departments are not called "universities" but "Higher Schools." Students who have not completed the full course at the *Kotogakko* may take a preparatory course at a university.

After three to four years of study, the degree of *Gakushi* may be attained (approximating the master's degree) which entitles the student to participate in post graduate studies that may lead to a doctorate. Japanese universities are organized differently from American colleges. They have adopted the continental European system of being higher professional schools whose freshmen, after an extremely rigid examination upon graduation from secondary school, have reached the level of American college Juniors.

All schools, except those of public elementary character, require fees and some additional expenses. Students usually live in dormitories and must wear school uniforms.

Teachers are greatly esteemed. Clearly, such reverence comes from the doctrine of Confucianism which demands respect for "nobility, age, and virtue." The teacher is regarded as a man worthy of the respect due the elders. "Teacher" is *sensei* in Japanese, meaning a person older than oneself. All teachers are *sensei* whether they teach in an elementary school or at a university. Of all intellectual

¹ There are no middle schools for girls.

professions, teaching is the most respected, and the social rules to be observed by students stress this fact. Possibly this admiration for teachers has decreased somewhat in the big cities but throughout the rural communities, representing the majority of the population, *sensei* are still at the top of the social ladder and their rule is unchallenged by parents.

Teacher-training seminaries are highly developed and the standards required are high even for elementary teachers. No one is permitted to teach unless authorized by the state. Teachers in public or state schools have to pass repeated examinations during a long period; teachers in private schools or at universities receive licenses only for the positions they occupy and must pass another examination should they go elsewhere.

The elementary curriculum is based upon moral training, civics, oral and written Japanese, some arithmetic, and drawing. The middle and higher school students, in addition, study Chinese language and literature and at least one European language, usually English but also German and French. Science and geography are always supplemented by handicraft training, including gardening which is so dear to the Japanese and part of the drill for formal etiquette. Textbooks are closely supervised by the Ministry of Education. A text for moral education in elementary schools shows the following chapter headings (first school year):

Significance of the emperor's birthday; Your teacher; Do not quarrel; Keep things in order; Be alert; Do things in order and take good care of them; Do not conceal your faults and never tell a lie; Have sympathy for other people and do not make trouble for others; Serve and obey your parents; Your family (father and mother, brother and sister); Be loyal to your country and to your friends.

In most cases, morals are presented by means of fables and stories. The names of the heroes in these stories are usually not those of living persons. The observation of national holidays which coincide with religious celebrations is another important device of moral training.

In spite of the intense militarism already preached in schools and emphasized through the obligation of postelementary students to wear uniforms, physical education is regarded as a part of moral training, general discipline, and self-control. Much is being done

to give hygienic enlightenment. The state of health in Japan was never very good; Japanese national maladies are bad eyes, bad teeth, and bad stomachs. School doctors now watch the physical condition of students, and textbooks help further health consciousness, in order to check these conditions. But so long as rice and fish remain the basic components of the Japanese diet, regardless of whether the necessary vitamins, proteins, and minerals are available or not, it cannot be expected that the national state of health will improve.

TRENDS OF YOUTH IN JAPAN

For many centuries, education in Japan was directed toward the perfection of the body for warlike purposes. It was the era of education of knights when intellectual learning hardly extended beyond the borders of Chinese literary formalism. Many of the great leaders and knights were illiterate. The medieval age concentrated upon a purely literary type of education, strictly formalized according to Confucian rites, and just as strictly nonutilitarian. The modern period has stressed more general knowledge, but has still maintained a strong formalistic attitude, far removed from Western utilitarianism. It has systematized moral training to a greater extent than ever before throughout Japan's long history. Nevertheless, American and European influences have penetrated to a certain extent. How did they influence the mind of Japan's youth?

In 1927, R. Sekiya wrote *The Book of Education*, which analyzed the inclinations and viewpoints of young men and women. It should be understood that this statistical essay was written at a time when Japanese "liberalism" was at its height. It was then that the government began to worry lest Western films and books destroy the venerable traditions of the National Faith Shinto.

Against six "desirable inclinations" of both sexes, Sekiya found fifteen negative tendencies among which figured prominently an increase of skepticism, a revolt against custom and morality, and a recklessness in stating one's own opinion. Girls had in addition developed the desire to become economically independent, to choose their own husbands after careful deliberation, and a great love for calisthenics.¹

¹ R. Sekiya, *The Book of Education*, Tokyo, 1927. Quoted by Kamao Murakami, *Das japanische Erziehungswesen*, Japanese-German Cultural Institute, Tokyo, 1934, pp. 253-254.

In order to combat such "dangerous" trends as disregard of tradition, independence of thought, reliance on mass action and feminine desire to determine when and whom to marry, "thought guidance" was developed into a system of strict supervision of children and adolescents. On holidays and free weekdays, teachers paid surprise visits to the homes of their pupils in order to check up on their conduct. In some towns, authorities demand that students post their names on their front doors to facilitate supervision. All minors are forbidden to drink or smoke, and many high schools prohibit their students leaving the parental home without permission unless accompanied by an adult member of the family.

YOUTH MOVEMENTS AND "THOUGHT GUIDANCE"

So much indoctrination is incorporated into the home and school life of young people that the establishment of youth organizations further to strengthen patriotism and loyalty toward the regime appears almost superfluous. As a matter of fact, only in recent years has the government begun to give its attention to extracurricular activities for boys and girls at various age levels.

There had been associations of young men before the time of the Meiji restoration. They stressed discipline and loyalty and saw to it that these old Japanese virtues were drilled into youngsters from eight years of age up to twenty. The twenty-year-olds were allowed to take their places in the ranks of the adults. Fundamentally, this was education in accordance with the spirit of *Bushido*. Japanese educators claim that Lord Baden-Powell, founder of the Boy Scouts, used the old Japanese youth associations as models.

Actually the Boy Scouts, founded in 1908 in England, were imitated by the Japanese in 1922 as *Shonendan*, meaning "boys' league." Two years later, a naval branch, the Navy League of Boys, was established. Here is the oath which the young Japanese members of *Shonendan* must take:

In agreement with my unshakable conviction and my honor, I herewith swear

1. To honor the divine will and to respect the imperial family
2. To serve others, humanity as well as my fatherland
3. To obey the law of the *Shonendan*¹

¹ Murakami, *op. cit.*, p. 48.

Not related to this organization is the so-called Red Cross Youth, consisting mainly of elementary pupils whose task it is to develop their physical and mental strength for the sake of "national morality" and "general humaneness."

More important is the *Seinendan*, a League of Young Men, whose historical beginnings can be traced to the thirteenth century. The heroism of Japanese youth during the Sino-Japanese and the Russo-Japanese wars induced the authorities to modernize these associations. In 1915, the position of *Seinendan* was clarified and, five years later, it became "autonomous," that is, it was to be supervised by the director of social education of each prefecture. Members range from twelve to twenty-five years of age. In 1937, there were about two and a half million male and one and a half million female members, the latter newly organized into a corresponding association for the *Joshi-Seinendan*, the Japanese League for Girls.

The activity of these leagues is very different from that of their counterparts in the totalitarian countries of Europe. While physical exercises are part of the program, cultural and moral education takes up by far the largest share. Lectures, concerts, theater performances, continuation schooling for elementary students, knowledge of the homeland, voluntary service for the community, study trips, assistance in case of emergency and accidents, and "neighborly thinking" are the main purposes of the two *Seinendan*. In other words, Japanese ideology, cultural subject matter, and the striving for a new collective living experience seem to outweigh military drill.

However, the government was alive to the desirability of conditioning the minds of those who were to be the future soldiers. It began to make use of ideological propaganda a long time before the world knew what this really meant. It sought to inculcate the creed of Imperial Japan in order to direct the minds of the students into desirable channels. For this purpose, lectures on the political and spiritual destiny of Japan have been given for years at all the institutions of higher learning by the best scholars of the land.

The individual districts have followed the matter up by organizing a "Prefectural Institute for National Culture" and a "Prefectural Society for Thought Guidance." They are quite frank in stating that these establishments are to serve for the guidance of

youth in the path of correct political and spiritual attitudes. In 1932, the Ministry of Education founded a governmental "Research Institute of National Culture" with the purpose of advancing national culture in its old and new manifestations. The Institute does research and attempts to apply its findings to practical life. The most important subjects dealt with are history, philosophy, literature, education, political science, economics, natural sciences, and current thought. Much subtler than the Nazi-Fascist propaganda ministries, these organizations formulate a master plan for teaching the mental attitudes desired by the political leaders. The schools, from the elementary level to the university, must adopt these formulas and indoctrinate their students accordingly. The youth associations, controlled by the prefects and directors of social education, do the same. Thus there is an ideological unity which is stronger and deeper than anywhere else, with the possible exception of the Soviet Union.

The only type of schools where premilitary instruction is a main part of the curriculum are the *Seinen-Kunenyo*, training institutions for physical fitness with additional vocational schooling. Young men between the ages of sixteen and seventeen are accepted. The institutions are usually maintained by their respective communities and subsidized by local industries, mining enterprises, or business concerns. There is a four-year course; classes meet at times when they do not interfere with the young people's jobs. However, during the four years, the following program must be completed: one hundred hours of moral training, two hundred hours of general education, one hundred hours of vocational subjects, and four hundred hours of semimilitary exercises. The schools are voluntary, yet almost one million participants received premilitary and ideological training in recent years, prior to the entry of Japan into the Second World War. The beginning of Japanese setbacks in 1943 brought about a serious curtailment of high-school and university education, technical training being the only exception. Such youth organizations as are still functioning must concentrate their efforts on the war for which they were all prepared.

With the help of its educational institutions, the Japanese government has developed generations which are willing tools in its hands. For Japan's young people, the spiritual motivation of any war

would overshadow its imperialistic aspects. To go to war meant to go on a crusade for Japan.

Death has a different connotation in Asia and Europe. The Japanese do not fear death, on the contrary, they seek it because to die for Japan means to be revered as one of the eight hundred myriad gods. The schools take great care to teach this type of morality which denies the value of the individual for the greater glory of the "eternal soul of Japan."

CONCLUSION

Different from Nazi-Fascism, the danger of Japanese totalitarianism to the West is not of an ideological character. The ideas of Shinto are part of the Japanese national mind and tinged with an Asiatic mysticism whose philosophy has always attracted Western thinkers but whose character and peculiar type of morality are difficult for the average Western mind to grasp.

The danger came from the ever-widening physical expansion of Japan which threatened to overrun all Asia in preparation for ultimate world conquest. In the end, Japanese designs menace the security of Western nations, both in America and Europe, and will continue to remain a potential threat unless Japan is forced to renounce for all times Emperor Jimmu's dream of world rule.

Japan is dangerous because her people have been objects of fanatical propaganda and indoctrination for centuries. The greater part of these people live under miserable conditions, having been forced to sacrifice even the smallest comforts of life to the military Moloch. Yet they do not resent such conditions greatly. They are ever ready to sacrifice their lives for the cause of the emperor.

Consequently, Japan is a danger, not only in war but also in postwar years. The cost of Japanese aggression and of the underestimate of Japan's preparedness and war-making ability has been great. Her participation in the war has been doubly effective, at least in the beginning of the conflict, because she acted in conjunction with the Axis. But her adherence to the Axis was wholly a matter of political and strategic expediency. She would not hesitate to make war on any nation which stands in the way of her quest for world rule. Fundamentally, much more is at stake, namely, the issue of eradicating from the mind of a people, conditioned by an

unbroken tradition of centuries, the central belief in a role which it has assigned to itself. Until this problem has been solved, if it can be solved at all, extreme care must be taken that Japan's military defeat is followed by a defeat of her national ideology.¹

¹ Cf. Joseph C. Grew, *Report to the Nation*, Simon & Schuster, Inc., New York, 1942.

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
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
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Part 2 The Great Transition:
The Soviet Union



13 Background of Marxism

INTRODUCTION

The necessity for collaboration between the Western democracies and the Soviet Union has been officially recognized by the United Nations. To be of real value, this collaboration cannot be limited to wartime but must continue thereafter in the interests of a durable and productive postwar organization.

The governments of the United States and the Soviet Union are, first of all, signatories of the Atlantic Charter, the Soviet Union signing this Joint Declaration of America and Britain (of August 14, 1941) on January 1, 1942. The two countries further declared their intention to collaborate actively by signing an agreement, on June 11, 1942, outlining Russia's participation in the Lend-Lease Act. In Article VII of this agreement it is stated that the guiding principle should be "to promote mutually advantageous economic relations between them (U.S.A. and U.S.S.R.) and the betterment of world-wide economic relations." The two nations agreed further to avoid all "discriminatory treatment in international commerce" and promised to expand "production, employment, and the exchange and consumption of goods, which are the material foundations of the liberty and welfare of all peoples. . . ."¹

The Moscow Conference was of even greater importance for the creation of a permanent working understanding between America and Russia. Delegations led respectively by Foreign Secretary Cordell Hull for the United States, Anthony Eden for Great Britain, and V. M. Molotov for the Soviet Union issued a Joint Four Nation Declaration, the Republic of China being included as an equal partner, on November 1, 1943. In addition to declarations concerning Italy and Austria, and a statement on Axis atrocities (signed by President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill, and Marshal Stalin), the four powers proposed united action

¹ Mutual-Aid Agreement between the United States and the U.S.S.R. of June 11, 1942. Quoted from *International Conciliation*, New York, September, 1942, No. 382.

for the termination of the war and the establishment of an "international organization, based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all peace loving States, and open to membership by all such States, large and small, for the maintenance of international peace and security."

The Moscow Conference was followed by another at Teheran, concluded on December 1, 1943, and by a third one, at Yalta, ending on February 11, 1945, where the leaders of the United States, Britain and the Soviet Union met to concert their efforts for the prosecution of the war and to agree upon the solution of political problems arising out of the defeat of Nazi Germany.

On the basis of the treaties to which the United States and the Soviet Union are partners and in which they have pledged themselves to close collaboration for the organization of a better post-war world, relations between the two countries will have to be built on a foundation of realism and mutual tolerance. Joseph Stalin expressed his confidence in the possibility of peaceful cooperation between the two countries long before the Moscow, Teheran and Yalta Conferences when he said:

American democracy and the Soviet system may peacefully exist side by side and compete with each other. But one cannot evolve into the other. The Soviet system will not evolve into American democracy and vice versa. We can peacefully exist side by side if we do not find fault with each other over every trifling matter.¹

The American approach was well formulated in a recent account on Soviet Asia:

After the victory, which her dauntless fighters at the front and her people behind the lines are sacrificing so much to win, the Soviet Union will play an active and important role in world affairs, and American-Soviet-British friendship, under the terms of recent pacts, will become a cornerstone of the post-war system of peace and security. In order to construct this friendship on a correct and adequate foundation, it is essential that both Americans and Russians learn a great deal more about each other than they know today.²

¹ From Stalin's interview with Roy W. Howard, March 1, 1936. See also *Stalin's Kampf*, M. R. Werner, ed., Howell, Soskin, Publishers, Inc., New York, 1940, p. 327.

² R. A. Davies and A. L. Steiger, *Soviet Asia*, Dial Press, Inc., New York, 1942, p. 25.

This approach was confirmed officially by a White House communiqué commenting on the Lend-Lease Agreement in the following words:

. . . Further we discussed the fundamental problems of cooperation of the Soviet Union and the United States in safeguarding peace and security to the freedom-loving peoples after the war. Both sides stated with satisfaction the unity of their views on all these questions. . . .

A durable postwar reconstruction, however, must be built upon more than commercial treaties. The value of the Lend-Lease Agreement lies in the fact that, beyond economic arrangements, it envisages far-reaching collaboration for which commercial collaboration is just a point of departure. The Moscow, Teheran and Yalta Conferences are political events in the broadest sense and by far transcend the realm of economy. History since 1918 has proved that no commercial treaty is durable unless accompanied by political and cultural agreements. If there cannot be full cooperation politically and culturally, universal economic planning will not be built on solid foundations. It is therefore essential that America, Britain, and the other United Nations approach the problem in a dispassionate and objective manner, uninfluenced by a prejudice against Sovietism and with a willingness to understand Soviet psychology and ideology. Naturally, a corresponding approach on the part of the Soviet Union is equally necessary.

To understand the Soviet Union, however, it is not enough to be acquainted with the application of its economic philosophy to its social and political life. One must also understand Russian history and the national psychological traits developed by this history in order to appreciate recent achievements.

For many centuries, the Russian people were suppressed by semibarbarous rulers supported by the aristocracy and the wealthy landowners. The masses lived in serfdom and misery. Illiterate, hopeless, and superstitious, they sought in various ineffective ways to escape the wretchedness of their existence. Centuries of constant suppression developed characteristics of self-effacement, caution, humility, and passive resignation to fate. Influences from the Far East, the Asiatic contempt for the value of human life, the Asiatics' capacity for suffering, have all been instrumental in mold-

ing the psychology of the Soviet peoples from Kamchatka to the borders of Poland, from the Arctic to Mongolia.

Russia has known many internal troubles. Rebellions were rarely staged by the common people but rather by the nobility, later by the bourgeoisie and the intelligentsia. Until 1917, the major revolutions have not been proletarian in nature. For example, the rebellion against Czar Ivan the Terrible, about 1570, was staged by the powerful Boyars who resented Ivan's severe military dictatorship; the "Decembrists" of 1825 were mostly aristocratic officers who had seen action in the war against Napoleon and certainly had no love for the masses. Even the revolution of 1905 was not entirely the work of the common people. This last was superficially successful in that the Russian Empire from then on was governed under a constitution; however, since the czar had the right to nominate at least half of the "people's representatives" the chief aims of the rebels were thwarted.

The czarist government was also backed by a church submissive to the state. This church devoted more care to the preservation of its vested interests than to the great Christian principles which it was supposed to uphold. After the development of industrial capitalism, factory workers in the cities became as destitute as the small peasants or farm hands who earned too much to starve but too little to live. There was no social legislation to speak of and no opportunity for the poor to better their lot. The czarist government had one aim only, namely, to protect the interests of the ruling classes regardless of the welfare of the common people. Not until the Revolution of 1917 were genuine reforms enacted.

The proverbial Russian patience came to an end during the First World War. The weakened condition of the czarist empire, and the armed soldiers—mostly workers and peasants—returning or deserting from the front made possible the outbreak of a revolution which had been systemically prepared by exiled radicals. All of them were disciples of Marx and Engels.

Although Marxism has undergone great and far-reaching revisions, it is still a dominant influence in Soviet thinking. Before the fundamentals of Marxism are sketched, a brief survey of the development of socialism may facilitate the understanding of the rather complex Marxian philosophy.

FORERUNNERS OF MODERN SOCIALISM

1. *The Term "Socialism."* The discussion of socialism will be confined in the main to those historical and contemporary phenomena responsible for the formation of Sovietism, in other words, proletarian socialism. This socialism developed during the nineteenth century and found its purest expression in the economic philosophy of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels.

There have been many forms of nonproletarian socialism. The legendary Inca state, the ancient state socialism of Sparta which has seen a rebirth in modern military totalitarianism (national socialism), the Platonic idea of a leading class of philosophers who were supposed to live in a moneyless, equalitarian community, the Christian monastic organization, were not socialistic in the contemporary sense of the word. Also, the famous utopias, written in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, can hardly be regarded as more than vaguely related to modern socialism. Thomas More's *Utopia*, Francis Bacon's *New Atlantis*, and Francis Harrington's *Oceana* all made suggestions regarding the progress of social justice. Both More and Harrington claimed that the ills of society have their source in private property and were unconcerned with the class concepts which popularized socialism among the masses after the industrial revolution.

Nor can Jean-Jacques Rousseau, one of the most radical eighteenth-century adversaries of absolutism, be classified as a predecessor of socialism as has been attempted by some. Rousseau himself, however, contributed greatly to political liberalism. He supplied many slogans to the French Revolution, but this revolution was nonproletarian and the communist and collectivist agitation of a man like Babeuf (about 1796) had no practical consequences.

Modern socialism, which is anticapitalistic and proletarian, has roots in the teachings of all those liberal seventeenth- and eighteenth-century thinkers who demanded that the state recognize the right of the individual and abolish the privileges of the few in the interest of the people. For Locke, the "people" meant a fairly limited group of society; Rousseau's meaning is nearer to our usage of the term. But since the development of industry and the growth of the proletariat are essentially developments of the nineteenth

century, it is only during this period that the history of modern socialism is of immediate interest.

The work of men who wrote to propagate socialism or campaigned for the introduction of socialistic reforms for the benefit of the masses may be divided into two stages. The first period witnessed the discussion of fundamental social and economic questions and some attempts, usually Utopian, at instituting socialistic experiments. The second period was one of maturing and increasing aggressiveness. Its radicalism developed into the socioeconomic system of Marx and Engels. Modern socialism, as it was conceived by the Russian Revolution, was built upon the doctrines of these two men. All later socialist theories are largely modifications of Marxism. Leninism, Trotzkyism, and Stalinism are also but variations of the theories of Marx and Engels.

Socialism, in this modern sense, is the attempt to bring about a new socioeconomic order suited to the needs of the masses of the working people. Socialism strives for the political and economic control of the state by the masses in the interest of society as a whole rather than in the interest of individuals. In the Marxist-Leninist view, it is a transitory stage supervised by the dictatorship of the proletariat and designed to prepare the way, ideologically and economically, for the ultimate goal of a communist society. Such a society would no longer need a state and consequently would be based on the ideal of absolute freedom through altruistic and voluntary subordination of the individuals to society without the incentive of competition for material goods.

Socialism is fundamentally materialistic. It looks upon life as the highest good and is distrustful of philosophic idealism which regards ideas as the ultimate reality. Socialism claims that this world and not the next is its concern; it is distrustful of spiritual doctrines which it considers as conceived by the ruling and educated classes for the purpose of holding down the masses. It is opposed to religion because it holds the churches to be tools of the ruling classes rather than altruistic social-minded humanitarian institutions. "Religion is an opiate for the people," Marx proclaimed.

Socialism believes in the equal responsibility of all individuals toward society and in the necessity of education toward the recog-

nition of this principle. It calls for the suppression of those individuals who are not willing to subordinate their own interests to those of the community in and for which they live. Nevertheless, modern socialism is not necessarily standardized equalitarianism; it is willing to give a greater share of goods to those members of society who through their work contribute more to the general well-being.¹ The common good is above the individual good because only the happiness of the community can guarantee the happiness of the individual.

Historically, the development of socialism changed from idealistic humanitarianism to an economic system that found its practical expression in the proletarian socialism of Bolshevik structure. For the understanding of this Russian type of socialism, a brief survey of pre-Marxian socialism may be valuable, before Marxism as the basis of Soviet ideology is explained. No attempt will be made to sketch the historic continuity of socialism up to Marx; only some of the men and their works will be mentioned whose influence contributed particularly to the formation of socialistic thought.

2. *Humanitarian or Utopian Socialism.* One of the first pioneers of modern socialism was Saint-Simon (1760-1825), a naively idealistic humanitarian. He conceived of social development in cycles, alternately constructive and destructive, and believed that after the destructive age of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic wars a time for reconstruction had come. The ideal state envisaged by Saint-Simon and his followers would be guided by engineers, scientists, and captains of industry who would sit in the legislative body. The wise leadership of these people would minimize the role of politics. Likewise, in the domain of religion, the clergy would become superfluous for the philosophers would develop a new type of Christianity.

While not expressly anticapitalist, this system would entail the abolition of private property. The emphasis on the cooperative form of the ideal society, a society in which every member would find his proper place according to his abilities, made it inimical to individualism.

¹ This does not pertain to a communist classless society. See pp. 261-264.

Saint-Simon's approach was essentially theoretical and emotional. Like most social reformers of this first period, he built his conceptions on the fundamental belief that man is good and that help to the underprivileged would contribute greatly to the progress of human society.¹

Charles Fourier (1772-1837), another of the best known French socialists of this first stage, denounced the waste which he saw as the inevitable result of capitalist competition. He demanded the substitution of a cooperative society, progressing "harmoniously," as he described it in his first major work.² Like Saint-Simon, Fourier had boundless confidence in human nature. On the strength of this confidence he envisioned a society consisting of so-called phalanxes, units of sixteen hundred persons, organized on a basis of communal living. Each phalanx would live in its own settlement; there was to be no class distinction among the members of the community. Everybody was assured of a minimum of subsistence; part of the surplus of the phalanx's income was to be distributed among its members according to their merits. Life in the phalanxes, free of all restraint, would provide the proper environment which would make it possible for the individual to achieve his own fulfilment, and therefore, happiness.

Fourier enjoyed very little recognition during his life. After his death, a few followers tried to organize cooperative phalanxes. The most important experiments of this kind were made in America in the years between 1840 and 1850, but the attempts were wrecked when it became evident that human nature did not meet Fourier's expectations.³

Etienne Cabet (1788-1856) belongs in the same tradition as Saint-Simon and Fourier, but was more radical than either. Under prison sentence for his attacks on Louis-Philippe, which appeared in his widely circulated radical sheet, *Populaire*, he fled to England. While there, he met Owen and became acquainted with More's *Utopia* which made a great impression on him. From this book, he drew many of the ideas for his ideal state which he described

¹ Saint-Simon's basic books are: *Du système industriel*, 1821; *Un catéchisme politique*, 1822; *Le nouveau Christianisme*, 1825.

² *Théorie des quatre mouvements*, Lyon, 1808.

³ The best known American phalanxes were the North American Phalanx, the Wisconsin Phalanx, and the Brook Farm Phalanx.

in his *Voyage en Icarie*. Cabet's system was essentially communistic, with the state, through its officials, in firm control of all the means of production, as well as of education and the press; little room was left for individual expression. Believing in the power of example, he too tried the device of a model colony in America—with the usual ultimate results.

In England, Robert Owen (1771–1858) gained a practical knowledge of social deficiencies during the years of his managership of several cotton mills where hundreds of adult and child workers suffered before the days of factory reforms. It was particularly the fate of children, whom he found to be in extremely bad physical, mental, and moral condition, that caused him to believe education and better housing would not only improve the state of the children's health but also the conditions of the community as a whole. Not content with preaching, he made New Lanark a model community, and a financial success in addition.

In 1813, he wrote one of his best known books in which he held that man's character was formed by circumstances over which he had no control. Consequently, he claimed, man should not be blamed for failure nor praised for success. It is necessary, he believed, to place man in the right environment from his earliest years; it is the duty of the state to see that this is done.¹

Owen agitated for a bill on factory reforms which he had introduced in Parliament. The bill, however, was so mutilated that Owen disclaimed responsibility for it in the amended form. He advocated the establishment of communities of twelve hundred persons settled on about a thousand acres of land with a community kitchen and yet with a traditional family life. These communities which, of course, remind us of Fourier's phalanxes, could be established by state, municipal, or private authority.

Encountering much opposition in England, Owen went to America where he founded, in 1828, the settlement of New Harmony, in Indiana. The enterprise failed and ruined Owen financially. However, his reputation as a social reformer had made him so famous in his native England that, when he came back, newly formed trade unions regarded him as their leader. Government

¹ *A New View on Society or Essays on the Principle of the Formation of Human Character*, 1813.

and private enterprise stifled the movement. Owen died, a frustrated but never despairing man.

During Owen's lifetime, and partly as the result of his failure, there also appeared in England the Chartist movement which, in 1838, proclaimed its famous six-point program: universal suffrage, vote by ballot, annually elected parliaments, equal electoral districts, payment of members of parliament, and abolition of property qualifications for election. The Chartists, typical in this respect of the subsequent tradition of British labor, which has never been so revolutionary as French or German labor, remained strictly within constitutional boundaries. The famous Fabian Society, founded as late as 1883, exemplifies the same tradition of attachment to evolutionary rather than revolutionary procedure.

Following these early reformers, there appeared others, less optimistic and less ready to compromise. They shifted from humanitarian idealism to economic systematization; in a few instances, even nihilistic tendencies came to the fore. One of the most interesting representatives of this pre-Marxian conception of socialism was P. J. Proudhon (1809-1865). He shocked the French conservatives with a book *What Is Property?*—a question which he did not hesitate to answer: property is theft. Proudhon was opposed to the prevailing ideas of French socialism and directed his efforts toward economic rather than political reform. As a prerequisite, he insisted that a new economic system could be successful only if based on the principles of justice, liberty, and equality. He demanded that the remuneration for any work should correspond to the measure and quality of the work done. In order to achieve this, he said, the belief in the goodness of man is not sufficient. A complete transformation of the social system must take place.

Proudhon opposed, in principle, the concept of property, whether owned by individuals or by governments. According to him, the transformation of society would occur in two stages of social change, namely, the transition toward reform, then its achievement. During the transitional period, interest was to be abolished, rent was to be reduced, and the right of the state to confiscate property established. While such an era of transition brings to mind some important aspects of the socialistic interim which, according to Marx, would lead to the ideal of a communist society,

Proudhon had no clear conception of the nature of the ultimate form of his socialism. He certainly did not agree with Marx's conception of a classless society. He wrote that "government by man in every form is oppression. The highest perfection of society is found in the union of order and anarchy."¹

Proudhon remained fundamentally an individualist, opposed to communism as causing injustice and being a "yoke of iron" and "stupid uniformity." No wonder that his relations with Karl Marx, whom he met in Paris in 1845, deteriorated rapidly after a short period of friendship. Proudhon's *Philosophy of Poverty* was attacked by Marx in a venomous pamphlet called *The Poverty of Philosophy* in which Marx took issue violently with Proudhon's anarchistic individualism.²

Less individualistic than Proudhon and less extreme than Cabet, Louis Blanc (1811-1882) was for a time one of the most influential socialists in France. He demanded the elimination of competition from which, he claimed, all evils originate. In his book, *L'organisation du travail* (The Organization of Work), he formulated the communist principle: to everyone according to his needs, from everyone according to his abilities. Competition, crushing the weaker, can only be eliminated when the state takes over employment. Blanc suggested the establishment of *ateliers sociaux*, social workshops, to be financed by the state as a step toward the eventual abolition of private property. These workshops were visualized as cooperative enterprises with a trade-union type of administration. Employment was to be given to everyone in accordance with his abilities.

Backed by considerable popular support, Blanc became a member of the Provisional Government after the downfall of Louis-Philippe. After the elections for the assembly, the government apparently adopted his scheme of national workshops, but put it into effect in such a way as to ensure the defeat of its purpose. Paris was soon swamped with a mob which thought of easy money for little work and the government had one hundred thousand destitute people on its hands. Whereupon the shops were closed,

¹ P. J. Proudhon, *Philosophy of Poverty*, B. R. Tucker, Princeton, Mass., 1873, pp. 259ff.

² Karl Marx, *The Poverty of Philosophy*, International Publishers Co., Inc., New York, 1936.

and rebellion broke out, during which Blanc barely escaped with his life. Shortly thereafter he fled to England.

Both English and French theorists were far from being as radically revolutionary as the Germans Karl Marx (1818-1883) and Friedrich Engels (1820-1895). These were the first socialists who advocated the overthrowing, by violent means if necessary, of the existing society in order to introduce a new economic and social order. The Marxian doctrine formed the ideological basis of the Revolutionary Russian Social Democratic party which later became the Russian Communist party of the Bolsheviks. It was Marxism which, from the latter part of the nineteenth century, was the dominant influence in socialism throughout the world. It is difficult to overestimate the tremendous impression of Marxism upon the twentieth-century world. Not only has it molded the ideology of the working class, not only has it provided one of the world's largest nations with a basic doctrine, but, in various forms and interpretations, it has unquestionably colored the viewpoint of the world at large.

14 *Marxism*

Different in approach from the social-minded Utopians, the nihilists, the anarchists, and the evolutionary socialists, Marxism propounds a scientific and revolutionary socialism, based mainly upon social and economic planning. The system was developed by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels during the years between 1844 and 1848. Originally an enthusiastic student of Hegel, Marx outlined his own interpretation of Hegelianism in his work *Hegel's Philosophy of Law* (1844) which contains an almost complete framework of his political creed. Engels wrote his *Critique of Political Economy* in 1845 and, at about the same time, an article on the "Condition of the Working Classes in England." Nearly ready to proclaim his perfected ideology, Marx attacked Proudhon in 1847 in *La misère de la philosophie* (The Poverty of Philosophy); one year later, Marx and Engels published their joint work, *The Communist Manifesto*, which contains a complete exposition of the fundamentals of proletarian socialism. The later works of the two epoch-making writers merely elaborate the theories of the Manifesto, notably *Das Kapital* which Marx did not quite finish, the last part of this work being completed by Engels who survived Marx by twelve years.

The number of books, pamphlets, and articles written on Marxism is as extraordinary as the reaction to this doctrine, ranging all the way from servile admiration to blind hatred. The vigorousness of the reaction shows that Marxism has touched upon vital problems of modern society. It cannot be the task of this volume to offer a detailed analysis of Marxism; however, a brief explanation of its most essential aspects is necessary for the understanding of the Soviet system which has accepted Marxism *in toto* but modified it for its particular use.

DIALECTICAL MATERIALISM

Marx and Engels were deeply affected by Hegel's method of historical dialectics.¹ Hegel conceived of history as a succession of culture periods whose individual *Zeitgeist* (contemporary spirit) would develop a prevailing *Weltanschauung*. Toward the end of a culture period, when the prevailing idea would lose its power, a new opposing idea would emerge and struggle for recognition. In other words, the *thesis* would be confronted by an *antithesis*. These antagonistic principles, being subject to unification, would become a synthesis, until the emergence of a new thesis would cause the resumption of the eternal struggle between opposing ideas.

Of this complex theory, Marx accepted the concept of historic cycles and the method of reasoning. But he rejected Hegel's idealism and replaced it with an economic plan. (One should, however, be careful not to confuse Marxian economic materialism with the scientific term mechanistic materialism.²)

Marx himself regarded the principle of dialectical materialism as equal in importance to Darwin's theory of evolution. He reasoned that nothing was established once and for all; that everything had its development up to a climax followed by decay; that it is beyond anyone's power to retard this development. This recognition opens the way for the dialectical process. Dialectics is a branch of logic which uses a certain method of reasoning for the systematic analysis of an idea. It is, in the words of Marx, the "science of the general laws of motion" of human thought processes and of the world of matter. Dialectical materialism is, consequently, a system of reasoning which uses discussion as a basic principle. Instead of being founded on idealistic reasoning, the dialectical process bases its logic upon factual evidence and the material achievements of civilization. According to Marx, these achievements have been made possible by certain working and living conditions and not through the influence of ideas. Dialectical materialism must remain realistic and eliminate idealistic or metaphysical argumentation.

¹ Cf. *supra.*, pp. 51 ff.

² G. D. H. Cole, in his book *What Marx Really Meant*, V. Gollancz, Ltd., London, 1934, suggests the use of the word *realism* rather than *materialism* so as to present a clearer contrast to idealism as a spiritual conception.

If the principle of dialectical materialism is to be the core of a new sociopolitical ideology, then history itself needs a new kind of interpretation. Marx believed he had found it in his doctrine of historical materialism, also known as the economic interpretation of history.

THE ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY

Marx wanted to "harmonize the science of society with the materialist basis." The starting point of his sociological deduction was "social production." If social production is the motive power of human development, the stages of history are determined by the type and organization of this production which, in turn, characterize particular civilizations.

If new economic forces have grown up within an established system, Marx reasoned, a conflict arises which initiates the beginning of a social revolution. Should this revolution be successful in destroying the prevailing economic doctrines the whole superstructure of the previous system gives place to a new one. The character of the economic principles underlying the ruling ideology will determine the whole complex of culture and civilization. This does not mean that everything contained in previous cultures is discarded completely. Marx and his greatest disciple, Lenin, were no iconoclasts. Both insisted that a proletarian state could and should use the best creations of culture whether they came from the classic ages, from the aristocratic periods, or from bourgeois times.

Thus seen, the course of history is not guided by the forces of the spirit. It is independent of ideas, driven by material forces. Or, differently expressed, every state is the organization of its ruling class. In the course of history, one ruling class replaces another after first having destroyed its predecessor, only to be destroyed in turn by its successor. Such a view of historical development logically leads to the Marxian principle of the class struggle.

THE CLASS STRUGGLE

"The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles," wrote Marx and Engels in their *Communist Manifesto*. They proceeded to narrate the story of the transformation of hu-

man society from feudalism to bourgeoisie. Against this bourgeoisie stands the proletariat as the only revolutionary class. The bourgeoisie own the means of production and thus the workers are compelled to sell themselves to the bourgeois capitalists. Interestingly, Marx warned the world to be careful of the lower middle class as being inclined toward conservatism and reaction in order that it might remain part of the bourgeoisie instead of sinking into the proletarian class. His warnings are particularly significant in view of the fact that the lower middle class has been the chief support of the Nazi-Fascist revolutions.

What is the final outcome of this class struggle—and the end of the dialectical process? Hegel had merely described a process and thus left a gap at the end of his philosophical road. Marx had some definite ideas to suggest. The end is the classless society, a stateless paradise on earth in which everyone would give all he had to society and in turn would expect no more for himself than he could consume. This is a stage at which, according to Engels, the state, that is, the remnant of the former capitalist class state, would “wither away.”

Since economics is the basis of Marxian philosophy, how then does Marx explain the faults of capitalist economy?

THE THEORY OF SURPLUS VALUE

This theory is the heaviest of Marx's economic ammunition against capitalism. We need commodities, he said, to satisfy human needs. These commodities have an established value for use or perhaps for exchange. Since they are the product of human labor, their value depends on the amount of labor invested in their production. Labor is thus the common denominator of all commodities. Since commodities are socially necessary, the labor value invested is a subject of social concern. The concept of value changes, consequently, according to the social conceptions which prevail at any particular time.

Lenin explained that the original formula of commodity circulation was the “sale of one commodity for the purpose of buying another”; the formula of capitalism is the opposite, “purchase for the purpose of selling at a profit.” This profit, or surplus value, is the difference between what the laborer receives (his wages) and

the price for which what he produces is sold. For the wages paid are determined by the living cost for the mere subsistence of the workers and their families, not by the value of the commodities that the workers produce. The capitalist uses the surplus gained to invest in further enterprises which again will produce surplus values. This process can be repeated *ad infinitum* and lead to an unrestricted accumulation of capital.

These, in brief, are the main pillars of the Marxist doctrine, as a result of which Marx envisaged the inevitability of a complete socialization of any capitalist society. The demands set forth in the *Communist Manifesto*, years before the writing of *Das Kapital*, testify to the radical changes he held to be both necessary and inevitable:

1. Abolition of property in land and application of all rents of land to public purposes.
2. A heavy progressive or graduated income tax.
3. Abolition of all right of inheritance.
4. Confiscation of the property of all emigrants and rebels.
5. Centralization of credit in the hands of the state, by means of a national bank with state capital and an exclusive monopoly.
6. Centralization of the means of communication and transportation in the hands of the state.
7. Extension of factories and instruments of production owned by the state; the bringing into cultivation of waste lands, and the improvement of the soil generally in accordance with a common plan.
8. Equal obligation of all to work. Establishment of industrial armies, especially for agriculture.
9. Combination of agriculture with manufacturing industries; gradual abolition of the distinction between town and country, by a more equal distribution of population over the country.
10. Free education for all children in public schools. Abolition of child factory labor in its present form. Combination of education with industrial production.¹

THE TWO STAGES OF SOCIALISM AND COMMUNISM

If the proletarians were able to seize power and put the Marxian doctrine into effect by first taking over the means of production, they would put an end to themselves as proletarians.² The formerly

¹ Marx and Engels, *The Communist Manifesto*.

² As Engels suggested in his *Anti Dühring* (*Herr Eugen Dühring's Revolution in Science*), International Publishers, New York, 1939.

existing class differences would then disappear because the type of social production would have become socialistic, because there would be no more exploitation by capitalists eager for surplus value, and because the government would no longer act as the representative of the ruling classes. In fact, the class struggle would become a thing of the past and, gradually, so would the state itself. "The state is not abolished, it withers away." This does not mean that a state of anarchy would be established. Lenin warned expressly that such an interpretation would "emasculate" Marxism.¹ Communist theoreticians stress emphatically that the bourgeois state could not wither away; it would have to be liquidated. On the other hand, the proletarian state of the socialistic period of transition would "cease of itself."

However, according to Marx, a classless society cannot come into being immediately after the bourgeoisie and its capitalist economy have been liquidated. The state in the traditional sense will still be needed for a time. "Between capitalist and communist society lies the period of the revolutionary transformation of one into the other," wrote Marx. The economic change is accompanied by a corresponding political change. In this time of transition, "the state can be nothing but the *revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat*."² The main tasks of the dictatorship of the proletariat are

1. to break the resistance of the landlords and capitalists overthrown and expropriated by the revolution, and to liquidate every attempt they make to restore the power of capital;
2. to organize construction in such a way as will rally all toilers around the proletariat and to carry on this work in such a way as will prepare for the liquidation, the extinction of classes;
3. to arm the revolution and to organize the army of the revolution for the struggle against the external army and for the struggle against imperialism.³

The Communist Manifesto states that "the first step in the revolution by the working class, is to raise the proletariat to the ruling class, to win the battle for democracy."⁴ What is the relation, then,

¹ See Lenin, *The State and the Revolution*, The United Communist Party of America, 1917, Chap. 1.

² Marx, Karl, *Critique of the Gotha Programme*, International Publishers Co., Inc., New York, 1933, pp. 44-45.

³ *The Dictatorship of the Proletariat*, International Publishers Co., Inc., New York, 1936, p. 40.

⁴ *The Communist Manifesto*, II. Italics mine.

between the dictatorship of the proletariat and a Marxian "democracy"?

First of all, Marx and Lenin would not regard capitalist democracy as genuine. Even if political democracy exists in every respect, "this democracy is always restricted by the narrow framework of capitalist exploitation, and consequently always remains, in reality, a democracy for the minority, only for the possessing classes, only for the rich. . . ." ¹ Therefore it is "hypocritical and false to the core. . . ." ² From such a state, no direct transition to the classless society or perfect communism is possible. During the transitional period, "democracy for the vast majority of the people and suppression by force . . . of the exploiters and oppressors of the people" would accompany the change from capitalism to communism. ³ If the perfect classless ideal were achieved, even democracy would wither away because then everybody would observe all the elementary rules of higher social life and would not need the supervision of any political system. Democracy, in the definition of Marx and Lenin is, curiously enough, a symptom of the proletarian dictatorship during the socialist transition period. Just as, according to Lenin, the bourgeois class state, be it a democracy or not, suppresses the majority of the people, so the "democracy" of the proletarian dictatorship would frankly admit suppression of the minority of former oppressors.

Socialism, the "lower" phase of communism, does not make any pretensions at being able to produce justice and equality or at eliminating differences in financial status. "Bourgeois right" is not abolished entirely because the system of distribution may still suffer from the evils developed under bourgeois organization. There will be many defects in this phase, one of them being the "division of labor and thereby the antithesis between mental and physical work." ⁴ Only during the "higher" phase of communism may the state wither away and freedom rule at last. For, according to Marxism, it will then no longer be necessary to say (as Art. 10 of the Stalin Constitution of 1936 still does) "from each according to his ability and to each according to his work"; everyone, in accordance

¹ See Lenin, *op. cit.*, Chap. V.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *Ibid.*

with his ability, may then expect reward according to his needs. Money disappears as a means of exchange; every worker receives a voucher from "society" and in return obtains from a cooperative store a quantity of commodities equivalent to what he produces. He would produce about as much as he needs for his living.

However, human beings are not equal mentally and physically, as Marx, Engels, and Lenin all recognized. There may be a single worker who does about as much work as a married man with children. Here unequal individuals would be measured with equal rights. The single man may receive less than the married man although he has done the same quantity and quality of work; the more intelligent man may get the same commodities as a much less intelligent one. Equal rights, in the words of Marx, thus become "unequal right for unequal work." Paradoxical as it may seem, unequal rights alone may prevent the reestablishment of inequalities, for there shall be none richer than any other.

IDEOLOGY AND UTOPIA

Marx and Lenin believed that men could be educated during the transitional period to lose their selfish and competitive inclinations and to become so socially minded that there would be no danger of jeopardizing the classless goal of the proletarian revolution. They did not say whether they regarded communism in its final form as the last stage of social evolution. They have, finally, made only vague predictions as to the duration of the proletarian dictatorship: they simply stated that it would last for generations. Less conservative prophets believed, before the outbreak of the Russo-German war, that a classless society might be established about 1970 in the Soviet Union but, on account of the ravages of the war, this goal will have to be put off a good deal further. However that may be, it is only fair to note that the ideal of communism and a classless society is fundamentally humanitarian and optimistic, just as the ideal of the first modern socialists was based on the belief that man is good or can be awakened to goodness if only he receives the necessary education and is placed in a decent environment.

Here is one of the deepest cleavages between the Nazi-Fascist and the Communist conceptions. The Nazis and Fascists are on principle pessimistic about human nature and believe that man

must be regimented and coerced in order to work efficiently; they maintain that society exists for the state and must remain subservient to it. The Soviets believe that man must be driven through a period of dictatorship but only for the ultimate purpose of being freed entirely from the bonds of a dominating state; they claim that man is capable of developing a deep social consciousness which will make him disregard and forget age-old instincts of selfish competition; they predict that man will be capable of living in complete freedom without the supervision of a power state, but on the basis of his new ethical conception of life and communal responsibilities alone.

Whatever we may say of the methods used to achieve this goal, methods which in practice so resemble totalitarian despotism, and however skeptical we may feel in regard to the ideals of a communist Utopia, the fundamental difference between the prospect of perpetual tyranny under Nazi-Fascist domination and the (supposedly) transitory rule of proletarian dictatorship should never be forgotten. Much as we may disagree with many of the Soviet principles and with Marxian doctrines, we shall have to admit that the ends of the Soviets are fundamentally ethical when compared with the antihumanitarian, anticultural designs of totalitarianism in Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy, and Japan.

LENINISM, TROTZKYISM, STALINISM

When the Bolshevik victory was achieved in Russia and the wars of intervention had subsided in the nineteen twenties, one question of decisive importance demanded an answer if the young socialist state was to follow a strong and clear-cut policy. Should the Soviet state follow the victory of its own revolution with the attempt to instigate a world revolution, in the belief that no localized revolution could ultimately be successful? Or, should it first try to establish peace and order within its own borders and build up socialism disregarding the rest of the world?

The position of the founders of Marxism, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, was unequivocal. In 1847, Engels stated in his draft for the Communist Manifesto: "Can this (proletarian) revolution take place merely in one country? The answer is no. . . . The communist revolution, therefore, will not be merely national, but

will take place simultaneously in all civilized countries; that is, at least, in England, America, France, and Germany. . . . It is a world revolution and will therefore have the whole world as its arena."¹

Was Lenin's position a similar one? It is difficult to answer this question unequivocally. Lenin was a Marxist of the purest kind but his political genius saved him from blind orthodoxy. While he definitely subscribed to Marx's fundamental principles, he modified Marxism and adapted Marx's and Engels' views to the Russian conditions which Marx had failed to take into account.

Lenin died in 1924. It is quite conceivable that he was in sympathy with the doctrine of world revolution, although the development of the Soviet Union was not advanced enough, during his lifetime, to permit him far-reaching speculation in global terms. The economic retrogression which necessitated the introduction of the New Economic Policy (NEP), a slight temporary lapse into capitalism, and the distinct necessity of having the peaceful cooperation of outside countries for the industrial reconstruction of Soviet Russia, made it imperative for him to avoid a decision.

The great opponents on this crucial issue were Stalin and Trotsky. However, their antagonism did not stem from a difference of opinion on this basic question of policy alone. In fact, only in 1925, after Lenin's death, did this radical divergence become the focus of the conflict between Stalin and Trotsky. Presumably Lenin's sympathies were with Trotsky rather than with Stalin, but the whole Stalinist literature had been carefully purged of everything uncomplimentary written by Lenin about Stalin. It is well known, however, and documented in Souvarine's reliable biography of Stalin, that on December 25, 1922, Lenin wrote a confidential note for the next Party Congress in which he warned that the split between Stalin and Trotsky might harm the party and expressed his opinion about Stalin rather bluntly. "Comrade Stalin, having become General Secretary, has concentrated an enormous power in his hands; and I am not sure that he always knows how to use that power with sufficient caution. . . .," Lenin stated. On Janu-

¹ Friedrich Engels, *Principles of Communism*, translated and quoted from the Russian edition of the Communist Manifesto, 1923, by M. T. Florinsky, *World Revolution and the U.S.S.R.*, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1933, pp. 132-133.

ary 4, 1923, he added: "Stalin is too rude. . . . Therefore I propose to the comrades to find a way to remove Stalin from that position and appoint to it another man who in all respects differs from Stalin only in superiority—namely more patient, more loyal, more polite, and more attentive to comrades, less capricious, etc."¹

Stalin himself had not always been a Stalinist. Before 1924 he seemed to doubt that socialism could be successfully established in a single country. In April, 1924, he said: ". . . Overthrowing the power of the bourgeoisie and establishing the power of the proletariat in a single country does not yet guarantee the complete victory of socialism. . . . Does it mean that with the forces of a single country it (the proletariat) can finally consolidate socialism . . . ? Certainly not. That requires victory for the revolution in at least several countries."²

However, he reversed his opinion shortly thereafter. Gradually seizing power and eliminating Trotsky within a few years after Lenin's death, he fought tenaciously against the doctrine of "permanent revolution." He explained that Engels, when he wrote his *Principles of Communism*, had not taken into consideration the extent of the resources of Russia, which would make it possible to create a successful Socialist state within her borders despite the opposition of the rest of the world. He quoted numerous pages of Lenin's writings to prove that the first Soviet leader had really adhered to "Stalinist" ideas.

But, on the other hand, Trotsky, too, quoted Lenin for his defense. He found prerevolutionary and postrevolutionary statements of Lenin which seemed to prove that the Soviet leader was a Trotskyite. Lenin's words are capable of a wide enough variety of interpretations to be usable by either faction. Trotsky insisted that the economic recovery of Russia should not be overestimated and that attention ought to be directed mainly toward fostering "permanent" revolution, extending all over the world, as the only way to establish socialism firmly. This doctrine is called "Trotskyism." Trotskyites maintain that socialism may use Russia as a basis from

¹ Quoted by Boris Souvarine, *Stalin*, Alliance Book Corporation, New York, 1939, pp. 305, 307.

² J. Stalin, *Foundations of Leninism*, International Publishers Co., Inc., New York, 1939, I, pp. 39-41. See also M. R. Werner, ed., *Stalin's Kampf*, Howell, Soskin Publishers, Inc., New York, 1940, p. 282.

which to expand universally. Instead of being content with the dictatorship of the proletariat in one single country, a state of permanent revolution should be established in order to reach first those countries in which the suitable conditions for revolution already exist and later the rest of the world. Consequently, for Trotskyites the consolidation of Russia herself was not the most important factor; it could easily lead to nationalism and to the stagnation of socialism altogether. Stalin, the Trotskyites charge, has betrayed the revolution by crushing revolutionary impetus and establishing a new Soviet nationalism or even imperialism. There was no reconciling these radically antagonistic points of view.

In actual fact, while Russia had survived the attempts to destroy her new regime by armed intervention, she had also failed on her part to bring about the destruction of the capitalist states during the early stages of the revolution. Reconciled to this situation—unorthodox though it was in Marxist theory—Stalinism was willing to soften the aggressiveness of the Comintern (Communist International)¹ and, up to the outbreak of the Russo-German war, was ready to face the consequences of isolation amidst the general hostility of the surrounding world. A new nationalism was to be fostered, founded on the principles of Soviet Marxism as the creed of the Russian “socialist fatherland.” In the middle thirties, this new nationalism developed very rapidly; the purges helped to strengthen it further, being presented as revealing the subversive designs of world Fascism. The Red Army, believed by Trotsky to be the instrument of proletarian aggression for the achievement of world socialism, now became an instrument for “national” defense against possible outside aggression.

Stalinism, to be sure, regarded the consolidation of the Soviet people's economic well-being as a prerequisite to any further extension of socialism. It also did much to foster the national cultures of the various Soviet republics and autonomous regions. It made an attempt to cooperate in the consolidation of an international peace policy and even became willing to make realistic compromises with capitalist governments. In order to carry out the Soviet Union's social and economic consolidation, it inaugurated the institution of five-year plans.

¹ Dissolved on June 9, 1943. See also p. 289.

According to Stalinism, the Soviet Union, given time for its development, would be able to present a picture of so perfect and abundant a life that the nations of the world, suffering and staggering under the burden of decaying capitalist economy, would be only too glad to adopt the Soviet system of their own accord. World socialism would thus come to be established by gradual evolution, under the guidance and example of the first country ever to adopt socialism as its way of life.

Thus, to the neutral observer, Stalinism appears in its behavior as a combination of unconventional realism and paradoxical contradictions. It opposes bourgeois tendencies but it also fights against "vulgar radicalism" and "leftist diversion." It is far less intellectual than Trotskyism and far more understandable to the Soviet masses. Objectionable as some of its methods appear to have been, to apply ordinary standards of legality to a deep social upheaval as has occurred in Russia, may well lead one astray. From the longer historical standpoint, it is conceivable that some of the more notorious and ruthless deeds of the Stalin regime may come to be regarded as necessary measures for the preservation of the U.S.S.R.

Stalinism is soberly realistic and devoid of sentiment; it is far-sighted, unconventional and self-centered. It has, for the time being, thrown overboard the role of would-be liberator of the world's underdogs and, while never rejecting the basic ideas of Marxism, has had the courage to change its methods completely for the achievement of this goal. Giving up an isolationism which, to a large extent was forced upon the Soviet Union, Stalinism is again quite ready to work with its antithesis, the capitalist countries, as it had been during the middle thirties. This does not mean that the Soviets now accept capitalism, nor do any of the changes in method signify a return to semi-capitalism or moderate socialism. Any attempt to arrive at an understanding with the Soviets on the basis of such a hope would be fatal to all concerned.

Through Stalinism, no doubt, the Russian Revolution passed from adolescence into maturity. The unexpected (to most outsiders) performance of the Soviet Union during the war would seem to testify to Stalin's wisdom. It also bears witness to the power of the Soviet-Marxist ideology and refutes those voices which claimed that the Soviet people did not like their system.

15 *The Soviet State and Policies*

THE ALL-UNION COMMUNIST PARTY

The history of the Communist Party, now supremely powerful in the Soviet Union, is the history of the Bolsheviks. Its organization started in Minsk in 1898. Only nine members attended, even fewer than were at the first meeting of the Nazi party. Lenin, who was then in Siberian exile, participated for the first time at the second party congress in London in 1903. It was then that the differences of opinion on tactical questions arose, which resulted in the schism between the majority group, the Bolsheviks, and the minority group, the Mensheviks. This cleavage was never healed.

The party was then named the Social Democratic Party and survived as such until 1917. In 1918 the title was changed to Russian Communist Party of the Bolsheviks. After Russia had become the Soviet Union in 1922, the party called itself the All-Union Communist Party of the Bolsheviks. Its program has been revised several times since the victory of the revolution; the last revision took place in 1939, being an amended version of the Party Constitution of 1934. The best possible definition of the party can be found in its preamble:

The All-Union Communist Party of the Bolsheviks, being a section of the Communist International, is the organized vanguard of the working class of the U.S.S.R., the highest form of class organization. The Party is guided in its work by Marxist-Leninist theory. The Party leads the working class, the peasantry, the intellectuals, that is all the Soviet people, in the struggle for the strengthening of the dictatorship of the working class, for the strengthening and development of the socialist order, for the victory of communism. The Party is the leading nucleus of all organizations of toilers, both social and State, and ensures the successful construction of communist society.

The position of the party in Soviet life is unique. It has seized control of the state; the state is its organ but is destined to cease existing as soon as the ultimate goal of the proletarian dictatorship, the classless society, has been reached. Until that time, the state

remains the executive organ of the party and is completely subject to the party's will. Strangely, the party had no official standing in its own state until, in 1936, the new "Stalin Constitution" legalized it in Article 126; it is further mentioned in Article 141 as one of the agencies permitted to nominate candidates for elections.

The party is organized in the form of a pyramid. The so-called communist cells, formed by every group of occupational, semi-occupational, or military character, are the prime agencies of communist propaganda and political agitation. They are largely responsible for the maintenance of the revolutionary proletarian spirit in the country. The cells form the base of the party pyramid which extends from the villages, towns, and countries to districts, regions, territories, and provinces. Each of these geographical units has its own congress which sends delegates to the highest organization, the All-Union Congress of the party.

This congress rules, in theory, and issues the directives of the party, the "Party Line." In practice, however, it is not the cumbersome congress but the Central Committee which wields the real power. Consisting of about seventy members, the Committee's most important function is the election of the general secretary of the party (Stalin has been reelected ever since he first became secretary in 1922) and the Political Bureau (*Politbureau*). The influence of the general secretary depends on his personality, just as it does in any similar organization of totalitarian or semitotalitarian character. Stalin gained his power through the skill with which he made his post influential; another man might have remained insignificant. One of the most powerful bodies of the Soviet bureaucracy is the *Politbureau*. It consists of a dozen or less persons and acts under the chairmanship of the party's general secretary. It is responsible for the directives which the party will be required to follow; it also decides upon party purges which have taken place several times since 1921. In some instances, the purges have lasted for a protracted period. This happened after the murder of Kirov in 1934 and again between 1936 and 1938 when the purges which accompanied the famous Moscow trials assumed such proportions that the whole domestic organization of the Soviet Union seemed upset. However, it is quite possible that the liquidation of high military and political officers strengthened Russia's security through

the elimination of a potential Fifth Column. Moreover, the reorganization of the party and the amending of the party constitution in 1939 were designed to pacify the restlessness of all who had experienced the terror of living under the ever-present threat of the GPU, the secret police.

Party membership is sharply restricted and candidates are thoroughly investigated before admission is granted.¹ Only the *Komsomols*, members of the Young Communists, who are looked upon as natural party candidates, are directly eligible to the party. Their records are an open book from earliest childhood, and their family affiliations are known. The *Komsomols* are at the same time the vanguard and the reserve troops of communism and, since the time of the revolutionary war, have proved to be the bulwark of the party. Candidates who do not belong to the *Komsomols* must have the recommendation of at least three party members of long standing and must pass through a probation period with flying colors. According to statistics of March 1, 1939, the Communist party numbered 1,588,900 members and 888,800 candidates for membership.²

The party, whose administration became increasingly centralized in the late thirties, is subject to the strictest discipline. Its moral requirements border on prudery. Executive officers must have been members for years before being eligible for higher rank in the party bureaucracy. Even the secretaryship of the "cells" requires at least one year's successful service. The personal conduct of party members must be faultless and of a higher standard than is expected of the average citizen. After all, the party is the country's élite; numerically, it constituted less than 1 per cent of the whole population before 1940.

The party and its policy (the Party Line) are supported mainly by the organizations of workers for whom the Soviet state and party exercise their trusteeship, the labor unions and the cooperatives.

¹ Only during the war, the admission to membership of the party was liberalized, especially for soldiers to whom membership was granted as a reward for their courageous fighting.

² James T. Shotwell and others, *Governments of Continental Europe*, "Soviet Russia," M. T. Florinsky, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1942, p. 833.

UNIONS AND COOPERATIVES

Obviously, the character of labor unions is bound to be different in the Soviet Union from what it is in capitalist countries. In the latter, unions are predominantly fighting organizations, defending members' rights against powerful employers. Unions outside of Russia are founded on the need to check arbitrary actions of the economically stronger management and for the protection of the workers who are powerless as individuals and can only defend themselves through collective action.

In the U.S.S.R., the unions are supposed to voice the workers' political will (actually, this is purely theoretical because this will is dictated by the *Politbureau*). They act as agencies for collective bargaining with the government, for supervising administrative practices of management, and for cultural activities of educational character. Of these three main duties, collective bargaining, which is most important in the West, is least important in the Soviet Union. The party's complete control of economic planning and budgeting automatically imposes upon the workers the necessity of accepting wages proposed by the government through its appointed managers. Rarely does a dispute go to the higher officials for decision. Problems of working conditions, on the other hand, belong to the direct responsibilities of the management which may be criticized by the workers for its production policies. The interesting educational activities of the workers' unions and clubs will be discussed later.

Officially, union membership is voluntary but the disadvantages of not belonging to one of the unions are so considerable that practically everyone applies for membership. Before the war, there existed more than 150 large labor unions in the Soviet Union with an approximate membership of 22 million. Local committees are coordinated with the committees of the regions, districts, and republics. The chief organization is the All-Union Central Congress of Trade Unions which leads the nation-wide system of unions through its elected All-Union Council of Trade unions.

According to reports of this highest organ representing Soviet labor for the years 1937, 1938, and 1939, the participation of work-

ers lacks vigor and interest.¹ Since the incentive of trade unions in capitalist countries is missing the workers apparently do not feel the need of collaborating to the desired extent. Basically, Soviet labor unions are merely agencies set up for the purpose of education in collectivism and socialistic discipline. This is one reason why Western trade unions have been reluctant to admit Soviet trade unions into the international labor organization. In this connection, it should be mentioned that delegates of Soviet labor unions were elected by secret ballot even before the Constitution of 1936 initiated an electoral reform.

The cooperatives are also typical of the way in which collectivization and common action are practiced in the Soviet Union. They constitute one of the most popular and most valuable forms of common enterprise and practical education for socialistic living. Retail trade is handled almost exclusively by cooperatives. In agriculture, the operation of cooperatives has been very successful. It may be noted that the rural and urban cooperatives are the only organizations allowed to own "private" property except, of course, the collective farms. The small village stores, operating on the cooperative basis, surpass in numbers the other types of cooperative organization, for example, department stores in larger cities whose members are mostly their shareholders. Business policies are devised by a management which has to face the criticism of its members at regular meetings.

The administration of cooperatives is organized in a fashion similar to that of the labor unions. The small local cooperatives are united through representation in the *rayons* (national districts). The district organizations are coordinated with the city cooperatives of the *oblast* (Union republic) and those of the R.S.F.S.R. (Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic). They are headed by the Central Board of the Central Union of the U.S.S.R. and the R.S.F.S.R. At the head of this organization the All-Union Congress of Consumers Cooperatives rules supreme.

The cooperatives, like the labor unions, are engaged in educational work. Their very activity constitutes an informal education of the consumer. For specialists there exists a Cooperative Academy

¹ Shotwell, *op. cit.*, pp. 896-897.

at Moscow and a Cooperative Institute at Leningrad, both holding the rank of universities.

Soviet cooperatives, like Soviet labor unions, serve the double purpose of supplying their members with commodities and instilling in them a sense of responsibility toward the community. They have a definite place in the economic as well as in the civic organization. They teach the masses the way of cooperative living as a socialist principle. They make it clear that no one who remains outside the social life of the community can expect to be granted the privileges of a collective to whose benefit he did not contribute. He cannot remain an individualist because the good of the collective is more important than his own personal interest. However, he may retain his individuality if he is able to subordinate his interests to those of the community which, in turn, will then secure as many advantages for him as conditions permit.

The Soviets hold that only by living and thinking in terms of the collective may modern man understand the character and function of his society. Therefore the Soviet government is vitally interested in the work of its labor unions and cooperatives and looks upon them as the backbone of Soviet society.

THE STATE AND ITS ADMINISTRATION

Lenin used to say that the structure of the Soviet state was so simple that any housewife could not help doing efficient administrative work. Until 1936, the Soviets, or councils, of the various geographical and administrative units, elected by open ballot, were the legal representatives of the people. The higher representatives were chosen by the lower ones, making the organization of the Soviet state appear like a pyramid, based on the village Soviet and rising through district and regional Soviets, autonomous territories, and Soviet republics to the Supreme Soviet, the highest body of the Union.

The guiding principle of this system was first, to make participation of the people in government as wide as possible, thereby teaching them a practical lesson in civics. Second, this type of indirect elections made it easier to exercise closer control over the representative organs of the state. Lenin's disciples used to call this system

a "democratic centralism." Indeed, formally, the Soviet state appears to be democratic. The federal union between the Soviet republics, autonomous republics, and national regions might in some respects be compared with the federation of the United States. It went farther in that it recognized and actually fostered indigenous cultures and languages for the many nationalities of the Soviet Union. In czarist times, one may remember, national cultures were suppressed in favor of Russian cultural predominance.

The political independence of these republics and regions, however, was necessarily restricted. All the parts of the Soviet Union remained politically, ideologically, and economically under the control of the Moscow central party organization. They were united in the Marxist-Leninist ideology. They were encouraged to retain and cultivate their national traits, but since it is impossible to separate political doctrines from cultural organization—and the Soviet would be the last to suggest such a cleavage—even vastly different cultures tended to become coordinated through the dominance in all of them of Marxist-Leninist theories and practices.

This federal unitarianism gave the executive powers so broad that the principle of federation remained politically theoretical until the Constitution of 1936 introduced important changes. The position of the R.S.F.S.R., the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republics, remained dominant in political and economic influence; its center, Moscow, being the seat of the central government as well as of the party, determined the character of the Soviet system's development throughout the whole union. It must, on the other hand, be admitted that the Soviet federation, while accepting political and economic orders from Moscow, solved the minority problem for the Soviet state. Equality was established among the many nationalities and races living within the union, and discrimination such as anti-Semitism was liable to severe punishment. Equality between the sexes was also established, as well as between town and country and between manual and intellectual work. But there was no possibility of deviating from the ruling ideology.

The new constitution, promulgated in 1936, has further simplified the Soviet state and no doubt contributed, in theory, to its democratization. To be sure, it has by no means discarded the basic Soviet ideology, nor has it abolished the one-party system. The fact

that group discussion was allowed and encouraged does not alter this fundamental principle. The most striking example of "popular cooperation" is the Stalin Constitution of 1936 which was submitted to all Soviet peoples and discussed for months before it came to the All-Union Congress of Soviets for acceptance. Yet of 154,000 suggestions for amendments, only 43 were accepted, and these were of minor significance.¹

In itself, the constitution is a remarkable document of progressive social and political conception. Unfortunately, many of its most important provisions remained in the realm of theory. The Soviet government felt free to disregard any of the provisions without asking the Supreme Soviet's permission if it believed that conditions required such violation.²

Some of the articles of the constitution bring out a marked contrast between the doctrine of the proletarian dictatorship and the democratic form of government. The constitution, while paving the way for the time of ideal communist living, is clearly designed for the socialist transition period. Therefore, it cannot be regarded as more than temporary, fitted to socialism rather than to communism.³

The constitution changed the electoral system and introduced a direct, universal, equal, and secret ballot. It ended the disfranchisement of certain groups of citizens who had no proletarian background and were not permitted to take part in former elections. The cumbersome All-Union Congress, the Soviet parliament, whose function had been the election of the Central Executive Committee, was abolished. Instead, a Supreme Soviet, to be elected directly by all citizens, was established. It consists of two houses: the Soviet of the Union, elected on the basis of one deputy for every 300,000 of the population (Art. 34); and the Soviet of Nationalities, elected on the basis of twenty-five deputies from each constituent republic, eleven deputies from each autonomous republic, five deputies from each autonomous region and one deputy from each national area (Art. 35). Since the constitution envisaged a reform of the Soviet judiciary, a new "Law on the Judiciary of the

¹ Shotwell, *op. cit.*, p. 840.

² See below, pp. 314-316.

³ See above, pp. 263-264.

U.S.S.R., the Constituent Republics and the Autonomous Republics" was written and approved by the Supreme Soviet as late as 1938. The Supreme Soviet elects the Attorney General, the highest law officer of the Soviet Union, and the Supreme Court.

Secret balloting was substituted for the former open election but it should be understood that there is no choice between several political parties as in the Western democracies. The people indicate their preference for leading personalities, but do not decide between political trends. Candidates are nominated by the Communist party but also by trade unions, cooperatives, young people's associations, and cultural organizations. While thus a democratic form of government and election gave the people the illusion of what was called "Soviet democracy," the dictatorship of the proletariat did not cease to exercise its power.

However, there exists also what one might call a "Soviet Bill of Rights." In Articles 118-133 of the constitution, basic rights for Soviet citizens are set forth: the right to work and rest; the right of equal educational opportunities; the right of free speech, free press, free assembly and meetings, as well as of street processions and demonstrations (Art. 124). But—through the Communist party, these rights are to be supervised "in the interest of the working people," a restriction which makes the bill largely theoretical. The constitution can therefore not be regarded as a safeguard for democracy. At best, it is a codification of Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist principles applied to the Soviet system, a juridical definition of Soviet government and administration, and an outline of a unitarian socialist society in which deviations from established laws cannot be tolerated and in which the distribution of rights and duties defines the proper place of human beings who may be punished if they do not conform. Stalin himself was quite frank in admitting that "the draft of the new Constitution actually leaves in force the regime of the dictatorship of the working class as well as it preserves unchanged the present leading position of the Communist party."¹

This seeming contradiction between form and content, between

¹ Stalin in an address to the eighth congress of the Soviets on November 25, 1936, as quoted in Shotwell, *op. cit.*, p. 854. It was this congress which adopted the constitution.

content and interpretation, and between totalitarian and democratic elements may be responsible for the misunderstanding of Soviet attitudes in the Western world. In the democracies, particularly, it is pointed out that elements of constitutionality, parliamentarism, federalism, fairness to the minorities, and humanitarian aims seem to be contradicted by a one-party system operating under the dictatorship of the proletariat, the Marxist doctrine, and the authoritarian law enforcement by the party. But since the Soviet system does not shun the use of unpleasant, if temporary, means to achieve a desirable end, conventional interpretations have been frankly discarded.

Thus the party, as executor of the Marxist ideology, imposes its will upon the government and does not tolerate any interference or opposition by any group or individual. Its general secretary and the men of the Politbureau wield absolute dictatorial power. They are theoretically responsible to the Supreme Soviet, but the delegates have never protested against their party leaders' decisions. Stalin and his associates have determined the Party Line according to prevailing conditions and their directives have become law. They have administered the proletariat's "will" as they have seen fit. They have created a new interpretation of Marxism which, in certain details, differs considerably from the original concepts of Marx and Engels, and even of Lenin. They justify their practices with their ultimate purpose, namely, to enforce a socialist discipline so that the people may become ready for the difficult task of living in a classless society. They regard themselves as the trustees of the people's will and are determined to carry out to the fullest extent their interpretation of this will. To reach the goal of happiness, they take the road of compulsion.

SOVIET ECONOMY: PLANNING

The goal of Soviet Marxism is the moneyless classless society. Only as long as the transitional state of socialism exists is money needed. In the Soviet Union this money has a different character from currency used in capitalist countries, because it is used for internal service alone. Only the government handles foreign currencies; the domestic rouble cannot be converted into foreign currency. The official course of the rouble given to foreigners who

traveled in Russia before the war was entirely arbitrary, because it was computed on the gold basis while paper roubles with much less buying power were issued for domestic use.

The evolution of Soviet money and economy from the days of the revolution to those of complete socialization and long-term planning passed through various stages. Right after the victory of the Revolution in 1917, a program of socialization was introduced. At that time, the country went through a period of chaos and complete economic collapse which was the consequence of the First World War as much as of the Revolution. The Soviet government believed that state-controlled planning was the only way out of this economic breakdown. It began to work on this planning as early as 1919. Meanwhile, the period of so-called War Communism introduced the most severe economic centralization and control.

This method did not work. In 1921, Lenin was compelled to relax governmental pressure by introducing the NEP, New Economic Policy. The enemies of communism thought they had triumphed and many followers of the revolution feared the worst. The reintroduction of a limited amount of private enterprise and independent "capitalistic" trading was looked upon by many as proof that socialism would not work. The relative freedom of peasants, merchants, and artisans to do business, in a small way, without governmental interference seemed to indicate the end of Marxism in Russia. But nothing was further from the truth. All Lenin wanted was to secure a breathing spell for the new Soviet state. In 1926, the NEP was already severely curtailed. In 1928, the first Five-Year Plan was introduced and made it impossible for anyone to continue private trading. Shortly afterwards, the peasants were forced to give up their economic independence. At the beginning of the thirties industry, commerce, and agriculture were safely in the hands of the government which from then on regulated production.

The Soviets "hold that money should not be a commodity in itself. . . . It cannot be employed for the accumulation of capital by an individual."¹ This does not mean that an individual cannot

¹ L. E. Hubbard, *Soviet Money and Finance*, Macmillan & Company, Ltd., London, 1936, p. 125.

amass a considerable sum of money but that he cannot use this money as "capital"; in other words, he cannot invest it into "reproductive" capital. In addition, buying power is curbed through the limitation of products. Complete economic planning cannot be reconciled with the unrestricted use of money. The value of money in the Soviet Union is thus rather theoretical. Full use of it can be made in retail trade. Apart from that, it serves as an instrument of accounting rather than as a means of exchange.

Soviet economy seems to show a number of characteristics which one may superficially compare with aspects of capitalist economy. Wrong interpretations of attempts by Soviet economists to adapt Marxism to changed world conditions have contributed much to the wishful thinking of capitalist economists who hoped for a reversal of Soviet socialism.¹ However, there is no basis for any such assumption. As an example, the problem of savings may be enlightening.

The state itself puts money away by taxation and "contribution," by compulsory limitation of consumers' goods, and through the private savings of individuals who earn more roubles than they can spend. Naturally, the use of the savings is determined by the party government; citizens have no influence on the financial policies of their government. "Private" savings are encouraged by the state, not in the form of open accounts but in the form of government bonds. Before the war, these bonds paid as much as 8 per cent interest or could be paid back by the state in a lump sum with a premium. Since the outbreak of the Russo-German war, war bonds have taken the place of the peacetime bonds.

Why should people save money in the Soviet Union? They do not need money for their old age because security is guaranteed to them until they die. They do not need to save for vacations because they are entitled to a free annual rest in the country with pay. Those who are in a position to save—not too many Soviet

¹ In its Spring issue of 1944, the New York magazine *Science and Society* published an article by L. A. Leontiev and others on the "Political Economy in the U.S.S.R.," a translation from *Pod Znamenem Marxizma*, No. 7-8, Moscow, 1943, in which advice was offered for a better and more modern interpretation of Marxian principles. The article was interpreted in some American newspapers as a reversal toward state capitalism and created a good deal of confusion.

Such an interpretation is absolutely unjustified. Marxist doctrines may have been modified to suit new conditions but they remain the foundation of the Soviet state.

citizens are—may perhaps here and there be able to buy a few “luxuries” (if such are available); they may rent a lot and build a *datcha*, a little summer house. But the incentive to save for purposes such as exist in capitalist countries is lacking. The incentive is what one may call “social pressure”; it has become, during the war, a patriotic must.

Most wage earners are expected to subscribe to government loans in order to keep prices at the desired level. To this extent, the loans have actually the effect of price stabilization. During the war, loans helped to finance armaments and, when peace has returned, will no doubt help to pay for the country's reconstruction. This may seem rather orthodox economic practice for a socialist state; but the significance of money and savings is altogether different from what it is in nonsocialist countries.

Planning in the broadest and deepest sense of this word is the foundation of Soviet economy. It is more: it is an instrument for the realization of the political and social doctrines of Stalinism; it is an agency of public education without equal. The prerequisites for planning are: first, complete socialization of all means of production, industrial and agricultural, by the state; second, centralization under a unified leadership. Article 11 of the constitution expressly states these as basic principles.

The five-year planning system went into effect on October 1, 1928. Its executive organ was *Gosplan*, a vast department headed by about seventy members appointed by the Council of People's Commissars. Essentially, *Gosplan* is responsible for the preparation of the plans, the coordination of information and details, and the control over the execution of the accepted plan in its various parts. *Gosplan* is assisted by various agencies of territorial and functional character. The directives of the plan, its fundamental principles, and the implications of its goal are set forth by the Communist party. When the plan has been outlined completely, its duplications ironed out, and the host of suggestions from all the industrial and collective-farm “trusts” worked into its draft, when all the “counterplans” urging more production have been embodied, then the finished product is returned to the party for final approval. The first of the plans (1928–1932) aimed at the complete industrialization of the country; the second (1932–1938) at the elimination

of the "exploitation of man by man"; the third Five-Year Plan, interrupted by the war, was dedicated to the transformation of society into a classless state on the basis of complete socialization of industry and collectivization of farming.¹

Since Soviet statistics are not always reliable, it is very hard to know just how far the plans succeeded in accomplishing their aims. An objective survey of the two completed periods shows both positive and negative results. Without doubt, the goal of the first Five-Year Plan, the industrialization of the country, has been essentially accomplished. Furthermore, agricultural collectivization and the establishment of farm cooperatives have achieved a great increase in farm production. In addition, planning played an important educative role by enforcing a new kind of communal living which was necessary for the successful carrying out of the plans.

On the other hand, while general production increased as much as 400 per cent between the beginning of the first and the end of the second Five-Year Plans, the quality of production was not high and the market remained short of consumers' goods. The question of how efficient the workers were cannot be answered easily. Considering the quantity and the lack of quality of Soviet production, it would be misleading to make comparisons with the highly developed industrial capacity and quality of capitalistic Western countries. The Soviet toilers, on the average, have shown great enthusiasm for fulfilling the requirements of the plans. But it must not be forgotten that an industrial country needs a tradition of industrial skill. Russia had been a backward agricultural country; her prewar industries were few and little developed. The Soviet government found itself confronted with the immediate need for industrial skill; it could not wait for its gradual development. So it invented the phrase "socialist competition" and encouraged the Stakhanov movement, named after Alexei Stakhanov, the miner, who was one of the first Soviet workers to increase his output manyfold simply by intelligently organizing his work. The introduction of payment for piece work, too, did much to increase output. The title "hero of labor" was created, granting the receiver honor and money as well as certain privileges.

¹ Cf. V. M. Molotov, *Preliminary Report on the Third Five-Year Plan*, cited by M. T. Florinsky in Shotwell, *op. cit.*, p. 867.

If there has been a lag in scheduled production, it has, in most cases, been not so much the fault of the workers as of the management. In fact, the tremendous and still-growing bureaucracy extending from the Supreme Economic Council down to the individual "trusts" or "syndicates" has hampered efficient management repeatedly and remains one of the basic problems of soviet economy. Managers are state employees; although they are responsible for the execution of their allotted tasks in the fulfillment of the Five-Year Plans, the lack of competitive pressure and the fear of being held to account for anything that goes wrong have hampered the exercise of enterprising spirit and individual initiative in many instances.

Nevertheless, the curve of Soviet production and the standard of Soviet living went up until the time when the growing international crisis made it necessary for the government to curtail production of peacetime commodities in favor of armaments. However, it would be unfair to conclude that the socialist scheme of centralized planning did not succeed. The Soviets themselves fully realized that it was far from accomplished and that they had much to learn and to change before achieving their goal. The amazing capacity of war production certainly proves that the experience of Soviet planning may furnish some useful lessons for the future when planning on an international scale may well determine the character of domestic planning. It also proves that people can be educated not to regard money as the sole incentive for production.

SOVIET FOREIGN RELATIONS

Soviet foreign policy has been rather puzzling at times. But if it is the main task of a foreign policy to pursue consistent ends, the "mystery" of Soviet foreign policy can easily be solved.

War and peace have different connotations in capitalist countries and in the Marxist Soviet Union. So have concepts like pacifism. The Soviet government has consistently pointed out that its policy has always been characterized by a strong desire for peace. The sincerity of such statements is obvious because the country needed peace for its reconstruction. However, this does not mean that it renounced war unqualifiedly as an instrument of policy. But the question remains: what kind of war? Lenin answered: "We

Marxists do not belong to the absolute opponents of any kind of war. . . ." It was clear to him that the Soviet Union was bound to meet opposition from the outside against the establishment of a socialist community. Such a conflict would be a "revolutionary" war, "resulting from class struggle . . . waged by the revolutionary classes" and having a "direct bearing upon revolutions. . . ." ¹ "Socialists cannot be opposed to types of war without ceasing to be socialists. We are struggling against the very root of wars—capitalism. But inasmuch as capitalism has not as yet been exterminated, we are struggling not against wars in general, but against reactionary wars. . . ." ²

In other words, the Soviets are not opposed to war on principle but only to imperialist wars which, in their view, are a result of the capitalist system. In the Marxian interpretation, such imperialist wars are but a phase in the class struggle, one more step in the deterioration of the nonsocialist state. As long as the communist classless society has not been established, wars cannot be prevented. Wars may be classified, according to Stalin, into just and unjust wars. Unjust wars are those conducted for purposes of imperialistic conquest or to suppress nations attempting to destroy conditions which their imperialistic and nationalistic tyrants want to perpetuate. Just wars are those fought for the protection of suppressed nations or for deliverance from the capitalist yoke.³ (One should add that a basically ideological conflict such as the Second World War was originally termed by Marxists an "imperialist" war and became "just" only after the Germans attacked Russia.)

The Soviet people are, of course, opposed to imperialistic wars; the Party Line has always maintained this position. However, this does not mean that Marxists believe in pacifism. Pacifism is "cheating of the masses," and if necessary "communists must take part in any reactionary war." ⁴ Proletarians will go to battle as expediency may dictate, if they are in danger of becoming the victims of imperialist aggression.

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Sochineniia* (Works), 3d ed., Moscow, 1935, Vol. XXX, pp. 332-333.

² *Ibid.*, Vol. XIII, p. 453.

³ T. A. Taracouzio, *War and Peace in Soviet Diplomacy*, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1940, p. 25.

⁴ Lenin, *op. cit.*, Vol. XX, pt. II, p. 530; see also Taracouzio, *op. cit.*, pp. 32-33.

Such belligerent spirit was evident in the first years of the young Soviet republic under Lenin and Trotzky. Both men believed in war as an instrument for the achievement of socialism in the world. Their hope for world revolution by armed force was very much alive at the time of the wars with Poland and the Baltic states between 1917 and 1921. Only during the last years of his life, Lenin, the realist, saw that world revolution could not be brought about in the near future and that great caution had to be used pending the proper time for action. Trotzky was less realistic. His insistence on permanent revolutionary war cost him his position in the Soviet Union.

His elimination from the political scene in Russia soon after Lenin's death left Stalin in control of foreign policy. Believing in the necessity of peace at home and abroad, Stalin succeeded in silencing the belligerency of the "leftists." He did not hesitate to appease the capitalist powers by curbing the activities of the Third International. He kept the Soviet Union at peace until November, 1939, the beginning of the Finnish war. He permitted Maxim Litvinov, the Soviet Union's shrewdest foreign commissar, to crusade for collective security until the attitude of the British and French at Munich convinced him of the futility of any attempts to preserve peace through collective action.

Historically, the Soviet search for peace is documented in the records of some of the most important conferences and sealed in some of the most important treaties concluded between 1922 and the outbreak of the Second World War. At the first international conference at which the Soviets participated after the victory of their revolution, in Genoa, 1922, they moved for complete international disarmament, a proposal which was turned down. The Treaty of Rapallo with Germany was the consequences and initiated a series of individual agreements which were to replace collective pacts. Stalin suggested in 1925 that "Soviet relations with the capitalist countries were based on the acceptance of the co-existence of two opposing systems."¹

The Briand-Kellogg Pact (Paris, 1928) and the Litvinov Protocol (Moscow, 1929) which was intended to make the Paris pact for the "renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy" work-

¹ Taracouzio, *op. cit.*, pp. 111-112.

able, are other indications of Soviet intentions to remain at peace. A few years later, on the occasion of the London Economic Conference of 1933, Litvinov initiated a new agreement defining aggression. This agreement was signed mainly by central and eastern European nations, and testifies to the determination of the Soviets to convince their European neighbors of their peaceful intentions.

The accession of Hitler to power in 1933 introduced a new factor in the situation. Not only were the National Socialists violently opposed to Marxism and Bolshevism as the sources of all the world's ills, but they also espoused General Haushofer's geopolitical theories according to which the control of the *Heartland* (viz. Russia and Siberia) was necessary for any power that wanted to dominate Europe and Asia.¹ Britain did not at first react to the potential danger of Hitlerite Germany but France was frightened and sought a rapprochement with the Soviet Union. This was made easier by the fact that the latter changed its views on the vital (to the French) issue of revisionism. As Radek expressed it

The way to revision of the predatory Versailles peace leads through a new world war. Discussion of revision is the smoke-screen behind which Imperialism prepares the most terrible and ruthless war that the human brain can conceive.²

The result was the conclusion of a mutual assistance pact in May, 1935, between France and the Soviet Union, after the French proposal of an "Eastern Locarno" had failed of acceptance. A similar pact between the U.S.S.R. and Czechoslovakia, contingent on the French treaty, was concluded two weeks later. In the meantime, Russia had been admitted to membership in the League of Nations in September, 1934.

Subsequent developments gradually pressed Britain closer to France; on the other hand, the Berlin-Rome Axis was formed in November, 1936, opposing the Paris-Moscow "front." The Spanish Civil War caused a further deterioration of international relations. The Soviet Union became unofficially yet actively involved in a type of war which, to the Marxian way of thinking, was permissible.

¹ See above, pp. 77 ff.

² Karl Radek in *Izvestia*, May, 1933, quoted in G. M. Gathorne-Hardy, *A Short History of International Affairs, 1920-1938*, Oxford University Press, London, 1938, p. 372.

The catastrophe of Munich dealt the final blow to the system of collective security which had been shipwrecked by Nazi aggressiveness and democratic lack of resolution. A few months later, Litvinov left the commissariat of foreign affairs. The Soviet Union, feeling deceived and hurt in its national pride, became more distrustful than ever and abstained from cooperating with the Western European democracies which had participated in the episode of Munich. Fearing that a Nazi Germany which had denounced the Bolshevik state in unprintable terms at the *Parteitag* of 1936 would not forever remain content with verbal abuse, Stalin bought himself time by concluding an economic treaty with Hitler in August, 1939.

The rapid and unopposed successes of Nazism in southeastern Europe, the increasingly close connection between Japan and the Axis, combined with a fear that the Western powers might come to terms with Germany at Russia's expense, account for this unexpected step. "On August 23, 1939, the communist policy of peace entered its fourth phase: attack"¹ The Russo-German treaty was in fact the signal that put an end to the era of peace.

The world was shocked when, on September 28, 1939, the German and Russian armies met in central Poland, agreed upon a frontier, and shared the "booty." The shock changed to anger when the Red Army occupied the Baltic States, and grew into outright hostility when the Soviets attacked Finland.

Whether the Soviets thought to have purchased immunity or whether they believed that a reckoning with Germany would inevitably come,² it is impossible to tell. At any rate, no less distrustful of Germany than of the Western powers, they sought to match the strategic advantages gained by the Nazis in Poland. There is no cause to believe that the Soviets contemplated launching an aggression for the cause of world revolution at this time. If for no other reasons, the dangerous uncertainty of the world situation would have made it an ill-chosen moment to embark on such a crusade. In addition, the Soviet Union had to bear in mind the danger of an aggressive Japan. Japan was deeply involved in China at this time, but the lack of physical means combined with internal

¹ Taracouzio, *op. cit.*, p. 238.

² See A. L. Strong, *The Soviets Expected It*, Dial Press, Inc., New York, 1942.

dissension hampered, for all its bravery, the effectiveness of Chinese resistance.

In 1938, after the Munich Agreement, the Soviets stood before the debris of their quest for collective security. Thus the Soviet actions against Poland, the Baltic States, and Finland may be interpreted as essentially preventive. The Soviet Union's desire for peace was strictly in line with Stalin's domestic policy of consolidation. Soviet proposals for disarmament and a system of international security against aggression were sincere because they were based upon the Stalinist conception that a long period of peace was necessary for Soviet socialism to become securely established.

The mature Stalinism of the Second World War stressed its belief in evolution. In accordance with this policy, the first major step was the abolition of the Comintern, the Communist International, on June 9, 1943. This organization convoked its first Congress in Moscow, in 1919, as the "general staff of the world revolution" and consisted of representatives of the Communist parties in many lands. However, a great many difficulties of a technical and political nature gradually decreased the Comintern's importance until, after 1935, it dwindled into virtual insignificance.

Stalin's policy of consolidation could not make much use of the Comintern which was working to undo the efforts of the Foreign Commissariat toward improving relations between the U.S.S.R. and the outside world. In addition, domestic consolidation led logically to a new nationalism in the development of which the Comintern had no place. Obviously, patriotism for the "Socialist Fatherland" excluded internationalism and therefore world revolution. Abolition of the Comintern was a master stroke of Soviet foreign policy. It served to discredit German propaganda against the Bolshevik bogey and to reassure the nations allied with Russia that, for the time being, the Soviets had no intention of interfering in the domestic affairs of other countries.

Another, even more important event in the development of Soviet foreign policy, was the passing of a constitutional amendment, reported by Foreign Commissar Vyacheslav M. Molotov on February 1, 1944 to the Supreme Soviet, according to which the Union Commissariats for Foreign Affairs and for Defense were to be transformed from Union Commissariats into Union Republic

Commissariats. This meant that the Soviet Union Republics (sixteen of them since 1940) were to have control of their own foreign policy and their own military organization.

The significance of this amendment, both for the period of the war and after, is far-reaching. First of all, this development is indeed the logical outcome of Soviet policies on federation and nationality ("minority") problems. As such, it implies a recognition of the sacrifices contributed by all the 180 nationalities, races, and tribes throughout the Union which have reached their political maturity as members of the union of Soviet republics.

More important for world politics is the creation of a system of federated states, each controlling its own defense system and its foreign policy without losing the advantages of participation in the federal economy, guaranteeing them an adequate economic existence. Being members of the union, they are, of course, adherents of the Soviet-Marxist ideology which through the Communist party still rules them from Moscow. But in a world full of economic insecurity, it will not be too difficult for the people to follow this central ideology, particularly since they may retain their indigenous culture, their own defense system, and their own ideas about relations with neighboring states.

There can be no doubt that this amendment opens the way for nations not now belonging to the Soviet Union to join it. It is a further step toward a peaceful penetration of Soviet influence toward southeastern and central Europe or, at least, a bid on the part of the Soviets to join their fortunes which, after the victory over Hitler, will be bright and promising.

Soviet relations with the Western democracies have, on the whole, greatly improved during the Allied comradeship in arms. From the Soviet acceptance of the Atlantic Charter through the conferences of Moscow, Teheran and Dumbarton Oaks to the Yalta agreement, the Soviet government has indicated its readiness to continue cooperation after the end of the Second World War. Peace being imperative for the reconstruction of the war-ravaged Soviet Union, there can be no doubt that the maintenance of peace is a vital Soviet interest. The Kremlin will do all in its power to secure peace for as long a time as possible.

However, emerging as one of the world's largest and mightiest

powers, the Soviet Union will not necessarily orient its policies along the same lines as the Western powers. The Soviet rulers are basically self-centered; their policy is first of all Russian. They are realistic and unconventional. They want security. Not satisfied with promises or treaties, they want strategic guarantees so as to protect themselves against future aggression. They are intent on preventing the Western powers from forming "*cordons sanitaires*" against themselves; rather do they wish to forge federations of states "friendly" to the Soviet Union particularly in Central and South-eastern Europe.

Coming out of her isolation and taking part in the attempt of the United Nations to create a peaceful and prosperous postwar world, the Soviet Union will yet continue to play a lone hand if it feels that it would be to its advantage.

16 Organization of Soviet Marxism

THE METHOD OF COMPULSION

1. *The NKVD.* As Marxists, the Soviets believe that their political and social goals cannot be attained without a strict control of the people—in the interest of the people—during the period of proletarian dictatorship. Thorough as the control of the party organs is, it might not be sufficient to prevent counterrevolutionary activities. Hence, the customary device of a dictatorship, the secret police, was created to supervise the nation's life in all its aspects.

Until 1934, the Union State Political Administration (abbreviated to OGPU in Russian, or simply to GPU) was in supreme command as the party's watchdog, overseer, and executioner. Its history went back to the days of the dreaded Czarist *Okhrana* which for decades had been an important instrument of oppression and had acquired a world-wide reputation for its methods of persecution and torture. In 1918, the leaders of the Russian Revolution created an "Extraordinary Commission to deal with Counterrevolution, Speculation, and Sabotage," abbreviated *Tcheka*. Felix Djerjinsky was made president of the board. The new organization continued the methods developed by the *Okhrana* and put them to the service of the Soviet state. The *Tcheka's* activities during the years following the Revolution may never be fully revealed, but the record of its reign of terror would rank high among those of similar organizations. The *Tcheka* was officially abolished in 1922 but in reality its activities were continued, though in less conspicuous fashion, by its successor the OGPU, or GPU. In the beginning, the personnel of the GPU, including its president, was much the same as that of the former *Tcheka*.

The GPU was organized into six departments: (1) the operative and general; (2) the foreign; (3) the economic; (4) transport and passports; (5) the Red Army; (6) the secret service.¹ The GPU had branch offices in all cities and in many railway stations. One

¹ Sidney and Beatrice Webb, *Soviet Communism: A New Civilization?*, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1938, pp. 577-578.

should not assume that it operated in the political field only. It was also active in the elimination of common criminals; it influenced the condition of prisons.

In 1934, the GPU, whose name had become a symbol of terror, was abolished as such. However, its organization was incorporated into the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs (abbreviated to NKVD in Russian) where it operated under the Bureau of State Security. In 1941, this Bureau became an independent Commissariat of State Security (abbreviated to NKGB in Russian). Since then, uniformed and plain-clothed agents of the NKVD or NKGB became known as NKVD men.

No outsider can fully appraise the NKVD's political activities. One may well question the extreme statement that there would be no Communist party or even a Soviet Union without the GPU;¹ it is doubtful whether any regime can survive on the strength of its secret police alone, without the negative support at least of a majority of the people. Thus it is quite possible, as the Webbs point out, that the Russian people as a whole had no basic objection to the GPU² and that they look upon the NKVD as the custodian of the proletarian revolution and its interests.

Every person in the Soviet Union, whether man, woman, or child, is under the permanent supervision of the NKVD through the local communist cells whose secretaries inform the NKVD of suspected noncooperation or subversive activities. The NKVD should be regarded as the most important instrument of the party in keeping the people in line. After all, the class struggle, under the dictatorship of the proletariat, is still in progress. Antisocialist influences may penetrate so long as there are capitalist countries. Since the weeding out of counterrevolutionary elements is one of the foremost tasks of the NKVD, this agency has been developed by the government into one of its most efficient organs. The internal organization is not too well known but it seems to be built on the lines of Soviet military hierarchy.

2. *Individualism and Individuality.* The Soviet state is highly collectivized. The nature of its ideology excludes individualism. The

¹ W. A. Rukeyser, *Working for Soviets*, Covici, Friede, Inc., New York, 1932, p. 182.

² S. and B. Webb, *op. cit.*, p. 585.

state watches through its control organs to see that such individualism may not develop lest it disturb the cooperative philosophy of socialism. Yet the Soviets insist that they do not want the individual to lose his identity. They maintain that theirs is no equalizing concept of society like Nazi totalitarianism where the individuality of the citizen is completely lost in the machinery of semimilitary mass organization. While individualism is opposed in the Soviet Union, individuality is encouraged. Moreover, there has been an official change of attitude in regard to the mass and the individual. True, the Soviet system originated through mass action, the revolutionary proletarians being the "cadres" of the movement. But this period has passed. Stressing the action of cadres rather than that of individuals was discouraged from the middle nineteen-thirties. Motion pictures, theaters, books, and political demonstrations have emphasized the value of the individual, thereby symbolizing the growing consolidation of a strong and unified Soviet state. Previously, the party had proclaimed that everything depended on its cadres; now it stressed that everything depended on the individual worker.

Thus a new emphasis was laid upon the human being, neglected during the pioneering years. This policy, it should be noted, is in direct contrast with the attitude of Nazi-Fascist totalitarianism. While on the whole the country was ruled on the assumption of its collective character, individuals in the mass now became distinct and stood out according to their character and ability. Class consciousness was still a prerequisite for success in the Soviet system, but gradually, during the years preceding the war, the responsibility was increasingly shifted to the members of the collective. The purges hampered this development considerably; the average Soviet citizen would hardly show any inclination to expose himself to suspicion and preferred to remain an inconspicuous part of the mass. However, the trend itself existed and marked a significant new departure coincident with the general tendency toward consolidation and pacification.

How far is the individual allowed to express his own ideas? Dare he speak up at all? In principle, he is allowed to offer constructive criticism so long as it pertains to his work and remains within the framework of the Party Line. He could not say that he did not like

the Politbureau without being purged immediately. He may, however, in the meetings of his working group, indulge in "self-criticism," meaning by this an indictment of shortcomings of his section or of the management. He may criticize working conditions within reasonable limits; he may also accuse responsible persons within his factory of not having cooperated to the fullest. While such self-criticism has somewhat decreased in the last years, it is regarded as one of the proofs of "Soviet democracy." It is typical of the Russian character. The Soviets do not like Dostoevsky's literary creations because many of his heroes indulge in self-humiliation and self-effacement. Yet psychologically, Soviet self-criticism, although more productive and materialistic, exactly meets the urge of the Russian character to confess, to humiliate itself, to indulge in self-abasement.

A broader kind of self-criticism is found in the workers' correspondence, letters to the editors of the country's newspapers and periodicals. This type of criticism has been endorsed by the government. Millions of letters pour into the editorial offices and are checked for the use of the government; in a few instances, they are printed in the papers. For the most part, the letters contain suggestions for improvements. Bolshevik leaders insist that the will of the masses is being carried out and that the participation of the masses remains essential; therefore public criticism is most important in finding out what the masses think and want. In reality the Party Line is set up without popular consultation. All the major decisions have been made by the top-ranking party organizations and have then been accepted by the Supreme Soviet without important changes. The dictatorship of the proletariat takes the form of those masses of proletarians who "dictate" surrendering themselves to their leaders.

The war has somewhat furthered the degree of freedom of expression. Early in 1944 Soviet publicists claimed that they were allowed to express their own opinions, and the Soviet government made it clear that it was not responsible for newspaper articles which represented the personal opinion of the writer.

But this apparent relaxation of stringent supervision in the government-controlled and subsidized press cannot be taken too literally. Certainly the trend toward individual expression has become

stronger than ever before, but so long as there exists a dictatorship of the proletariat, that is, so long as communism has not been achieved and counterrevolutionary influences may still make themselves felt, the state and the party, according to the Marxian doctrine, must of necessity limit the freedom of the spoken and written word.

3. *Family Life.* Marx and Engels were prepared to give up traditional family life in the belief that only among the bourgeoisie did the "completely developed form of this family" exist:

On what foundation is the present family, the bourgeois family, based? On capital, on private gain. . . . The bourgeois family will vanish as a matter of course when its complement vanishes, and both will vanish with the vanishing of capital. (The complement is public prostitution.) Do you charge us with wanting to stop the exploitation of children by their parents? To this crime we plead guilty. . . . The bourgeois sees in his wife a mere instrument of production. He hears that the instruments of production are to be exploited in common and, naturally, can come to no other conclusion, than that the lot of being common to all will likewise fall to the woman. . . . Our bourgeois, not content with having the wives and daughters of their proletarians at their disposal, not to speak of common prostitutes, take the greatest pleasure in seducing each others' wives. . . . Bourgeois marriage is in reality a system of wives in common and thus, at the most, what the Communists might possibly be reproached with, is that they desire to introduce, in substitution for a hypocritically concealed, an openly legalized community of women. . . .¹

This tirade was never taken too seriously, even by convinced Marxists. The experience of disrupted family life in the first years of the Soviet Union's existence proved that Marx and Engels erred when they regarded the family as an exclusively bourgeois institution.² Human desire for family living developed early in the history of the human race and the family has become the basic unit of the state. While the aspects and forms of family life have always been affected by a changing environment, its dissolution, that is, the abolition of marriage as the foundation stone of an orderly society, would invite anarchy. As long as we need the state, we need

¹ Marx and Engels, *The Communist Manifesto*, Part II.

² Marx himself was a good father who took care of his wife and children without following his own prescription of morals. He and Engels lived a bourgeois life. They adapted themselves to existing conditions, yielding to the social pressure of their time.

the family. According to Marxism, a classless society would need neither.

During the first few years of the Soviet regime family life was disrupted, but not because of orthodox Marxist considerations. The conditions of the country were such that housing, nutrition, and the impact of a completely new life upset normal social living. In addition, the enthusiasts of collectivization looked with suspicion on the privacy of family life as indicative of counterrevolutionary tendencies and bourgeois inclinations. So the general upheaval disturbed family relations. Never, however, have women been "communized" as anti-Bolshevik propaganda tried to convince the world was the case.

As time passed and the Soviet state became stabilized, the policy of consolidation reached the family, too. The climax of a conservative movement, sponsored by the Stalin government and expressed by new family decrees and the prohibition of abortion (1936), found the family restored to a place of honor in the Soviet state. Obviously, the new society called for a new type of relationship between man and wife, parents and children. The official reconfirmation of women's equality (Article 122 of the Stalin Constitution), the comparative ease of obtaining a divorce, and the refusal of the government to distinguish between "registered" and "unregistered" marriage (legal marriage and concubinate), all contributed to a new vision of family morality which necessarily differed from that of the West. One should not forget that marriage outside the Soviet Union is an institution of a partly worldly, partly religious character. Many nations give the churches a decisive role in the marriage institution. The Soviet Union does nothing of the kind. It regards marriage as a private concern of the individual citizen but it looks upon a couple with children as a potential unit for the perpetuation of the socialist fatherland and is willing to preserve this unit intact.

The laxity of which the Soviets were often accused when they were trying experiments in new social living, no longer exists. Although the government believes that sex relations are the private affair of the parties involved so long as the community is not harmed in any way, the élite, the Communist party members, or the members of the *Komsomols* are expected to lead a moral if

not an abstinent life. Their behavior must be exemplary; a decorous family life is part of such conduct and clearly shows how much the views on marriage and the family have changed since the early days of the U.S.S.R. Bad housing conditions in the overcrowded cities, and the fact that both parents are busy working and fulfilling their political duties, attending meetings or receiving additional education, make it difficult to intensify family life. Most children have to stay in the communal crèches or kindergartens. Families cannot seclude themselves because their individual members are not in a position to manage their own lives. So numerous are their obligations that there is hardly time for private life. The GPU does not control the home as does the Gestapo, but on the other hand German children stay at home at least until they are six. Soviet children are very rarely brought up by their mothers; they enjoy the facilities of children's homes where they learn to live "collectively."

Whether a greater intensity of family life may be restored when the housing problem is solved and a greater prosperity enables men and women to work fewer hours is a matter of conjecture though it is quite possible. However, the Soviet government decided not to wait for such a favorable time but encouraged the trend toward conservative family life by promulgating new family laws on July 8, 1944, supplementing and reinforcing those of 1936.

Increased material aid will be given to "expectant mothers, mothers of large families and unmarried mothers in order to encourage large families and increase the protection of mother and child."¹ In view of this tendency, certain differentiations are now being made between married and unmarried mothers which formerly did not exist. The reasons for this are not of moral nature; there is no discrimination against children born out of wedlock, nor are unmarried mothers ostracized. But the population policy of the Soviet government is directed toward a high birth rate and a consolidation of social life. Inasmuch as the recognition of marriage as a fundamental principle seems to exclude social experimentation and is the best guarantee of a successful rearing of children, bachelorhood is discouraged and penalized by a special tax. Families with one or two children will have to pay a nominal tax, too.

¹ Edict of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. on the Increase of State Aid for Mothers and Children, *Information Bulletin of the Embassy of the U.S.S.R.*, Washington, July 25, 1944.

Divorce has become considerably more difficult. It has now been made the object of complex court actions and rather high expenses. It is contingent upon the failure of the court's attempts to reconcile the parties. The petition for divorce must be advertised by the complaining party in the local newspaper at the expense of this party. If a divorce is to be granted, a settlement concerning the custody of the children as well as property arrangements have to be effected, just as in capitalist countries.

The Soviets do not tolerate bigamy and frown upon promiscuity; they are proud of having almost entirely eliminated prostitution. Their institutes for the physical and social rehabilitation of the few remaining prostitutes are well known. Marxism still influences the political and economic aspects of Russian life but it no longer has much effect on the family.

4. *Church and Religion.* It was Lenin himself who saved the church from utter destruction when, in 1919, the majority of the Communist party demanded the elimination of all religious activities and beliefs. The status of the church is now defined in Article 124 of the Constitution of 1936 which, while separating state and church completely, grants freedom of religious worship. At the same time, it permits freedom of antireligious activity. The Communist party, of course, is fundamentally antireligious and would hardly permit any churchgoer ever to become a member.

The Marxian enmity toward religion is well known. "Religion is the moan of the oppressed creature, the sentiment of a heartless world, as it is the spirit of spiritless conditions. It is the opiate of the people."¹ Religion, for Marxists, is like idealism without a realistic basis, shifting the center of gravity of man's interests to the other world while neglecting this world and its woes. If religion could improve present social conditions Marxists might recognize it as an ethical power, though unwilling to accept its spiritual motivation. For them, a change can be brought about only by the transformation of the economic system. Spiritualism, in no matter what form, merely serves in their eyes to divert the people's attention from facts to illusions; therefore, it is an "opiate."

In addition, the church has, in the opinion of Marxism, collabo-

¹ Karl Marx, "Criticism of the Hegelian Philosophy of Right," in *Selected Essays*, trans. by H. J. Stenning, International Publishers Co., Inc., New York, 1926, p. 12.

rated with the ruling classes, or, in other words, has helped the capitalist state to maintain the *status quo*. If the capitalist state is destroyed, its church must go down too; otherwise it might remain as a counterrevolutionary power within the new socialist society. No state which is dominated by an ideology permeating its entire organization can permit such a power to persist. We have seen the difficulties of churches in Nazi-Fascist countries. The difficulties increase under a dictatorship of the proletariat. They were particularly acute in Russia where the Greek Orthodox Church had been so closely associated with czarism and had helped to keep the masses of the people in utter ignorance, superstition, and poverty.¹ Considering the record of this church over a long period of time, it is not surprising that the new regime should have sought its destruction. As a matter of fact, the reopening of several churches soon after the victory of the Revolution, and the destruction of very few others, were signs of extraordinary political discipline. The Nazis have ruined more synagogues than the Bolsheviks have churches.

Democracy grants its citizens religious freedom and its corollary, tolerance. Tolerance, if genuine, is by its nature indivisible; it must be extended to believers and nonbelievers alike. It follows that moral crusades against the Soviets can only be justified when they are directed against outright persecution. However, rumors of persecutions of believers have usually been exaggerated. The Soviet government opposed the existence of the church as a political agency but hardly ever enforced oppressive methods against believers except that the party excluded them as members.

While exposed to journalistic attacks of rabid atheists, the churches throughout the Soviet Union enjoyed considerable freedom of worship. Stalin even tolerated a few monasteries. He never pretended, of course, to do so for sentimental reasons—although he himself was once a student in a theological seminary. Marxism is ideologically antireligious but Sovietism became strong enough to be able to tolerate a strictly nonpolitical, powerless institution. The Constitution of 1936 returned civil rights to priests,

¹ See Paul Miliukov, *Outlines of Russian Culture*, Part I: "Religion and the Church," University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 1942. Cf. also J. S. Curtiss *State and Church in Russia*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1940.

but, as the late Metropolitan Sergei, the first patriarch of the Russian Orthodox Church under Soviet rule, pointed out, even before 1936 freedom of religion existed. Instances of local antagonism were corrected by the higher authorities.¹ The patriarch also stated that the church had plenty of money from voluntary contributions. The government has even allowed it to send money to America to help orthodox churches here. Religious instruction, however, may only be given privately.²

Wallace Carroll reports that in 1939 there were still thirty million believers of all sects in the Soviet Union. This number was submitted by the president of the League of the Militant Godless and thus might be exaggerated. "Before the Revolution, Russia had a hundred thousand parishes and religious communities. In 1941, the Soviet government estimated that the Russian Orthodox Church and the Renewed Orthodox Church maintained 4225 churches and 37 monasteries, the Roman Catholics 1744 churches and 2309 chapels, the Moslems 1312 mosques, and the Jews 1011 synagogues. The high proportion of Catholic churches was largely due to the recent annexation of eastern Poland and the Baltic States."³ For a country known to be "godless" this number of open churches seems to point to a brighter future for religion in the U.S.S.R. Immediately after the outbreak of the Russo-German war, when the churches proclaimed their complete support of the fight against Hitler, the so-called antireligious museums were closed.⁴ The antireligious organ *Bezbozhnik* (The Godless) ceased publication. The Soviet government, in reply to inquiries of the American government in the matter of religious freedom, has given reassuring answers. The reasons for this reversal of policy were several. The pressure of war diverted attention to more pressing issues than the ideological struggle of the state against the church. The necessity for the Soviet Union to cooperate closely with her Western Allies during the war and postwar years made a compromise by

¹ Wallace Carroll, *We're in This With Russia*, Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, 1942, pp. 148-151.

² *Ibid.*, p. 151.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 147.

⁴ Antireligious or godless museums consisted of two sections. The first was to prove through the presentation of scientific facts that the Bible was wrong; the second was purely propagandistic, pointing to the sins committed by the church against the people in czarist times.

the Soviets over a momentarily minor matter feasible. Also, the patriotism shown by the believers in support of the war, their donations to the Red Army, and the resulting cordial correspondence between Stalin and the church dignitaries initiated the beginning of a period in which state and church may reach a workable *modus vivendi* even though Marxism can never give up its fundamentally antireligious attitude.

However, the church will not be allowed to gain political influence and the state will reserve the exclusive supervision of education and of social problems.

In September, 1943, permission was given to reconstitute the Holy Synod. This supreme body of the Russian-Orthodox Church elected the Metropolitan Sergei as its patriarch.¹ This important event was not only an official recognition of the church's loyalty to the Soviet Union. It also helped to strengthen Russian nationalism, for, despite its association with the czarist state, the Russian Church has always been part of Russia and has deep roots among the Russian people. The Soviet government will hardly permit the Holy Synod to exercise too great an influence upon the new society but it will grant its believing citizens the benefit of a spiritual organization. At the same time, it will be able to present the new situation to the outside world as evidence that it has gone a long way since 1917 and that the new Soviet nationalism is a far cry from early Bolshevism.

The majority of Soviet citizens today, to be sure, have very little interest in religion. Their education in Soviet schools has taught them to direct their spiritual craving into different channels. They believe, first and foremost, in the righteousness and future of their political religion; social and economic ideologies possess the character of a religion, as has often been pointed out.

Furthermore, Soviet citizens have another outlet for the spiritual urges of their souls: the cultural and artistic endeavors of their nation and the treasure of the arts created by inspired men of all countries. For them, to hear a symphony concert, to enjoy a play with a lofty message, to read a good book, or to study at the feet of great scientists is sincere worship, devoid of everyday escapism

¹ Patriarch Sergei died in May, 1944. His successor was Alexei, former Metropolitan of Leningrad, who was decorated for his heroism during the siege of that city.

entertainment as we know it in the West. One may wonder whether this will prove to be sufficient in the long run and whether there might not come a time when the spiritual needs of the people will grow so strong that they will turn again to a spiritual religion.

THE METHOD OF INDOCTRINATION

1. *Soviet Culture.* The establishment of a classless society, so the Soviets claim, means the inauguration of a genuine state of democracy. The prerequisite for democratic living is a high standard of education for all citizens. American democracy has recognized this necessity and, in the course of its existence, has developed a school system unsurpassed in the opportunities that it offers. Obviously, uneducated citizens are not capable of understanding the duties of responsible citizenship. The leaders of Soviet socialism, their final goal always in mind, came to similar conclusions. Lenin stated that the two things a socialist society requires most are, first, the greatest possible amount of industrial output and, second, the highest possible degree of culture and education.

Prompted by the desire to speed popular education as much as humanly possible and to create a new proletarian culture, the Soviet government began to make the people culture-conscious from the beginning of its rule. *Kulturi*, culture, now embraced all the things contributing to a higher level of living. Many of the hundred-odd nationalities of the Soviet Union had to start learning from the beginning how to live as cultured human beings. Some of the Far Eastern nomadic tribes had to be settled and civilized. This meant, first, a campaign for literacy. Within two decades, the Soviet government succeeded in changing a 75 to 80 per cent illiterate people into a population of which only about 20 per cent—including the Far Eastern tribes—could not yet read or write.

In accomplishing this task, the Soviets had to overcome extraordinary difficulties owing to the fact that many of their nationalities and tribes beyond the Urals had not even developed an alphabet. Philological and anthropological expeditions were sent out by Moscow to explore the cultural history of the tribes in question and to devise an alphabet for them. More than seventy new alphabets have been developed in this way and have enabled primitive tribes to become at least semiliterate.

In addition, the Soviets taught their peoples something about the rudiments of the art of living. To come clean-shaven to work, to have well-set hair and manicured fingernails, to look one's best when attending the theater—all this was considered indispensable for culture. The state perfume trust, which up to the war sold an incredible amount of cosmetics to women, is as much a part of this "culture" as the beauty parlors and the barber shops which are crowded from early morning until late at night; many of their customers have to patronize them whether they like to or not. Amusement parks in all the larger cities are a mixture of Coney Island, promenade grounds, and athletic fields where loud-speakers transmit music by Beethoven and Tchaikovsky instead of jazz; they are called "Parks of Culture and Rest."

At the same time, the young Soviet state had no difficulty in arousing a fervent and absorbing interest in the arts as the most important manifestation of culture. Art enjoyment and understanding is now the possession of the whole people and not, as the Soviets point out repeatedly, the privilege of a ruling class. The tremendous demand for art, once aroused, became one of the most effective means of indoctrination and education in the hands of the proletarian dictators. Ever since Lenin, Soviet leaders have recognized that the innate desire of man to create, or to absorb the artistic creation of others, could be used for the purpose of molding mind, feeling, and morale according to definite patterns. They saw to it that art "ceased to be a luxury and became an essential component of education and of the whole organization of society."¹

The educational success of the Soviet government in the fields of culture and, specifically, in the realm of the arts is unique in the annals of intellectual history. The intensity and passion with which all types of people have used the opportunity of educating themselves through artistic media is rather moving. It bespeaks eloquently the need of the human soul for beauty. It must be admitted by even the most violent opponents of the Soviet system that the speed with which the masses of the Soviet people became literate and art-loving is as fantastic as it is significant. The Nazi-

¹ Kurt London, *The Seven Soviet Arts*, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1938, p. 19.

Fascist nations have imitated the Soviet idea of using the arts for educational purposes albeit with wholly different aims.

The Soviet quest for culture manifests itself in an infinite variety of ways. One cannot understand the spirit of this country without knowing the extent and meaning of its new culture. Roughly, it may be divided into two aspects. One is the cultivation of the intellect through informal education. All adults and adolescents are subject to it and the enjoyment of the arts is made available to all. Art education is given to those who prove to have above-average talent. To be an artist is an honor, and very remunerative, too.

The other aspect embraces formal education in schools, art schools, and extracurricular activities mainly of an artistic nature, suited to give growing children an opportunity for self-expression and, at the same time, to reveal talent which must not be lost to the nation. All through the school years, the arts form an essential part of the curriculum. Indirect artistic influence through environmental features is considered important and is particularly evident in the clubs of workers and of youth organizations.

Naturally, all these fields of culture are under strict supervision of the party and the government. The dictatorship of the proletariat could not forego control of the arts which it regards as essential instruments of socialist construction. It is, therefore, no wonder that the Soviet state not only provides for comprehensive art organizations but even goes so far as to issue directives on the style of the art to be produced and cleared for public exhibition. For believers in the freedom of artistic creation, this restriction seems prohibitive and mars the fine impression made by the attempt to assist and further the arts.

The total control of the arts and of artistic personnel is entrusted to the All-Union Central Committee on Art which was set up in 1936 and reorganized in 1939.

2. *The Central Committee on Art.* In the decree of the Council of People's Commissars of September 25, 1939, in reference to the "situation regarding the Committee on Art," the committee's activities were defined as follows:

The Committee on Art affects leadership over all phases of art in the U.S.S.R. except cinematography; directly supervises the most important artistic organizations and enterprises of all-union scope by personal di-

rections and through the administration of the art committees of union republic scope; it supervises the artistic organizations and enterprises of republic and local standing.

The committee is attached to the Council of People's Commissars (Sovnarkom) and has a vast scope of responsibilities, the most important of which are:

1. Supervision of the repertory theaters and concert organizations of all-union standing; direction and control, through the administration of art affairs, of the repertories of artistic-audience enterprises of republic and local scope.
2. Supervision of projects of monuments to outstanding sociopolitical, scientific, technological, and art workers; projects of architectural and sculptural character dedicated to important historical events.
3. Organization of exhibits, competitions, olympiads for all branches of amateur and professional art.
4. Cooperation with trade unions and politico-educational organizations in the development of artistic activity, coordination of the work of social organizations in the field of artistic activities.
5. Supervision of the activities of the organizations which embrace artists, such as the Unions of Soviet Composers, Soviet Artists, Soviet Architects, Theater Societies.
6. Control of openings and closings of artistic enterprises (for spectators) as well as of educational institutions; promotion and supervision of groups on tour (theaters, ensembles, and individual artists).
7. Government control of shows and repertories and their advertising; supervision of production of recordings; regulation of prices for tickets.
8. Regulation of finances, artists' fees and royalties.

These are some of the main duties of the committee. Its absolute power in directing art policies is set forth in Part III, paragraph 6 of the Decree of 1939; there it is stated that the president of the committee may revoke rulings of the art administrations of the *Sovnarkoms* of the union republics that are contrary to the rulings of the *Sovnarkom* of the U.S.S.R.

The Committee on Art consists of the following main departments:

1. Chief administration of theaters.
2. Chief administration of musical enterprises.
3. Chief administration of enterprises of pictorial and graphic arts, museums, galleries, and public monuments.

4. Chief administration of circuses.
5. Chief administration of control over spectacles and repertoires of theaters, concerts, the fine arts, radio, and records.

In order to ensure the efficiency of supervision, a Control Inspection Group is attached to the bureau of the President of the Committee on Art. The Soviets are on constant guard lest subversive tendencies creep into the arts. It seems that of all their cultural organizations, only the former Chief Administration of Cinematography (GUKF) failed to keep its promises. Since 1938, GUKF has been liquidated and has become the only artistic branch in the Soviet Union to work on a decentralized basis. Formerly subject to the Committee on Art, the films are now entirely separated from it as far as the technical and industrial sides of production are concerned. In purely artistic matters, the committee still has a certain unofficial influence.

Since the state completely subsidizes the arts, it has created organizations which at the same time help to supervise them and make them available to the masses. There are art cooperatives which enable artists to study and create; the cooperatives also act as the artists' "agents" by selling art products to the state, municipal, and club organizations. There are artists' trade unions which determine wage scales, provide rest homes, arrange for financial assistance, supply proper food and medical care for the artists, and act as their legal representatives in cases of conflict. There are associations for creative artists, established in 1932, which provide protection and security for writers, painters, sculptors, musical composers, architects, and creative workers in other branches of the arts. All these organizations are headed by the art administrations of the union republics and, finally, controlled by the All-Union Committee on Art.¹

It must be stated, however, that artists are not entirely free to express themselves as they may wish. In return for economic security and a high social standing, they must give up their individualism (not individuality) and conform with the Soviet state's conception of what type of art should be given to the people. They are told that Soviet art must be created in the style of "socialistic realism" and that it should never be either "formalistic" or "natu-

¹ Cf. London, *op. cit.*, Chaps. 2, 3.

realistic"; that Soviet art must deal with the problems of the new society and never become art for art's sake; that it must not foster counterrevolutionary tendencies nor be addressed to a few esthetes instead of to the whole people. Artists who cannot follow these rules lose their professional standing. Only those who identify their talent with the social and esthetic conceptions of the party are given the opportunity to work in an atmosphere of security. They alone are given money, titles, and medals; they alone belong to the nation's "aristocracy of mind" which the Soviets strive earnestly to build up.

The Soviet peoples, particularly the Russians and Ukrainians, are tremendously gifted for artistic creation. Until the beginning of the Russo-German war, they were producing enormous quantities of art work of every kind. The enforcement of "socialistic realism" did not entirely impede the development of artistic quality but, to be sure, most of the art works were clearly utilitarian, educational, and propagandistic. The first quarter century of Soviet culture saw many startling creations but there can be no question that political decrees are not exactly helping the production of timeless works of art.

Since the beginning of the thirties, the Soviet government has taken a rather conservative stand in matters of taste.¹ It has fostered the use of classical culture as the basis on which a new Soviet style should develop its own dignified line. It has gone much too far in opposing modernism. But it is possible that its cultural policies may willingly forego the opportunity of permitting the growth of individual great art now for the sake of a broader basis of culture in the future, when the educational level of the Soviet people may permit the relaxation of conventionalism and conservatism in the field of the arts.

3. *Adult Education.* Immediately after peace was restored in the early twenties, a "Down with Illiteracy" society was founded whose branches became active in every factory, every social organization, and every club of the country. It is estimated that in 1932 about eighty million people attended schools of various types, that is, half

¹ Soviet esthetic conservatism was a consequence of the Stalin consolidation of the thirties. It was otherwise during the first decade after the victory of the Revolution when political propaganda affected the arts and led to extreme modernism and often misunderstood expressionism. Cf. London, *op. cit.*, pp. 75, 76.

the entire population.¹ However, the need for systematized training made it necessary to establish regular adult schools which operated in the evenings only. The illiterate worker, young or old, first entered the literacy school; for four months he worked on the alphabet and for five more months on a "postalphabet" course. During the following nine months, he had to absorb a four-year syllabus in a "semiliterate" school and then conclude his studies in a higher school during the following two years. These concentrated studies correspond to a full seven-year school syllabus.

Workers who have an incomplete secondary training and want to supplement it to enter the university or one of the higher technical institutes of university rank may enroll in *rabfacs*, "worker's faculties." These are supposed to be temporary institutions because in time, when everybody will have received a free and compulsory secondary education, they will no longer be needed. Workers who have graduated from secondary school receive every assistance for advanced study and are relieved of their work.

There is almost no field of knowledge which is not made available for study to the workers. (The term "worker" is used in the Soviet Union as an honorary title. Man as producer is a worker; man as member of society is a citizen.) The Soviet cultural workers, extending from university professors to village teachers, form a wide front of trained educators who help in the work of adult education; they also include untrained amateurs who make up in enthusiasm what they lack in knowledge. These *Cultarmyists* (the word is copied from *Redarmyist*) number many hundreds of thousands of men and women who are responsible for the extraordinary speed with which the Soviet Union achieved literary and culture-consciousness among its peoples.

Among the institutes which are the intellectual trustees of Marxian culture are the Communist Academy of Science, the Institute of Lenin, the Academy for the Communist Training of the Youth, and the so-called Communist Universities which are frequented mainly by workers who have been graduated from evening schools or the *rabfacs*.

Informal education is given in the many clubs, almost a hundred thousand of them, which are organizing what one might call the

¹ Beatrice King, *Changing Man*, The Viking Press, New York, 1937, p. 224.

"extracurricular" activities of the workers. These institutions are often endowed with the most luxurious appointments, at least in the larger cities, and cost the government great sums of money. The Soviet leaders have never refused to spend money on their growing civilization; in 1938, the entire cultural budget amounted to 42,000,000,000 roubles. The employees of "all industrial establishments, offices and institutions contribute to the trade unions a sum equivalent to 1 per cent of their total payroll for cultural work among employees and members of their families."¹ Since the national payroll amounted to almost 100,000,000,000 roubles in 1938, the sum of 1,000,000,000 was available for cultural activities in the clubs.

Many of these clubs or "palaces of culture" belong to the trade unions. The scope of their activities may be judged by the fact that the Railwaymen's Central House of Culture in Moscow spent no less than 17,000,000 roubles for cultural activities in 1938 alone.² These grandiose cultural activities are not the only ones that help to educate the masses. There is an organization of amateur artists, consisting of 70,000 amateur art circles that are greatly encouraged by the government. There are ideological service hours near the "Red Corner," a type of altar decorated principally with red cloth, the Soviet emblem, and pictures of Lenin and Stalin—clearly an adaptation of the Icon and very similar in its use. There is no Soviet ship on the high seas without its Red Corner, and the factories have special rooms assigned to house it.

Innumerable groups exist within the organization of the clubs. There are groups for political study, dramatics, choral singing, and general education. The many thousand substantial libraries throughout the country are an additional asset in cultural education; books are loved and their editions, although numbering millions of copies, are so rapidly exhausted that the average buyer is fortunate if he can find what he wants. The building up of private libraries is encouraged but not easy to carry out. Moreover, art in all its forms is made available to the workers. Their organizations secure theater tickets for them, or, if the town is too small for the maintenance of a repertory theater, touring companies are invited for "command"

¹ M. Kijnetzov, *Palaces of Culture and Clubs in the U.S.S.R.*, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1939, p. 8.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 9-10.

performances. The same holds true of symphony orchestras and of circuses. Among the few forms of lighter entertainment, the circus is extremely popular with Soviet citizens.

If there are museums, groups of workers, led by a guide who is an expert in art and art criticism, visit them during their free days; if there are none, art galleries arrange temporary exhibits. Motion-picture films are shown through loaned projectors if there is no permanent cinema. In all these cases, the government sees to it that under no circumstances are people in small villages or peasants shown third- and fourth-rate art. When the Arctic Eskimos wanted to see some plays, the Moscow Little Theater, one of the finest in this theater-minded country, manufactured light-weight stage settings, flew all its best actors and actresses to the Arctic, and played Shakespeare for them. The principle of equality is applied in the cultural realm; the Committee on Art may decide upon the quality or suitability of subject matter for various regions but it would not, as a rule, permit discrimination between town and country.

Needless to say, the radio has a large role in the dissemination of education. There are training courses given over the air and there is much "incidental" instruction arranged in popular and entertaining ways which make it easy for listeners to assimilate new knowledge.

The cultural activities of the Red Army deserve specific mention. The extent to which the authorities encourage the soldiers' interest in the arts and general culture is unique. While the governments of many nations have recognized that soldiers must be given ideological indoctrination and training in technical fields, no other army in the world has ever indulged in artistic activities like the Red Army. Its legitimate theater ensembles, its symphony and folk-music concerts, its section for painters and sculptors have been highly developed. There are both amateurs and professionals. The families of the Redarmyists participate in these artistic efforts; in fact, even the children of soldiers are given the opportunity of exhibiting their paintings and sculptures in special Red Army museums. Naturally, many of these activities are definitely related to ideological instruction, and, psychologically, the impact of culture upon a military machine opens new perspectives. The heroic stand of the Red Army has proved that the enjoyment and creation of

art does not in any way effeminate soldiers; on the contrary, it probably gave them a greater sense of the values they were defending.

The question may be asked whether these cultural activities of the Soviet state are not motivated by the same reasons which caused the Germans to create the *Kraft-durch-Freude* and the Italians the *Dopolavoro* organizations. No doubt, ideological indoctrination plays its part. But there exists one fundamental difference, namely, that respect for and appreciation of culture are integral parts of the Soviet creed. In the attempt to create a new socialist civilization typical of the Soviet peoples, it appeals to the ideological as well as to the patriotic feeling of the masses. It tries to establish a national culture. In the Nazi-Fascist countries, cultural activities were one of the many devices for ideological propaganda. In the Soviet Union they serve the same purpose but, in addition, they are among the most important means of education for citizenship in a socialist society.

4. *The Soviet School System. HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY.* The development of Soviet schools took place in three phases before it reached its 1941 status. The first occurred during the chaos of the revolutionary wars and foreign intervention; it lasted roughly from 1917 to 1921. At this time many radicals declared that schools were as unnecessary as the influence of the family was dangerous. In spite of Lenin's decree promising free compulsory education for both boys and girls in every child's native tongue, school life in these years remained precarious. The more radical view never gained the upper hand but an acute shortage of politically reliable teachers impeded school reorganization.

The second period was characterized by the importation of American progressive-education methods, notably, the Dalton Laboratory Plan and the project method. The new methodology had become known to the Russians through the writings of John Dewey, William H. Kilpatrick, and their followers. Its application in the Soviet Union gave rise to "collective learning," a strange kind of study teamwork organized in so-called brigades. Pupils in groups of four to six worked out projects together without considering individual differences. During the few years in which these methods flourished, university students frowned upon lectures and

concentrated upon collective work in seminars. As during the first period, professors and teachers were sharply censored by students and could be dismissed on recommendation of the latter.

The third period was initiated by the first Five-Year Plan. Its importance comes from the fact that it saw the introduction of the Labor School, the establishment of the principle of "polytechnization," and the abolition, in 1931-1932, of the Dalton Plan and the project method. The Labor School was not successful. Its curriculum centered around the three main topics of nature, labor, and society, what might be called a broad social-science curriculum. It was eliminated in favor of the traditional curriculum and soon traditional teaching methods were likewise reintroduced.

Polytechnization, on the other hand, has remained an essential part of Soviet education. It is a socialist principle, outlined by Marx who, in turn, had developed the idea from earlier socialist theoreticians. Education, according to Marx, means three things, namely, intellectual development, physical development, and polytechnical education. Polytechnization will give students knowledge of the general scientific principles of all production processes and will, at the same time, familiarize children and adolescents with the tools of production and their use. Polytechnization should not be confused with vocational training; rather it is intended to teach an understanding of the relations between life and work, and to prepare the young to play their role in the industrialization of the Soviet Union. It emphasizes the interaction between economy, politics, and learning; it strives to make a whole man out of the future Soviet citizen in so far as he should be taught to understand the integral process of life in an industrialized socialist society. The children will therefore include in their studies theoretical and practical technology; they will do manual work to put what they have learned into practice; and they will broaden their horizon through excursions to factories and other centers of economic life. Usually, every school is expected to be under the patronage of a factory or collective farm in its neighborhood. Workers will establish personal contacts with the pupils, thus enabling the youngsters to grasp the significance of industrialization and collectivization for the ultimate goal of socialism.

At the end of the second Five-Year Plan, the Soviets were mov-

ing toward the accomplishment of their goal, the establishment of a compulsory free ten-year education for all (elementary and secondary), thus living up to the resolution of the Party Congress of 1923 which proclaimed:

The school must be used as an agency for the elimination of all social classes and building the communist state. Accordingly education must be free and compulsory for all without distinction of sex and up to the age of 17 and should start as early as possible. All must be enabled to attend school by the provision of food, clothing, shoes, and school supplies at public expense.

A comparison of the Soviet school situation in 1939 with the conditions which prevailed in 1914 indicates the progress achieved in the space of twenty-five years: In 1914, there were only one million secondary school pupils throughout the whole Russian Empire; in 1939, twelve million. In 1914, there were a mere 8,137,000 pupils studying in all types of schools; in 1939, about 47,500,000. Against not even a hundred thousand czarist teachers in 1911, there were one million in 1939, and the third Five-Year Plan provided for an additional 600,000. Against 112,000 university students in 1914, there were now at least 600,000, a number that was fast growing with every new term.¹

This all goes to show that the cultural program of the Soviet planning system has apparently been more successful than its industrial counterpart. It also confirms the supreme importance attached by the Soviets to the education of their people and, especially, of their growing youth, the torch bearers of communism. It is worth examining the educational philosophy upon which a socialist school system is built.

There is, first of all, the principle of free education for all from the cradle through the highest institution of learning. In fact, until the fall of 1940, when the Soviets began to curb free secondary education by introducing fees for all except the *otlitchniki* ("A" students), the Soviet school system appeared just as democratic as the American system. Both school organizations believe in universal high-school training as a natural and necessary continuation of the elementary level; neither system regards high schools as pri-

¹ O. Leonora, *Public Education in the U.S.S.R.*, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1939, pp. 11, 14.

marily preparatory for university studies reserved for the limited numbers of an élite. Both believe that society should educate its future citizens toward as high a degree of civic responsibility as possible. Both systems, also, hold, in theory at least, that education must be made available to all regardless of race or creed, and that environmental needs should determine the local curricula of individual schools. Both systems strive for excellent vocational training and both emphasize the equality of educational opportunity of the sexes.

Until 1940, both systems believed in coeducation; however, the Soviet government has changed its mind and has, since then, reintroduced a separation between boys and girls during the years of puberty. It is interesting to note that some of America's progressive private schools, such as the Dalton Schools, had also frowned upon coeducation of children during their high-school years even before the Russians promulgated their reversal of opinion.

However, the two countries differ in the matter of religion. Both would agree that state and church should remain separated. But while American schools do not discourage extracurricular religious instruction, the Soviet schools have ceased mentioning religion and have substituted political ideology for religious teaching. Also, in contrast with the decentralization of American education, the schools in Russia depend on the momentary stage of central planning; while local authorities are permitted to retain their own points of view, the basic directives for all curricula emanate from the central government in Moscow. In this way, the educational philosophy remains unified throughout the country and may be defined in terms of dialectical materialism, collectivism (cooperation as opposed to individual endeavor), internationalism, equality between the sexes, and the application of science to the problems of social life.¹

The generosity of educational offerings was restricted in 1940 when the European War came into full swing and the Soviet government realized that it would eventually not be able to stay out of the conflict. The introduction of fees for secondary education for all students whose work was not rated at least two-thirds A and

¹ George S. Counts, *The Soviet Challenge to America*, The John Day Company, New York, 1931, pp. 340ff.

one-third B was coupled with a decree for a vocational labor draft, the State Labor Reserves. It was ordered that youths from fourteen to seventeen, respectively grouped according to types of vocation, be inducted into newly organized training schools. About one million boys, but no girls, were scheduled for vocational draft without being allowed to leave the job assigned to them for at least four years. Instruction and maintenance were to be free of charge. All graduates were to be deferred from military service and paid according to the usual rates. The former Factory Apprentice Schools, whose enrollment had dropped considerably, were obliged to turn over their buildings and equipment to the new vocational training centers.

This decree was a violation of the Constitution which ensures the right of education "... free of charge including higher education, by the system of state stipends for the overwhelming majority of students in higher schools."¹ It was probably necessary to enforce greater effort in securing trained labor reserves for the defense industries. Until the introduction of this decree, one could say that the Soviet school system was one of Russia's finest and most democratic achievements, especially after the Constitution of 1936 had removed the previous discrimination against the children of non-proletarian backgrounds.

TYPES OF SCHOOLS. During the first three years of their life, children are taken care of mostly in the *crèches* which are financed and supervised either by municipal authorities or by factory combines whose workers are offered their facilities. Bad housing conditions and the parents' lack of time make these homes for infants imperative. The children receive good care, food, and the faint beginnings of a social education. They live in small separated groups in order to restrict possible illnesses to the smallest number of cases.

At the age of four, children go to the kindergarten where they stay for the next four years. While the *crèches* are under the control of the Commissariat of Health, the kindergartens are under the control of the Commissariat of Education. The children are

¹ Article 121 of the Constitution of 1936. In the absence of an official translation, Anna Louise Strong's version is used, as quoted in Sidney and Beatrice Webb, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 528ff.

divided into age groups of four- to five- and six- to seven-year-olds. A daily record is kept of each child. At least three elaborate reports on the individual children are given every year. The kindergartens give the children preschool instruction and begin definite political indoctrination. The degree of receptivity of the children is noted in their records which may be important for future investigations. The institutes are well equipped and neatly decorated. In the larger industrial cities, one may find them located in remarkable buildings with highly artistic murals and beautifully landscaped gardens.

The elementary-school course begins when the child is eight years old and lasts four years. The child then changes over to the first part of the high school without a special examination. This first division of secondary training takes three years. The student is then fifteen years old and has to decide what course of studies he wishes to follow. He may finish senior high school in three more years, after which he may enter one of the universities or higher institutions of technical or artistic training (at eighteen). He may, if he is extraordinarily talented in one of the arts, enter a special art secondary school (with a four-year course) and then change to one of the academies of art, music, architecture, literature, or motion pictures (at nineteen).

The student of fifteen may also enter a "technicum," covering a three-year course of vocational character. Technicums are the Russian counterparts of American vocational high schools and are very popular with young people who want to become technicians and engineers. The graduate of the technicum may also enroll in an institution of university rank. University studies take an average of five years; they may be followed by two to three years of post-graduate studies at one of the academies of science or art which are also attended by older students and artists who feel that they need supplementary study. Universities are institutions of professional training. They are organized along the same lines as the universities in continental Europe where there are no colleges.

Apart from technical and artistic training, the practical aims of education in Soviet schools are, briefly: first, to impart a definite body of knowledge of a general character; second, to train the students in the socioeconomic problems of Marxism, in the principles of the class struggle, the structure of the Soviet state, and the

place of labor in society; third, to introduce the students to the problems of practical work in a socialist community. It is almost unnecessary to add that the Marxist-Leninist ideology determines both teaching methods and curriculum content.

Parents are urged to participate in school administration. School Councils, which are elected, have to consider important details of school policies, for example, sanitary conditions; economy and general welfare; criticism of the curriculum; and encouragement of school attendance. Cultural activities fostering all the arts are discussed and decided upon. The self-government of schools, however, has been losing ground since the middle thirties, because the authorities have returned to traditional school discipline and conventional teaching methods.

The organization of life at the universities is remarkable. Tuition is free. In addition, about 88 per cent of the students receive allowances from the state ranging from 130 to 200 roubles a month. Students working at the academies of the People's Commissariats earn their money according to the rates of skilled workers, up to 700 roubles. Many students who come from out of town are given free lodgings; the majority receive board and some of them clothing. Vacations may be spent free at special rest homes in various regions of the country and the students use this opportunity to become acquainted with their fatherland. The fundamental difference between the Soviet student and his colleagues in other parts of the world is his professional security and, therefore, his mental peace. Not only is he free of financial worries while he pursues his studies, but he also knows that there will be a place for him after graduation. University study is no sinecure in the Soviet Union; it is regarded as work of a highly responsible nature. The state supports the student and expects him in turn to repay society through hard work and meritorious conduct. Up to the time of the war, there were 716 Soviet higher educational institutions which were training students in 178 different branches of scientific, technological, and art fields. All these institutions are regarded as potential contributors to the building of a socialist society and therefore esteemed by the people as important and necessary.

One other branch of education should be mentioned—the correspondence courses. More than 200,000 men and women who

have had a secondary education but whose work or geographical location makes it difficult or impossible for them to attend full-time university courses, learn through correspondence lessons. This type of self-education is given official recognition on a par with regular academic study.

EXTRACURRICULAR ACTIVITIES. Extracurricular activities are predominantly cultural in character and center mainly in the so-called circles which are engaged in manifold and widespread artistic activities. The program to be followed and the methods to be used are not decreed but suggested by the experts of the Central House for the Artistic Training of Children in Moscow, which has about a hundred branch offices throughout the country. This institution supervises the artistic training in schools, in special training centers, and particularly in the circles. The functions of the Central House are divided into departments for music, painting, sculpture, theater, literature, games, and dances. The motion picture is excluded and is handled instead by the children's film-production centers.

The influence of the Central House is far-reaching although it is difficult to judge to what extent its suggestions have been accepted. In some instances, they have become law; in others, they were discarded. The institute is a unique phenomenon, additional proof of the importance that the Soviets attach to the artistic education of young people.

The art circles are divided into groups similar to those of the Central House. Teachers contribute their work mainly on a voluntary basis. They are expected to guide the children and not to impose their personal style or artistic conception upon them. Good work done by the children in these circles does not remain unnoticed. The most talented take part in a competition, the winners of which compete with those of other communities in a regional contest. The regional winners in turn enter the district competitions. Finally, the most gifted children of all the union republics are chosen. The supreme test is held in Moscow. The winners are highly honored and are given the opportunity of entering the best training institutions in the field of their choice. Their careers are ensured from this day on unless they lose their eagerness for continued study and improvement. The competitions are called "olym-

piads." They not only encourage the amateurs to express themselves artistically, they also are a quest for new talent of which, the Soviets are convinced, there can never be enough.

In a more informal way, the children's free time is filled with opportunities for artistic appreciation. They have permanent repertory theaters for their exclusive use; they have their own publishing house which distributes hundreds of thousands of children's books every year; they are offered daily radio programs directed to three different age groups; they have their own motion pictures and a film studio producing movies for children and adolescents exclusively. Usually, the programs are differentiated for children up to eight, for those between eight and twelve, and for youngsters between twelve and seventeen.

Children are taken seriously in the Soviet Union. Their artistic production receives much attention. There are regular exhibitions of children's paintings; there are youth magazines which publish their writings; and there are children's concerts offering a program of music written for them by grown-ups and adolescents. The Central House for Artistic Education, which is under the supervision of the Commissariats of Education, maintains an enormous correspondence with gifted children in all parts of the country and advises them how to produce art.¹

But the stress on the arts and general culture should not be mistaken for an overemphasis on esthetics, for every aspect of the regular and extracurricular activities is made to fit the pattern of ideological training. On the one hand, in accordance with Lenin's wish that "production" of culture be given predominant care because only thus could a classless society be prepared, encouragement of art is used to educate children to the desired realization of their place and function as members of a socialist society. On the other, the Soviet social and economic system is pictured as representing a higher stage in human development than the systems existing in other countries. If the Nazi youth feel contempt toward all non-Germans, the Soviet boys and girls retaliate with pity for the outside world under the "yoke of capitalism," and feel that one day they may have to help liberate their fellow men. The youth movements strengthen this attitude and give the finishing

¹ London, *op. cit.*, Part V, "The Children and the Arts," pp. 317-341.

touches to the education of youth, although the alliance between the Western democracies and the Soviet Union has brought to Soviet youth a greater knowledge of the outside world.

YOUTH MOVEMENTS. We have seen that, in the totalitarian states, youth movements are among the most effective instruments for indoctrinating youth in the prevailing ideology and for preparation for national defense. The Soviet Union, too, established a youth organization which originated in the first years of the revolutionary period when anti-Bolshevik elements were trying to consolidate themselves. The Soviets answered with the *Youk* organization (*Youk* meaning Young Communists). But like many German communists who became members of the Nazi Storm Troopers in order to commit sabotage whenever possible, so the anti-Soviet elements began to flock to the *Youk*. This became known; the *Youks* were disbanded and replaced by the All-Union Leninist Communist League of Youth, the *Komsomols*, reliable sons and daughters of the Revolution who became the vanguard of Soviet reconstruction. Ever since, the *Komsomols* have remained the center of Soviet youth organizations and the natural candidates for party membership. They have stood in the front lines of the revolutionary wars; they also have done pioneering work in the cultural fields. From the Soviet point of view, they have certainly earned the gratitude of the party leaders. Their importance is, in fact, surpassed only by the party itself. Since 1935, their activity has been restricted mainly to educational fields, and it is since that time that the *Komsomols* have really become the senior supervisory group within the youth movement. It may be mentioned here that the publication of this organization, *Komsomolskaia Pravda*, is a newspaper of great influence which has a daily circulation of several hundreds of thousands of copies.

Generally speaking, the Soviet youth organization is divided into three different groups with clearly defined duties for each.

1. *The Komsomols.* Members of this group are between the ages of fourteen and twenty-three. As party membership begins at eighteen, some of the *Komsomols* are already full-fledged party members and thus help the party maintain close control of the activities of the *Komsomols*. Admission is easy for sons and daughters of workers or peasants. Children of office employees are required to have the

recommendation of a *Komsomol* of at least two years good standing plus the sponsorship of a member of the party who has belonged to it for not less than three years. Children of former bourgeois need particularly good sponsorship. The probation time runs up to eighteen months.

The enforcement of discipline is the foremost task of this organization. The cells which control the members see to it that the orders of the Ninth All-Union Congress regarding *Komsomols* are carried out:

The *Komsomoletz* must be energetic, honorable, daring, supremely loyal to the revolution, and an example to all youth and all workers. . . . The *Komsomoletz* fights persistently for the general line of the Party. He is obliged to study systemically the teaching of Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin. . . . The *Komsomoletz* is an active worker on the cultural revolution front. He fights for the polytechnization of the schools. He is an active physical culturist. He must be prepared at any moment to defend the Soviet Union with arms. He must study military matters, and master one form of military discipline. . . .¹

In addition to this variety of duties, the *Komsomol* must be "politically literate." If after three years he still lacks the necessary knowledge of an intricate ideology, he may be compelled to give up his membership. This supreme penalty may also be enforced for indulgence in drinking or sexual laxity. Indeed, *Komsomols* are expected to be almost perfect specimens, and it is not surprising that they are chosen as the best leaders and teachers of the younger divisions of Soviet youth so as to exemplify the "purity of communist life."

2. *The Pioneers.* Members range from the age of ten to sixteen. The Pioneers are looked upon as the "children" of the *Komsomols*. They are organized in brigades of forty to fifty, subdivided into links of ten led by a *Komsomol*. The day upon which the boys and girls are officially enrolled and swear the oath of allegiance to the ideals of Lenin and the defense of the proletariat is a great occasion and widely celebrated. The Pioneers receive guidebooks from which they have to learn how to behave. There are five "laws" and five "customs." The laws decree that the Pioneers must always be faithful to the cause of Lenin and the workers' class; that they are

¹ Quoted by Sidney and Beatrice Webb, *op. cit.*, pp. 396-397.

to be regarded as the younger brothers of the Komsomols and of members of the Communist party; that they, in turn, should organize other children and lead them in exemplary manner; that they are supposed to be good comrades to other Pioneers and to the children of the workers and peasants throughout the world as well; and that they must strive to acquire a maximum of knowledge in order to understand the reasons for the struggle of workmen.


The customs demand that the Pioneers protect their own health and the health of others; that they fulfill their tasks promptly without wasting their own or other people's time; that they be industrious and persevering, find a way out of every difficulty, and learn how to work collectively; that they be careful of the people's property, particularly books, clothes, and the equipment of the workshops; and that they neither swear, drink, nor smoke.

The principle of polytechnization is, as far as possible, carried out by attaching pioneer formations to factories or collective farms. Their cultural education takes place in the "Palaces for Pioneers" which, at least in some large cities, are the realization of an adolescent's dream. The Pioneer Palace in Moscow possesses a luxuriously furnished clubhouse with all imaginable facilities including theater and motion-picture halls, libraries, rest rooms, and studios for young painters, sculptors, artisans, and photographers. There are also, in various other buildings, numerous technical facilities designed to give the young people an opportunity to develop their interests. Electromechanic machinery, steam engines, turbines, dynamos, motors, and physical, chemical, and biological laboratories are at the children's disposal.

There is no separation of the sexes. As a matter of fact, girls may be group leaders as well as boys. A separation is avoided even during the physical exercise periods.

3. *The Octobrists.* These comprise the youngest group, ranging from eight to eleven. They are organized into sections of twenty-five with a Komsomol as their leader; the sections are subdivided into groups of five children, led by a Pioneer. Young as they are, the children must already promise to live up to the rules prescribed for them. They are admonished to help the Pioneers, the Komsomols, and the members of the party; to be neat and clean; to work hard; and to strive to become Pioneers themselves.

It is interesting to observe that the different age groups overlap, making for better integration of the whole. Below is a chart of this organization which shows the dovetailing of the Soviet youth groups from the Octobrists up to the party members:



Unlike the Nazi-Fascist youth organizations, the Soviet youth movement is first and foremost political and cultural. Physical education is amply provided for, yet mental discipline and not militarism is the core of youth training. Military instruction for children of the kind provided in Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy is frowned upon. Only the more mature Komsomols study military tactics as a required subject. Before the war, the regular period of service in the Red Army was considered sufficient to give all young and healthy Soviet citizens a thorough training: two years in the regular army, three years in the air force, and five years in the Red Fleet. The war has of necessity suspended age limitations; many a hero has been of high-school age. Military indoctrination of youth was not attempted in peacetime, but even during the war indoctrination has remained political and social rather than militaristic. The Soviets regard militarism merely as a means to an end and not as an end in itself.

It is possible that the war and the ensuing reputation of the military profession may change some aspects of education and of extracurricular activities when peace is restored. Premilitary training may well become a subject of singular importance and the number of military schools for future officers is likely to be increased. However, Soviet militarism will probably remain different from German militarism because it is the apparent tendency of the Soviet government to prevent the army from becoming too influential a factor. The constitutional amendment, granting the sixteen Union Republics the right of maintaining their own Defense Commissariats, may well be a skillful device to decentralize the Red Army, thus curtailing its political influence on perfectly unassailable grounds.

CONCLUSION

For many years, contradictions between Soviet theory and practice, between Soviet aims and methods have given the outside world a confused picture of the new Russia. Of the many books and papers written about it, few have been truly objective. The entry of the Soviet Union into the Second World War on the side of the Western Allies and the outstanding heroism of the whole Soviet people has brought about a change of attitude but many people still find themselves torn between their admiration for the Red Army and their dislike of Bolshevik practices.

Yet if the Second World War is to begin liberating humanity from many evil inheritances of previous centuries, deep-rooted mutual prejudices on the part of both Western and Eastern peoples must be eradicated. If, for example, the Soviet system is unsuitable for the West, just as Western political and social thought is unacceptable to the Soviets, each might yet benefit by the adoption of certain ideas or institutions of the other.

The alliance between the Western powers and the Soviet Union has initiated greater efforts toward better understanding in the West as well as in the East. These well-meant attempts are naturally limited by antagonistic ideologies but the Western and Eastern peoples must all face the fact that the fate of the postwar world remains dependent upon the extent of collaboration between the Allies. If peace is to be preserved for a long period, total peace must follow total war.

The responsibility therefore rests clearly with the Western Allies as well as with the Soviet Union. The only possible way to live up to this responsibility is an honest compromise on the basis of which one may hope that ideological and political differences of opinion may be ironed out gradually. The more progressive the social and economic postwar policy of the United States and Britain becomes and the less totalitarian the dictatorship of the proletariat shows itself to be, the easier should it be to reach such a compromise.

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Part 3 Painful Intermezzo:
Vichy France



17 Mismanagement of Democracy

FRUSTRATION OF ENLIGHTENMENT

For two hundred years, from 1589 to 1789, France was ruled by a dynasty of kings who wielded absolute authority over a unified and rather well-defined homogeneous country. When the last absolute king died on the scaffold, it seemed as if the theories of the French intellectuals were about to be put into practice. The suppression of the spirit of freedom and reason, the misery of the common people upon whose bent shoulders rested the heavy weight of an insatiable court, and the impact of liberal ideas manifesting themselves throughout the world, led to the explosion of 1789 which initiated a new era in Europe.

One of the most remarkable documents of the Enlightenment was Montesquieu's *Spirit of Laws* (1748), written through a period of nineteen years and still one of the greatest books on political science. It clarified the essence of law and government in relation to man, helping the intellectuals of the period to systematize their theories. There were, besides, the activities of the enlightened philosophers of rationalism, led by Voltaire, Diderot, Helvétius, and Holbach, who pointed to the rottenness and weakness of the social organization. Without the intellectual equipment of these men, without the unconventional and liberal philosophies of Hume and Locke, Rousseau would not have been able to revolutionize the thought of his contemporaries and to prepare the way for the rebels of 1789. Rousseau, of course, was a Swiss, but imbued with the spirit of French culture which made him think in French terms. His influence was not limited to France; before the French Revolution proclaimed the Rights of Man and Citizen, Thomas Jefferson had drafted the Declaration of Independence, clearly under the influence of the ideas of Rousseau, Locke, and other French and English liberals on the state, social relations, and natural rights.

The impact of the Revolution, tremendous throughout the outside world, was cushioned by Napoleon, who did not, however,

eliminate its effect altogether as the three major revolutions during the nineteenth century, in 1830, 1848, and 1871 showed. When Bonaparte was permitted to become a dictator under the name of First Consul, he thought that Europe could be forced by armed might to unite under the sovereignty of an imperial France. Blinded with military glory, he did not realize that force can never induce nations to adopt a political point of view, that only the power of a common ideal or the stress of common suffering can achieve unification on a voluntary basis. His political ideal was French and not European; his social ideal was the bourgeois, the satisfied, individualistic buffer between the upper classes and the masses of the people, and not the citizen whose social conscience would have prevented the ideals of the revolution from becoming lost in a new social stratification.

It is interesting to note that the young American republic, which lacked the age-old European conventions and had discarded many European prejudices, gave the development of the citizen a better opportunity than any other country. One may state without hesitation that the essence of French revolutionary thought has remained alive in the American Constitution. It did not altogether die in France, but lost a great deal of its impetus after Napoleon returned from Egypt and usurped the power of absolute government on November 9, 1799.

From then on, France lived under the "dictatorship of the middle class."¹ A brief restoration of the monarchy or the return of the empire under Napoleon III changed this fact just as little as did the revolutions of 1830, 1848, and 1871. As the upper and lower classes lost their political influence, the various strata of the bourgeoisie determined the character of France's policy, particularly during the seven decades of the Third Republic which they supported for the maintenance of their position. There was a decided majority, established by free ballot since 1871, and the term "dictatorship" should therefore be looked upon as a symbol rather than as meaning forcible political control.

¹ Albert Guérard, *The France of Tomorrow*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1942, pp. 141ff.

FAILURE OF THE THIRD REPUBLIC

The Constitution of 1875, the result of a brief revolution following the defeat at the hands of the Prussians, was "admirably calculated to hamper effective action."¹ It did not even grant the French a bill of rights since it refrained from incorporating the famous Rights of Man which had been proclaimed by the Revolution of 1789. From its inception, it labored under a cumbersome organization and suffered from the instability of ever-changing cabinets. That, under these circumstances, it held out for seventy years, is not a miracle but a proof of the devotion to a form of government which best represented the interests of the majority of the French people. In addition, a perpetuated bureaucracy which had remained the traditional backbone of the French state through empires, kingdoms, and all political shades of the three republics, contributed to the conservation of middle-class rule. Like the French bourgeoisie, it survived the turmoils of the nineteenth century.

"French democracy has been moribund for years," Albert Guérard writes, adding that France "had not yet become, in the full sense of the term, a democracy."² There is hardly any perfect democracy in this imperfect world of ours but the speed with which Marshal Pétain could eliminate the ideals of liberty, equality, and fraternity seems to indicate that the hold of the Republic on the French people has been overestimated by the millions of lovers of French civilization all over the world.

The nation whose official stationery and whose coins bore the proud words "Liberty, Equality, Fraternity," persevered in backwardness of social legislation. It began only in the nineteen twenties to modernize an educational philosophy which had fostered the cultural conceit of a bourgeois intelligentsia which regarded themselves as the sole possessors of the privilege of higher education. (Fees for secondary schools were abolished in 1930.) It steadfastly refused to grant women the right to vote. It was not able or willing to check the subversive activities of those whose pernicious influences and whose hatred of progressivism contributed essentially to France's collapse in 1940.

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 137.

² *Ibid.*, p. 141.

It is significant that the French petty bourgeoisie and the peasantry did not feel antagonistic toward the moneyed middle classes and did not seem greatly disturbed by the influence of powerful industrial groups, such as the *Comité des Forges*. Overlooking their own poor chances, they worked for and with the rich and powerful, always hoping for the day when they could retire and live the modest life of a *rentier*, spending the interest of conservatively invested capital, the result of lifelong sacrifice and self-denial. The French *rentier*, a rugged individualist *par excellence*, became the very symbol of egoism and shying away from social responsibilities.

To be sure, many of these shortcomings are not peculiar to the Third French Republic. But as French civilization pretended to tutor and lead the civilized world, more was expected from her. Calling herself the *grande nation*, a title which she undoubtedly deserved in certain periods of her history, France was obliged to justify her reputation but instead permitted her political and social structure to deteriorate under the surface glitter of the extraordinary achievements of her artists and scientists. It seems as though the intellectual accomplishments of French philosophers and social explorers led outsiders to believe that the French state could be identified with these pioneers of rationalism and intelligence. But in reality France, having become a living museum, was in dire need of rejuvenation.

THE LAST REFORM ATTEMPT

Of the many French regimes during the past centuries, the Third Republic may well appear to be one of the most liberal. But "it was born feeble, it remained ailing."¹ Not that reforms were not attempted repeatedly. However, they did not have enduring results. Of all these attempts, the last one in the lifetime of the Third Republic, and the most interesting and far-reaching, was the reform of the government of the Popular Front, headed by Léon Blum, France's unsuccessful "new deal." But very soon the conservative elements of various shades, and even those who called themselves "radicals," began to stem the tide of reform. Blum's concessions to French plutocracy and British toryism in the Spanish civil war could not reconcile the individualistic tra-

¹ Guérard, *op. cit.*, p. 182.

ditionalism of the French middle class to large-scale social and economic reforms.

There had never before been a basic agreement on the part of progressives about the character and extent of reforms to be introduced. However, the terrible experience of German liberals, whose split had enabled Hitler to gain power at their cost, might conceivably have served as a warning to French leftists and moderates. The communists, possibly at the suggestion of Moscow's Third International, declared their willingness to collaborate with a cabinet whose majority was certainly anything but revolutionary. They agreed upon a reform plan based upon a series of political and economic prerequisites.

The political demands were headed by the call for energetic action against the French Fascist movements which had grown too strong for comfort and, like the *Croix de Feu*, the *Solidarité Française*, the *Jeunesses Patriotes*, and the *Action Française*, maintained semimilitary formations. Next on the list was a reform of the press, a very necessary reorganization aiming to repeal some recent laws restricting the freedom of opinion,¹ to control the sources of its finance, to end monopolies, and to prevent the formation of trusts. In addition, reorganization of the state-controlled radio was demanded, based upon absolute "equality of political and social organizations at the microphone." Important measures were adopted to safeguard the freedom of trade unionism and to better working conditions for women. For the people as a whole, generous educational reforms were proposed, doing away with discrimination against poor students and establishing, at last, the *école unique*, the unified school with free and universal secondary education for all pupils regardless of their parents' financial standing.²

The Popular Front's foreign policy wished to adhere to the system of collective security and opened to all nations the possibility of becoming cosigners of the Franco-Soviet Pact (which, by the

¹ The freedom of the French press, that is of some of its sections, had been somewhat impaired by Blum's conservative predecessors. On the whole, however, the French press was free and made ample use of its freedom. Its venality, its corruption, and some of its outright subversion played havoc with French public opinion in the years of crisis.

² This school reform, Léon Blum's favorite reform, offered some excellent new features. Daladier adopted the reform but it was too late: the outbreak of the war in 1939 prevented its realization.

way, had been signed by a conservative government prior to the Popular Front). The desire for international cooperation and the endeavor to pass from armed to unarmed peace prevented the Popular Front from preparing France against aggression. In view of the fact that the Nazi-Fascist combination of power grew stronger daily and rehearsed its war machinery in Spain, this policy seems to have been extremely unrealistic. Decrees for the nationalization of the armament industry and the Bank of France could not offset this vital mistake; moreover, they had serious domestic repercussions. They caused important elements of high finance in France to look to Hitler rather than to Blum and strengthened a definite pro-Fascist tendency of subversive character.

Objectively, the reforms of the Popular Front were moderate and logical. In fact, its program "still left France, in actual practice, far behind America."¹ The French wage earners accepted them more or less. The mass of employers, large and small, opposed the restriction of their "individual rights" when the working week was reduced to forty hours. French employers had considered it their privilege to exploit their workers in a manner not befitting a democracy. Now they were prevented from doing so.

Furthermore, control of agriculture according to a national plan aroused as much antagonism from the independent peasants and landowners as the regulation of the banking business, the nationalization of the Bank of France, and of the armament industry. A number of measures planned to solve the unemployment problem which here and there show traces of the early New Deal incited heated controversy without actually being seriously supported by the French people. There was relatively least resistance against a plan for the reorganization of taxation and for new social-security laws.²

While large sections of the people seemed to accept these meas-

¹ Guérard, *op. cit.*, p. 187.

² See Guérard, *op. cit.*, Chap. 9, "Social Pragmatism and the Blum Experiment"; J. C. de Wilde, *The New Deal in France*, Foreign Policy Association, New York, 1937; and Maurice Thorez, *France Today and the People's Front*, International Publishers Co., Inc., New York, 1938. (Thorez was the communist leader collaborating with the Blum government. His account is necessarily one-sided but interesting in many ways. It reflects the hopes of many Frenchmen under the Popular Front in Marxist interpretation.)

ures, the middle classes fought them bitterly and sabotaged them whenever they could. As a result, life became upset, further weakening France's political position in the growing European crisis. The aim of the Popular Front to strengthen France through domestic reorganization was counteracted by influential classes who were led by the "two hundred," the richest families of France.

In retrospect, the Popular Front should be regarded as the last important attempt to reorganize France, but it is also clear that the Blum government lacked the wholehearted support of the powerful French "dictatorship of the middle classes." Being a compromise administration, it could not oppose strongly enough those Frenchmen who preferred property to liberty. The Blum reform was by no means radical; it did nothing more than recognize conditions and tried to meet them with a minimum of disturbance. The bourgeois character of the cabinet, which did not contain a single communist member, would have prevented radicalism in any case.

The resistance against Blum's reforms opened the road for those who wished to capitalize on the discontent of the French nation. The French were split into a multitude of political parties, surpassed only by those of republican Germany. The Popular Front consisted essentially of Radical Socialists, Socialists, and Communists. The Rightists were composed, at the time of the 1936 elections, of Conservatives, the Republican Federation, Social-Action Republicans, Agrarians, the Independent Popular Action, Popular Democrats, Independent Republicans, the Democratic Alliance (a combination of the Republicans of the Left and Independent Radicals), and the Democratic Left. The names of these parties, for the most part, give no clue to their programs; the conservative parties had liberal-sounding names and the progressives were not so radical as their names would lead one to believe. The Communists were vociferous but limited in numbers and influence.

After the Blum government collapsed, its most important reforms were gradually undone by the bourgeois conservatives who again assumed power. Some of them preferred Fascism to a Popular Front, not realizing that such misjudgment would eventually bring about their own destruction. Thus ended the last major attempt to save France from disaster.

THE FRENCH STATE UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF 1875

In contrast to the American Constitution which not only outlines the form of the government of the United States but also symbolizes the political philosophy of the American people, the French Constitution dealt almost exclusively with the governmental structure of the Third Republic. Like many constitutions, it provided for an executive, a legislative branch, and a judiciary. It adopted Montesquieu's doctrine of the separation of powers of government, but it did not expressly limit the legislative powers of the chambers to amend the constitution as long as legislation was not actually unconstitutional. In other words, the laws produced by parliament were of greater practical importance than the constitutional law. Only those who opposed the republic on principle would have wanted to amend the constitution or even vote it out of existence. There were no provisions which could have legally prevented such an act, as witness the creation of the Vichy regime in 1940.

Here is a brief sketch of pre-1940 France's political organization: the president of the republic, elected by the National Assembly,¹ was a figurehead. His executive powers were purely formal. He signed laws, could theoretically dissolve the chamber, commanded the armed forces, and officially negotiated and ratified treaties with foreign powers. In practice, he would depend entirely upon the advice of his cabinet over whose official meetings he had to preside without being able to cast his vote in any decision.

The executive power of pre-1940 France was in the hands of the cabinet of ministers and the two chambers of parliament. The real—not the titular—head of government was the premier (*Président du Conseil*, president of the council of ministers). Appointed officially by the president, he, in turn, appointed the ministers of his cabinet. As in Britain, he was compelled to base his political power upon a majority backing in parliament. These ministers were mainly political appointees. The frequent and temperamental vacillations typical of the French chamber produced absolute insecurity for the cabinet. The average life of a ministry, as has been mentioned above, was a short one; the history of the Third Repub-

¹ The National Assembly was constituted when the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies convened jointly.

lic shows examples of cabinets which did not outlast a week; the majority did not last longer than half a year. The weaker the coalition of parties behind the cabinet, the more short-lived its activities. Coalitions were essential because the French parties were so numerous that no single party could ever control a majority. Moreover, the French character made the deputies rally around an opposition rather than defend the men in power. Public opinion was by no means the sole cause of ministerial insecurity.

Behind the unstable cabinets, the never-changing administration (civil service) with its *fonctionnaires* (functionaries) formed the permanent element of government. The posts were publicly advertised and filled after competitive examinations had been passed.¹ The *fonctionnaires* received tenure and consequently a maximum of economic security although their incomes were very small. But the real executive power in the Third Republic was in the hands of the two houses of the French parliament: the senate and the chamber of deputies. This structure deviated from the original ideal of unicameralism and was the result of a compromise between royalists and republicans at the time of the creation of the Constitution of 1875.² The senate was the more conservative house. Senators were elected for nine years while deputies had to repeat their campaigning every four years. Senators had to be at least forty, deputies could be elected from twenty-five years of age. Often enough, progressive laws voted in the chamber of deputies were killed in the senate. For many years the latter body remained the target of radicals who clamored for its abolition. But the senate never considered voting itself out of existence although, constitutionally, it had the right to do so.

During the Third Republic various electoral systems were in use. The system of single constituencies, changed to that of proportional representation for a time, was reinstated after 1927. This system distorted the parliamentary representation because of the unequal

¹ This automatically eliminated candidates for executive jobs whose education had not been of secondary or university level. Primary-school graduation was required for even the lowest positions. The average civil servant had a higher primary or vocationally specialized education. Thus, while equal opportunities were officially granted to candidates, their backgrounds remained decisive in their chances of appointment.

² James T. Shotwell, *Governments of Continental Europe*, R. K. Gooch, "The Government and Politics of France," The Macmillan Company, New York, 1942, p. 140.

size of constituencies. Furthermore, experience had shown that the single-member constituency system tended to perpetuate prevailing political trends even against the wish of the people on the strength of the influence of the Ministry of the Interior. The central government exercised a great deal of power in all the provinces, sometimes imitating the Second Empire's "official candidacies" by indirectly endorsing those candidates who were agreeable to the government in power.¹

As a consequence, the call for electoral reform went on for decades and climaxed in heated controversies during the last twelve years of the Third Republic when many people complained about the injustices of its electoral system without being able to change it. The fact that no reform could be achieved was the result of the practically unlimited power of a parliament which executed the will of a conservative bourgeoisie.

When the war broke out, Daladier demanded and received sweeping dictatorial powers such as no French government had ever received during the First World War. To be sure, domestically, the situation was far more precarious in 1939 than in 1914. The war was extremely unpopular. The Fascists and the Communists sabotaged it. The Communists in particular declared that they would not endorse another "imperialist" war. Russia, it will be remembered, had concluded a treaty with Germany shortly before the invasion of Poland by the Nazi army. Daladier decided to dissolve the Communist party and to permit only those of its deputies to remain in parliament who openly repudiated the Party Line. The moderate Socialists and progressive bourgeois parties had severed their relations with the Communists when the latter argued vociferously that the 1940 elections should be suspended on account of the critical situation (July, 1939).

When Daladier fell and Reynaud took over, some hopes were felt that conditions might improve, just as optimism soared when Gamelin was relieved of his command and Weygand took over. However, the poorly equipped and quickly demoralized French army was crushed by German dive bombers and tanks against which it was powerless. On June 16, 1940, the Reynaud cabinet discussed the British proposal of an integral union between Great

¹ Shotwell, *op. cit.*, pp. 143-145.

Britain and France which would merge both countries into one and grant all their subjects dual citizenship. It was the most radical and progressive suggestion yet to come from any British government. Later historians may well see in this proposal the beginning of a new era of supernational cooperation marking the end of the age of isolated nationalism. But the French did not comprehend its scope; probably not even the British realized the vast implication of this stroke of their political genius.

Unfortunately, the proposal came too late. It is not yet clear whether the French cabinet declined or whether the utmost gravity of the military situation caused the cabinet to deliberate on a possible armistice offer to Germany after hearing the report of General Weygand. By a vote of 13 to 11, the cabinet decided to send the request for the cessation of hostilities on this same day, thereby ending further debate on the British proposal. Reynaud resigned. President Lebrun called Pétain and made him Premier. Pétain had been summoned previously from his post as ambassador to Franco's government in Madrid. He was known to be reactionary, not without Fascist leanings, and imbued with a conviction of the invincibility of the German military machine.

PÉTAIN: THE END OF THE THIRD REPUBLIC

Pétain's feelings about the Third Republic were an open secret. He had never liked it. He was known to have been in favor of a compromise with imperial Germany during the latter part of the First World War. The "Defender of Verdun" was known to be an admirer of German militarism whose adaptation to France he openly advocated after he had paid a visit to Nazi Germany in 1935. He despised democracy; he resented the men who ruled France, disliked the Anglo-Saxon democracies, and opposed the separation of church and state. Thus it was only logical—though humiliating for France—that his government sent him as ambassador to Fascist Madrid after the Quay d'Orsay had recognized General Franco as the legal ruler of Spain. Sending a known reactionary with Fascist leanings to Madrid was a gesture of reconciliation not to be misunderstood.

Hence his accession to the premiership in a France that faced negotiation with Hitler was not surprising. In fact, it was to be

expected: "The arrival of Marshal Pétain was not an accident," wrote a Frenchman who used to be one of the politically best informed conservative publicists in pre-1940 France. "It had been premeditated, prepared and made possible in the course of a long series of events. Very few initiated men knew about the intrigues behind the scene. It was one of the most scientific and perfect German maneuvers which have led France to her terrible downfall, maneuvers which were the more clever and the more perfect the less it could be verified that the old soldier was an accomplice."¹

Since 1935, there had grown a tendency to build up the Marshal and predict that great political influence would emanate from him in the near future. In the same year, Pétain traveled through Germany and received the visit of Hermann Goering in his private car. Goering told him that Hitler esteemed but one man in the whole of France, the victor of Verdun. This was an insult to the French Republic but the aged Marshal, quite flattered, stated publicly that he was "very impressed." Again, after 1935, the French Fascist circles openly campaigned for Pétain; Gustave Hervé published a book demanding the premiership for the Marshal with full powers to bring about reforms. (Foch had never been accorded such political favor.) One of the practical results of this campaign was the Marshal's nomination to the Spanish ambassadorship. Shortly after the outbreak of the war, the intrigues centering around the Marshal caused M. de Kérillis to write: "Some people try hard to convince the Marshal to resign his post in Madrid and accept the leadership of a cabinet for which several notorious defeatists are slated. According to the plotters, the old Marshal would have to play a role analogous to the one of Marshal Hindenburg who opened the door to Hitler in a moment of discouragement. One must come to the conclusion that such conception could not possibly have developed in French brains."²

There is a good deal of likelihood that German fifth-column activities reached deep into French society and had affected influential circles which flirted with Nazism as a salvation from socialism and communism. In any event, the development of French

¹ Henri de Kérillis, *Français, Voici la Vérité*, Editions de la Maison Française, New York, 1942, pp. 266ff.

² Henri de Kérillis in *L'Epoque*, October 22, 1939.

totalitarianism showed many analogies with the history of the Nazi advent to power. Pétain followed the legal road toward the liquidation of the republican Constitution of 1875 exactly as Hitler had proceeded legally in 1933. Since the introduction of permanent decree laws appeared to be unconstitutional, the National Assembly was convoked and granted the Marshal the right to rule by decree. Parliament voted for the convocation of the Assembly almost unanimously; the communists had been ousted and were absent. The memorable days of July 10 and 11, 1940, witnessed the abdication of the French chambers which consented to the transfer of dictatorial powers to the Chief of State, Pétain, and, at the same time permitted the repeal of the Constitution of 1875. The dazed French parliamentarians, long undermined in their national morale, faced with a military catastrophe without precedent and an extremely harsh armistice imposed upon France by Hitler, obediently committed political suicide.

The long-ailing Third Republic had at long last passed away. Another political intermezzo began, the grimmest in French history.

18 France Under Semi-Fascism

THE VICHY STATE

With the abolition of the Constitution of 1875, the structure of French government changed radically. Pétain took over both the presidency and the premiership—a striking parallel with Hitler who did the same after Hindenburg's death. The motivation of the Marshal's proposal for a change of government from parliamentarianism to totalitarianism, adopted on July 10, 1940, was clearly brought out in a "Preamble" outlining the political and social basis of his projected state. "At the most cruel moment in its history, France must understand and accept the necessity of a national revolution. It must see in it the condition on which its present safety and its future security depend."¹ Hence Pétain turned to the chambers so that they might "render possible, by a solemn act characteristic of republican law and order, this immense effort." What, then, did he demand of the dying chambers?

In the first place, the government was to be given *full powers* in order to be able to "save what ought to be saved," to "destroy what ought to be destroyed," and to "construct what ought to be constructed." The government was to "restore to the State its sovereignty and to the governmental power its independence." It was promised that the government would secure "the collaboration of a national representation," one of the many enigmatic phrases which distinguish this strange document. The government would abolish "abuses and routine." Its power, "freed from the pressure by oligarchies," would be used to reconstruct the country "with strictest equity."

In the second place, *national instruction and the protection of the family* was to be reorganized. The "intellectual and moral degeneration" had to be fought to improve the birth rate and to protect

¹ Preamble of the Government Resolution Intended to Amend the Constitution of 1875 (*exposé des motifs*), July 10, 1940, quoted by R. K. Gooch, *The French Counter-Revolution of 1940: The Pétain Government and the Vichy Regime*, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1940, pp. 4, 5.

the family. Then followed an interesting interpretation of the significance and role of the state. The government, according to Pétain, "well knows that social groups, families, professions, communes and regions exist prior to the State. The State is only the general organ of national consolidation and of unity. It ought not, therefore, to encroach upon the legitimate activities; but it will subordinate them to the general interest and to the common good. It will control them and will protect them."¹ Very subtly, the power of the state was ascribed to society whose "interest" the state promised to represent. It was not mentioned that the government would determine for this society what the common good should entail. Soon enough it became clear that the government—that is, Pétain—desired a modernized guild system, resembling the Fascist corporativism, in order to create a social hierarchy with representation for the professions and vocations under the supervision of an all-powerful state.

Finally, a new *continental economy* and a new conception of *justice and a scale of new values* was proposed. In the economic field, Pétain accepted Hitler's desire that France, in a Nazi-dominated Europe, should remain predominantly agricultural. The remnants of its industry were to return to "quality production," which meant that the French could not compete with any standardized mass production nor could they hope to restore their big industry. A "rationalization" of production was to be brought about specifically through corporative institutions. Such a new economic order was to produce a new social order. "One aristocracy alone will be recognized—that of intelligence; one of merit alone—work."²

The Preamble presented the motivation for the following law:

The National Assembly grants all power to the Government of the Republic, under the authority and the signature of Marshal Pétain, with a view to promulgation, through one or more acts, of a new constitution of the French State. This constitution shall guarantee the rights of work, family, and native country.³

This constitutional law gave Pétain the power to decree whatever

¹ Loc. cit.

² Loc. cit.

³ Constitutional Law of July 10, 1940, promulgated in Vichy. Note that liberty, equality, fraternity were now replaced by work, family, country.

statutes he desired to promulgate. Since it was approved by both chambers, it has to be considered entirely legal. The French parliament, under the impact of catastrophic events, granted Pétain the right of ruling by decree law; the Constitutional Law of July 10, 1940, was analogous to the German "Enabling Act" of 1933. In both cases, parliament transferred all its powers to a totalitarian government headed by a dictator. The actual revolution, from a legal standpoint, began when the National Assembly, "instead of itself adopting the substantive constitutional changes . . . disregarded its proper constitutional function and turned over the entire *pouvoir constituant* to the Pétain cabinet—in effect to Marshal Pétain himself."¹

Pétain, after having received the right to rule by decree law, began to proclaim a series of "Constitutional Acts." From the political point of view, the first three were the most important. Act 1 repealed Article 2 of the French Constitution of 1875 pertaining to the presidency; the marshal elevated himself to the position of "Chief of the French State" (corresponding to Hitler's title of *Reichsfuehrer*). Act 2 defined the chief's plenary governmental powers, giving him complete control of the entire French state. He could, from then on, appoint and dismiss all ministers and secretaries of state who, as in Nazi-Fascist practice, were responsible to him alone and not to parliament. He could in ministerial council exercise legislative power, until the formation of a new assembly, and even afterwards in case of emergency. He could promulgate laws and enforce them; fill any important military and civil position; command the armed forces; decide on fiscal and budgetary measures; have foreign envoys accredited to him alone; decree martial law; and negotiate and ratify treaties. The only right not accorded to him was the right to declare war without previous assent of the legislative assemblies.

Act 3 was perhaps the most significant of all. It stated that the two chambers "shall continue to exist until there shall have been formed the assemblies provided for by the Constitutional Law of July 10, 1940." Moreover, "the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies shall be adjourned until further order. They shall hereafter be

¹ Frederic Austin Ogg, *The Rise of Dictatorship in France*, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1941, p. 18.

convened only on call of the Head of State.”¹ Any articles in the old constitution which were contrary to these three acts were to be repealed. A new constitution for postwar times was promised by Pétain in a radio broadcast of March 19, 1941. As a temporary measure, a so-called National Council was organized (January, 1941), consisting of 188 carefully picked representatives of various professions and vocations, whose task it was to discuss matters submitted to them by the chief of state. No former parliamentarians were included. Forty members of this Council constituted themselves as a committee for the purpose of “reorganizing” parties—with the exception of the Communist Party. It is obvious that this “reorganization” was a step toward the realization of the ideal of the Pétain dictatorship, a one-party system, with a minimum of disturbance. The more rabid French Fascists tried to reach the goal of a one-party system with Gestapo methods of persuasion: brutal force, torture, and murder. They founded the “French Popular Party” along Nazi lines.

Clearly, this organization of the Vichy state was regarded by the people as temporary. The Pétain government realized from the beginning that the progress and outcome of the war would decide the eventual fate of its constitutional experiment. Within one year of parliament’s grant of dictatorial power to Pétain to preserve as much of France as was humanly possible, the respect of the people for the aged Marshal began to wane. His weakness in the face of the intrigues of Pierre Laval, Admiral Darlan, the followers of Doriot, and similar Fascists; his compliance with never-ending German demands, shattered the foundation on which Pétain had hoped to rebuild the internal structure of the nation. Laval, first declared successor to the Marshal, then ousted but eventually reinstated, under heavy German pressure, went farther in accepting Nazi rule than Pétain had ever dared. The Chief of State remained silent even when Laval collaborated with the Germans in conscripting French labor to work in German factories. In the end, the Marshal became a powerless figurehead, unable to cope with the Fascist radicals who wanted to develop authoritarianism into a full-fledged totalitarianism of Nazi character.

¹ The translation used here and on previous pages is that given by R. K. Gooch, *op. cit.*, pp. 7, 8.

In the pursuit of absolute power for the state, both employers' and employees' associations were suppressed. The French Labor Unions were dissolved and the powerful industrial groups such as the *Comité des Forges*, which had influenced the country's political fortunes for many years and must be regarded as the most guilty groups contributing to France's downfall, were gradually deprived of their standing and finally crowded out by German industrial and banking interests.

The role of the Catholic Church during the life of the Third Republic had been one of subdued opposition; it now found itself confronted with a government which offered some material restitution as well as the promise to reintroduce compulsory religious instruction in French state schools. Hoping for an eventual end of the separation between state and church in all matters of education and social policy, the church now looked to Pétain with great hopes for its political renaissance in France.

The leaders of the Pétain government frankly recognized that they ruled without the people's endorsement. In fact, they admitted that they had to work against the people's will. No doubt, Vichy became increasingly nazified the longer it stayed in power. In a radio broadcast of August 12, 1941, dealing with the apparent unrest of the French people who showed dissatisfaction with the "collaborationist" Vichy regime, Marshal Pétain announced the following principles of his policy:

1. Activity of political parties and groups of political origin is suspended until further notice in the unoccupied zone. These parties may no longer hold either public or private meetings. They must cease any distribution of tracts or notices. Those that fail to conform to these decisions will be dissolved.

2. Payment of members of Parliament is suppressed as of September 30.

3. The first disciplinary sanctions against State officials guilty of false declarations regarding membership in secret societies has been ordered. The names of officials have been published this morning in the *Journal Officiel*. Holders of high Masonic degrees—of which the first list has just been published—may no longer exercise any public function.

4. The Legion of War Veterans remains the best instrument in the free zone of the National Revolution. But it is able to carry out its civil task only by remaining in all ranks subordinate to the Government.

5. I will double the means of police action, whose discipline and loyalty should guarantee public order.

6. A group of Commissars of Public Power is created. These high officials will be charged with studying the spirit in which the laws, decrees, orders, and instructions of the central power will be carried out. They will have the mission of ferreting out and destroying obstacles which abuse of the rules of administrative routine or activity of secret societies can oppose to the work of National Revolution.

7. Powers of regional prefects, the first units of those who will be Governors of provinces in the France of tomorrow, will be reenforced. Their power, so far as the central administration is concerned, is increased. Their authority over all heads of local services is direct and complete.

8. The labor charter designed to regulate, according to the principles of my St. Etienne speech, relations among workers, artisans, technicians, and employers in an agreement reached with mutual understanding, has resulted in a solemn accord. It will be published shortly.

9. The provisional statute of economic organization will be revamped on a basis of reorganization of committees with larger representation of small industry and artisans, with revision of their financial administration and their relations with provincial arbitration organisms.

10. The powers, role, and organization of the National Food Supply Bureau will be modified according to means which, safeguarding the interests of consumers, permit the authority of the State to make itself felt at the same time on a national and regional basis.

11. I have decided to use the powers given me by Constitutional Act No. 7 to judge those responsible for our disaster. A Council of Justice is created to that effect. It will submit its reports before October 15.

12. In the application of this same Constitutional Act, all Ministers and high officials must swear an oath of fealty to me and engage themselves to carry out duties in their charge for the well-being of the State according to the rules of honor and propriety.¹

These twelve points meant nothing less than the elimination of the last vestiges of civil rights. They constituted the final step toward the liquidation of political parties, the destruction of the chambers, the prohibition of belonging to any order or lodge not endorsed by the regime, the shifting of responsibility to those formerly in power, the preparation of Fascist labor laws, and the concentration of power in the Chief of State.

Comparing these principles with the basic legislation of the

¹ Pétain's broadcast to the French people of August 12, 1941, published in *International Conciliation*, September, 1941, No. 372, pp. 597ff.

Vichy state, one can easily recognize the growth of totalitarianism in France during the first year of the existence of the new regime. The second year, ending with Laval in power, proved conclusively that Vichy had staked its future upon an Axis victory and had arranged its policies accordingly. After two years, the people lost confidence and began looking anxiously to the growing power of America and Britain. To a large extent, the actions of the Vichy regime were dictated by the fact, taking precedence over all others, that Germany was the conqueror and in a position to enforce her will, as Pétain himself explained. But there was, in addition, a whole series of measures which had their origin, not in German pressure and exactions, but in the firm conviction that the France of the Third Republic had been a decadent society which must be restored to an earlier and sounder outlook. Some—patriotic Frenchmen according to their own lights—went so far as to see in the collapse a divinely ordained punishment for the errors of former ways and sincerely believed that out of defeat and atonement would emerge a renovated nation. Such views were those of a minority, but this minority was strongly represented in the Vichy regime. Pétain himself probably shared this outlook.

To effect this renovation, it was essential to enact a thoroughgoing reform of the educational system in order to inculcate the proper outlook into the rising generation. It will be interesting to examine how far the educational reforms followed the Nazi-Fascist example.

VICHY EDUCATION AND INDOCTRINATION

The fundamental philosophy and the organization of the French educational system had changed little throughout the past century. Primary schools more or less followed the outline worked out by Guizot, education minister in 1833, and secondary education remained under the influence of Napoleon's ideas.

Some headway toward greater democracy in education was made after the last war. The *Compagnons de l'Université Nouvelle*, a group of educators and writers, agitated for the establishment of the *école unique* which was to do away with the sharp distinction between elementary and secondary schools and was to assure the children of the masses access to the more advanced forms of edu-

cation. In 1925 a common school for all children up to the age of eleven was created by law which meant the abolition of the special preparatory classes, in which the children of the bourgeoisie had received their education. At the same time it was voted to abolish fees in the secondary schools and to increase the number of state scholarships for gifted pupils. While classical studies continued to form the backbone of all secondary education, a "modern" course was developed which stressed the sciences and modern languages. These reforms were continued in the thirties by Jean Zay who tried to improve the quality of the vocational schools so as to make their curriculums more attractive and equivalent to the curriculums of the secondary schools (*lycée* and *collège*) which prepared for the universities and the *Grandes Ecoles*. He also introduced psychological experiments in the form of special classes *d'orientation* for children aged eleven or older to help parents, teachers, and pupils to determine the students' best talents and capacities. The Popular Front went further in proposing that maintenance grants be offered to poor parents in order to permit them to have their gifted children continue in school instead of helping on farms or in the shops. This proposal never became law.

The Vichy regime showed little sympathy for these reforms and has done its best to undo them. Explaining the reasons for France's defeat, the Pétain government declared that the poor moral conditions in France were a consequence of the French educational system and particularly of the recent reforms. It was not considered beneficial to offer too much learning indiscriminately to all French youth. It was contended that too much "theoretical" and "encyclopedic" knowledge was not the best preparation for life. Consequently, the Vichy regime stressed manual training, sports, and moral, civic, and patriotic indoctrination. Classical culture and "speculative learning" were to be reserved for the few. In this connection it is significant to note that one of the first decrees of the Vichy regime reintroduced fees in all secondary schools.

As has already been mentioned, Pétain himself advocated a "spiritualization" of the schools. However, the attempt to make religious instruction a required subject aroused so much opposition that the Education Ministry decided not to incorporate religion in the curriculum for the time being and to permit religious classes

to assemble outside the school buildings only. A report confirmed that references to God were removed from all curriculums and were replaced by "spiritual values" and "Christian civilization."¹ A deeply rooted tradition of anticlericalism could not be forgotten quickly by the French. Nevertheless, private Catholic schools, the work of which had been severely impeded by the Third Republic, were soon encouraged and received certain hidden state subsidies.

The Vichy regime did not make any changes in the nursery schools, the *écoles maternelles*, which existed mainly for preschool children of working-class families and for those whose parents were too poor to take proper care of them before they began to attend school. In its reform proposals, the government stated that there would not be much change in primary education.² Pupils of the primary division continued along familiar lines, in general, until the age of twelve or thirteen when they took the examination for the *Certificat d'Etudes Primaires* (certificate of primary studies). The year during which they prepared for this examination was the first of a series of four years of study which constituted either the *enseignement primaire supérieur* or the *enseignement moderne* (higher primary education or modern education). Pupils could either give up their studies after receiving the C.E.P. or continue with higher primary education. This primary division was dedicated entirely to practical training to the exclusion of the classical languages.

Like the German secondary "special" form, the classical gymnasium, the secondary level of Vichy France's education was devoted to classical studies exclusively. Beginning with the *sixième* class (children aged eleven or twelve), Latin was made compulsory. Greek, too, became a compulsory part of the curriculum; no secondary-school student was permitted to skip the classical languages whatever the final aim of his studies might be. To pass the *baccalauréat*, a very difficult examination preceding graduation, the student had to take two examinations. The first was held one year before the end of his course. If he passed, he could decide whether

¹ See G. H. Archambault, "Coeducation Ban Decreed by Vichy," *The New York Times*, September 3, 1941.

² The French education *primaire* does not correspond with American elementary education. There were in France two different types of education, *primaire* and *secondaire*, each of which had its own elementary schooling.

to major in classics of science for his second *baccalauréat*. Those students who did not want to study classical languages had but one choice, the higher primary course which did not permit them to go to the university. Only very few extraordinarily gifted students of the higher primary course could be transferred to classes which did not offer classical languages but corresponded to the last two years of the secondary course. In isolated cases, such students were permitted to take the *baccalauréat* and enter the university.

These features did not show any important deviation from the system in use for many years. The government did, however, endeavor to introduce more sports which had been badly neglected in French schools. A training schedule was worked out by Jean Borotra, former tennis champion, incorporating the following types of physical instruction in the general education: (1) general physical training; (2) sports and games; (3) various activities of general educational value—whatever that meant. The primary curriculums had to devote nine hours weekly to physical training; the universities three half days. Medical checkups were to be made at regular intervals.

The new program for "moral teaching" which the former Vichy education minister, Georges Ripert, decreed for both elementary and secondary schools is of particular interest. Subjects to be discussed in elementary schools were, for example, "the duties of the pupils toward their neighbors; respect for family and country; respect for thoughts of others and various religious beliefs."¹ If these suggestions had been followed without Fascist bias, they might have accomplished some good for many young French people who had become cynical and nihilistic.

Moral teaching, of course, was not to be limited to matters of conduct and work. It could be extended to any subject with the definite purpose of political indoctrination. According to reports, history was one of the first subjects to be "revised" by the Vichy government. Professors were asked

to insist on the continuity of the effort which has been made through centuries to construct, maintain, and rebuild France. Too often political passion takes from the historian the impartiality which is needed to

¹ Associated Press dispatch from Vichy, March 12, 1941.

judge the work accomplished under a very different political regime. . . . Too often nowadays there is a tendency to believe that the civilizing work of France began only yesterday and is bound to a certain policy or philosophy. We must have a more liberal conception of history. If one cannot insist too much on the importance which the Great Revolution of 1789 means to our country, it is not necessary to represent it as breaking completely with the entire past and still less to believe that before 1789 France had not yet possessed a great influence in the world.¹

This was indeed a subtle way of arriving at a new interpretation of prerevolutionary absolutism. No history teacher would have seriously denied the importance of France under the kings, nor had there been any tendency to belittle the significance of earlier events. What was desired, no doubt, was less emphasis on the Revolution and more on an authoritarian France which ignored the Rights of Man. This shift was called a "liberalization" of history teaching. As the collaborationist tendencies gained momentum, further restriction of objective presentation of subject matter was to be expected, and not only in history. It is known how the children of occupied France, Belgium, and Holland, to mention only some of the German-occupied countries, experienced the Nazi conception of "learning." After France became German-controlled in both military and political respects, Nazi indoctrination, adapted to the French mind, doubtless colored French history and moral teaching considerably.

By far the most drastic change in the Vichy educational plan was the abolition of the normal schools that had been honored training institutions for primary-school teachers ever since the Revolution. They have often been held to scorn, out of a condescending attitude toward them on the part of those who had attended the lycées, as engendering the *esprit primaire*, taken to mean a narrow, provincial type of outlook. In pre-Vichy France, access to these schools was through the higher primary schools, frequented by the children of the people. In this way, the primary schools were assured of teachers who themselves were close to the needs and aspirations of the masses. Many of them showed marked left-wing tendencies, which made them unacceptable to the men of Vichy. This may be the reason why since 1942, no student without the *baccalauréat* was permitted to teach. After

¹ John Elliott, report in the New York Herald Tribune of October 20, 1940.

having passed this examination, two or three years of additional study, in the candidate's chosen field, were required. Candidates could be either secondary-school students or graduates of the higher primary school who have been transferred to the secondary level for the last two years leading up to the *baccalauréat*.

This revision was not altogether an invention of Vichy. It had been foreshadowed in the reform promulgated in 1939. At that time it was also decreed that the *baccalauréat* was to be compulsory for all future elementary-school teachers and that future secondary-school teachers would have to have a regular university training. However, there is a fundamental difference. The 1939 reform was meant to enhance the position of teachers and—by way of the *école unique*—further to open access to the higher studies to the sons and daughters of the lower classes. The Vichy reform, coming on top of the re-introduction of fees in secondary schools, was designed to reduce, within the French schools, the influence of the low-born with their subversive ideas.

The over-all picture of education under Vichy authoritarianism is one reflecting its transitional character. It accentuated the out-moded tradition of intellectual selection, and eliminated most of the gains toward a more democratic system of education made during the last twenty years of the Third Republic.

The organization of youth movements along totalitarian lines constituted a much more radical departure from precedent. The outline of the Vichy-sponsored youth movements was not so clear and definite as that of other totalitarian or semitotalitarian countries, but the trends toward authoritarian indoctrination and regimentation were easily visible.

YOUTH MOVEMENTS AND LABOR CAMPS

There existed a number of voluntary youth organization in pre-Vichy France, mainly of Catholic origin. The most important were the scouts (five major groups) and the Catholic Association of French Youth (also comprising five divisions). In addition, there were groups with specialized interests in sports, politics, and youth hostels. It is estimated that about one-seventh of all French male adolescents were enrolled in these groups. After the "national revolution" of 1940 the political youth organizations of left-wing tend-

encies were forbidden; all other organizations were brought under the control of a special director of youth activities within the Ministry of Education. In spite of this attempt at centralized regimentation most of the old established movements, such as the scouts, suffered little, presumably because of their Catholic nature. One may well believe reports that the vast majority of the members of these organizations were not pro-Vichy and certainly not collaborationist, much as the Vichy government tried to sway them to its point of view.

Two new youth groups were founded after the advent of the Pétain government. The first, *Compagnons de France*, was organized in 1940. Their political attitude did not automatically reflect Vichy policies. While sponsored by the Pétain regime, they were not collaborationist. The second was Fascist in character and inclination, influenced by the tendencies of Jaques Doriot, one of France's most radical Nazis. Of its two branches, one was called the *Jeunesse de France d'Outre Mer*, and the other, the smaller, the *Jeunesse Populaire Française*. Little became known about these movements except that they copied the tactics of Nazi storm troopers and Fascist squads. They were armed and aimed to destroy everything associated with the France of yesterday. Apparently even the government was somewhat afraid of them, because they imitated the tactics of the Hitler Youth very closely, getting all the support they needed from the Germans in the former occupied zone where they built their strongholds.

The *Compagnons de France* was a noncompulsory movement of young men between sixteen and twenty who wished to take an active part in the reconstruction of France. The *Compagnons* afforded those who for any reason did not become members of any other youth organization an opportunity to join the ranks of young France. Their rallying cry was "France," their motto, "United to serve," and their oath: "I put myself at the service of France and promise to obey my chiefs and perform the work of the *Compagnons*." In the official language of Vichy, this organization was considered as "carrying a common faith in France." The *Compagnons* "will endeavor in every possible way to revive abandoned or dying villages, to clear wastelands, to assist refugees. Their

mission is one of peace, order, and reconstruction. . . . They want their work to be hardy and invigorating. They want to toughen youths and to give them a taste of hard life. The *Compagnons* are itinerants, traveling around to set up their work or simply to know their country better."¹ Their ethical objectives were to fight the oppression of the weak, general selfishness, slovenliness, the exaggeration of the importance of comfort and money, and the indifference to the country's best interests. To reach these ends, the *Compagnons* were held to the following: respect for each individual, sense of the community, discipline and good behavior, service through work, physical exercises and outdoor life, and discovery of France.

Evidently this program was vastly different from the military setup of the Nazi-Fascist youth movements. In theory, each boy was to be treated as an individual and not as a cog of a gigantic machine; the family retained its importance and, in consequence, the organization could not interrupt family life as was customary in Germany and Italy or in the Soviet Union. To learn altruism and cooperative behavior is necessary for French youth who need more discipline and physical training. Not much could be held against the group, particularly since it was officially claimed that the *Compagnons* were not supposed to be a pseudomilitary, political, or religious movement. They also differed from the scouts and they could definitely not be likened to any Hitlerian, Fascist, or Phalangist organization—according to Vichy assurances.

In addition to the duty of assisting in France's reconstruction, the *Compagnons* were to fight against routine, alcoholism, and venereal diseases. They were to prepare themselves for vocations in specialized workshops of the *Compagnies de Chantiers* which were of industrial, commercial, and agricultural character. According to Vichy claims in 1941, there were 288 workshops for 13 different vocations.²

That the glowing accounts of the Vichy government about the *Compagnons* were exaggerated seems to be pretty well established. In 1942, the organization counted not more than about thirty

¹ Official information released by the Vichy government on August 21, 1940.

² *L'Espoir Français*, a Vichy youth organ, October 10, 1941, p. 11.

thousand members in the whole of France and her dependencies which is all the more remarkable as the upper age limit for membership was extended to thirty-five.¹

Perhaps the most profitable aspect of Vichy French youth movements was the stress on vocational training and practical work for the common good. In particular, the organization of the *Chantiers de la Jeunesse*, though noncompulsory, was set up in January, 1941, probably following the example of German labor camps. Work was the ideal of this movement; but civic training remained an essential part of the vocational instruction and practical assignments.

The objective of the *Chantiers* was fourfold. First, they tried to teach young Frenchmen a consciousness of their duty toward the country. Second, they showed them how to collaborate with each other without class distinction in order to accomplish a common objective. Third, they aimed at achieving a material and moral rebirth of the country. Fourth, they wanted to avoid, by means of an intelligent public-works program, an accumulation of unemployed.

Although discipline was strict, there was an effort to avoid the atmosphere of the barracks. While the camps were not supposed to be "monasteries," the young people were to consider themselves members of a social structure in which problems of the hour demanded voluntary subordination to the needs of community and country. In addition to work and civic training, in order to avoid "mental laziness," intellectual pursuits were not to be altogether neglected. Physical education, too, was to be part of the program. Medical examinations for admission were strict.


The whole organization was built up to give young people a new feeling of hope and solidarity, thus helping to reconstruct the country through work and a high morale. The *Chantiers* were open to young men who had not yet been called to the colors as well as to those inducted before the armistice. As a permanent institution, the *Chantiers* were to take the place of military service.

The program of the *Chantiers* was basically sound in view of the situation in which France found herself after the conclusion of the armistice. The difficult question is whether these organizations were led in the vigorous manner of traditional French schools

¹ In January, 1944, the *Compagnons* were dissolved, probably on German orders.

—in which discipline was always important—or whether the Vichy authorities tried to transform the *Chantiers* into Labor Camps of German character.

According to reports from Vichy, the *Chantiers* were organized along the following lines:



Among the work projects of the *Chantiers* were the production of charcoal, rebuilding of roads, reforestation and the cultivation of waste land, and many types of agricultural work such as harvesting and fruit picking. Each workshop was permitted to develop independently; its newly created traditions were transmitted from the older members, the *anciens*, to newcomers, the *nouveaux*. Before the complete German occupation of France in November, 1942, the *Chantiers* must have been one of the few groups to which a certain individuality was still permitted.¹

Quite different were the *Ecoles de Cadres* in which future leaders for youth organizations were trained. These schools were or-

¹ *L'Espoir Français*, Vichy, October 10, 1941, p. 31.

ganized, in the words of Vichy, to form a numerous élite of adolescents who were sincerely and profoundly imbued with the spirit of the National Revolution. The young people were to be made "ardent propagandists and intelligent promoters of the doctrine of the Marshal."¹

Some information on how these theories were put into practice may be gathered from the account of an eighteen-year-old boy who was enrolled for some months at one of these leader schools in 1942. Of ninety students enrolled in the course only thirty-five were able to complete it. Extremely heavy work and marching for many miles formed the nucleus of the curriculum from the beginning. Lectures stressed hero worship, the center of which was Hitler and Pétain. The healthy influence of Nazi Germany was emphasized repeatedly. Education for death was fostered by compelling the students to lecture and write essays on topics like "What is it you would give your life for?", or "To die for one's chief," or "What sort of death do you prefer?" and "At what age do you want to die?". Political indoctrination was only overshadowed by physical work.²

Obviously, these *Ecoles de Cadres* were patterned on Nazi models. While not too much weight can be given to the report of an eighteen-year-old refugee, the character of these schools may well be as described for it conformed to what we know of Nazi youth training which the Vichy Fascists no doubt sought to imitate.

VICHY CORPORATISM

Nothing can better illustrate the tendency of the Vichy state toward a totalitarian control over its entire political and economic organization than the French Labor Charter, issued by Pétain on October 4, 1941. It was designed to control and keep in discipline all vocations and professions by putting representatives of twenty-five basic "professional families" under direct supervision of the Superior Council of the Labor Charter.

There were five different types of representatives: employers, workers, white-collar workers, foremen, and technicians. Outlawing trade unions and strikes, the various local, regional, and national

¹ *Ibid.* p. 13.

² *Pour La Victoire*, French language weekly, New York, October 17, 1942.

corporations were to form committees, consisting of employers and employees, to work out collective contracts and to fix minimum wages. Labor courts were established to take care of differences of opinion, resembling those in Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy.

It is significant that special corporate organizations were created for agriculture and industry in both of which the German government was particularly interested and which may actually have been established at German suggestion. In agriculture, corporatism was to replace former agricultural societies; in industry, such formerly powerful organizations as the *Comité des Forges* or the *Confédération Générale de la Production Française*, had already been dissolved and were now replaced by sixty committees, each committee representing a specialized industry.¹

There can hardly be a doubt as to the use of these organizations for purposes of suppressing both labor and management. Highly colored reports from Vichy France stressed the smooth functioning of labor-employer relations and word reached the outside world that unwilling French labor was trying to use the organization for keeping its ranks intact for the time when the liberation would come. Whether France, or, for that matter, any other country, will make use of the better features of corporatism, especially the collaboration between employers and employees or the establishment of corporate representation on behalf of certain vocations and professions, remains open to question. As a characterization of the Vichy state, the establishment of corporations and of a labor charter after Nazi-Fascist examples is significant, testifying to Pétain's leaning toward Fascism along German-Italian lines.

VICHY SOCIAL AND POLITICAL TRENDS

The attitude of the French people toward the Vichy government became clear soon after Pétain's investiture. At the beginning, the nation was so stunned by the extent of its defeat that the arrival of the Marshal was greeted as the only way to solve the most urgent problems. Forgotten was the political past of the aged man which had not pleased most Frenchmen in prewar years. He was now the

¹ For details of the French Labor Charter and the organization of corporations, see Shepard B. Clough, "The House that Pétain Built," in *Political Science Quarterly*, New York, March, 1944.

"grandfather" of the nation just as Gaston Doumergue had been, a few years before, in a less dangerous crisis. Pétain's age did not matter, for the conservative caste of French society has always put a premium on age in political leadership.

During the first months following the military catastrophe, most Frenchmen believed that Pétain would put up at least passive resistance. People thought that "he is lying to the Germans, double-crossing them in order to gain time to fight again if some day a miracle makes that possible."¹ During this period, most French people doubted that a complete German victory could be prevented. Meanwhile, Pétain's policy was one of resignation. Naively hoping for chivalry on the part of the victors, he tried to minimize France's suffering through appeasement. Laval and his group, however, attempted quite openly to make France national-socialist while Hitler himself, contemptuous of "inferior" France, went about exploiting her. French economy was gradually taken over by the Germans; French prisoners of war were not returned and additional man power was recruited for labor in the Reich.

Gradually, Pétain's political importance vanished. It died almost completely after he was compelled to recall Laval whom he had discarded in the beginning, fearing that the shrewd auvergnat would interfere with his wait-and-see policy. Laval's attempt to negotiate a Franco-German peace had revealed his true colors and his desire to follow German "suggestions."

Until the Germans forced the reinstatement of Laval in 1942, Pétain sought to rule "unoccupied" France with the help of men like Flandin and Darlan. Probably Vichy wanted to avoid the imposition by the Germans of the rule of French Nazis like Déat or Doriot. Some months later, the aged Marshal stated that Laval had won his entire confidence "not only by his words, but by his deeds. There is no longer the slightest difference between us. . . . When Laval speaks it is in agreement with me. . . ." Laval, however, stated a few days later: "I wish for a German victory."² He certainly did his utmost, from this time on, to help the German

¹ André Philip, "Inside France: The Conquered Stir," *The New York Times Magazine*, November 1, 1942.

² Léon Marchal, *Vichy, Two Years of Deception*, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1943, p. 205.

war effort, particularly by sending French workers to Germany. Pétain had become a figurehead, tottering toward his grave, concluding ingloriously an otherwise brilliant career. "Pétain means Verdun and Verdun means resistance to the last," the French people had said when he took over after the disaster had happened. But he betrayed the people's confidence just as Hindenburg did. Both men, after great military careers, wanted to save their countries; both tried to do it by dealing with the devil. Both lost and thereby jeopardized their good name before the judgment of history.

The majority of the French people resisted passively both the seductions and threats of the Nazi cliques. A number of famous people in the world of arts and letters succumbed to German flattery; certain groups tried to outnazi the Nazis, and a few traitors helped the cause of Hitler and Laval. For example, the former labor leader René Bélin, accepting the post of labor minister in the Pétain government, dissolved the trade unions. But the masses of the people did not give up. As the lower middle classes lost their economic status, many of them joined the workers. The French underground developed rapidly with the growth of disillusionment about the Pétain-Laval regime; it grew stronger still after the Germans occupied the whole of France.

The underground was first organized in various groups built around illegal newspapers such as *Combat*, *Libération*, *Franc-Tireur*, *Le Populaire*, *La Quatrième République*, 1793, and others.¹ Despite heavy Nazi and Vichy pressure and an increasing use of terror by the Germans, these groups became gradually coordinated. Their strongest fighter units called themselves *Les Hommes du Maquis*, or simply *Maquis*. According to a statement of General de Gaulle made in London, on May 27, 1942, the leaders of these fighting groups were, for the most part, new men who had never before been politically important. They greatly contributed to the liberation of France by coordinating their activities with the invading Allied armies.

Needless to say, Laval, emulating Nazi example, introduced Gestapo methods in France: brutal "coordination," labor con-

¹ André Philip, *loc. cit.*

scription mainly for service in Germany, strict censorship of the radio, press, and motion pictures, and a total suppression of civil rights.

THE DE GAULLIST MOVEMENT

Apart from the underground opposition in France proper, there remained a positive source of spiritual strength and hope emanating from the Free French Committee under the leadership of General Charles de Gaulle with headquarters first in London and then in Algiers. In 1942, the name of this organization became "French National Committee of Liberation" and in 1944 it assumed the title of "Provisional Government of the French Republic."

Many observers have wondered why so few French leaders attempted to flee from France to organize resistance from the outside. The answer is probably that they did not realize the nature and extent of France's defeat and that they misjudged the political and ideological nature of their enemy. Also a good many felt that the war was definitely lost and that their place, in that event, was at home. Among the few far-sighted men who refused to give up hope was General de Gaulle, the officer whom the French war ministry overruled when he called for a complete mechanization of the army and an increased air force. When France collapsed, he left for London in order to organize French resistance and to represent France in the continued Allied war effort, thus ensuring his country a voice in a future peace settlement.

Politically, General de Gaulle has never been a liberal. He has never concealed this fact but he has promised that he would not impose his political ideas upon a liberated France. "Once the enemy is driven from their land, all French men and women will elect a National Assembly which will decide in full exercise of its sovereignty what course the future of the country shall take," he stated in a declaration on policy on June 24, 1942. In subsequent years, when de Gaulle forces strove to create a provisional government, this policy was somewhat changed. The National Committee sought recognition by the great powers because it desired to take over the reins of government immediately upon liberation and had in mind ruling France until the danger of civil war should pass, whereupon general elections are to be held.

However, Britain and the United States did not consent until July, 1944, to grant the National Committee limited recognition as the provisional government of France; they insisted that it should remain up to the French people from the very beginning to choose their own government. General Eisenhower, commander-in-chief of the Allied armies, was to have the power of decision so long as France remained a theater of operations.

Of the great Allied nations, the Soviet Union was first to grant the de Gaulle group recognition and actually accredited an ambassador to the Free French. Until 1944, indirect recognition of the National Committee as the only representative group was implied when conquered French colonial territories, originally under Vichy domination, were subsequently administered by both the British and the Free French. Subsidies were also put at the disposal of the Committee whose president remained Charles de Gaulle for all parts of the French Empire.

According to him, the "Fighting French are of no party; they include all parties, all opinions who are agreed on one question: the liberation of France. But that is far from meaning that Fighting France should be purely and simply limited to a military framework." (Interview of May 27, 1942.) The de Gaullist movement, while predominantly military, has tried since its inception to "enlist the French people in the war," an aim which is obviously both military and political. The Free French, or as they have called themselves since July 13, 1942, the "Fighting French," did not claim to represent the whole of France in its political and social aspects. But they looked upon themselves as the trustees of their country. They did not earn this right merely by fleeing France, but by actual participation in fighting the war on all fronts.

In one of his first important statements of policy, de Gaulle expressed his point of view in the following words:

We want France to recover everything that belongs to her. For us, the end of the war means restoration both of complete integrity to our home country, the empire and the French heritage, and of the nation's absolute sovereignty over her own destinies. . . . As we mean to make France once again sole mistress in her own house, so we shall see to it that the French people be their own and sole masters. . . .¹

¹ Declaration of Policy, June 24, 1942.

The fact that France cannot be rebuilt without being incorporated into a new world organization has also been recognized by de Gaulle. He stated:

We want this war which similarly affects the destiny of all peoples and has united the democracies in one and the same effort, to result in a world organization establishing lasting solidarity and mutual help between the nations in every sphere. . . .¹

Such language, coming from a man whose former political affiliations are known to be conservative, is highly significant. For de Gaulle, like all his followers, does not believe that the political system which ruled pre-Vichy France can ever be used again. The old parliament can never come back. It surrendered to Pétain—a fact which will not be forgotten. Those leaders of France's economy who sold out to Germany will never be allowed to resume their former position. Postwar France is certain to show a considerable change in her social structure, thus creating a new political point of view which will be reflected in its representation.

De Gaulle himself has made this repeatedly clear. In his speech before the Consultative Assembly in Algiers on March 18, 1944, he stated with emphasis that in the political, social, and economic fields, he would not tolerate group interests such as ruled France before her downfall. He forecast the elimination of such groups and the shift toward a social-minded egalitarian state organization.

No doubt, such reorganization is bound to be affected by the form and content of the plans devised by the governments of the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union. Even the apparent determination of the general to tackle the task of recreating France alone will not prevent such influences from carrying considerable weight. France's historic achievements alone will not suffice to secure her a leading position in the postwar world. She can no longer rest content on the laurels of past achievements. She will have to regenerate her old civilization into a new one. She will have to revolutionize her spirit toward a new interpretation of her most precious heritage: liberty, equality, fraternity. The core of such a new interpretation may perhaps be found in the following words of General de Gaulle:

¹ De Gaulle's Declaration of Policies, cited above.

We want to destroy forever the mechanical organization of mankind such as the enemy have achieved in contempt of all religion, morals and charity simply because they were strong enough to override others. And, moreover, in a powerful rebirth of the resources of the nation and the empire, inspired by methodical technique, we want the age-old French ideal of liberty, equality, and fraternity henceforth to be applied to our land in order that every individual may be free in thoughts, beliefs, and actions, that at the outset all may have equal opportunities in their social life, and that every man be respected by his fellows and helped if in need.¹

CONCLUSION—THE END OF VICHY

The occupation by American and British troops of French North Africa and the revolt of a considerable part of the French colonial army against the Vichy regime ended what remained of Vichy "independence" by causing the occupation of the "free zone" by German forces in November, 1942. With Admiral Darlan out of the picture, the aged Marshal Pétain weakly protesting, and Laval concentrating on the remnants of a shadow government, the Vichy regime faded into an inglorious obscurity. In spite of Hitler's breaking of the armistice treaty by occupying the former "free zone," the men of Vichy stayed on as German puppets. Only when the Allied armies succeeded in liberating France from German occupation, did the most dismal period of France's history end.

The eclipse of France was as total as her defeat. Her sovereignty re-established, she will have to make great efforts to restore her political, military and cultural prestige. She is certain to be supported by the great Allied powers, especially by the United States and Great Britain, in whose interest it is to have a strong and powerful France help guard western civilization in Europe.

Obviously, France cannot and will not rely on outside help alone to become strong again. General de Gaulle, having re-established the seat of the French government in Paris, made it known that the French people desire to achieve their regeneration with their own means so far as this is possible. However, France's rehabilitation will be no easy matter. In addition to her political and economic problems, she needs to undergo what one might call a "mental revolution." She will have to develop new social and eco-

¹ De Gaulle's Declaration of Policies.

nomie points of view; she will have to discard outworn traditions and change her former way of living considerably. How fast and to what extent she will again acquire prosperity and influence, will depend on the extent of her recuperative powers. Obviously, new strength for a liberated France, so desirable for the Western world, must be generated from within while France consolidates her new ideals.

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
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Part 4 The Evolution of Democracy:
Great Britain and the U.S.A.



Introduction

Ideological aggression in the twentieth century is essentially directed "against the three predominant ideas of the nineteenth century: liberal democracy, national self-determination, and laissez-faire economics."¹ The character of these ideologies, their theories and practices, have been briefly described in the previous chapters. Whatever their ultimate goals may be, they have produced similar phenomena in the countries where they have prevailed, which have all united in attacking liberal democracy.

The initial success of the dictatorships made it difficult for defenders of democracy to meet the arguments of absolutism, especially since the most powerful democracies seemed to be unable to show just how their cumbersome, muddling system was superior to the efficiency of dictatorship.

Indeed, despite the totalitarian revolutions, the great democratic nations were slow in recognizing a changed situation. Britain was "still hampered by lingering regrets for the laissez-faire period which was that of her greatest prosperity."² Not until 1933, and under the stress of economic collapse, did the United States begin to launch a program of socio-economic reforms. In comparable circumstances, the Popular Front sought to introduce similar reforms in France in 1936. One must turn to some small nations, notably the Scandinavian countries, to find a sane adaptation of democracy to the changed conditions of our time.

Generally speaking, the reforms initiated by the democratic countries were belated and insufficient. They were concessions to the "age of the common man," but they were half-heartedly endorsed compromises, too weak to stand up against ideological aggression. The timidity of the democracies and their futile attempts to buy time with repeated concessions could only result in the catastrophe which has engulfed the world. Totalitarianism,

¹ Edward Hallet Carr, *Conditions of Peace*, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1942, p. 11.

² E. H. Carr, *op. cit.*, p. 13.

being by its very nature universal, disregarded national boundaries and started an ideological invasion long before its armies proceeded to physical invasion. Hence the democracies were not only militarily but also ideologically unprepared when the Second World War broke out. Their effort to rearm and regain strength for eventual action became successful only after the Nazi-Fascist assault resulted in a clear threat to their national existence. For a long time, the resources of the democracies were not developed to their fullest to check the aggressors; the understanding of the "revolution of nihilism" made slow progress, and knowledge of the totalitarian enemy's doctrine and methods remained insufficient. The effective devices of totalitarian propaganda were not parried with an equally effective defense of democratic principles.

The state of totalitarian countries and of those whose total authoritarianism may be regarded as transitional has been described in previous chapters. It is the chief purpose of this book to help clarify the systems and political programs of the non-democratic countries of major importance in their various aspects and implications. To make this purpose even clearer, an appraisal of the two greatest democracies, the United States and Britain, cannot be omitted.

Being in a state of evolution and striving for a postwar settlement worthy of its expenditures in men and material during the Second World War, democracy is losing some of its former characteristics and assuming new ones. These changes began to occur about the time of the First World War, and it may well take many years before new political, social, economic and cultural forms are established. It is therefore impossible to outline with accuracy the coming evolution of democracy.

There are, however, trends observable in Britain and America toward a reorganization of democracy in both the domestic and the international fields, trends which may well be affected by the ascendancy of the Soviet Union. Due to their size and power, the two Anglo-Saxon countries will influence the ultimate form and character of postwar reorganization. French prewar democracy does not offer a very compelling example because it has lost its prestige; Scandinavian democracy, extraordinarily advanced, has a limited influence, just as has Switzerland, because the peculiar

conditions prevailing in these small countries are not often applicable elsewhere.

There remain, for purposes of analysis and example, Britain and the United States. We are familiar with the history of American democracy but it may be worth while to survey the growth of British constitutionalism about which there exists a good deal of misunderstanding and confusion.

SECTION ONE: THE BRITISH COMMON-WEALTH OF NATIONS

19 *The Evolution of English Democracy*

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

In 1215 King John was forced to sign the Magna Charta. This document has often been described as the birth certificate of English democracy. Actually, it was in large part a confirmation of "good and ancient customs" which the royal power had failed to respect. It was a typical feudal document, extracted from the king by the baronage, an assertion of the medieval belief that the royal power was subject to the law and not above it. It had little to do with the rights of the common people. Nevertheless, it proved a useful precedent in the later struggle to curb royal power; it was conveniently referred to and reinterpreted in the seventeenth century. From the Magna Charta may be said to have gradually evolved the fundamental English principle of no taxation without representation.

Out of the continued struggles of the thirteenth century between the Crown and the baronage grew the rudiments of the parliamentary institution. The so-called Model Parliament, summoned in 1295 by Edward I, had in it two knights from the shires and two burgesses from the towns. This body had little influence in law making at first, its main task being the appropriation of money for the royal treasury; in fact representation was considered a burden to be avoided if possible rather than a privilege to be sought. It is nevertheless out of the use of the power of the purse that the original body evolved into the all powerful Parliament of today. Similar institutions existed across the Channel, in France, and it is all the more interesting to contrast the steadily growing power of the English Parliament with the decline of the French Estates General, especially from the beginning of the seventeenth century onward.

With the advent of the Tudors to the throne and the restoration of order after the turmoil of the fifteenth century, royal power in England came close to being absolute. Both Henry VIII and Elizabeth, however, able and skilful rulers, were more interested in the substance than in the formal trappings of power. Moreover, they were in tune with their time and enjoyed a large measure of support from the rising commercial class. Consequently, they did not seek to interfere with Parliament which proved generally amenable to their wishes.

It was otherwise with the Stuarts. James I (1603-1625) described by his brother king, Henry IV of France, as "the wisest fool in Christendom," was a better theologian than ruler. He asserted the divine right of kings and sought to rule without Parliament. The struggle between Crown and Parliament, complicated by the religious situation, continued under his son Charles I (1625-1649). The Petition of Rights which he granted in 1628 was not lived up to by him. His arbitrariness in matters both religious and financial caused the constitutional struggle to degenerate into civil war, the outcome of which was the defeat of the king and his execution in 1649. This was the very time when in France began the reign of the sun-king, Louis XIV, who was to give utterance to the most sweeping expression of the theory and practice of absolute monarchy with his famous: *L'État, c'est moi*.

The triumph of Parliament was short-lived, for, as is often the case with violent revolutions, power was soon concentrated in the hands of a small minority. The Instrument of Government, first instance in modern times of a written constitution, was an enlightened document providing for a unicameral legislature. England was in effect a constitutional monarchy, Cromwell, the Lord Protector, being appointed to rule for life. But in practice it was governed by a military dictatorship; even Parliament had to be dismissed. Not unpopular at first, because of its military successes and its commercial policies, the diminishing basis of support for Cromwell's rule led to a revulsion of feeling which, shortly after his death, caused the restoration of the "legitimate" ruler in the person of Charles II.

Experience and exile had taught Charles nothing save craft. If anything, his residence at the French court had strengthened

his belief in the divine right of kings. He sought to bolster his position through a secret alliance with Louis XIV; he was also suspected of Catholic leanings. His skill and personal charm enabled him to end his days on the throne, but the struggle broke out anew under his Catholic brother and successor, James II. In 1688, Parliament called in to rule James' daughter Mary and her husband William of Orange. Deprived of support, James fled, leaving Parliament triumphant.

The significance of the Glorious Revolution lay in the fact that it was a successful assertion of the right of Parliament to dominate the Crown to the extent of regulating the succession. The new rulers derived their right to rule, not from divine appointment, but from the will of Parliament, however unrepresentative that body may have been at the time by comparison with present day standards of universal suffrage. Their recognition of the Bill of Rights¹ in 1689 marks the definite triumph of constitutionalism in England.

The first two Hanoverian kings (1714-1760), unversed and uninterested in English affairs, were content to let Whigs and Tories contend for supremacy within Parliament, and the modern cabinet system began to take shape. When George III came to the throne, the system was so firmly entrenched that his attempts at personal rule could not threaten its hold on the country, a hold which has remained unbroken to the present.

SOME HIGHLIGHTS OF BRITISH POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

Out of the situation just described there grew an impressive body of political thought which rationalized and expounded the principles of constitutional government. To be sure, England too has had her philosophers of absolutism. Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) wrote as early as 1651 in his famous *Leviathan* that "The only way to erect . . . a Common Power . . . is, to conferre all their power and strength upon one Man, upon one Assembly of men, that they may reduce all their wills, by plurality of voices, unto one Will . . . in such manner, as if every man should say

¹ This Bill of Rights asserted freedom of debate in Parliament, freedom of petition and elections. The king could no longer suspend laws, levy taxes, or maintain armed forces without parliamentary consent.

to every man, *I Authorize and give up my Right of Governing myself to this Man, or to this Assembly of men, on this condition, that thou give up thy Right to him, and Authorize his Actions in like manner.* This done, the Multitude, so united in one Person, is called a Common-wealth, in latine Civitas. . . ."¹

But Hobbes' life covered the Commonwealth and the latter part of the Stuart rule. However, the trend of political development, striving away from absolutism, was best reflected in the thinking of the great John Locke, in the unconventional criticism of the sceptical David Hume, in the liberal utilitarianism of John Stuart Mill, in the philosophy of liberty of Thomas Paine. It would far exceed the scope of this chapter to analyze the teaching of these men but a few words should be said about John Locke (1632-1704) whose importance in giving shape to the British conception of state, society, and education may almost be compared with the influence of Hegel on the development of German and Italian totalitarianism. Locke, more than any other English writer, has clarified political liberalism and tolerance. If one may speak of a British "ideology," his influence has helped to shape it, as it has helped to awaken the social and political conscience of the world outside the British Isles.

Locke based his tolerance mainly on the belief that man is imperfect, full of frailties, and thus incapable of being right even if he thinks he is. Man has no innate understanding. He acquires knowledge through experience, which is a doubtful method. How then could there exist a "state of equality, wherein all the power and jurisdiction is reciprocal, no one having more than another . . . ?"² Hobbes would have answered that, if one could not trust human beings because of their innate frailties, authority should be established once and for all. Locke was more generous. His state, made up of humans who were born with a "blank mind" and had nothing but education and experience to cope with life, was to be a "state of liberty yet it is not a state of license; though man in that state have an uncontrollable liberty to dispose of his person or possessions, yet he has not liberty to destroy himself. . . .

¹ Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*, Everyman's Library, New York, 1914, p. 89.

² John Locke, *Two Treatises of Civil Government*, Everyman's Library, New York, 1924, p. 118.

The state of Nature has a law of Nature to govern it, which obliges everyone, and reason, which is that law, teaches all mankind who will but consult it, that being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty or possessions. . . ."¹

Holding such a view of human nature, Locke advocated the restriction of authority rather than its enhancement. He proposed to limit legislative power by putting it "into the hands of divers persons who, duly assembled, have by themselves, or jointly with others, a power to make laws, which when they have done, being separated again, they are themselves subject to the laws they have made. . . ."² While one may discern in his philosophy the beginnings of political democracy, he did not recognize economic equality. He stressed the obligations of the government or the ruler to protect property and to abide by its "contract" with the people, failing which the latter would be relieved of their duty to obey. Here then was the beginning of the revolutionary theories which justified the Glorious Revolution in England and were taken over and extended by the American and French revolutions.

Since man is born with a mind as blank as a *tabula rasa*, his education becomes of necessity extremely important. In his treatises *Thoughts on Education* and *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, Locke suggested new methods of rearing young English gentlemen and training their minds. Liberal in politics, Locke prescribed severe mental drill in order to achieve the three major aims of education: vigor of the body, good breeding, wisdom of conduct, and mental power. He enumerated the four virtues of a gentleman: first stood virtue itself with its characteristics of self-control, self-denial, and a religious well-tempered soul. Second was wisdom with a knowledge of the world, prudence, foresight, and an ability in affairs without ever becoming tricky. Third should be good breeding, with a regard for the rights and the failures of others as gained from early examples and constant practice throughout the educational process. Lastly came learning which remained secondary to other accomplishments, for a virtuous or wise man was more valuable than a great scholar. Such was, indeed, the pat-

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 119.

² *Ibid.*, p. 190.

tern of English education as it used to be practiced in the formal discipline of public schools which endeavored to train a sound mind and a sound body. Sense impression and experience, Locke believed, were the raw materials which, through the application of reasoning, would produce knowledge.

Locke's philosophy of individual liberty led to the conception of popular sovereignty and constitutionalism, built on the foundation of an education that would develop self-controlled and responsible men. It has furnished a firm basis for the growth of a British democratic ideology. No wonder that the French liberals of the eighteenth century and later those of many other countries turned to Locke's liberalism for guidance. For all its shortcomings, its essential spirit remains alive and capable of adaptation to changed conditions. "Let us . . . read Locke again, and read him more penetratingly," wrote an American scholar. "We shall find in his pages much to ponder and much to apply to the problems of modern society. We shall discover, perhaps to our surprise, that Locke sought not liberty for the strong, the favored, and the fortunate alone, but liberty for every man regardless of his circumstances in life; and that he looked upon government as a necessary and proper agency of the majority to secure and conserve the liberty of all."¹

GROWTH OF THE CLASS STATE AND ECONOMIC LAISSEZ FAIRE

Who then were the men representing this philosophy of liberty and what sort of rule did they give to the country where these ideas first originated?

The British parliament—England and Scotland became united in 1707—was regarded by the British people as the safeguard and the symbol of growing political liberty. But this parliament was not as yet representative of all classes. Aristocracy and higher clergy united in the House of Lords; the House of Commons consisted of the lower nobility (landowners whose titles were inseparably connected with their estates) and of the increasingly wealthy middle class whose views were almost identical with those of the

¹ Chester C. Maxey, *Political Philosophies*, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1938, p. 264.

nobility. The revolutions of the seventeenth century were essentially a successful bid for power on the part of this commercial class whose strength began to grow with the Commercial Revolution of the preceding century. In alliance with the royal power against the feudal nobility at first, by the seventeenth century the mercantile class had grown strong enough to challenge the crown itself. Thus, taken together, the two houses represented a block of interests which were not those of the lower classes.

The Industrial Revolution, the first phase of which occurred between 1760 and 1815, marked the transformation of a mercantilistic economy into a new system of industry and commerce growing out of technological progress. The Industrial Revolution also resulted in a different distribution of a growing population, thus emphasizing the misrepresentation in elections. In the industrial areas, a few wealthy industrialists for all practical purposes ruled a mass of workers whose living and working conditions were appalling. But economic liberalism, as preached by Adam Smith in *The Wealth of Nations*, was incapable of remedying this situation. For this liberalism was rooted in the fatalistic belief in a God-ordained system of free and unrestricted competition. In other words, freedom existed for people to get rich and conserve or augment their wealth by every means within the legal frame; people were also at liberty to starve or pauperize others on hunger wages. Charity was not a concern of the state, not even of the communities, but of religious and private organizations. The age of economic liberalism created conditions unknown to the so-called Dark Ages during which the guilds and corporations acknowledged a responsibility for the welfare of their members. It took a long time until, during the nineteenth century, society began to correct the worst defects of this laissez-faire attitude; it may be the task of the twentieth century to complete the reform.

The beginning of the nineteenth century saw the end of the Napoleonic wars and a slump in economic life resulting in a depression of the first order. As yet, the working people had no possibility of expressing their will by voting. Their spontaneous but unorganized and often blind manifestations of anger were ruthlessly suppressed. Robert Owen's attempt to lead the newly created trade unions and the Chartist agitation both failed, but marked

the beginning of a British labor-union movement. None of those whose sympathy was with the masses could as yet hope to be elected to parliament. However, a few concessions began to be made in the field of education, and working conditions were slightly bettered for women and children. A small beginning was the Factory Act of 1819 forbidding the employment of children under nine; in 1833 work was limited for youthful workers under eighteen; and from 1847 on employers were not to force women to work more than ten hours a day. From 1850, Sunday was to be at least a half holiday.

The reform movement of 1830 and 1832 was a distinctively middle-class movement. When Lord Grey could not at first induce parliament to accept his reform plan, he dissolved parliament and gained an electoral victory for the Whigs. The Tories, outraged not only by a reform plan which showed a definite middle-class influence but also by the suggested electoral revisions enlarging the influence of people with average means, tried their utmost to block Lord Grey's propositions. Finally, Lord Grey resigned and then was asked to come back. He accepted, on the understanding that the king would, if necessary, create enough new peers to put through the reform. The threat was sufficient to ensure the passage of the bill, which was by no means revolutionary. The more radical programs of the Chartists¹ and of Robert Owen² were rejected. Liberalism and free trade remained victorious in the expanding empire which reached the zenith of its power in the Victorian age.

Parliamentary life and elections became a contest between the older established landed aristocracy and the rising wealthy manufacturing class, although it must be borne in mind that the two groups overlapped and tended to fuse with the passage of time. In so far as one can generalize, it may be said that the new class advocated a wider franchise (e.g., the Reform Bill of 1832) while the older was politically more conservative but at the same time more willing to enact certain social, if paternalistic, reforms. In the second half of the century, after the repeal of the Corn Laws—a definite triumph of free trade and the manufacturing class—the resulting lowering of prices served to improve somewhat the

¹ See above, p. 254.

² See above, pp. 253-254.

still appalling lot of the lower classes, especially of the city proletariat.

In 1867, the conservative Prime Minister Disraeli, stealing a page from the opposition, gave the city proletariat the right to vote. Gladstone did the same for farm labor in 1884. It was also about this time that a moderate socialist party began to appear on the political scene.

The Victorian era of a British imperialism which had been developed by private enterprise had, indeed, created an empire on which the sun never set. England, as Great Britain and her empire are often called throughout the world, became rich and saturated; the pride of empire, not always devoid of arrogance, created in the outside world a varying mixture of admiration, envy, and dislike, and not a little misunderstanding.

The British Empire with its 500,000,000 subjects had become the richest realm on earth—yet there were still very many slums. Britain had become a firmly established constitutional monarchy—yet it was still a class state. The social stratification was reflected in the discriminations of the educational system, which, especially until the First World War, tended to perpetuate the privileges of the ruling classes. At the same time, there existed less political radicalism in Britain than on the European continent. The opposition, even when coming from labor, was "loyal." To a surprising degree, the lower classes had accepted their standing; the majority approved and were proud of the empire.

The effects of the First World War went deeper than the aftermath of the Napoleonic wars. As the Liberal Party declined, the new Labor Party increasingly filled its place. In 1924 the first Labor government in British history came into power. None of the parties however, conservative or progressive, was able to remedy the grave economic slump which has troubled Britain ever since the end of the last war. Concurrently, a redefinition of imperial relations had become inevitable. The reform had its inception in a transformation of the empire into the British Commonwealth of Nations, a unique political conception, typical of British mentality which so extraordinarily connects rationalism and emotionalism under a coordinating mask of tranquillity and self-control.

FROM THE EMPIRE TO THE COMMONWEALTH

An empire, as Sir Norman Angell once said, is a form of political organization in which subject provinces or territories are ruled from a governing center. These territories are subject to laws not determined by themselves but by their foreign masters. It is the interest of the ruling power which is decisive and not that of the ruled territories. Following the unfortunate experience of the revolt and loss of the American colonies, Britain took to heart the lesson of the futility of trying to enforce controls from London upon unwilling dependencies which had become capable of managing their own affairs. The recommendations of the famous Durham Report of 1839, and the creation of the Dominion of Canada in 1867, are milestones along the road of liberalization of British imperial policy. Toward the end of the nineteenth century, there originated the practice of holding "colonial conferences," called "Imperial Conferences" from 1907 on, meetings of the prime ministers of the United Kingdom and the dominions for the purpose of discussing matters of common interest to the various members of the empire.

The First World War accelerated the pace of change. During the Imperial Conference of 1911, Sir Edward Grey had spoken of "assent" and "approval" of British foreign policy to be secured from the conferees, as if the dominions were sovereign states. During the war, the dominions were entirely loyal to the mother country; they put their resources at her disposal, and participated in war cabinets. But, at the same time, while constitutional issues were shelved during the war, the dominions set forth demands for absolute political independence. For the first time, in the twentieth century the term "Commonwealth" was used. The dominions were then represented at the Peace Conference, they became independent members of the League of Nations, and likewise ratified the peace treaties on a par with other sovereign states.

Gradually, the dominions built up their own diplomatic organizations and, from then on, played an important role in international relations. The evolution of the empire into a commonwealth became clearly defined at the Imperial Conference of 1926.

In a report of this meeting, held under the chairmanship of Lord Balfour, one reads that the idea of a constitution for the empire was not believed to be feasible because its "widely scattered parts have very different characteristics, very different histories, and are at very different stages of evolution. . . ." ¹ The report then goes on to make one of the most important statements of British political thought on imperial policies. The self-governing communities, consisting of Great Britain and the dominions, are "*autonomous Communities within the British Empire, equal in status, in no way subordinate one to another in any aspect of their domestic or external affairs, though united by a common allegiance to the Crown, and freely associated as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations.*" ²

The report explains that "every self-governing member of the Empire is now the master of its destiny . . . and is subject to no compulsion whatever. . . . Free institutions are its life-blood. Free cooperation is its instrument. . . ." ³ The proclamation of the Statute of Westminster of 1931 amounted to a declaration of independence for six nations. The "Third British Empire," as some historians call the Commonwealth of Nations, had taken another step toward deimperialization: "no act passed after 1931 by the Parliament of the United Kingdom will be deemed to extend to a Dominion." The dominions are described as "autonomous communities"; in fact, they are independent states with their own governments, diplomatic corps, tariffs, immigration laws, and, as in the case of Australia, have their own colonies or dependencies. The only visible and symbolic bond with the motherland is the Crown. But, the king of England does not "rule" as king of England in Canada, Australia, or any other dominion. He is king of Canada in the affairs of that country as he is king of Australia or king of the Union of South Africa in those dominions. His representative, the governor general, is selected by the individual dominion and not by the British government in Britain.

India has a unique position in the Third British Empire. Pres-

¹ Committee Report of the Imperial Conference of 1926, London.

² Ibid. Italics are in the original.

³ Ibid. The report is quoted by Sir Alfred Zimmern in his booklet, *From the British Empire to the British Commonwealth*, Longmans, Green and Company, London, 1941, pp. 48-49.

ent indications would seem to point to the achievement of dominion status for her. It is planned to have elected groups work out a constitution for an Indian union of states as the basis for home rule. India would then have the same status as dominions like Canada or Australia. Theoretically she would be pledged to remain loyal to the crown but in fact she would be free to act with complete independence to the extent of seceding from the Commonwealth if she chose to do so. Sir Stafford Cripps, when he visited India in the spring of 1942, made this explicitly clear. His attempt to bring about an agreement between the main Indian parties and Britain failed because, during the war, Britain refused to change India's status and wanted to reserve the right to control the defense of the country against possible Japanese aggression.¹

India's problems have always been complex and delicate, and the position of Britain has been greatly misjudged and misunderstood. Without exonerating the tactics of imperialism, it should be kept in mind that the British conquered India in much the same way as other European imperialist powers conquered other parts of the world. With the rise of a tendency to question the ethics of imperialism, especially after the First World War, opinion in Britain has become increasingly willing to widen the sphere of Indian self-rule, until the prospect of India's eventual independence has become widely accepted.

It is interesting to consider the share of Britain in the import and export trade of the rest of the empire. The following chart shows that, while Britain has the greatest share of trade of any single nation with her dominions and dependencies, that share is very far from constituting a monopoly.²

As Britain does not now exert economic domination over her dominions, her political influence on them is correspondingly limited. The Statute of Westminster in 1931 was merely the formal recognition in law of a situation already existing in fact, as the movement toward independence increasingly dissociated the dominions from the political aspirations of the mother country. Yet the Crown still remains a unifying symbol, and so does the com-

¹ See R. Coupland, *The Cripps Mission*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1942.

² Sir Norman Angell, "Who Owns the British Empire?" *The Survey Graphic*, May, 1941.

mon language, the acceptance of the same cultural background, and the belief in unity of action, whenever the existence of the Commonwealth is endangered.

The strength of this essentially spiritual bond between motherland and dominions is a factor often difficult for outsiders to understand, particularly since Britain has "no proprietary rights what-

From whom does the Empire buy?

17.5%	from United Kingdom	Canada	82.5%	from rest of the world
41.6%	" " "	Australia	58.4%	" " " " "
43.3%	" " "	South Africa	56.7%	" " " " "
47.8%	" " "	New Zealand	52.2%	" " " " "
31.4%	" " "	India	68.6%	" " " " "
26.6%	" " "	{ Colonies and } Protectorates	73.4%	" " " " "
26.7%	" " "	Mandates	73.3%	" " " " "

To whom does the Empire sell?

39.1%	to United Kingdom	Canada	60.9%	to rest of the world
54.5%	" " "	Australia	45.5%	" " " " "
38.1%	" " "	South Africa	61.9%	" " " " "
84.5%	" " "	New Zealand	15.5%	" " " " "
34.2%	" " "	India	65.8%	" " " " "
35.4%	" " "	{ Colonies and } Protectorates	64.6%	" " " " "
37.5%	" " "	Mandates	62.5%	" " " " "

ever in Canada, or Australia, or South Africa, or New Zealand, or Newfoundland, or Ireland" and "draws no tribute at all from them or from any colony whatever. On the contrary, the British taxpayer is often taxed for the defense and the development of the overseas territories."¹

Britain's movement toward economic and social reforms is bound to affect her empire policy deeply, but there is no reason to look for the disintegration of the Commonwealth; if anything, the voluntary nature of the association is an added source of strength. In a future of international cooperation, there is no doubt that the survival of the Commonwealth will be to the benefit of its members. The dominions may of course make certain adjustments in both their foreign and economic policies, if their interests re-

¹ Angell, op. cit.

quire it, without regard for the preferences of Great Britain. Thus, for example, one may expect to see a much closer cooperation between the United States and the dominions of Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.

Culturally, the dominions are very close to Britain whose governmental system they have adopted, modifying it according to local needs.

BRITISH GOVERNMENT

There does not exist in the classic land of parliamentary government a written constitution. The charters accumulated during the course of English history constitute the legal basis for Britain's constitutional and democratic monarchy. The Magna Charta, the Bill of Rights, the Great Reform Act, and the Statute of Westminster are some of the most important legal documents that take the place of a constitution. The need for a written constitution was never really felt, particularly since, from 1689 on, the practice as well as the theory of constitutional government has been firmly entrenched.

Few people in Britain have missed a constitution. The majority, clinging to time-honored traditions, would probably endorse Benjamin Disraeli's dislike for a written constitution when he wrote, in 1835: "Free government cannot be scribbled down—this great invention—in a morning on the envelope of a letter by some charter-concocting monarch, or sketched with ludicrous facility in the conceited commonplace book of a utilitarian sage."¹ However, the problems arising in a government where the distribution of power is subject to legal interpretation rather than to codified constitutional law are manifold and delicate. A deep sense of historic tradition, respect for the rule of law, and a general acceptance of certain ideas on the nature of government are responsible for the success of the constitutional evolution of Britain. No wonder that customs and usages are of great importance although they have never become a written law of the land.

Who, then, rules Britain? The king? The cabinet? Parliament? The king's oath at the time of his coronation leaves no doubt of

¹ Quoted by W. I. Jennings, "Disraeli and the Constitution," *Journal of Comparative Legislation and International Law*, Series 3, XIII, 1931, p. 182.

his position: he is, like every Briton, subject to the law and obliged to honor the statutes of parliament. As a guardian of constitutional rights, the king has come to be accepted by all classes, including the laboring class. The Labor Party, through its representatives, stated that "there can be no question among thoughtful people that the monarchy plays a large part in holding the British Empire together; loyalty to the king, both at home and in the Dominions, is a more religious than political attitude. . . . Nothing could be more false than an assertion that Republicanism is necessarily synonymous with democracy. . . ." ¹ The power of the king depends on his influence rather than on his rights. As Walter Bagehot put it, the king has the right to be consulted, to encourage, and to warn. The measure of tact an English king is able to muster will determine the measure of his influence. Yet legally and financially he is dependent upon parliament. His salary, the so-called civil list, must be approved by parliament annually.

The king's advisory body is the Privy Council. Since the original duties of this body have been taken over by the cabinet, its role is more ceremonial than political. Its advisory function is more or less theoretical. The most important man in the government is the prime minister who is named by the king to form a cabinet and who, in turn, chooses the cabinet ministers. The cabinet is responsible to parliament and can be overthrown by an expression of non-confidence. It is the most influential and powerful part of the government. Customarily, the cabinet will resign as a unit if its proposals are rejected by parliament. It works on the basis of a traditional understanding of its functions which are not written in law. The prime minister, being a party leader, will naturally constitute his cabinet in accordance with this fact. Members of the cabinet are usually members of the parliamentary parties.

British civil servants are chosen under special laws according to which candidates have to pass examinations of various grades and classes, but not specialized ones as in America. Permanent tenure for all employees has achieved a considerable stability. Cabinets come and go but permanent civil servants continue to rule. In fact, ministers have often been mouthpieces of their subordinate ex-

¹ J. H. Thomas, *When Labor Rules*, Harcourt, Brace and Company, New York, 1921, pp. 45-47; as quoted by N. L. Hill and H. W. Stoke, *The Background of European Governments*, Farrar & Rinehart, Inc., New York, 1935, pp. 25-26.

perts whose opinions they express, for civil servants are professionals while ministers may be amateurs.

Parliament has two houses, the House of Lords and the House of Commons. Members of the House of Lords are peers of the realm. Membership is hereditary since peerages are inherited by primogeniture. The legislative importance of the Lords as a check on the lower house has been steadily decreasing.

Like the French Senate, the House of Lords has often been attacked. Peers in England have not only privileges; they also suffer from certain disabilities. They cannot vote at parliamentary elections, nor are they eligible for membership in the House of Commons. If, for example, the son of a peer is a member of the Commons and succeeds to his father's title upon the latter's death, he automatically must give up his seat in the lower house. The speaker of the Lords is the Lord Chancellor, nominated by the cabinet but appointed by the king. The rules of procedure are extremely liberal.

The House of Lords may introduce or reject any bills except those concerning finances.¹ The House of Commons alone has the power of handling financial problems. It is conceivable that conflicts arising out of different views between the two houses may further restrict the influence of the Lords, and a reform of the House of Lords is not out of the question during the postwar years when Britain as a whole may well undergo basic changes in its political and social system. But this does not mean that the bicameral system of parliament will be given up easily.

The House of Commons, the lower house, is one of the most powerful and most efficiently functioning legislative bodies of the world. The speaker, usually elected without many formalities, does not speak to the house but for it. He must be neutral and cannot represent any party so long as he is in office. Rules for parliamentary procedure are rigidly fixed; even speaking time is limited to a definite period. One hour of questions is reserved for every session. (A certain similarity may be noticed between the "questions" in the House of Commons and the "interpellations" in the French Chamber of Deputies.) Legislative work is done mainly in the special committees, the most important of which is the cabinet itself.

¹ Lords have only suspensory power of veto over financial bills passed by Commons.

The history of Parliament's electoral reforms is the history of the growth of British democracy. The Great Reform Act of 1832 initiated the most revolutionary change and the continuing reform movement produced the Second Reform Act introduced by Disraeli in 1867. Further agitation for liberalization of suffrage, including suffrage for women, came to an end when, in 1918, the Representation of the People Act was accepted. This act terminated the distinction between borough and county votes and proclaimed the right to vote for every male citizen over twenty-one and for women over thirty. Exactly ten years later the age limit for women was lowered to twenty-one. For national elections, there is now no discrimination except against "criminals, idiots, aliens, paupers, and peers." (Paupers are regarded as having no address.) However, in municipal elections there is still discrimination against all those who have no "ownership or occupancy" of some property.

There are two more fields of significance and importance in the British system of government: the courts of law and the institution of local government. "In the entire history of mankind there have been only two great systems of law, the civil law of Rome and the common law of England."¹ This common law has shaped the life of Anglo-Saxon countries, namely, England, the major part of the overseas dominions, and the United States (not Scotland, curiously enough). Common law has been developed in the courts of law through experience and in response to practical needs. Unwritten at the beginning, it grew later through an accumulation of the written decisions of the judges. Gradually, these decisions were regarded as establishing precedents and became law. Common law is more flexible and thus, to a certain extent, more democratic than Roman law. Its great advantage over Roman law consists in that it "represents the survival of the fittest among the various legal customs and rules which successive generations of men have tried."²

There is no court exercising judicial authority over the whole of Britain or the Commonwealth. The legal system of England and Wales is different from that of Scotland, North Ireland, or Canada.

¹ William B. Munro, *The Governments of Europe*, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1931, p. 270.

² *Ibid.*, p. 274.

The nearest thing to a Supreme Court for the United Kingdom is the House of Lords. The judicial committee of the Privy Council is the supreme court for cases from India, the dominions, and the colonies. However, this committee is not exactly a court in that it cannot make final decisions; it can only recommend to the king what it believes to be right, an advice which is always followed.

The legal profession in Britain stands on a high level. Judges are appointed for life by the crown. There is no spoils system. The ethical and social standing of lawyers (called "solicitors" and "bar-risters") in England is higher than in America. The speed of legal procedure is greater and the question of constitutionality is hardly ever raised.

Local government is one of the most democratic aspects of British institutions. Reaching far back into history, developing without specific plan or preconceived organization, it presented a picture of chaos until it was reformed at least three times during the nineteenth century. The eight spheres of local government in England and Wales illustrate the results of this development: County Councils, County Borough Councils, Non-County Borough Councils, Metropolitan Borough Councils, Urban District Councils, Rural District Councils, Parish Councils, and Parish Meetings. The administrative body of city employees has tenure of office. No spoils system exists; hence the officials and their subordinates are completely familiar with their work and become experts of long standing in their fields. They remain in office so long as their work and their behavior are satisfactory.

The principle of local government is deeply entrenched in the minds and hearts of all Britons. The intervention of the national government which found it necessary to loan money to localities and, naturally, saw to it that the money was well spent, did not lead to centralized control, for the value of the decentralization of local self-government has been recognized and accepted.¹ The local leaders are duly elected by all classes participating on an equal basis. Many localities are under Labor rule. Mayors or borough presidents may originate from every class and they never become local tyrants as does a political boss in an American community.

¹ During the periods of severe air raids over London, decentralization of city government proved most beneficial. Damage remained localized and the paralyzation of one district did not affect the others.

BRITISH DEMOCRACY AND BRITISH CLASSES

Britain's social structure is characterized by rigid class distinction and yet British society functions with a minimum of friction between the classes, the existence of which has, to a remarkable degree, become an accepted tradition. In many ways, Britain is more markedly a class state than many other nations—yet she has produced some of the greatest documents and thinkers of democracy. She may pride herself on being among the pioneers and having remained a foremost exponent of religious and political freedom to our own time.

The strange and extraordinary thing is that all these different classes are united by what one may call "Commonwealth ideology" which seems to be a part of every British subject, no matter to what class he may belong. Out of traditional, systematized thinking, certain common and fundamental elements have emerged. Such are the consciousness of personal freedom combined with a deep feeling for legality; the spirit of fair play and good sport; a general tendency toward compromise; a certain distrust of intellectualism in favor of a practical utilitarianism. Geographical and political isolation, together with success, have bred a certain fatalism which finds expression in muddling-through and wait-and-see slogans and outlook.

In a sense, the evolution of the empire may be said to have reflected the conceptions of British society. So long as the empire was truly imperialistic, the British Isles played the role of an aristocracy toward the middle class of the dominions and the lower class of the colonies. Parallel with the growth of democratic practice at home, the empire evolved into the Commonwealth of Nations. One may thus envisage the existence of a democratic union of independent British nations on the imperial plane, and simultaneously expect the breakdown of former social classes, or at least, a limitation of class differences that would bring about their eventual dissolution. There is only one institution which might well be preserved from the days of the class state: the monarchy. The king as a symbol of imperial unity will remain the expression of a voluntary union of free states on the basis of British institutions.

Class differences have been reflected in a great inequality in the distribution of wealth. However, for years, directly and through inheritance taxes, the government has taxed the great estates, Britain's stronghold of aristocracy, so heavily that most of them have already been divided, thus undermining one basis of the political power of the aristocracy. Income taxes have been extremely high since the First World War and have tended to hamper the concentration of wealth. The Second World War has accelerated the process of dividing up the great fortunes. Hand in hand with this development, there has been a great expansion of social services. The nineteenth-century liberal view that the state should refrain as much as possible from interfering with the free workings of society, dominated Britain's domestic policy for a long time, but has been gradually revised during the turmoils in the first part of the twentieth century. New British conceptions of the state's responsibility for the welfare of the people have become increasingly noticeable since the depression that followed the First World War.

Postwar reconstruction planning by the British government, as announced in the years 1943 and 1944, includes a democratization of education, a scheme for universal medical insurance and vastly improved housing. The realization of the Beveridge Plan may yet ensure a minimum of decent living to everyone. But social services alone are no sign of democracy at work. Totalitarian countries, too, offer social welfare to their citizens. Should it then be the object of democracy to strive for the "building up a new kind of State, a new sort of machinery of government, one of whose aims will be to serve its citizens in all the fields where individual and voluntary action is not enough, while at the same time giving them real freedom and real equality of opportunity . . . ?"¹

Change in Britain may be expected to be less abrupt than elsewhere. The British people have learned to value their political freedom as a matter of tradition. Moreover, their deep rooted tendency either to conserve conditions or to modify them gradually, the hold of ancient customs in both government and community life, have affected the lower middle classes and a great many workers. This is the reason why no revolution has been seriously attempted ever since constitutional government was established and

¹ Julian Huxley, *Democracy Marches*, Harper & Brothers, New York, 1941, p. 35.

parliament was permitted to function freely. The Marxian conception of the class struggle never gained a foothold in Britain. The British Labor Party, while representing the interests of the working people, has been essentially conservative in its methods. Unlike the Marxists, it shares with the Conservatives the fundamental British attachment to evolutionary gradualness. This is one reason why the Labor Party has outlawed communists in its ranks. Typical of Labor's adherence in principle to British institutions was the remark of a labor leader that in the event Britain became a republic, the workers would elect the king as president.

The present British class structure is essentially that which developed during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and became consolidated during the Victorian period. Even the First World War, far reaching as its effects were, did not cause fundamental changes. It should perhaps be stressed that the British have, on the whole, thought of democracy primarily as a political system of constitutionalism and parliamentarism. In other words, political democracy has been considered sufficient by the majority of the British people; economic democracy is a very new conception which has slowly come to the attention of the masses.

Ernest Bevin, Britain's foremost Labor leader and member of the British war cabinet, stated: "We must not confuse democracy with the maintenance of a particular form of economic or financial system, rather is it a condition which allows for change of the system itself and provides for such adaptation as the change in public need and opinion demands. Hence if the system is incapable of adequately providing the people with food, shelter, and the necessary amenities and opportunities for full development, democracy can by the act of election of those who favor another system, or modification of a given system, provide an opportunity for so doing."¹

On another occasion, Mr. Bevin summarized his belief in democratic ethics in even broader terms when he suggested with much idealism,

1. that we accept democracy as our guiding article of faith;
2. that we seek at all costs to maintain it, be ever ready to defend it both

¹ The Rt. Hon. Ernest Bevin, *The Balance Sheet of the Future*, Robert M. McBride & Company, New York, 1941, pp. 176-177.

- within and without, and develop a great comradeship with the democracies and those who are striving for liberty throughout the world;
3. that we use the opportunities it provides to adapt our social system to secure social justice and opportunity for everyone;
 4. that we use the whole of our democratic strength to contribute to progress and the establishment of a world order;
 5. that we strive not to make giants, but to elevate the human race.¹

To be sure, these are the words of a British cabinet minister rather than of a Labor leader who used to denounce "monopolization, trustification and financial domination of the people" as preventing the achievement of equal opportunities. When he made the latter statement, Mr. Bevin held that the nation was divided into three social groups: the upper classes, the working classes actually at work, and the submerged classes on poor relief. On behalf of the poor, he rebuked parliament for balancing the budget rather than helping suffering humanity. He chided Britain's educational system for depriving the working people of its opportunities. He claimed that British class distinction was maintained by the English system of education and that it was this system which stubbornly preserved the *status quo*, despite frequent attempts to break down its rigid traditions after the end of the First World War.

Mr. Bevin is only one of the many critics of the British class system who believe that the educational system of England is to blame for the tenacity with which Britain has clung to its social injustices.

BRITISH EDUCATION UNTIL 1939

In order to understand the nature of the British social structure as it existed at the outbreak of the war in 1939, one must survey its educational system and trends. One can hardly speak of a well-defined educational philosophy unless the very lack of system be considered a philosophy. Every child was to be given a fixed minimum of training to satisfy the requirements of the state, but it was left to individual families to enrich such schooling according to their abilities and tastes in either public or private schools.

True, an increasing number of "free places" were given to intelligent children whose parents would not have been able to send them to higher schools; but the fundamental concept of education

¹ Bevin, *op. cit.*, p. 190.

was based upon the perpetuation of the social status of parents, some exceptions notwithstanding.¹

In contrast to France where education throughout the country remained under the strict supervision of a centralized agency, English education is decentralized within the framework of local self-government. The state's task is "to enforce education under the best possible conditions," and it "accordingly refrains from prescribing the details of what shall be taught, but through the conditions underlying the distribution of grants for education sets up general standards which are concerned mainly with the externa—all those factors that make an efficient educative process possible."² In other words, the state leaves the formulation of curricula to be dictated by local conditions and the opinions of individual headmasters. It only suggests broad outlines without systematizing them into a rigid organization.

There is, however, one aim which has been uppermost in the mind of English educators for centuries: the training of moral character. For this goal, John Locke made suggestions which have left their imprint upon English schools. His recommendations for mental and physical discipline still stand even though they have been modified. Corporal punishment is still recognized as a necessary means of character formation. The British ideas of how character can be molded into the ideal of a gentleman determine the curriculum and teaching methods. Spartan living is combined with suspicion of too individualistic an intelligence. G. B. Shaw once remarked that an Englishman thinks he is moral when he is uncomfortable. Less jestingly, Macaulay warned of the "union of high intelligence with desires," implying that a mediocre person with accepted moral standards is more valuable than an exceptional individual with unorthodox views. He thereby expressed the average Englishman's slight condescension for the "high-brow" and typi-

¹ The educational system discussed in the following paragraphs pertains to England and Wales. It is not necessarily typical of education in all parts of Britain; Scottish education, for example, inspired by John Knox's demand for a large degree of equality of opportunities in education, is less class-bound than English education. The percentage of university students in Scotland is higher than in any other European country. However, in view of the dominant position of England in determining the political fortunes of Great Britain, the discussion is limited to English education proper.

² I. L. Kandel, *Comparative Education*, Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, 1933, p. 58.

fied popular distrust of persons who are outstanding enough to disregard traditions and go their own way. There can be no doubt that English character training has produced men who have helped build the empire, but there can also be no doubt that the strange mixture of formal discipline and hidden anti-intellectualism has become unsuitable for modern England.

Between the two world wars, three major reform attempts were made, all of them influential but not conclusive. The *Fisher Act* of 1918 tried to broaden educational opportunities for the children of the masses. Its provisions were well meant but insufficient; however, its philosophy contributed heavily toward educational emancipation. Some of its practical provisions, especially the introduction of part-time continuation schooling of vocational character, were approved but never fully executed.

The famous *Hadow Report*¹ was only a semiofficial document submitted to the Board of Education; its recommendations never became law. Yet its influence, particularly upon middle-school development, was considerable. Hadow advocated that elementary education be divided into primary and higher primary levels: primary education to be made available for all children from five to eleven, the senior level to be made compulsory for all children up to fifteen years of age and to offer a large variety of schools. The latter would include secondary education of a classical and scientific nature. This meant the organization of a unified primary school for all children and the opening of educational opportunities to children after eleven according to their abilities. It also meant that the compulsory school age should be raised to fifteen instead of fourteen. The latter point was incorporated in the *Edwards Act* of 1937. As a result of this report, middle schools (the so-called Central Schools and modern Senior schools) were fostered by many local authorities and encouraged by the Board of Education. The report also advocated a considerable addition of vocational elements in secondary curriculums. While the war of 1939 interrupted this development, it may well be continued in years to come and help break down class education.

Equal in importance to the *Hadow Report* of 1926 was the

¹ Prepared in 1926 by the Advisory Committee of the Board of Education under the chairmanship of Sir W. H. Hadow.

Spens Report of 1938, which proposed a further democratization of secondary education and the organization of three types of secondary schools, thus clarifying the whole structure of English post-elementary education.

The educational process, before the war, began with nursery schools for children between two and five. They were noncompulsory institutions of growing popularity but hampered by financial limitations. Compulsory school attendance started at the age of five, in certain cases six, depending upon local laws. No adolescent was permitted to leave school before the age of fourteen. Theoretically, elementary courses were divided into three phases distinguishing junior, middle, and senior grades. However, this arrangement was not compulsory. The division into infant and elementary stages, for children from five to seven and eight to fourteen respectively, was much more common. The question of coeducation was left to the discretion of the local authorities. Elementary-school graduates between fourteen and eighteen were required to participate in part-time continuation schooling. However, the execution of this decree has never been fully enforced.¹

Elementary-school pupils had the opportunity of being transferred to either the Senior or the Central schools (middle schools of utilitarian character), both of them free of charge. The Senior schools were merely an extension of the Junior schools and no entrance examination was required. They were compulsory for all those who did not pass an entrance examination to either the Central or Grammar (Secondary) schools. In order to be admitted to middle schooling, candidates, aged eleven, had to pass a "free-place examination." Those who passed were given the opportunity of being transferred to a secondary school in preparation for university study. Since the number of free places was limited to about 50 per cent of the candidates, the examinations were rather rigid. Boys and girls studying in middle schools would be trained for "utilitarian" purposes although one cannot exactly say that these schools had a definite vocational character. They stressed industrial and commercial training and offered home economics courses for girls. Adolescents were graduated at the age of fifteen or sixteen.

¹ Kandel, *op. cit.*, p. 100.

Secondary schools were predominantly nonvocational and dedicated to the liberal arts as instruments of character training and mental discipline. They had two divisions, for students from twelve to sixteen and for those from sixteen to eighteen. After the first four years, an examination had to be passed; and another "higher" examination before final graduation. Some graduates would then be transferred to universities or university colleges which were maintained from incomes of endowments and state contributions. A number of scholarships were provided for gifted students without means. Except the elementary and senior schools, all other institutions of learning charged fees. The number of free places, especially for secondary schools, increased considerably between the two wars; however, the school system as such was not free.

For students who were unsuited to academic or secondary training, there was a variety of vocational full-time schools. Most of them charged tuition but they also offered a number of free places for vocationally gifted students. A few of the junior technical schools provided by local authorities were free, being subsidized by local communities and the Board of Education. Vocational training in Britain came into its own between the two wars; the postwar reconstruction program will further enhance this development in accordance with the requirements of planning.¹

The system of private education, famous and significant for Britain, and one of the most attacked of British institutions, is scheduled for the most fundamental changes during the postwar reconstruction. With only a few free places for exceptionally gifted children, it became the privilege of those families who were willing and able to pay a high price to secure for their children the privilege of a high-class education which would in practice determine their careers to the best advantage. There existed a vast choice of private schools, from the kindergarten to the "public schools." Parents were not forbidden to have their children educated at home in preparation for one of these (secondary level) boarding schools if they so chose. Otherwise, there were specialized preparatories of more or less exclusive character. The most famous "public schools" for boys were Eton, Harrow, Rugby, and Winchester.

¹ See below, pp. 403 ff.

Ironically, the "public schools" originated as institutions for poor students and were then really public. Somehow, they developed into the most exclusive type of aristocratic boarding school existing in Britain. Their graduates have contributed heavily, one could almost say exclusively, to Britain's leadership; they preserve an *esprit de corps* throughout life. The schools are class schools *par excellence* and hence most open to attack and reform. They have remained the stronghold of tradition and conservatism.

The fundamental grievances against this educational system are aptly summarized by the Master of Balliol College, Oxford, in the following four points: (1) There is still, on the whole, one system of education for the poor and another for the rich. (2) For the poor, education ends at too early an age. (3) The conditions under which boys from the primary schools can climb the educational ladder to the universities are such that we are paying for a great blessing, democracy in the universities, with a new curse—the production of an intelligentsia in the worst sense of that term. (4) The excessive specialization of our higher secondary and university education is producing the same effect.¹

On the other hand, the author remarks that the English educational system offers the advantage of greater variety and adaptability which, as we may well add, pertained especially to progressive educational methodology and very modern experimental schools. The English educational system, decentralized as it grew up, developed its character just as haphazardly as the British constitution and the English common law. Yet it would be a mistake to assume that eager reformers might want to regiment education in the one-sided way some continental European nations chose to do. They would not consider variety an evil in itself. They would, however, refuse to accept the fact that the "decision as to which boys should go to which schools, or be trained in which system, depends not on ability or fitness, but on wealth and class."²

Adult education has been developed on a much larger scale in England than in the United States. While in Britain it was coordinated by a special Advisory Committee on Adult Education

¹ See A. D. Lindsay, "A Plan for Education," *Picture Post*, London, January 4, 1941.

² *Ibid.*

at the Board of Education, it is, in America, a stepchild of Congress and has very little money for its development.

Adult education in Britain is entirely cultural. It developed in the University Extension movement and its offspring, the Workers' Educational Association. The W.E.A., founded in 1903, has become an important institution. Artistic activities are fostered by the British Institute of Adult Education. The British Broadcasting Corporation has been helpful for "listening groups," and the Women's Institutes were especially interested in providing education for women. The activities are, for the most, of a cultural-artistic nature. Music, drama, and literature are extremely popular. In the purely educational fields, there are, in addition to the university extension courses, the People's Colleges and educational settlements. The London Working Men's College, one of the oldest, was founded in 1854 and is still well attended. In other places, for example in Sheffield, such a college was absorbed by the local university. Attempts were made to organize "a network of local colleges" which would be, at the same time, a "meeting place" and a center of educational activities. During the war, the public libraries, which offer an excellent system of library service in all towns and cities, have increasingly assisted adult-education work.

Except for the Boy Scouts, there were, up to the outbreak of war in 1939, no youth movements to speak of in Britain. Since then, a number of such organizations have been founded, mainly for the purpose of organizing all available help for the war effort. It is to be expected that these movements, if continued in one form or another, will be vastly different from any totalitarian youth movement, in fact, may offer the example of a perfect antithesis between a boy scout and a Hitler youth.

BRITISH EDUCATION AFTER 1939; THE NEW EDUCATION BILL

The British system of education has, between the two wars, striven to democratize itself. But it was only after the hardships of the war reached the shores of the British isles that the central government as well as the county and municipal authorities opened the way for a comprehensive and immediate educational reform, freeing the British people at last from the shackles of class educa-

tion, and introducing a thoroughly democratic educational philosophy.

Before the war, this tendency toward democratization had expressed itself through an increasing number of "free places" and scholarships in schools and universities. It could also be seen in the growing attention the government paid to the development of better vocational schools. It went hand in hand with the attempt to better the health of the country's youth by distributing free milk and free lunches. It meant that every student in teacher-training institutions received financial aid from the state.

As far as the war and the effects of the bombings permitted, this policy was expanded after 1939.¹ It has found its climax in the new Education Bill which the Churchill government introduced in 1943 and which was passed by Parliament in 1944, with the understanding that the proposed reforms will be postponed until, after the end of the war, enough teachers, buildings, and equipment are available.

The new Education Bill is indeed a radical change of policy when contrasted with the slow, half-hearted development of education in Britain during the past century. First of all it raises the school-leaving age from fourteen to fifteen and will further raise it to sixteen as soon as educational facilities are available. This, however, does not mean that fifteen- or sixteen-year-old youths are through with education: there will be so-called Young People's Colleges, a new type of part-time continuation training, compulsory for all who have not completed their secondary training, up to eighteen years of age.

There will be no fees for elementary and secondary education in Britain when the new bill is in force. In Scotland, faithful to tradition, all forms of post-primary education are free; England and Wales will now follow this practice. Instead of an education system which was classified into elementary, middle (vocational), secondary, and "public-school" strata, there will be one unified school system, divided into (1) elementary, (2) secondary, and (3) further education. Elementary courses will be for children up to eleven; all children willing and able may then continue to avail

¹ Cf. Walter Kotschnig, *Slaves Need No Leaders*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1943, pp. 11-19; 220-236.

themselves of secondary education and choose from a variety of academic or vocational secondary schools, which will be free of charge.

While greater stress than before will be given to religious instruction, the control of the state over religious schools—which constitute a considerable part of English schools—will be strengthened. Church authorities must conform in order to receive state subsidies. Such denominational schools which wish to remain private (as will, no doubt, the Catholic schools in Britain), must conform to the prescribed high standard of physical school requirements. In general, the system of state inspection of private schools will be compulsory instead of being left as formerly to the discretion of local authorities and the consent of the private institutions to be inspected. Youth services, particularly those introduced during the war, will be retained and developed further, including medical care, extracurricular and recreational activities, etc.

This reform will unquestionably democratize education in England to a degree hitherto unknown. The effect on the new generations is bound to be deep. There is only one gap left to fill: the future of the "public schools." It may be expected, however, that the revolutionizing of England's education is bound to decrease gradually the historic importance of the "school tie" and cause the famous schools like Eton, Winchester, Harrow, Rugby, and others to adapt themselves to the democratic state system of education.

Together with the plan for socializing medicine throughout the United Kingdom, the new Education Bill is certainly one of the most progressive actions Britain has taken during her entire history. It may well be indicative of a change of attitude in the mentality of the British people.¹

¹ *Educational Reconstruction*, presented by the Board of Education to Parliament in July, 1943, H. M. Stationery Office, London, 1943.

Basically, England's policy of educational decentralization has not been changed in the new Education Bill. The interpretation of educational policies is still left to the local authorities.

20 *Britain in Transition*

THE TRANSFORMATION OF BRITISH DEMOCRACY

The form and institutions of British liberalism and their growth and application to national life can be fully understood only when viewed on the basis of the peculiar and unique British character, a character that is fundamentally kind and tolerant, has a strong sense of fairness, is alien to hatred, and devoid of vindictiveness. The British may be distrustful of intellectuality but they are deeply civilized and humane.

This may well be the reason why the enormous inequalities in all the phases of life have been accepted as inevitable. The ruling class, educated in the "public schools," has had the most important positions in its possession, a fact about which the less privileged have not complained too loudly. Even the failure to reform an educational system based on class distinctions has caused relatively little objection. A British writer stated quite frankly that "the truth of the matter appears to be that the people of Britain do not care greatly for social and economic equality."¹ Certainly there has been in Britain a striking absence of class struggles of Marxist quality. British democracy has been based on political liberalism but has excluded social and economic equality of opportunities. "The traditional English conception of liberty consists, indeed, essentially in the absence of oppression."²

The war introduced a new factor. The Dunkirk episode and the subsequent bombings of British cities brought a new sense of unity to the nation. More important still, the colossal task of organizing the country for a protracted struggle became the prime endeavor of the government. Thus, indirectly, the war may be responsible for bringing about profound alterations in the structure of British society.

While primarily concerned with waging the war, the govern-

¹ W. A. Robson, "The British System of Government," in the survey, *British Life and Thought*, Longmans, Green and Company, New York, 1941, pp. 78-79.

² *Ibid.*, p. 79.

ment, which had meantime become a coalition of all parties, announced its intention of planning for the future on a basis of far-reaching social reforms. Without making too specific commitments, the government simply undertook to sponsor the study of social problems and their possible remedies as they would arise in the years to come. In this way, it kept the development well in hand and made the "British Revolution" a legal procedure.

In addition, it encouraged the drafting of many interim reports, compiled by semiofficial agencies, political parties, and religious and private groups.

In order to give a clear view of the trends which seem to be dominant and which may strongly modify the tenor of social and political life in Britain, there follows a brief survey which sketches the direction and scope of reconstruction plans on the basis of the most important material available at the present time.

GOVERNMENT POSTWAR PLANNING

General Policies. In January, 1941, the government created a commission for the study of reconstruction and postwar problems consisting of ministers under the chairmanship of Mr. Arthur Greenwood. The object of this commission was to seek practical solutions for the immediate problems of a transition from war to peace. Amplifying these terms, the prime minister stated that it was the task of Mr. Greenwood "to plan in advance a number of practical steps which it is indispensable to take if our society is to move forward, as it must. . . ." ¹ The questions involved deal predominantly with social and economic reconstruction, to be solved on the basis of the existing national unity "as has been achieved under the pressure of this present struggle for life." ²

Physical reconstruction is to be considered within the framework of the study of postwar problems under the following assumptions:

1. that the principle of planning will be accepted as national policy and that some central planning authority will be required;
2. that this authority will proceed on a positive policy for such matters as agriculture, industrial development and transport;

¹ Prime Minister Winston Churchill's statement in the House of Commons on January 22, 1941.

² *Ibid.*

3. that some services will require treatment on a national basis, some regionally and some locally.¹

In March, 1942, the government announced that the duties of handling reconstruction problems, hitherto performed by Minister without Portfolio, would be transferred to Paymaster-General Sir William Allen Jowitt. The intention to establish a central planning agency was also announced. It was to be headed by a Ministry of Works and Planning, a new version of the former Ministry of Works and Buildings.

In addition, the government named a number of committees to study special problems which might arise after the war. As special objects of study it mentioned, among others, the following items: reeducation in agriculture; rehabilitation (reeducation) of demobilized soldiers; education; electoral reorganization; increase of health services; modernizing of medical schools; and redistribution of population in connection with rebuilding. New industries and new lines of communication were to be planned; social insurance and various social services were to be enlarged considerably. However, although the various individuals and committees were duly studying the basic problems, no governmental directives on policy had been issued. The British government remained opposed to any declaration of postwar aims in a definite form. While accepting the Atlantic Charter without reservation, a more detailed program of ideological, political, social, and economic reorganization was withheld. British official opinion was expressed by Lord Cranborne who stated that there are "overwhelming reasons against a unilateral declaration of policy at the present stage. . . . The Atlantic Charter . . . lays down the fundamental principles on which the peace settlement must be based. . . . His Majesty's Government regard themselves as absolutely pledged to carry out . . . all the articles of the Atlantic Charter. . . . But if it is a mistake to make a declaration of war aims, that is not to say it is a mistake for a nation to prepare war aims. . . ." ² In other words, the British government set up machinery to prepare plans for possible use at a later time. It did not want to commit itself to reforms of too

¹ Statement by Lord Reith, Minister of Works and Buildings, House of Lords, February 26, 1941.

² Statement by Lord Cranborne, House of Lords, June 2, 1942.

definite a character and left the various agencies to proceed at their discretion.

The Beveridge Report. The official report of the noted Oxford economist, Sir William Beveridge, who solved Britain's man-power problem and, like Winston Churchill, was one of those who had warned for years against appeasement, is of special significance. Commissioned by the government to undertake a sweeping study on measures for social security after the war, he submitted the document to Commons on December 1, 1942, after nineteen months of work. The report is one of the most advanced documents ever sponsored by a nonsocialist government, in Britain or anywhere else. It may well become Britain's economic Magna Charta; it will remain a memorial testifying to the extent of the transformation of British ideals.¹

Sir William's report centered on two fundamental issues: unemployment and social insurance in conjunction with a minimum income guaranteed for all British subjects. He did not, however, suggest definite solutions for eliminating unemployment. He stated that unemployment was a separate problem to be dealt with by the government after the war. Instead of suggesting basic changes in British economy which might eliminate unemployment and thus cure the evil at the root, he tried to mitigate its consequences by offering a state insurance scheme guaranteeing freedom from want.

Certain gaps in the report itself can easily be filled from statements made publicly by Sir William before the publication of his report. His own ideas seem to be far more revolutionary than the provisions and points of departure of the actual report. He stressed that it was not in his mind to socialize or bolshevize Britain. Private initiative was to be retained—if only within the framework of governmental planning. Hence laissez-faire economy was out of the question. In two speeches he made statements to the effect that basic economic principles were on the verge of change, thus requiring those fundamental modifications of the existing socioeconomic system which he had failed to mention in his report. "Private enterprise at private risk was a good ship and one that

¹ The Report appeared in the United States by arrangement with His Majesty's Stationery Office as *Social Insurance and Allied Services, Report by Sir William Beveridge*, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1942.

brought us far, but it was for fair weather and open seas. For the ice-bound straits of war and in finding a way out of them a vessel of sturdier build is needed. Private control of the means of production, whatever might be said for it on other grounds, cannot be described as an essential liberty of the British people. Not more than a tiny fraction of them ever enjoyed that right."¹

If these views should be accepted as guiding principles, then the state would have to undergo a complete reorganization. Hence Sir William said that "any further extension of State activity in the economic sphere involves reconsideration of the machinery and methods of government, including both the central organization and the personnel of the civil service." His conclusion was that "the civil service is quite admirable for the kind of job it has had to do in the past. For the new jobs one may want a new type of official and a new organization. The fluidity of resources and the absence of barriers to the transfer of men from one type of work to another are as necessary as national planning itself."²

Without accepting the Soviet ideology, Sir William was bold enough to admit that the experience of the Soviets might be useful. A reasonable national planning and fluidity of labor, he claimed, would create not only employment for all but also much benefit for the communities. Political freedom, freedom of opinion, freedom of personal property, and freedom to save one's income would be the basis of any reconstruction.³

Such unconventional reasoning was based on the introduction of two new ideas. First, national planning was to restrict the freedom of action of private enterprise (though not eliminating its initiative when in accord with national policies); second, a new conception of property was introduced by referring, in the enumeration of essential freedoms, to *personal* rather than private property—a differentiation which we also find in the Soviet Constitution of 1936.

However, the guiding principles of Sir William's social-security plan showed very clearly that he did not propose to adopt Marxism,

¹ Speech by Sir William Beveridge as reported in *The New York Times*, October 26, 1942.

² Sir William Beveridge's speech before the Fabian Society, London, November 22, 1942.

³ Speech as reported on October 26, 1942.

although probably no reformer can escape some socialist influence while planning for the betterment of the lot of man. Essentially, Beveridge suggested social security for all citizens, young and old, male and female, "from the cradle to the grave." In order to achieve this goal with a minimum of friction and resistance on the part of vested interests, he did not hesitate to advocate pushing aside the powerful insurance companies and reorganizing the whole civil-service apparatus whose hidden influence had remained unaffected by changes in governments.

The high light of the plan was a social insurance system of widest range which was to cover unemployment, health, accident, marriage, childbirth, allowances for children, retirement for the aged, and funeral expenses. The coverage was a universal one, with joint contributions by employers, workers, and the government. According to the plan, the population was to be divided into six classes for purposes of social security:

Class I: Employees (persons whose normal occupation is employment under contract service).

Class II: Others gainfully occupied including employers, traders, and independent workers of all kinds.

Class III: Housewives (married women of working age).

Class IV: Others of working age not gainfully occupied.

Class V: Below working age.

Class VI: Retired above working age.¹

The distribution of benefits, costing the British people roughly 10 to 11 per cent of the national income, would include free medical, dental, hospital, nursing, and convalescent services. It would entail a virtual abolition of private insurance because the government would have to take over private industrial insurance companies whose operating costs were considered unduly high.

The ideological basis of this plan is clearly freedom from want,² which the government regards as a crucial postwar issue. The question as to whether freedom from want can be attained in the near future depends on four conditions: first, that in the postwar world nations set themselves the aim to cooperate for production in peace rather than plot mutual destruction by war, whether open or concealed; second, that the British economic policy and

¹ Beveridge, *op. cit.*, pp. 9-11.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 7-9.

structure after the war shall be adjusted in such a way as to maintain productive employment; third, that a plan for social security—in other words a plan for the maintenance of a minimum income—shall be adopted free from unnecessary costs of administration; fourth, that decisions regarding the nature of this plan shall be made during the war and not postponed until after its end.

It would be the task of a Ministry of Social Security to organize and administer the plan which is certain to encounter the obstruction of those still clinging to laissez-faire economy. "Old conceptions of free trade and protection don't square with the economic needs of today," wrote Sir William, thereby revealing the twentieth-century economic philosophy on the basis of which his plan is conceived. It is a heartening document and may well exercise a great deal of influence not only in Britain but throughout the civilized world, not excluding the United States, where some of Beveridge's recommendations have already been anticipated in a milder form.

LABOR'S REFORM PLANS

The Beveridge plan, radical as it may seem, was sponsored by a British government which is a coalition of conservative and liberal elements but, as a whole, more conservative than progressive. It is only natural that the Labor Party, officially representing the masses of workers, should be vitally interested in both the domestic and international aspects of planning. The party published a manifesto in 1918 entitled *Labor and Social Order*. The disappointment over the lack of success of this program was not forgotten when, after the outbreak of the Second World War, the party pledged itself to fight "until Nazism and Fascism are overthrown" but, at the same time, expressed its belief that "the world is a single economic unit" for which "we must have international economic planning."¹

The Labor Party has also published an Interim Report on Reconstruction, and it may be enlightening to compare its demands with the ideas emanating from official sources. The basis of the Labor plan is an indictment of governmental policy between 1918 and 1939—a policy which, incidentally, their own party members

¹ See Annual Conference of the British Labor Party, 1941.

were not able or willing to change while in power. The privileged forces, the report states, "sought to meet the social and economic problems of the twentieth century with ideas which were already obsolete. They refused to recognize that a democratic civilization is incompatible, under conditions of modern science and technology, with either the parochialism of national sovereignty on the one hand, or the confinement of freedom on the other, to those whose possession of property gave them, and them alone, access to economic security. . . ."

After the lessons learned during the years between the wars, the Labor Party has arrived at certain definite conclusions: An unplanned society cannot maintain a reasonable standard of living for many of its citizens; private enterprise will think in terms of private profit, resulting in mass unemployment; backing systems like Nazism or Fascism by tacit consent or appeasement is but a consequence of private control of the means of production because of vested interests and opposition to planning; only the extreme war emergency made it imperative to subordinate private interests to planning for victory.

When this victory has been achieved, according to the report, the problems arising will be "no less profound" than the struggle against Hitlerism. The Labor Party therefore set out to enumerate four items as a "deliberate part of our war effort": first, to provide full employment; second, to "rebuild a Britain to standards worthy of the men and women who have preserved it"; third, to organize social services covering health, food, and old-age care; fourth, to provide equal educational opportunities for all. Interestingly, in the report, the party referred to the President of the United States who enumerated essential political and economic privileges for a healthy democracy, such as equality of opportunities, jobs for those who can work, security for those who need it, the ending of special privileges for the few, the preservation of civil liberties for all, and the constant rise of the standard of living based upon technological progress. These ideals are implied in the Atlantic Charter; the fact that the British government has declared its adherence to the Charter amounts, in the opinion of the Labor Party, to official acceptance of these principles. The party is careful to stress that it does not think that the transformation of society can take place over-

night. It does point out, however, that the acceptance of principles must, immediately, bring about a change in the control of "essential instruments of production."

In the international field, the party advocates an early understanding on postwar programs between the United Nations, and arrives at the following conclusions. Aggressor nations must, after their defeat, be kept disarmed; the principle of collective security must be reintroduced; this principle must go hand in hand with a recognition of the interdependence of nations, but each country, not excluding the defeated Axis nations, is entitled to its form of government, subject only to acceptance and respect of the four freedoms and their international implications.

At the time of the publication of the Beveridge Report, the Labor Party set forth further points elaborating its previous demands. Arthur Greenwood, the Labor spokesman, reiterated that a return to prewar standards and conceptions was out of the question; consequently, he thought the government must plan now so as to avoid the possibility of facing the immediate postwar period with inadequate preparations. Moreover, it was recommended that most of the war agencies should be retained after the cessation of hostilities until the functioning of the agencies of reorganization was assured. In detail, the Labor Party called for a "development board" with a parallel finance board, to prepare assistance for Britain, and a similar organism for countries ruined by war and those undeveloped economically and culturally. It goes without saying that one of the most emphatic demands of Labor remained the creation of the best educational system possible, free for all children and adults.

AUSTRALIA'S RADICAL PLAN

In his report, Sir William Beveridge urged the attention of his readers to the New Zealand plan, which he considered rather similar to his own. However, the government of Australia has by far outdone every country in mapping out a radical departure from prewar economy and society.¹

¹ It is of interest that the relations between Australia and the Soviet Union have been increasingly cordial since the outbreak of the German-Russian war; one should not forget that the predominance of Labor in both countries happens to coincide with a growing industrialization.

Australia's Labor government not only proposes complete social security for all but also wants the state to assume the burden. In other words, while the Beveridge plan suggests a contributory scheme—insurance premiums are to be paid by employers, employees, and the state—the Australian plan proposes to be noncontributory. In addition, a comprehensive program of socialized medicine forms an essential part of the plan, together with slum clearance to be financed as public works. Australia is to be divided into medical districts, each containing health centers open to everyone regardless of his economic status. The government proposes to engage for this purpose at the outset two thousand doctors, many nurses, and a big hospital staff.

Very different from Britain's Beveridge report which on the whole aims to retain private enterprise, the Australian scheme wants industry to be state-controlled and education to be entirely free for all, including university study. If this sounds like the fulfillment of a socialist's dream, one should not forget that there is a fundamental difference with the Marxist doctrine, namely, that the necessity of a class struggle has not been recognized and that, therefore, a proletarian dictatorship is out of the question. Moreover, no attempt will be made to establish a communist society.

Australia, like the United States, has a federal system of government. Since the plan calls for a centralized administration, the individual states of the Australian Commonwealth would have to give up part of their sovereignty for the common good. It should be mentioned that this plan has not been published in its integrated form but that it developed during the year 1942; it was made known gradually, not all at once. While the spirit of the plan can be clearly recognized, its details may be modified by its own originators before it goes to parliament.

THE CHURCH AND PLANNING

Finally, the church too has taken cognizance of the imperative necessity for postwar reform. The most radical member of the Anglican Church, the Rev. Hewlett Johnson, Dean of Canterbury, seemed very definitely on the side of Labor in his demands that banking and big industry be controlled by the state. Dean Johnson was well acquainted with the Soviet Union; in his popular book *The*

Soviet Power,¹ he gave a very vivid, if perhaps too optimistic, account of the Soviets' achievements. For him, the Soviet system was a long step toward the realization of a better working Christianity. No doubt Dean Johnson was inclined to go farther in some respects than the Anglican Church hierarchy might conceivably care to venture. The statement of the Archbishop of Canterbury, the late Rev. William Temple, probably represents the opinion of the majority of the Anglican Church; and it is important to remember that the Church of England has a great deal of influence upon public opinion if not on governmental decisions.

The Archbishop recognized the necessity that the church concern itself with social problems on a much vaster scale than heretofore. Mere charity, he knew, is not enough if the church is to retain its influence. While stating that "there is nothing wrong about profits as such," he recognized that an "economic system of justice" must be built upon the conception that the consumer is not the means but the end of the economic process. In order to direct the economic mind toward such an ideal, the Archbishop suggested a new "Christian order," namely, the "fullest possible development of individual personality in the widest and deepest possible fellowship." Specifically, he proposed six points to achieve this goal: first, every child should grow up in a decent environment both at home and in the community; second, every child should have equal educational opportunities and his education should be inspired by faith in God; third, every citizen should be secure in the possession of a minimum income, sufficient to bring up his children under good circumstances; fourth, every citizen should have a voice in the conduct of the nation's economy and "the satisfaction of knowing that his labor is directed to the wellbeing of the community"; fifth, after the war, every citizen should have sufficient leisure time and two days of rest a week and every employee should be given annual vacations with pay in order to further his personal interests and health of mind and body; sixth, every citizen should be granted freedom of worship, speech, assembly and association.²

This is a generous program although it would preserve the social

¹ Hewlett Johnson, Dean of Canterbury, *The Soviet Power*, Modern Age Books, Inc., New York, 1940.

² Cf. The Most Reverend William Temple, Archbishop of Canterbury, *Christianity and Social Order*, Penguin Books, New York, 1942.

status quo to an even greater extent than Sir William Beveridge's report is willing to concede. The larger issues on whose settlement the realization of such a program would depend, are briefly defined in a clear and down-to-earth formulation by a "Committee to study the foundations of a just and durable peace" in March, 1943. The theses of the Committee are called the "Six Pillars of Peace" and signed by the Archbishops of Canterbury and York and some of the most prominent British churchmen and teachers. These are the "Six Pillars":

1. Political collaboration between the United Nations and ultimately between all nations.
2. Collaboration on economic and financial matters of world-wide import.
3. Adaptation of the world's treaty structure to changing conditions.
4. Assurance, through international organization, of ultimate autonomy for subject peoples.
5. Control of armaments.
6. Establishment of the principle of the rights of people everywhere to intellectual and religious liberty.

The Catholic bishops of England, too, have drafted "minimum conditions for Christian life" which demand some social reforms but, on the whole, are the most conservative of all. They state cautiously that "the enormous inequality in the distribution of wealth and control of the lives of the masses by a comparatively few rich people is contrary to social justice" but they do not make any practical suggestions as to the remedy. They agree, with the Anglican clergy, that decent living conditions are of extreme importance, and they urge industry to grant its employees a living wage, meaning one that will make possible comfort and savings. On the other hand, they advocate the abolition of work for wives, the abolition of birth control, religious education, and a ban on obscene books by a board of publishers. These are issues of secondary urgency by comparison with the pressing problems Britain and the world will face during the postwar reconstruction period.¹

To complete this survey, it should be stated that there are also groups which demand a return to prewar ideals. The so-called Individualist Group wants individualism restored to its fullest. Profit,

¹ Pastoral letter of the Roman Catholic Church of England, June 21, 1942.

they claim, should be regarded as a proper motive of commerce and "trade whether domestic or international, should be freed from unnecessary restrictions."¹ The phrasing of their Manifesto evinces a dislike for new tendencies which are comprehensively described as "regimentation of opinion." It is not difficult to recognize the old-school tradition of self-centered nationalism, fostered by representatives of those groups who do not favor reforms that might impair their privileged position.

However, such an attitude is rarer in war-ravaged Britain than in America which has not experienced the horrors of war on its own soil. It is hard to believe that the British people will ever endorse a return to outmoded times. But their revolution may proceed on the basis of the continuity of their history, thus avoiding a violent break with their cherished traditions.

CONCLUSION: PROBLEMS BRITAIN FACES

The continuous development of political liberties in the centuries during which little England grew to be the mother country of the greatest empire that the world has known will always remain an outstanding monument in the political evolution of man. To be sure, economic democracy has not been achieved in Britain. State and church alike have accepted social and economic inequality as inevitably in the order of things. Parliament has represented predominantly the interest of the upper and middle classes which, in turn, have monopolized education, thereby denying the masses equality of opportunities. However, all the injustices, inequalities, and class distinctions do not invalidate the picture of steady, if unfinished, progress. The practical development of a liberal political philosophy is characteristic of Britain's constitutional history.

The ideological power of British constitutionalism has been such that, in spite of social and economic disabilities, the lower classes have remained loyal to king and parliament. This is all the more remarkable when one considers how great the privileges of birth and money have remained to our own time. The reluctance of the ruling classes to acknowledge the significance of the cata-

¹ "Manifesto on British Liberty" by the "Individualist Group," *International Conciliation*, No. 384, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, November, 1942, pp. 452-454.

strophic years from 1914 to 1918 and their inclination, between 1933 and 1939, to regard Nazism as a possible safeguard against popular movements, have substantially contributed to the disaster which befell the world in 1939.

It was only the impact of the Second World War which induced the British conservatives to admit, up to a point, the necessity of a change of domestic policy. They saw that mere political democracy and the razing of some slums would never solve the social and economic problems bound to arise after the war. The realization of the limitations of British power and the military performance of the Soviet Union also led most of them to revise their views about the latter country.

The British leaders agreed that it was impossible this time to go back where they left off when the war began. The problem for Britain—and for the world—remains how to combine political liberty with social security. Obviously, this must have been in the mind of Beveridge, for the British are too sober to believe in the idea of a classless society. This problem cannot be solved, however, without a reinterpretation of democracy in social and economic terms. It involves the difficult task of reeducation in modern democratic living. Intellectual understanding and ideological assent are equally necessary; longstanding traditions will have to be modified or abolished. In economic terms, the world faces a “profound modification of the conception of property”¹ and will have to divert its attention from profit to service. Such an attitude needs mental preparation. Since 1940, the establishment of planned production and supervised consumption, and the elimination of want under state control, have made quick progress in war-torn Britain, particularly after the dark days of Dunkirk and the mass bombings of British cities. War is a great teacher; Professor Carr goes so far as to call it “the most powerful instrument in effecting . . . transformation”;² for him, “war is at the present time the most purposeful of our social institutions; and we shall make no progress towards its elimination until we recognize and provide for the essential function which it performs.”³

¹ Carr, *op. cit.*, p. 80.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 116–117.

³ *Loc. cit.*

Yet the current necessities of war alone cannot transform the traditions of a mature nation, but they may serve to initiate a new era. The creation of new social conceptions cannot be a mere matter of months or even of a few years. The spirit of a new world may be born in war but it will take a sound peace, and a long period of peace, for it to grow.

Moreover, it is dangerous to believe that postwar plans, however excellent they may be, will immediately solve all problems. When the guns cease firing, political battles will again rage violently. The proponents of social and economic discrimination will not yield without a protracted struggle; neither will the advocates of Marxian communism easily give up their fight for a proletarian dictatorship.

While it may not be possible, for a long time to come, to picture a reformed postwar world in definite terms, war-torn Britain offers some clearly visible prospects of a constitutional state, living in a culturally close but politically loose union with its dominions, granting India the rights of an independent dominion, and gradually freeing its colonies from central control through educating them toward the goal of self-administration. It is conceivable that Britain may eventually discard the philosophy of its former ruling classes, further restricting their political power by increasing the democratization of parliament; she will no doubt continue to grant wide freedom to local authorities but may demand, at the same time, the subordination of personal and group interests to national planning. The process of planning may serve gradually to right basic injustices.

Britain is already committed to enlarge its social services, to introduce a new educational system designed to wipe out class distinctions, to eliminate slums, and to put every citizen under the care of a free and universal medical supervision. Britain, because of its sufferings through the rigors of war, may well be the first country in the world to furnish the example of democratic evolution from a constitutional class state to a cooperative liberal democracy.

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SECTION TWO: THE UNITED STATES

21 *America in the World Conflict*

AMERICA'S UNIQUE POSITION

The military conclusion of the Second World War will merely close the first phase of the world-wide struggle, for the issues of rehabilitation and reorientation which will confront the victors are even greater than the military problems. While the organization of a postwar settlement will obviously require the active cooperation of all the United Nations, the burden of responsibility will lie clearly at first upon the shoulders of the United States, Britain, and Russia. China, the fourth big power among the leading states of the United Nations, will hardly be able for an extended period to contribute more than her prestige and her moral support.

The question thus arises as to which of the United Nations may be sufficiently strong, both politically and economically, to assume the leadership as the *primus inter pares*, i.e., to help the needy nations by supplying food, clothing, and medical assistance; to mediate and conciliate antagonisms which manifest themselves in a score of problems between some of the United Nations; to give spiritual and intellectual comfort to social and political destitutes in all climates by offering them hope for the Four Freedoms.

It would be difficult for Britain to assume this burden. Her energies will be fully absorbed by the task of domestic reconstruction and the reorganization of the Commonwealth. Also, her past imperial record may not make her acceptable to a number of peoples. Humanity has grown weary of imperialism, and Britain's tendency toward deimperialization still does not carry conviction in many parts of the world. Psychologically, Britain is too homogeneous, too far removed from the melting-pot idea accepted in both the United States and the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Union, on the other hand, will also hardly be in a

position to assume this leadership for the world at large even though its influence may become dominant in such regions as central and southeastern Europe. First of all, Russia will need a long time to rebuild her devastated areas and to develop her industrial and agricultural production to the point where she may reach the level of the Western democracies. Secondly, Russia's ideology, while acclaimed by the masses in many lands, is by no means universally accepted; in fact, the Soviets themselves have resolved to refrain from exporting ideological propaganda for the time being. Everywhere men are tired of dictatorships. They need solid, strong leadership, but they want to remain free to decide upon a way of life of their own choosing.

There remains the United States as a possible candidate for the tremendous task of leadership in universal rehabilitation. Blessed with a geographically advantageous position, much less exposed to the ravages of war than, for example, European countries, the United States possesses not only great natural wealth but, what is at least as important, the trained man power and the technical facilities to exploit its resources. It has ample living space; its population is large, its communication system excellent, and the organization of its industry and agriculture unsurpassed. America's role in the First and Second World Wars has been such as not to impair its basic economic strength.

In addition to its great material power, America is ideologically in an unusual position. It began its independent existence as a democratic republic, which it has remained ever since. There have been times when parts of the Union did not exactly honor the great heritage of humanitarianism and liberty as it was expounded by Washington, Jefferson, Jackson, and Lincoln. In our own time it is possible to point to serious shortcomings, but it is true nevertheless that the tradition of democracy is inextricably woven into the pattern of American life.

Through a century and a half the United States has proved that its political philosophy is not a mere theory. It has championed the cause of the oppressed and opened a haven for them. It has offered to humanity more opportunities than any other country. America has shown to the world that it is possible for people of many different nationalities to live and work together harmoni-

ously and has thereby shown by its example how unnecessary it is to introduce discriminations for the sake of a supposed national homogeneity.

By comparison with the great imperialistic nations of Europe, the American record has been relatively mild. The vastness of the American continent has made it unnecessary to look to the acquisition of overseas possessions and the tradition of aloofness from the outside world has militated in the same direction.

Likewise, the problem of minorities has been solved with success, or rather it has never been allowed to arise—among the white population at least. The fact that the country was settled from the first by refugees from oppression and that, until recently, immigration has been unrestricted, has given rise to a tradition of tolerance, national and religious, which has thrown deep roots into the American way of life. The fact that newcomers have on the whole been allowed to move freely, both territorially and socially, has produced among them a genuine desire for assimilation. To be sure, discrimination, on social or other grounds, is not entirely unknown, but it is true nevertheless that there do not exist national minorities in the European sense.

For all these reasons, when the time comes to help and comfort exhausted peoples, when man in all corners of the earth will ask for better living, the historic task of leadership may well fall to America because America seems best in a position to help. Having established a modern democracy in conjunction with its independence, the United States will be in a position, if it wishes, to assume the leadership in extending the democratic principle over large sections of the earth.

This does not mean, however, the imposition of an "American Century" upon a weary postwar world in so far as the phrase has connotations of an American ideological imperialism. The government and politics of the United States remain an internal matter; their theory and practice may or may not be adopted by other nations. If there is an "American Century" in the making, it must only be in the sense that American political philosophy, as expressed in the Declaration of Independence and the Bill of Rights—and their modern version, the Four Freedoms—will become widely accepted by other nations; in the sense that the century fol-

lowing the French Revolution could be called a "French Century" from the influence of that revolution abroad.

There need be no senseless imitation of the American governmental system. All that is suggested is a consideration of the worth of the political ideals developed in America during the past century and a half: a philosophy of humaneness based on the value and the dignity of the individual. This philosophy advocates the principle of the individual right to the pursuit of happiness; it is flexible and adaptable to different times and circumstances. It does not matter that America itself has not yet reached this goal: it has at least pointed the way, established a procedure of travel, and commenced the voyage ahead of others.

If America is to accept the opportunity as well as the responsibilities of postwar leadership, it must also make provision for domestic reforms, mainly of a social and economic nature. In the following, some suggestions for a reinterpretation of American democracy will be examined in brief. But a short sketch of America's present political status must precede this discussion.

THE UNIQUE CHARACTER OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY

1. *Preliminary Observations.* Environment strongly determines man's character and thinking. The political ideal of democracy which was tried out now and again in Europe since the days of Greece's aristocratic democracy and of Palestine's theocratic democracy acquired a different aspect in the New World. The burden of century-old traditions which hampered the most radical European reformers was more easily cast off in America. The great Thomas Jefferson was for all practical purposes a far more successful rebel against political traditions, so far as result and duration were concerned, than Marat, Robespierre, and Danton put together. His Declaration of Independence, America's first "New Deal," adopted by the Philadelphia Congress in 1776, was a decisive departure from all existing political precedent. It is this Declaration, whose first paragraphs have remained so surprisingly young, which has given the United States a philosophy of its own, American yet universal. For the principles of Thomas Jefferson are not nationally limited. They are deeply humane and hence applicable throughout the world.

The thirteen colonies had managed to unite—up to a point—in the effort to secure independence. But independence once secured, the task remained of welding a nation out of discordant interests no longer held together by an immediate common purpose.

The solution was the acceptance of the federal idea. The young nation needed a strong central government but the states that formed the Union desired to remain independent to the greatest possible extent. The Constitutional Convention of 1787 adopted a federal system which the great British statesman Gladstone called “the most wonderful work ever struck off at a given time by the brain and purpose of man.”¹ The final form of the American Constitution was an excellent piece of original statesmanship which has proved its power by surviving many other constitutions. It was by no means an easy task to induce the states to ratify the Constitution. The final ratification, after one of the most critical periods of American history, was a manifestation of remarkably sound political sense.

Even the bitter contest between the Federalists and the anti-Federalists turned out to be beneficial. Those who feared too strong a central power secured as the price for their support the first ten amendments to the Constitution, the Bill of Rights adopted in 1791. This American Magna Charta, once again showing Thomas Jefferson's concern for the preservation of popular rights, became an additional asset of American political philosophy by completing and codifying the spirit of the Declaration of Independence.

It is highly significant that each period of major crisis in American history produced leaders who were permitted by the people to guide the fortunes of the nation safely through the storms it had to weather. Washington was the first. During the era of consolidation, it was Jefferson, and later Jackson, who stabilized the gains of the American Revolution. Monroe set forth a wise foreign policy suitable to nineteenth century conditions and America's lack of naval power. Then, years later, it was Abraham Lincoln who saved the fundamentals of American democracy. In a period of prevalent and universal imperialism and militarism, Theodore Roosevelt waved the “big stick” to ensure the world's respect for American

¹ Gladstone in *North American Review*, CXXVII, 185, quoted by W. B. Guitteau, *The History of the United States*, Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, 1942, p. 181.

power though remaining essentially a liberal in domestic policies. After the First World War, it was Woodrow Wilson who clearly recognized the futility of isolationism and opened the minds of the people of the United States to the dangers inherent in such a policy. In the crises following the great depression, Franklin Delano Roosevelt guided the country through the dangers of a world beset by totalitarian revolutions. It is a measure of the vitality of American democracy that it has been able to produce and retain the leaders it needed.

The general aspects of American democracy have universally influenced the social and political evolution of democratic thought. They have helped to maintain the morale of oppressed peoples. They will continue to offer a hope and an example for the universal reorganization following the Second World War. In their fundamental greatness, they need no rejuvenation: what they need is a new interpretation and application to present day circumstances.

2. *The Constitution of the United States.* Twelve years after the signing of the Declaration of Independence, in 1788, the Constitution was ratified by nine of the thirteen states. On a few pages, the machinery of democratic government was set up, supplemented by charter provisions, especially the Bill of Rights.

There are six fundamental principles which characterize American constitutional philosophy. First, American government is *representative government*, as any democratic government should be. This principle remains as valid as it has ever been. The people as a whole should be represented and not only certain sections or classes; there can be no other interpretation of the principle of representative government. Second, the principle of *dual government* expresses the idea of a federal system in which the rights of the national (central) government are limited to definite fields while the state governments have their own rights upon which the Federal government is not permitted to infringe. Certain powers of the national government cannot be curtailed by the states, for example, decisions of foreign policy; others may not be touched by the Federal government, for example, trade within the states.

Third is the principle of limiting the power of government by guaranteeing *inalienable rights of the individual*, such as were proclaimed in the Declaration of Independence by the founding fa-

thers of America, and then again in our era in the Four Freedoms. Fourth is the principle of the *independence of the judiciary*, the Supreme Court of the United States and the other Federal courts which remain independent of the executive branch (the president) as well as of Congress, and whose members are appointed for life. Fifth is the *principle of checks and balances*, a doctrine first advocated by Montesquieu when he warned that there could be no liberty when the legislative and executive powers were united in the same person or in the same body of public officials. American government is separated into three branches: the executive (the president); the legislative (Congress); and the judicial (Supreme and Federal courts). Each of these branches performs its tasks independently of the others, and can act as a check upon them, thereby safeguarding the people against a concentration of too much power in the hands of one of the branches.

The sixth principle demands *joint power of the president and the Senate in the determination of foreign policy*. The people, represented by the Senate, are to have a voice in shaping the relations of the United States with outside powers. The decision of the president, who may negotiate treaties, is not binding. It will be remembered that the Senate refused to ratify the League of Nations Covenant and the Treaty of Versailles. It should also be pointed out that the Atlantic Charter has never appeared as a piece of legislation before the Senate and therefore has not the binding character of law for the United States.

The success of the Constitution surpassed even Thomas Jefferson's expectations. He believed the Constitution would be adhered to and government remain virtuous so long as the country remained largely agricultural; but he had no faith in the durability of the Constitution should urban life develop along European lines when "governments will become corrupt as in Europe."¹ This pessimism has proved unjustified. On the other hand, the changing conditions of life and economics, reflected in political and economic crises of an increasingly serious nature, especially after 1918, have given rise to a demand for reinterpretations and readjustments of the original framework of government.

¹ Thomas Jefferson, *Writings*, P. L. Ford, ed., G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York, 1894, Vol. IV, p. 479.

It is reassuring, and characteristic of the American spirit, that the discussion of such reinterpretations and reforms is taken for granted, just as it is significant that the Constitution has so successfully ridden all the storms that it has met. "This stability is the more remarkable when the profound and revolutionary change that has taken place in the social life of man since the Constitution was adopted is taken into account."¹ Indeed, the actual text of the Constitution still stands as it was originally adopted, yet its practical application has undergone changes without impairing its spirit. Chief Justice Marshall's opinion on this flexibility of the Constitution was clearly expressed when he said that it was "intended to endure for ages to come and consequently to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs."² Perhaps one of the reasons for this phenomenon is the fact that the powers of government are merely enumerated instead of being closely defined in the Constitution.

The movements for reform of governmental machinery center on the demand for a change in the executive branch of the government. Some want to introduce cabinet government such as exists in Britain. This system is held to be more efficient in times of emergency and crisis because it permits quicker action. It is also considered more democratic because the prime minister may be dismissed at any time by parliament if his policies are not endorsed. In the United States, it is claimed, the president is hampered by a slow-working congressional machine; he remains in office for four full years and can be removed only by impeachment. Would-be reformers refer to no less a witness than President Woodrow Wilson who, in his doctor's thesis, had commented on the president's office in these words: "Nothing short of a well-nigh impossible impeachment can unmake a President, except four successions of the seasons. . . . A Prime Minister must keep himself in favor with the majority, a President need only keep alive. . . ."³

This is not the place to discuss the possible advantages and disadvantages of this reform or of proposed changes related to times

¹ James M. Beck, *The Constitution of the United States*, Doubleday, Doran, and Company, Inc., New York, 1941, p. 174.

² *Ibid.*, p. 177.

³ Quoted by Henry Hazlitt, *A New Constitution Now*, Whittlesey House, (McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc.), New York, 1942, pp. 28-29.

of war and emergency, such as better electoral methods, or the much-fought-about abolition of poll taxes; of the liquidation of the spoils system and the appointment of judicial personnel on the basis of merit rather than political connections; of the abolition of merely historical institutions such as the Electoral College; and last, but not least, of a revision of the prerogatives of the Senate.

Much more difficult and controversial are problems of interpretation which may affect basic principles of the Constitution. For example, how far can dual government be preserved in a time when a greater centralization of government becomes an imperative prerequisite for the efficient prosecution of the war and for the readjustment to peace? How far will the individual states be obliged to yield their prerogatives if and when central planning, both at home and in the international field, begins to function? How much of the system of "checks and balances" can be retained if it should paralyze the war effort or hamper a vigorous foreign policy that must be flexible and capable of quick decisions? How much will the concept of individualism have to be sacrificed to the needs of a future cooperative society?

There is no doubt that greatly changed conditions make reinterpretations necessary. In view of the magnitude of the changes connected with the World War and its aftermath, the ideological adjustment of any democratic Constitution is liable to limp behind the changes that occur. If an equilibrium is not established, conflicts will arise which may endanger the whole system upon which the possibility of adjustments is predicated. That is why, for a considerable time to come, ideological reinterpretations are more urgent than changes in governmental machinery. It is the spirit rather than the technical apparatus which will decide the progress and development of American democracy.

3. *Educational Philosophy.* Every analysis of American democracy which does not consider American educational philosophy and practice fails to take into account one of the most significant traits of this democracy. Conversely, "in any realistic definition of education for the United States, therefore, must appear the whole philosophy and practice of democracy."¹

¹ Charles A. Beard, *The Unique Function of Education in American Democracy*, Educational Policies Commission, Washington, D. C., 1937, p. 89.

American philosophy, as a whole, never exhausted itself in abstract speculations; it rather stressed the practical aspects of social living and education in a democracy. John Dewey, although somewhat one-sided in his pragmatic point of view, was the pioneer of this trend. Even if today some of his theses do not entirely fit the needs, he, more than any other American educator, has helped to clarify American social philosophy. He recognized the necessity of a school system and methodology reflecting democratic life perhaps even more clearly than his great predecessors, men like Horace Mann, Henry Barnard, or G. Stanley-Hall. The desire to "socialize the individual" or, in other words, to make social beings out of new members of the community, has from then on been a dominant influence in determining democratic character formation in the United States. This cannot and must not be understood as an education for life in a crystallized society, once established and never abandoned. While it is necessary to uphold certain standards of behavior as a cultural basis of mutual relationship, the members of a democratic community should be free to create new standards whenever they find that the old ones are no longer satisfactory.

This school of thought is reflected in American educational philosophy which, liberal and progressive, for the most part rejects the immutability of theories. As democracy itself goes through a continuous process of growth, so education for democracy must remain subject to the influences of the manifold currents of life. Such mental and political growth can be achieved through social experience by which man enriches his understanding and broadens his horizon. Once the child has been "socialized" in school, instead of having been merely drilled and indoctrinated, he will quickly become aware of his duties toward society. "To say that education is a social function, securing direction and development in the immature through their participation in the life of the group to which they belong, is to say in effect that education will vary with the quality of life which prevails in a group."¹ It is evident that the "quality and quantity of the socialization depends upon the habits and aims of the group."² If this group happens to be

¹ John Dewey, *Democracy and Education*, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1916, p. 94.

² *Ibid.*, p. 96.

democratic, and therefore adapts itself to the continuing changes which take place in the life of the community, education itself becomes of necessity flexible and its goal is likewise flexible.

Translated into practical application, this philosophy will determine the nature of a school system fit to serve a democracy. The American school system is on the way to solving the problems raised by so complex a society as is democracy. There remains, however, much to be done. Educational reforms will have to be considered for the elimination of obstacles which are still in the way of a total equality of opportunities.¹ Since an "educational ladder" has been established in the United States which enables the child to follow through his studies in a unified organization of free elementary and high schools, and which prevents class education and intellectual snobbery, a solid foundation exists upon which equal educational opportunities can be offered to all students, regardless of their families' social or economic standing.

Furthermore, compulsory elementary education does not cover the needs of the training of future members of a democratic society. The goal must be a free universal compulsory high-school education. The desire to keep young people in school until they are seventeen or eighteen years of age has made headway for moral, political, and vocational reasons. Various types of academic or vocational high schools could easily take care of the individual aptitudes of students. Two or three years of junior high school, as a period of transition between the elementary and high-school courses, may provide ample opportunities to determine the most suitable type of studies and to guide the adolescents into the academic or vocational branches of their last years of secondary education.

However, care must be taken to avoid a one-sided utilitarian training for jobs as the focal point of education. If postwar planning succeeds in diminishing the menace of economic insecurity, liberal education should come into its own again. Opportunities should be provided for occupational training but the ultimate aim of education in a democracy must remain the development of the personality of each individual student. The higher the cultural

¹ Cf. George S. Counts, *The Selective Character of American Secondary Education*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1922.

standard of citizens, the higher the level of the democratic society which they will constitute.¹

Under a future system of socioeconomic planning, the financial problems of education can and must be taken care of by society as a matter of national honor and self-preservation. Democracy, if it is to work efficiently, needs more than a set of rights and duties; it needs the creation of a high ethical motive power among its citizens. The schools must regard it as their foremost duty to cultivate such standards in each student. Once the worst economic injustices are remedied, the goal of democratic education will have to be an appreciation of civic ethics rather than the ideal of money-making.

For the decades to come, no nation may evade the responsibility of establishing high-school education for all, just as it should provide for free tuition and maintenance of all those gifted students whose logical destination is the college or the university. In the United States, these principles may have to become binding for all the states of the Union. Control of education is one of the prerogatives of the states, and not all of them have lived up to the ideals of American democracy in their educational programs. Dual government still has its great merits but it should not paralyze the growth of a consolidated American democratic ideology which is needed for internal and external purposes. The leading position of the United States in the world should exclude regional exceptions within the nation. The aim to be achieved in the international sphere must also be accomplished within the country itself.

In addition to the principles and system of democratic education, the problem of methodology has been hotly debated ever since the beginning of the twentieth century when John Dewey started his experiments in "progressive" education. The unfortunate fact that activity teaching and progressive education have been greatly misunderstood and misused has made them the target of old-school adherents. However, it should be made clear that the most liberal-minded educational methodology, the most elaborate type of activity instruction for smaller children, cannot be divorced from social and mental discipline. A compromise will have to be

¹ Cf. Mark van Doren, *Liberal Education*, Henry Holt & Company, New York, 1943.

made between the authoritarianism of traditional schooling and the democratic independence of "learning by doing." Democracy needs the development of self-expression on the part of its future members; but it also needs individual discipline and knowledge of one's civic responsibilities. Democratic education does not want to mold the child into traditional patterns of thinking and behavior; it gives its individuals the opportunity of free growth and mental flexibility. Yet if each child is left to do what he wants without an understanding of the importance of social requirements, he may mistake liberty for license and endanger democracy. The liberalism of a cooperative society is broad and deep but it demands self-control and self-discipline. There is no reason why progressive education should not be able to teach the child such virtues informally instead of by coercion—and that is the great advantage of progressive methods if used by skillful teachers.

The elements of success for democratic progress are all present in the principles of American education. The organization of an educational ladder, the relatively wide range of educational opportunities, and the free play of controversy about educational methodology have created admirable achievements since the beginning of the present century. This is why one may look forward with optimism to further successful reforms as soon as the financing of education has been recognized as an issue that transcends local or regional limitations. Bargaining, bickering, and saving money by slashing educational budgets should be regarded as a sin against the spirit of democracy. There is no need for extravagance, but it must never be forgotten that the continued success of democracy is absolutely dependent upon an adequate education. There must also be created safeguards against the interference of local politics in education. In the words of Charles A. Beard: "When the process and ends of our democratic society are placed above the exigencies of partisan politics and the immediate advantages of power, then it becomes evident that education as a safeguard and preparation for democratic living must not be subjected every hour and in every way to the unrestrained control of men and women lifted into political office for a brief term by the fortunes of campaigns and elections."¹

¹ Beard, *op. cit.*, p. 118.

4. *American Economy in Transition.* Roughly speaking, American economic history, before the upheavals of the twentieth century initiated a new era, may be divided into two periods. At first, the economy of the young United States was based upon agriculture; individual self-sufficient farmers were its pillars. The scene changed gradually, particularly after the Civil War, when the Union became industrialized and industrial individualism replaced agricultural individualism. One was as "rugged" as the other; both contributed essentially to the amazing growth and wealth of the young nation. During the second period especially, wealth was accumulated by ruthless exploitation of natural resources. Yet the productive power of the country was developed tremendously, thus creating the preliminary conditions for general prosperity. During the "roaring" twenties it seemed as if the economic millennium had arrived; in reality, the sociopolitical conditions required a complete change of economic and social organization.

When America found itself on the verge of economic collapse, when the expectations of ever-increasing prosperity rapidly changed into defeatism, many people became convinced that the nineteenth-century era of unrestricted economic individualism was over. The deep changes which took place in the political and economic systems of the world after the upheaval of 1914, affected America as well. The depression during the late twenties and the early thirties was not an isolated American phenomenon; it encompassed almost every country, helping to put in power "national" revolutions which promised the people a way out of the chaos of insecurity.

The arrival of the New Deal in 1933 opened the way to long overdue social and economic reforms. While the preceding emergency measures of the NRA (National Recovery Act) were blocked by believers in traditional conceptions of American social and economic life, the subsequent reforms became firmly entrenched in the minds of a majority of Americans. Inevitably, the changes suggested and adopted involved a certain degree of control by the central government over the business of powerful groups who claimed that it was up to them to take care of economic recovery, although they had not been able, before 1929, to stem the tide of economic disaster. While they did not decline the help of the

Federal government, they balked at its "interference" in their affairs. But the development of a new economic policy could not be held back and the government, on the whole, disregarded these objections, for further delay in reform might have produced conditions ripe for serious upheavals.

No matter how critically one may look upon some of the New Deal's policies, its domestic reforms, introduced since 1933, must be regarded as the first attempt to adapt American democracy to the changed conditions of the twentieth century. Considered somewhat revolutionary at first, a good many of the New Deal's provisions were in reality long overdue reforms which have since been absorbed by the American body politic. They have, within a few years, deeply modified social conceptions among large groups of Americans. Yet they should be regarded as merely transitional. Being a strictly temporary device, the New Deal is but the connecting link between older and newer conceptions of national and global economy. When compared with the economic individualism of the nineteenth century, it may seem revolutionary; when compared with the postwar planning of a country like Britain or the social legislation of Scandinavian countries, it appears elementary and mildly conservative.

When the results of the presidential election of 1932 indicated the desire of the American people to try a new way, the incoming administration, in view of the magnitude of the task which confronted it, sought and obtained a wide extension of Federal power. For example, stricter supervision was imposed upon banking. Protection of depositors went hand in hand with preventive measures against fraudulent speculation with other people's money. Banks outside of the Federal Reserve System were permitted to borrow from Federal Reserve banks if they were able to put up acceptable security. Furthermore, the Agricultural Adjustment Act was devised to bring back more prosperity to the farmers, as the National Industrial Recovery Act was intended to help industry. These acts were pronounced unconstitutional by the Supreme Court after having been in force for two years, but substitute acts were introduced in their place.

A vast program of relief in the form of public works paralleled other measures of economic planning, such as the famous Ten-

nessee Valley Authority and other large projects designed to increase electric power potential, make waste land productive, and reduce the price of electricity to consumers. A National Housing Act looked to the organization of a new building program. A Social Security Act will prove to be one of the most important precedents of postwar planning; the same is true of unemployment insurance provisions.

The American people indicated its general approval of the reforms just mentioned when President Roosevelt was reelected in 1936 with an unusually large majority. Further reform and relief measures were introduced during his second term which was called by many the "Second New Deal." Labor legislation became particularly prominent and enhanced the influence of the trade unions. The Fair Labor Standards Act falls into this category as does the Wagner-Steagall Housing Act for the improvement of housing conditions. Further planning for agriculture and public utilities was introduced, pointing to an increasing centralization of governmental responsibilities.

During the last months of President Roosevelt's second administration, the volume of social and economic legislation suffered a sharp decrease. Attention became increasingly focussed on the grave international situation. It became necessary to introduce the Selective Service Act against the wishes of many of the administration's most ardent supporters. The nation as a whole had not yet fully realized the danger in which it found itself as a result of its refusal to build up its strength to match that of the aggressors. The various Neutrality Acts, from 1935 to 1939, reflected the desire of the country to isolate itself from the conflicts which had already broken out in various parts of the world. Only the cash-and-carry provision enabled the Allies to buy war materials while America still remained neutral. Later, in March, 1941, the Lend-Lease Act, one of the most ingenious pieces of legislation ever conceived to circumvent obsolete yet persisting statutes, helped to maintain the strength of the attacked nations until America itself became involved in the Second World War.¹

After December 7, 1941, the entire productive capacity of the

¹ Cf. Edward R. Stettinius, *Lend-Lease, Weapon for Victory*, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1944.

country was turned to rearmament so that it could become the "arsenal of democracy." War agencies like the War Production Board and the Office of Price Administration were established in order to determine the character of the industrial output, to decide on the distribution of raw materials, to restrict the manufacturing of civilian goods, to protect consumers through price ceilings and to increase agricultural production.

The war did not altogether put an end to the controversy raging over the successes and failures of the New Deal but relegated this controversy to the background. In the words of President Roosevelt, the "New Deal" had become a "Win the War" movement. But many basic issues still remain unsolved while, abroad, the impact of warfare will have speeded up the process of radical change with the result that Americans have become intensely aware of the necessity for postwar planning in both the domestic and international fields. Some aspects of planning will be sketched in the following chapter.

22 *Planning for a New America*

GENERAL PRINCIPLES

There are two types of planning. One is limited to an individual nation; the other embraces a number of cooperating countries. Owing to the failure of the League of Nations to organize international planning, domestic planning only has been attempted by certain individual nations. However, such limited planning can be but a temporary solution. As distances shrink and spheres of interest overlap, this world, with its unequal distribution of natural wealth, industrial capacity, agricultural productivity, and cultural standards, must eventually become a wholly planned unit with individual tasks assigned to individual countries.

Domestic planning, whenever it has been attempted on a large scale since the First World War, has been for the purpose of meeting a specific emergency, and has tended toward autarchy. The vast five-year plans of the Soviet Union had as their aim the speedy industrialization of the country not only for better living but also for purposes of defense. Germany's four-year plans were, to an even higher degree, schemes for a strictly controlled and planned war economy. The ultimate aim of these integrated schemes was the achievement of self-sufficiency for protective or aggressive purposes. Yet there does not exist one nation in the world that can prosper, for any great length of time, on the basis of autarchic principles. Not even the Soviet Union with all its uncovered riches or the United States with its highly developed industrial and agricultural wealth could go on living forever in absolute self-sufficiency without, at the same time, reducing their standards of living. Attempts at autarchy have invariably meant scarcity and hard work with little compensation for the individual.

In the history of the United States there have been repeated attempts to plan individual projects which, however, hardly ever transgressed the boundaries of their strictly specialized goals. City and regional planning, organization of railroads and public utili-

ties, and various types of industrial systematization have been attempted successfully; they have taught Americans valuable lessons in the art of planning. In the field of social legislation and public-works relief the Federal government has introduced measures for nationwide emergency planning for a limited period of need. Thus planning in America has had some background, even though it has been of limited scope and not comparable with the sweeping laws of planned totalitarian control.

The democratic nature of American planning can best be seen in the enumeration of the following usual steps, listed by a professional planner and typical of the cautious procedure of planning in the United States:

1. The determination of objectives to be sought.
2. Research—to understand the problem.
3. The discovery of alternative solutions.
4. Policy making—choosing between alternatives, including the frequent choice of doing nothing.
5. The detailed execution of the chosen alternative—known in physical planning as lay-out or design.¹

This is obviously an adequate approach for local planning. The question is now whether American planners will be able to organize postwar planning along these lines of approach. The difficulty of determining the objects of planning increases in proportion to its geographical and political extent. On a nation-wide, and even more on an international scale, the objects of planning are most difficult to determine. There will be even more differences of opinion with regard to the methods and details for reaching these objectives; there will, finally, be differences of opinion as to whether the aims can be reached through an ameliorated status quo or by introducing a far reaching modification of traditional economy and social conceptions.

In a democracy, the decisions about the nature of the objectives of planning must depend on the people whose life will be deeply affected by them. Moreover, no government in the United States has ever functioned successfully without the support of a majority of public opinion. Admittedly, public opinion is formed slowly.

¹ George B. Calloway, "American Planning," in *Planning for America*, Henry Holt and Company, Inc., New York, 1941, p. 6.

It may take shape with dangerous reluctance. For example, it took many Americans years to recognize that the world had become an interdependent unit, that America's isolation from the rest of the world was a dangerous illusion, and that such an illusion was not only fostered by sincere American patriots but also by the enemies of democracy in order to keep the United States morally and militarily weak.

Once America recognizes its position in the world, realizing that cooperation with the other nations is to its own vital interests and is essential for the maintenance of peace, the aspects of its planning, domestically and internationally, are bound to change. The clearer the global issue becomes, the less will Americans be able to escape the conclusion that military victory alone does not offer a permanent solution of its problems, just as the introduction of domestic social security laws alone cannot provide a lasting settlement of the social and economic issues.

Two days after the United States was forced into the war, on December 9, 1941, President Roosevelt in a radio address said: "We are going to win the war and we are going to win the peace that follows. . . ."¹ Thereby, Mr. Roosevelt raised by implication a problem which will remain a paramount issue for years to come: if America wants to prepare for lasting peace, what kind of peace shall it be?

The most impressive answer was given by the former Vice-President, Henry A. Wallace, whose address before the Free World Association has already become a classical document: "I say that the century into which we are entering—the century which will come out of this war—can be and must be the century of the common man. . . . The methods of the nineteenth century will not work in the people's century which is now about to begin. . . . The people, in their millennial and revolutionary march to manifesting here on earth the dignity that is in every human soul, hold as their credo the four freedoms enunciated by President Roosevelt in his message to Congress on January 6, 1941. These four freedoms are the very core of the revolution for which the United Nations have taken their stand. . . ."²

¹ Italics mine.

² May 8, 1942. The speech is known under two titles. One is "The Price of Free World Victory," the other "Toward New Horizons: The World Beyond the War."

Mr. Wallace's vision of peace is clearly global and indivisible. For him, there cannot be hope of realistic, productive domestic postwar planning except in conjunction with the rest of the world. He recognizes America's responsible position as friend and counselor of less fortunate peoples but does not claim any privileges from such a position: "Those who write the peace must think of the whole world. There can be no privileged peoples. We ourselves in the United States are no more master race than the Nazis. . . . No nation will have the God-given right to exploit other nations . . ."¹

The nucleus of Mr. Wallace's philosophy of planning may be found in the following words: "When the freedom-loving people march—when the farmers have an opportunity to buy land at reasonable prices and to sell the produce of their land through their own organizations, when workers have the opportunity to form unions and bargain collectively, and when children of all the people have an opportunity to attend schools which teach them the truths of the real world in which they live—when these opportunities are open to everyone, then the world moves straight ahead."²

PREPARING FOR REORGANIZATION

Even before Mr. Wallace had stated these objectives and before a man as cautious as the former Under-Secretary of State, Sumner Welles, suggested that "the organization through which the United Nations are to carry on and cooperate should surely be formed so far as practicable before the fires of the war which are welding them together have cooled,"³ an ever-increasing number of agencies, private, official, and academic, started elaborating plans for domestic security and international cooperation. With the improvement of the Allied military situation, the scope of research for the development of acceptable postwar reorganization and the output of literature connected with it has grown to extraordinary proportions. Already in 1942, at a time when Allied military progress was still slow and the end of the war not in sight, a selection of the most important sources revealed the publication of 100 books, 43 pam-

¹ *Ibid.*

² *Ibid.*

³ Speech of June 17, 1942.

phlets, and 120 articles of major authority in newspapers and periodicals.¹ In the same year, almost 200 research agencies were active, according to statistics published by the Twentieth Century Fund, among them a good many big business, bank, and industrial research institutes, working on problems of postwar organization.² Not enumerated in this source book were colleges and universities which offered courses and seminars on postwar problems and planning. Noteworthy is the activity of the Universities Committee on Post-War International Problems which, since the Fall of 1942, has issued thousands of "analytical reports on the problems of the peace settlement and the postwar years." A summary of these reports dealing with the strategy of peace, the method and stages of development, the treatment of Germany, the organization of security, and the problem of relief and rehabilitation has been published by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.³

In the following years, agencies and publications on postwar planning multiplied. People began to discuss the staggering problems of transforming the war economy into one of durable peace and prosperity. The executive and legislative branches of the government of the United States, following this trend of public opinion, began to consider the problem seriously. The Republican Party, formerly the stronghold of isolationism, reversed its stand in the foreign policy platform of Mackinack Island in 1943. In the same year, both houses of Congress adopted a resolution, committing themselves to the principle of international cooperation. President Roosevelt and former Secretary of State Cordell Hull both fostered the idea of a strong international organization with the purpose of maintaining the peace, by armed force if necessary.

But a "people's peace" which of necessity was to follow a "people's war" requires international treaties to be based on the assumption of well-organized domestic planning. For the domestic conditions of pivotal countries should be of vital interest to all other nations and the old thesis according to which the situation in other

¹ *Peace Aims and Post-War Planning*, a selected and annotated bibliography by Fawn M. Brodie, World Peace Foundation, Boston, July, 1942.

² George B. Calloway, *Postwar Planning in the United States*, Twentieth Century Fund, New York, 1942.

³ *International Conciliation*, New York, No. 401, June, 1944 and No. 405, Section 1, November, 1944.

parts of the world is nobody else's business, has proved to be completely wrong. Inner political conflicts, depressions, and dislocations during the decades following the First World War had driven peoples to desperation.

Democratic postwar reforms must therefore take into account both domestic and international issues. Speaking first of the domestic outlook of postwar planning for America, the clearest and most characteristic proposals have come from the National Resources Planning Board, a government agency which was unfortunately abolished by Act of Congress in 1943 but whose suggestions, realistic and moderate as they were, have not been excelled by any other proposal except, perhaps, by the recommendations of Bernard Baruch for immediate postwar adjustments.¹

The basic platform upon which the NRPB built its theories consists of "nine principles of personal rights" which, while especially suitable for America, have a universal validity. To be sure, only rights are mentioned and not the corresponding duties. Yet a new-age democracy cannot recognize that its citizens are automatically entitled to rights unless they agree to fulfill their duties as well. Rights cannot be taken for granted; they have to be validated again and again by the contributions of the individual to society. Appropriately, Henry A. Wallace spoke of a "Bill of Duties" for citizens who wish to be protected by a Bill of Rights.

Citizens' rights as outlined by the NRPB are as follows:

1. The right to work, usefully and creatively through the productive years.
2. The right to fair play, adequate to command the necessities and amenities of life in exchange for work, ideas, thrift, and other socially valuable service.
3. The right to adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care.
4. The right to security, with freedom from fear of old age, want, dependency, sickness, unemployment, and accident.
5. The right to live in a system of free enterprise, free from compulsory labor, irresponsible private power, arbitrary public authority, and unregulated monopolies.
6. The right to come and go, to speak or to be silent, free from the spyings of secret political police.

¹ Bernard M. Baruch and John M. Hancock, *Report on War and Post-War Adjustment Policies*, Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C., February 15, 1944.

7. The right to equality before the law, with equal access to justice in fact.
8. The right to education, for work, for citizenship, and for personal growth and happiness.
9. The right to rest, recreation, and adventure; the opportunity to enjoy life and take part in advancing civilization.¹

"These rights and opportunities," the declaration concludes, "we in the United States want for ourselves and for our children now and when this war is over. They go beyond the political forms and freedoms for which our ancestors fought and which they handed on to us, because we live in a new world in which the central problems arise from new pressures of power, production and population, which our forefathers did not face."²

It is on the basis of these principles that the "American Beveridge Plan" has been developed by the NRPB. The plan, whose broad outlines will now be presented, is almost entirely concerned with socio-economic reforms in the domestic American field.

THE POSTWAR OBJECTIVES OF THE NRPB AGENDA³

The Board's Postwar Agenda of November, 1942, adheres to the fundamental economic principle of free enterprise. Acceptance of this conception may be said to be characteristic of American opinion in general. Of the nine major tasks listed in the Agenda, eight are exclusively domestic. Point 9 contains the only reference to "plans for international collaboration" whose objectives would be the maintenance of world peace and the promotion of higher world standards of living.

Appropriately, point number 1 concerns itself with plans for demobilization. The release of men from active duty in the armed forces or from war industry and war agencies as well as the use of war plants requires a well-prepared policy in order to prevent unemployment and economic upheavals such as occurred after 1918. Effective use of man power and manufacturing power for peacetime purposes must be planned. The NRPB is concerned about

¹ From "National Resources Development," a report of the National Resources Planning Board transmitted to Congress by the President on January 14, 1942.

² Ibid. See also L. D. White, ed., *The Future of Government in the United States*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1942, pp. 22-23.

³ "Post-War Agenda," a chart, National Resources Planning Board, Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C., November, 1942.

the relaxation of wartime economic controls which it wants to see abandoned immediately. However, if any central plan is to be followed for the purpose of preventing general confusion, it is difficult to conceive that these wartime controls can be discarded otherwise than slowly and gradually. Also, the use of surpluses, as mentioned in the Agenda, will hardly become a problem for some time after the cessation of hostilities. The United States has commitments to feed many peoples in Europe and Asia. Instead of surpluses, the urgent needs of the world will have to be met. Again, America may be forced to maintain a large military police force abroad, and it cannot be assumed that a complete disarmament will become effective for a considerable period following the cessation of hostilities.

Point number 2 concerns itself with private enterprise. It offers encouragement to individual initiative, suggesting a maximum production of goods and services by private enterprise. It is, however, pointed out that government aids and controls will create an "economic climate" in which private enterprise, particularly industry and agriculture, may operate "free from monopolistic practices." Attention is also given to the "geographical distribution of industry which will ensure the most effective use of human and material resources." If private enterprise is identified with a continuation of economic individualism, the effective restriction of monopolies and the distribution of man power must of necessity limit individualism and make it subject to central planning.

Point number 3 is of great importance inasmuch as it suggests general plans for public activity. It comes under the heading of "Building America" and proposes improvements in physical facilities such as urban development, rural public works, conservation of natural resources, development of energy resources, of river basins, and of transportation. Furthermore, it suggests the development of service activities dealing with health, nutrition, medical care, and education including youth activities, recreation, library, cultural activities, and research. The fundamental objective is the "provision of training for all, young and old, to equip them to take part in the world of work, of cultural enjoyment and achievement of family life and of citizenship in a democracy." The Board seems to realize that equal opportunities for education are yet to

be developed to the fullest by raising the question of how "educational opportunity for all young people (can) be progressively realized."

Point number 4 deals with social security, distinguishing between the causes of need, whether unemployment or low standards of living. The loss of a "normal" level of income would bring about want just as would unemployment. Old age, sickness and accidents, the loss of a family breadwinner, the loss or depreciation of property, and dislocation due to war and enemy action demand "assurances of minimum security for all people wherever they reside, and maintenance of the social stability and values threatened when people lack jobs or income." The necessity of a minimum-wage level is indicated by the statement that there should be an improvement in low levels of income from employment in industry, commerce, agriculture, and domestic service.

Point 5 discusses population and man power. It advocates a "maximum productive utilization of the nation's manpower resources." It deals with the distribution of labor and its training for various purposes; it considers the effect of migration upon the national population pattern and the important and delicate problem of immigration into the United States; it is concerned with the improvement of working conditions which, it admits, must be controlled; it finally goes into the problem of reclaiming the handicapped for productive work and of making possible vocational rehabilitation.

Point 6 analyzes financial and fiscal policy. The primary fiscal policy should be the maintenance of a level of economic activity approximating the full utilization of resources. The problem is raised as to how far private capital and government will participate in investing money. An adequate organization of the government revenue is next on the Agenda. The tax burden should be distributed among citizens "by a progressive system of taxation, geared to business cycles, and with consideration of its effect on business enterprise, and the vitality of useful, private financial institutions." As to intergovernmental fiscal relations, the development of harmonious federal, state, and local revenue systems and policies as well as the maintenance of the vitality of the federal system itself is advocated.

Point 7 conceives plans for regional, state, and local participation in the development of regional resources in harmony with national objectives. Point 8 suggests plans for effective administration through the establishment of adequate public and private administrative institutions. Lastly, point 9 sets forth plans for international collaboration, as mentioned above.

So much for the Agenda. In a pamphlet on the general principles of postwar planning, the Board describes the central objectives of such planning in the following terms:

1. We must plan for full employment, for maintaining the national income at 100 billion dollars a year, at least, rather than to let it slip back to 80 or 70 or 60 billion dollars again. In other words, we shall plan to balance our national production-consumption budget at a high level of full employment, not at a low level with mass unemployment.

2. We must plan to do this without requiring work from youth who should be in school, the aged who should be relieved if they wish it, and women who choose to make their contribution in the home, and without asking anyone to work regularly in mines, factories, transportation, or offices more than 40 hours a week or 50 weeks a year, or to sacrifice the wage standards which have been set.

3. We must plan to decentralize post-emergency activities as far as possible; to use to the utmost our system of modified free enterprise with its voluntary employment, its special reward for effort, imagination, and improvement, its elasticity and competition; and to advance cooperatively under national and governmental leadership.

4. We must plan to enable every human being within our boundaries to realize progressively the promise of American life in food, shelter, clothing, medical care, education, work, rest, home life, opportunity to advance, adventure, and the basic freedoms.

5. We must plan to make *Building America* the keynote of the post-war program, including both development of our national resources to add to the national estate, and service activities, which will increase the vitality, health, skill, productivity, knowledge, and happiness of the American people, and thus together end unemployment and add to our wealth and well-being.¹

This plan is indicative of what may be called the "official trend" of American thought. In working out the plan, the NRPB consulted states, local governments, and various nongovernmental groups and individuals. Its work originated in the request of Presi-

¹ *Post-War Planning*, National Resources Planning Board, Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C., September, 1942, pp. 3-4.

dent Roosevelt made in November, 1940. The Board considered itself a "clearing house to gather ideas and plans, to stimulate appropriate independent action by other public and private agencies, to bring together individuals who are interested in harmonizing their views, and to furnish the President with information and assistance on the formulation of policies in these matters."¹

These proposals of the NRPB constitute only one of the many plans devised to solve the domestic problems which will confront the country after the conclusion of the war. They are significant as an indication of the tendency to maintain a system of social and economic individualism with a minimum of control by the state. Such a plan would entail no fundamental reforms, but would merely be an attempt to remedy the worst grievances that have arisen during the past half century. The NRPB, as most of the other planning agencies, would carefully refrain from curbing private initiative to which overwhelming importance is attached. The present social system, as it has evolved since the days of Lincoln, would essentially persist, governmental control would be eliminated whenever possible, and great care would be taken to "balance the budget" in every branch of communal life. Time alone can tell whether such reforms will suffice, especially when one considers that postwar developments in other parts of the world are apt to be considerably more radical in character.

RECENT TRENDS OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

Next to domestic planning, America's position in the world and its relations with the world's nations, particularly its great war allies, must be analyzed in the light of expected changes and plans for the reform of international relations. In order to be in a better position to visualize America's possible approach to global planning, it is worth reviewing briefly American policy since the advent of Hitler.

The great antagonists of the Second World War, Roosevelt and Hitler, both assumed office at the beginning of 1933. While Hitler immediately embarked upon a long-range policy of aggression, Roosevelt's first care in the realm of foreign policy was to lay emphasis on a "good neighbor policy." This is a characteristic con-

¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 1-2.

trast and one that will retain historic significance.¹ The United States has pursued this policy ever since, and has to a considerable degree convinced the suspicious Latin-American nations that it meant what it said. The practical results of this policy were particularly evident during the conferences at Buenos Aires, in December, 1936, and at Lima, two years later. The subsequent loyal attitude of most of the Latin-American states toward the United States after the outbreak of the Second World War confirmed the wisdom of the policy of the Roosevelt administration which has sought to eliminate in Western Hemisphere relations those elements that may appear as "Yankee imperialism."

In addition to the Declaration of Lima, which concerned itself exclusively with Western Hemisphere relations, a more general "Declaration of American Principles" was accepted during the Conference of Lima, proposing eight rules of conduct: (1) the intervention of one state in the affairs of another is inadmissible; (2) all differences of an international character should be settled by peaceful means; (3) the use of force as an instrument of national or international policy is proscribed; (4) relations between states should be governed by the precepts of international law; (5) treaties should be faithfully observed and revised by agreement of the contracting parties; (6) peaceful collaboration and intellectual interchange should be sought among the peoples of the Americas; (7) economic reconstruction as a contribution to national and international well-being and peace should be fostered; (8) international cooperation as a necessary condition to the maintenance of the aforementioned principles should be encouraged.²

The government of the United States sought to apply the spirit of these principles to its relations with nations in other parts of the world as well. However, the nature of the aggressor states both in Europe and Asia made such an approach impracticable. In the Pacific as well as in the Atlantic, the United States found itself confronted with dangerous threats to its political and economic security. It was all the more difficult to handle the situation be-

¹ See President Roosevelt's inaugural address of March 4, 1933, where the term "good neighbor policy" was coined. See also Sumner Welles, *The Time for Decision*, Harper and Brothers, New York, 1944, Ch. V: The Good Neighbor Policy.

² J. Holladay Latané and David W. Wainhouse, *A History of American Foreign Policy*, Doubleday, Doran and Company, Inc., New York, 1940, p. 875.

cause a considerable segment of American public opinion failed to grasp the ideological nature of the beginning struggle for power and the more concrete menace of the Nazi-Fascist policy to the very shores which were believed so safely guarded by two oceans and the Monroe Doctrine. The strength of traditional isolationism, as it expressed itself in Congress, made it extremely difficult for the foreign policy of the United States to cope with the growing threat to the security of the nation.¹

When Japan launched her policy of aggression in the Far East, when Italy attacked Abyssinia, when Hitler abrogated the Treaty of Versailles, militarized the Rhineland, and continued on his path of bloodless conquest to the climax of Munich, in 1938, no action was taken by Britain, France, and the United States. At home, President Roosevelt's strong warning in his famous speech in Chicago did not convince his opponents. He declared then that "the peace-loving nations must make a concerted effort in opposition to these violations of treaties and those ignorings of humane instincts which today are creating a state of international anarchy and instability from which there is no escape through mere isolation or neutrality. . . . It seems to be unfortunately true that the epidemic of world lawlessness is spreading. When an epidemic of physical disease starts to spread, the community approves and joins in a quarantine of the patients in order to protect the health of the community against the spread of disease. . . ." ²

At this time, the government was prevented from undertaking an effective program of rearmament. Power groups and endlessly repeated quotations from Washington, Jefferson and Monroe, succeeded in hampering American preparation for the inevitable totalitarian onslaught. When the Second World War broke out in September, 1939, American public opinion was still predominantly isolationist. Fortunately, the administration succeeded at last in obtaining the passage of the Selective Service Act; a few, though inadequate, appropriations were granted for most urgent defense works, and a policy of help to Britain was gradually adopted.

Pearl Harbor brought at last a realization of the danger threaten-

¹ Cf. *Peace and War, United States Foreign Policies 1931-1941*, Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C. See also J. Alsop and R. Kintner, *The American White Paper*, Simon and Schuster, Inc., New York, 1940.

² Speech of October 5, 1937, also referred to as the "Quarantine Speech."

ing America and of the desperate need for preparedness. The twentieth century advocates of an eighteenth century foreign policy were, for the time being, silenced. In the phrasing of the Department of State, United States foreign policy was compelled, during the decade before its entrance in the Second World War, "to move within the framework of a gradual evolution of public opinion in the United States away from the idea of isolation expressed in 'neutrality' legislation and toward realization that the Axis design was a plan of world conquest in which the United States was intended to be a certain, though perhaps ultimate, victim, and that our primary policy therefore must be defense against actual and mounting danger."¹

The lesson to be learned from the crucial years between the two world wars is clear enough. With the technological changes in communication and transportation, the world has grown so small that no conflict of major character can remain localized. This is particularly true of revolutionary, ideological wars which have tended to expand even at times when communications were still slow. But in a modern world where a word travels around the earth in a second and where the trip from America to Britain by air takes a few hours, wars of ideas are bound to be contagious, and political diseases must be quarantined.

The question of how to avoid wars is as old as war itself but never before has a satisfactory answer been so imperative. The changed conditions of our technically far-advanced century do not permit much further delay unless man resigns himself to wage war every second or third generation. Inasmuch as the issues involved are extremely complex and governments may not be expected to sacrifice prerogatives of sovereignty, it is probably too much to look forward to an early establishment of eternal peace. However, a modest progress toward an ultimate solution of this age-old problem of durable peace may perhaps be hoped for.

As far as the United States is concerned, it will be confronted with the necessity of accepting new departures in its foreign policy. Being in a key position through its power and its role in the Second World War, it has indeed recognized the urgency of a sweeping revision of its traditional isolation, despite its deep-rooted suspicion

¹ Peace and War, p. 3.

of international cooperation expressed in the heritage of historic warnings against "foreign entanglements."

The Department of State has endorsed the organization of an International Court of Justice and promised an intensified continuation of the "good neighbor policy" toward the democratic world. It has accepted the philosophy of the Atlantic Charter and fortified it with economic agreements, based upon the provisions of the Charter. The Department has repeatedly expressed its determination to cooperate with the United Nations after the termination of the war.

It has already been indicated above that the inevitability of fundamental changes in the relations of the United States with foreign countries was recognized by both houses of Congress in official resolutions,¹ and large segments of the American people, regardless of party affiliation, have already endorsed the abandonment of America's traditional aloofness.² If, then, the United States is to give up its historic position, if it is to help maintain peace and back up this commitment with all its immense power, what ways are open for it to achieve this purpose with the best chance of success?

The United States could become a partner in a world-wide organization whose power would be maintained by an international police force. This would mean the surrendering of some prerogatives of sovereignty on the part of all members. At the present time, not much hope for an agreement of this sort is indicated.

Another possibility is a world organization without power, in the manner of the former League of Nations. But the voluntary element in the collaboration of the participating powers would hamper its effectiveness as severely as that of the League and in the end tend to reduce it to a mere forum of conflicting interests.

A rejuvenated nationalism with imperialistic tendencies, the probable choice of died-in-the-wool isolationists, is a third possibility. However, it seems doubtful that the representatives of this

¹ Resolutions adopting the principle of international cooperations were passed by the Senate on November 5, 1943, and by the House on September 21, 1943.

² The United States Chamber of Commerce issued a declaration in March, 1944, based on the Moscow Declaration of November, 1943, concerning "Measures to Promote International Law and Order," *International Conciliation*, No. 400, New York, May, 1944.

tendency will, after years of ideological warfare against tyranny, be strong enough to secure the adoption of such a policy which must, in the long run, make the position of even a very powerful America insecure.

A last possibility is a limited combination of powerful forces, united to maintain peace against all possible aggression. Consisting of the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and possibly China, such an organization would resemble Walter Lippmann's proposal for a "nuclear alliance."¹

Having witnessed the change of public opinion in matters of foreign policy and having noticed that the Republican Party was about to adopt the principle of international cooperation, the State Department submitted to Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and China, in the spring of 1944, definite proposals for the organization of an international machinery suitable to check aggression and to promote prosperous cooperation among peace-loving nations.

Some weeks later, in June, 1944, President Roosevelt laid down a general plan of international organization which he had formulated along nonpartisan lines. Based on previous statements of policy by American and Allied leaders, the President surprised the world with a blueprint for international postwar security, leaving the sovereignty of all participating nations fully intact. While the plan did not go into details, it attempted to line up both the American people and the United Nations behind a policy of compromise, based upon Cordell Hull's well-defined statement on United States foreign policy of March, 1944. This statement is certainly one of the best attempts to amalgamate alternatives of peace planning and to clarify the new American approach to foreign affairs.

Protesting his belief in international cooperation, founded on the principles of liberty, equality, justice, morality, and law as the most effective method of promoting the social and economic well-being of all nations, Mr. Hull declared himself in favor of some international organization backed by force. Before such force is used, differences of opinion should be mediated by an International Court of Justice. In observance of the Atlantic Charter, every na-

¹ Walter Lippmann, *U. S. Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic*, Little, Brown and Company, Boston, 1943, pp. 161 ff.

tion, including the small ones, should be guaranteed independence and sovereignty; their form of government should be chosen by them and their economic situation, as well as the economy of the whole world, helped through reduction of international trade barriers. Dependent peoples should be prepared for the responsibilities of self-government through material and educational development, and aggressor nations should be put under surveillance until they have demonstrated their willingness and ability to live in peace with other nations. Reduction of armaments should be sought at the earliest possible moment.

This excellent statement, testifying to the progress in international-mindedness since 1933, has in various instances been implemented, for example by America's endorsement of an international labor office; by America's collaboration toward an international agreement on monetary and currency stabilization; by America's stimulation of international economic collaboration; by America's participation in the UNRRA (United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration) for the reconstruction of war-torn countries and for the relief of their suffering during the years of Nazi oppression; and by the readiness of the United States to be a partner in a global organization of international aviation after the end of the war. However, the most important achievement of this new trend in American foreign policy is the Dumbarton Oaks proposal to create a general international organization to maintain the peace.

In a conference called through the initiative of the United States and sponsored by all the United Nations, representatives of the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union and China, in consultation with the delegates of smaller powers, began to confer on August 21, 1944, in order to agree upon the establishment of an international organization. The main tasks of this organization were to be the prevention of international conflicts through mediation, the prevention of threats against world peace, and the mobilization of military and economic forces against an aggressor who refused to negotiate his case peacefully. In addition, the organization would try to alleviate international economic crises and would attempt to solve social and humanitarian problems.

The Dumbarton Oaks draft agreement left several important problems unanswered. But at Yalta, the leaders of the United States,

Great Britain and the Soviet Union supplemented the proposed plan with suggestions for a voting procedure for the influential Security Council. They also decided that representatives of the United Nations should convene in San Francisco on April 25, 1945, to arrange for the implementation of the Dumbarton Oaks plan and build machinery to maintain the peace before the war ended.

The three main bodies through which the organization would function are the General Assembly, the Security Council, and the International Court of Justice. The General Assembly, meeting in annual or special sessions, would be composed of representatives of all member states. The Security Council, being in permanent session, would consist of five permanent members, namely, the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, China and, eventually, France. In addition, representatives of six member states would be elected for a period of two years by the General Assembly and, after the end of their term, be followed by representatives of other states. All member nations would be parties of the International Court of Justice.

Bureaus of secondary importance would be a Secretariat, an Economic and Social Council composed of eighteen representatives of member states elected for a period of three years, and a Military Staff Committee, consisting of staff officers representing the permanent members of the Security Council.

The most important difference between the Covenant of the defunct League of Nations and the Dumbarton Oaks proposal lies in the greater determination of the United Nations to use force, if necessary, in order to keep the peace, and the desire of the United Nations not to limit their collaboration to the defense of peace but to work for the solution of international problems of social and economic nature. Thus, while the Dumbarton Oaks agreement is by no means complete or ideal, and while many delicate problems will have to be worked out during the postwar years, the improvement of the aspects of international cooperation between the two World Wars is considerable.¹

However, it should be kept in mind that any organization of international scope cannot rely, in the long run, upon backing by

¹ For the official text of the Dumbarton Oaks Agreement see *International Conciliation*, New York, No. 405, Section 2, November 1944.

force alone. To be sure, the armed forces of the big Allies will have to be ready to enforce a peace settlement, if only by their presence, but international collaboration and durable peace must in the end be based on a generally and voluntarily accepted code of law. So long as such a code of law is neither recognized nor applied by the nations which strive for durable peace, there can be no hope for more than an armistice until the outbreak of another, more terrible war.

The idea of international cooperation is old. The creation of a binding code of international law was attempted repeatedly by great statesmen and jurists from Erasmus of Rotterdam¹ to Emanuel Kant who in 1795 suggested in his treatise *On Perpetual Peace* that international law should be founded upon a federation of free states, armies should be abolished, a permanent congress representing the member states should remain in session, and, in addition to national citizenship, world citizenship should be instituted.

All through the nineteenth century, peace and international collaboration were advocated by European and American writers. As early as 1828, the American Peace Society was founded in Boston. The Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, limited in scope as they were, represented the greatest advance in the attempt to develop a tangible instrument of international relations. The sources of international law were derived from customs and treaties. But the nations remained reluctant to relinquish any part of their sovereignty, thereby preventing international law from becoming a binding force. War remained a recognized instrument of national policy. "The fact that states could legalize any kind of extortion by declaring war and the brutal violations of the 'laws of war,' brought international law into popular contempt."² The Briand-Kellogg Pact of 1928, ratified by sixty-two states, did, at the time, denounce war as an instrument of national policy. This agreement was hailed as the beginning of a new era of international cooperation, but its subsequent fate was not calculated to make people more hopeful of the attainment of lasting peace on the basis of mutually binding laws.

But a world organization of nations cannot forego the acceptance

¹ Erasmus, *Querula Pacis* (Complaint of Peace), 1516.

² P. E. Corbett, *Post-War Worlds*, Farrar & Rinehart, Inc., New York, 1942, p. 99.

of a supranational law which, once it has been universally ratified, would have to be given precedence over national law. This obviously entails the relinquishing of certain sovereign rights, thus making a realistically operating international law appear as a very distant possibility. International Courts of Justice will have just as little power to prevent wars as had the Hague Court so long as national prerogatives are esteemed higher than universal law. In other words, so long as unrestricted nationalism is upheld as an unchangeable doctrine, any durable formation of a universal league will be difficult to achieve. The overemphasis on nationalistic political philosophy tends to end in "statism," that is, in the sacrifice of the individual rights of citizens to the all-powerful state. Nationalism performed a useful task by freeing the Occident from the shackles of medieval otherworldliness and then developing newly defined territories into a variety of culture areas with distinct civilizations. It lost much of its usefulness for human society when it divided the world into hostile camps.

Once the necessity of a universal league is recognized as urgent enough to discard nationalistic prejudices, it is conceivable that this goal may be reached in a variety of ways. A community of states may be regionalized;¹ it may start out as a "Federal Union";² it may develop as a League of Continents, fostering collaboration between Eurasia, Africa, and the Western Hemisphere, including Australia;³ it may begin as a "nuclear alliance" to be developed by attachment of other nations.⁴ But no international organization can possibly succeed without having subscribed to a binding international law in order to "promote the common welfare of all peoples and to maintain just and peaceful relations between all states."⁵

However, the creation of a new international law as well as of an organization or plan to establish international cooperation

¹ See Ely Culbertson, *Total Peace*, Doubleday, Doran and Company, New York, 1944.

² See Clarence Streit, *Union Now*, Harper & Brothers, New York, 1941.

³ Arthur C. Millspaugh, *Peace Plans and American Choices*, The Brookings Institution, Washington, D. C., 1942.

⁴ See Lippmann, *op. cit.*

⁵ *The International Law of the Future: Postulates, Principles, Proposals*, A Statement of a Community of Views by North Americans, International Conciliation, No. 399, New York, April, 1944, p. 267.

among the nations is a long and laborious process. Nobody should assume that a solution of these problems can be hoped for soon after the end of the Second World War. The years between the actual end of fighting and the establishment of a stable postwar society have no less a task than to accomplish, peacefully, a world revolution. Therefore, any suggestion of entering immediately into a "controlled peace" after the last shot has been fired seems ill-advised.¹

CONCLUSION FOR AMERICA

Ambassador John Gilbert Winant's credo that "the postwar world calls for a political philosophy which reaches beyond selfish nationalism to a plan of political and economic collaboration in order that we may join together to create a prosperous and peaceful world" fairly expresses the ideals of the majority of Americans after the collapse of isolationism. In its own interest, America will have to fulfill its commitments toward international cooperation, for it has been demonstrated "every day that the frontiers of freedom and security do not lie in oceans or along boundary lines, but extend throughout the world, and that they have to be defended wherever the forces of reaction try to break through."

Failure to establish a well-organized cooperative supranational organism with parallel internal reforms in the individual countries would breed the germs of another catastrophe. One should remember the prophetic words of President Woodrow Wilson who warned after the end of the First World War: "I can predict with absolute certainty that within another generation there will be another world war if the nations of the world do not concert the method by which to prevent it. . . . I do not hesitate to say that the war we have just been through with terror of every kind, is not to be compared with the war we would have to face next time."²

President Wilson's somber predictions have come true because the world failed to heed his advice. They will come true again if the mistakes of the League of Nations are repeated. However, it should be made emphatically clear that there can be no hope of immediate solution. The years following the end of the Second

¹ See Herbert Hoover, speech of December 16, 1942.

² See S. K. Padover, *Wilson's Ideals*, American Council on Public Affairs, 1942.

World War cannot but be hard ones. International readjustments will be reflected in domestic struggles for reforms. No Utopia can be expected by any clear-thinking student of politics.

America seems destined to take the initiative in producing a settlement as soon as conditions permit.

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